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ABSTRACT 
THE ORGANIZATION OF HALAKHIC KNOWLEDGE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SCHOLARLY CULTURE 
Tamara Morsel-Eisenberg 
David B. Ruderman 
Far from being abstract and immaterial, knowledge is impacted in myriad ways by non-intellectual factors, 
such as technology, organization, culture, and erudite practices. The scholarship of halakha, Jewish 
religious law, is a millennia-long tradition that was shaped by historical changes in its particular contexts. 
In sixteenth-century Europe specifically, historical circumstances — the advent of print, the dislocation of 
the Jewish communities of Ashkenaz (the German lands) reconstructed in Eastern Europe, and the shift 
to systematic organizational paradigms introduced by newly dominant works — led to a complete 
reordering of halakha. Drawing upon methods from the history of knowledge, social and cultural history, 
book history, media studies, and studies of knowledge-organization, this dissertation shows that the 
changes taking place in Europe between the 1470s and the 1570s influenced a profound transformation 
of the halakhic system. These changes in technology, organization, and community, fundamentally 
transformed Jewish law, which became more ordered and therefore more easily accessible, transmissible 
and applicable than its predecessor. To argue this, the dissertation’s first two units examine the shift from 
personal manuscript collections to printed books, from heterogeneous compilations to hyper-structured 
codifications, and from a panoply of localized customs to unified, universalized, Jewish law. The third unit 
studies the evolution of one form of halakhic writing – the responsum, epistolary exchanges about legal 
problems – to examine how the abovementioned changes shaped halakhic texts and their structure. An 
analysis of responsa as they evolve from letters, to documents in the rabbinic archive, to published works, 
displays the scholarly practices and forms of logic specific to each one of these media against the 
backdrop of the larger shifts in the history of knowledge. As a whole, this study shows that, in the 
sixteenth century, halakhic culture transformed from a flexible, heterogeneous, and personal universe to 
an increasingly stable, homogenous, and generalized legal system that henceforth shaped Jewish legal 
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Far from being abstract and immaterial, knowledge is impacted in myriad ways by non-
intellectual factors, such as technology, organization, culture, and erudite practices. The 
scholarship of halakha, Jewish religious law, is a millennia-long tradition that was shaped 
by historical changes in its particular contexts. In sixteenth-century Europe specifically, 
historical circumstances — the advent of print, the dislocation of the Jewish communities 
of Ashkenaz (the German lands) reconstructed in Eastern Europe, and the shift to 
systematic organizational paradigms introduced by newly dominant works — led to a 
complete reordering of halakha. Drawing upon methods from the history of knowledge, 
social and cultural history, book history, media studies, and studies of knowledge-
organization, this dissertation shows that the changes taking place in Europe between the 
1470s and the 1570s influenced a profound transformation of the halakhic system. These 
changes in technology, organization, and community, fundamentally transformed Jewish 
law, which became more ordered and therefore more easily accessible, transmissible and 
applicable than its predecessor. To argue this, the dissertation’s first two units examine the 
shift from personal manuscript collections to printed books, from heterogeneous 
compilations to hyper-structured codifications, and from a panoply of localized customs to 
unified, universalized, Jewish law. The third unit studies the evolution of one form of 
halakhic writing – the responsum, epistolary exchanges about legal problems – to examine 
how the abovementioned changes shaped halakhic texts and their structure. An analysis of 
responsa as they evolve from letters, to documents in the rabbinic archive, to published 
works, displays the scholarly practices and forms of logic specific to each one of these 
media against the backdrop of the larger shifts in the history of knowledge. As a whole, 
this study shows that, in the sixteenth century, halakhic culture transformed from a flexible, 
heterogeneous, and personal universe to an increasingly stable, homogenous, and 
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The study and application of religious law is considered a traditional enterprise, an attempt 
faithfully to reconstruct and interpret the divine will revealed in a distant past. The learning 
and implementation of Jewish religious law – or halakha, as it is called, is such an 
enterprise. As halakha is often regarded as existing beyond time, whereas history seems 
grounded only in the earthly realm, the inclination to separate history from halakha is 
nearly instinctive. In this sense, Orthodox Judaism, for instance, largely eschews the 
historical dimension of halakha, viewing this law as eternal and unchanging. A famous 
joke that rabbis tell about the history of halakha goes: “Historians can go ahead and tell 
you what the rabbis wore, but I will tell you what they said!” What the rabbis said, like 
Jewish law itself, does, indeed, relate to the transcendental; however, it definitely takes 
place in time. 
Notwithstanding the timeless, unchanging nature of halakha’s objectives, 
revolutions have, in fact, taken place within its realm. These changes were not solely the 
result of reactions to external physical or ideological crises threatening religious Judaism 
– a frequent focus of Jewish historiography. As scholarship has shown, some of the most 
radical changes in early modern Europe in general were revolutions that occurred inside 
the realm of knowledge. The failure to engage in the historical component in halakha 
would, therefore, be a double loss, both for intellectual history and for our understanding 
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of Jewish law. This dissertation explores one of the most significant such revolutions in 
Jewish intellectual history. It focuses on the scholarship of halakha, which, in sheer 
volume, cultural importance, and specificity is one of the main – or, arguably, the main 
branch of Jewish intellectual activity before the modern period. 
More specifically, my dissertation investigates the reorganization of halakhic 
knowledge in early modern Europe, as this corpus, which featured a combination of orality 
and loosely ordered textual compilations, shifted almost exclusively to textual, highly 
structured codifications. The religious culture of Ashkenaz, the communities with roots in 
the German lands,1 which, by the sixteenth century, for the most part, had moved eastward 
to Poland and Lithuania, had traditionally ordered its halakhic texts in a largely haphazard, 
often miscellaneous, and highly fluid manner. My dissertation focuses roughly on the 
sixteenth century, or, to be more precise, on the century between the 1470s and the 1570s, 
which begins with the birth of Hebrew print and ends with the death of rabbis Moshe 
Isserles (ca.1572) and Shlomo Luria (ca. 1574), the first generation of great Eastern 
European rabbis who wrote halakhic works. This period saw upheavals in various realms: 
technological innovation in the form of the printing press and groundbreaking books, 
particularly the Shulḥan Arukh (Set table), a halakhic codification printed in the middle of 
the sixteenth century; it also witnessed communal disruption as the original Jewish 
                                                     
1 The meaning of Ashkenaz is, in many ways, constantly in flux, and this dissertation deals with 
some of the fluctuations in the ashkenazic cultural, scholarly and religious makeup. In the most general terms, 
Ashkenaz can be defined, geographically, as the communities with roots in the German lands, linguistically, 
as the Yiddish-speaking sphere or, halakhically, as the early modern communities following Rabbi Moshe 
Isserles’ glosses of the Shulḥan Arukh, which will be discussed in the course of this dissertation. Ashkenaz 
is, of course, no monolith. See, for instance, chapter 3 in this dissertation for distinctions within Ashkenaz 
depending on the trajectory of particular communities; chapter four for chronological differences in 
ashkenazic modes of transmission and attitudes to their past.  
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communities of Western Europe disappeared. The combination of these changes led to a 
veritable knowledge revolution in the field of halakha. 
The texts that determine Jewish law belong to a complex web of religious 
scholarship and adjudication, encompassing various types of written and oral elements. In 
Ashkenaz, halakhic texts had traditionally been ordered and copied in loose, 
heterogeneous, and flexible ways, featuring strictly legal material alongside other types of 
text, while eschewing any strict organizational structure and leaving considerable room for 
non-textual elements. The contrast between late medieval and early modern organization 
was stronger in Ashkenaz compared to other halakhic cultures, such as that of Sfarad (the 
Iberian diaspora), where halakhic texts were traditionally more rigidly organized. The 
reorganization of the body of ashkenazic halakha entailed increasing systematization; 
distinctions between various types of texts grew sharper; the ordering of similar texts 
became more structured; and hierarchies of authority within the same types of texts and 
amongst the disparate categories of halakhic writing, as well as their relationship to non-
textual elements, were crystallizing and being renegotiated. Even as the substantive 
contents of the law remained relatively intact, this organizational transformation caused a 
profound disruption in the halakha of Ashkenaz, affecting its modes of transmission, 
interpretation, and adjudication. 
The disruption of halakhic scholarly culture in Ashkenaz provided opportunities for 
introducing a more methodical and universally standardized halakha, on the one hand, but, 
on the other, it undermined the more fluid and particularistic ashkenazic approach. In 
analyzing this transformation and its consequences, this dissertation aims at describing an 
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important and thus far understudied chapter in the history of Jewish knowledge. At the 
same time, it examines broader questions pertaining to the organization, interpretation, and 
transmission of knowledge, and the intellectual, technological, and socio-cultural dynamics 
underlying the development of religious law. I call the reorganization of Jewish law in 
Ashkenaz a “disruption,” a term from the recent vocabulary of digital knowledge 
technology that signifies advances so fundamentally groundbreaking that they redefine a 
field, rendering earlier practices useless. The term’s twofold implication of destruction and 
innovation conveys my dual focus on new organizational forms; it points to the gains they 
represent on the one hand, and, on the other, to the losses incurred with the disappearance 
of the old forms as the organization of knowledge develops. 
The narrative proceeds not by relating a series of biographies and portraits of great 
rabbis and great works, as has often been the case for Jewish intellectual history, but by 
analyzing a series of radical shifts in the field of knowledge. This profound change has not 
yet been fully studied because, in a sense, it has not been recognized as a major moment in 
Jewish intellectual history. Historians of Jewish culture and intellectual history have often 
overlooked the history of halakha because the study of Jewish law, with its reputation of 
hairsplitting casuistry and its seemingly excessive preoccupation with the minutiae of daily 
religious life, did not present itself as the most pre-eminent classical field of intellectual 
activity compared to Jewish philosophy, biblical commentary, poetry, or even kabbalah. 
Scholars of Jewish law, for their part, both academics and rabbis, have tended to omit this 
chapter in the history of halakha because it was so successful in shaping the world of Jewish 
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law, even to this day, that is difficult to imagine that Jewish legal scholarship ever looked 
any different than it has since those sixteenth-century transformations. But it did. 
Ever since the late Middle Ages, ashkenazic halakhic texts were transmitted by 
means of manuscript compilations, which I call likutim (pl.). The word likut (sing.), which 
is derived from the verb le-laket (to glean/harvest or collect), is a term sometimes used by 
historians specifically to designate personal collections of various texts. In the context of 
this dissertation, it will be used more broadly to describe a range of halakhic collections, 
some personal and haphazard, others less so. I employ this term (rather than miscellany, 
for instance) because it encompasses both the practice of compiling textual material and its 
product, thus enabling an inquiry into the connections between the practice of creating such 
collections, their outcomes, and the fundamental approaches to knowledge that these 
collections reflect. 
Likutim were personal and flexible: personal, in that every scholar copied his2 own 
compilation (or had one copied for him), according to his own focus, possibilities, and 
needs; no two compilations were identical. They were flexible, as the contents varied and 
fluctuated from one copy to another. Likutim contained a multitude of genres of disparate 
(often incommensurable) texts from different sources and authors. This individual nature 
and flexibility represented more than a matter of material form (personal manuscripts) and 
organization (compilations that lacked an overarching structure); it was deeply embedded 
in the culture’s approach to religious knowledge and law. Unlike a purely oral culture, 
                                                     
2 I will be using masculine pronouns for scholars of halakha throughout this dissertation, not, of 
course, because women cannot be halakhic scholars, but rather, because it reflects the historical reality at the 
time. 
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scribal culture relies on written texts and interprets them as such, but, unlike print culture, 
manuscript culture shares characteristics of fluidity with oral culture. The profound roots 
of ashkenazic halakhic culture in likut practices and its specific significance for religious 
knowledge and law will be explored in the first unit, an introductory chapter dealing with 
the inherited ashkenazic tradition leading up to the upheavals of the sixteenth century. I 
present a theoretical sketch of various approaches to religious law and knowledge, placing 
compilations at one end of the spectrum and codifications, which are comprehensive, 
complete, and structured, at the other. The ashkenazic approach favored local transmission 
and scribal culture, encompassing a combination of orality and text that late medieval 
manuscript compilations supported. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, this scholarly culture – and the religious-legal 
approach that accompanied it – could not look more different. It transitioned from a multi-
vocal system that operated according to principles of personal transmission and local, 
scribal dynamics to a highly systematized textual world in which all legal texts were 
expected to fit into one dominant and consistent system of codification. Transmission of 
halakhic texts in stable form via print favored codifications over compilations as the 
regnant organizational paradigm. Moreover, the Jewish communities of Ashkenaz had 
undergone deep changes and dislocations. These shifts added up to a fundamental 
metamorphosis, opening up innovative possibilities for halakhic reasoning and legal 
structures. In the three central chapters of the dissertation, comprising its second unit, I 
study the mechanism of this shift in knowledge organization by analyzing: (1) material and 
technological changes, namely, the transition to print; (2) the emergence and gradual 
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predominance of new paradigms of organization, primarily, complete and comprehensive 
codifications, with the Shulḥan Arukh as its outstanding representative; and (3) social and 
cultural changes, including the disappearance of the small local communities in the areas 
of Germany and Austria, and the rise of the large urban communities in Poland-Lithuania 
that replaced them. 
The chapters in this second unit describe these changes and consider the reactions 
of the traditional ashkenazic scholarly community to these transformations. Moreover, the 
intellectual and legal impact of these new forms of knowledge is illustrated by introducing 
specific case studies throughout the chapters, which provide concrete examples of the 
developments and changes in legal reasoning and halakhic approaches before and after this 
revolution. These variances were effected not by adding or subtracting specific data, but, 
rather, as a result of the transformations in the organization of knowledge, which supported 
new ways of working with religious law and precluded older ones. 
 The impact of print is analyzed in a systematic comparison of all the fifteenth-
century ashkenazic collections of responsa printed in sixteenth-century Italy. The first such 
works to be printed (most notably Trumat ha-deshen, [Offering of the ashes], Venice, 
1519), were unprecedentedly structured for ashkenazic responsa collections; they include 
finding aids, introductions, and references to one single author and to an unknown potential 
readership. Other responsa books printed in this period, organized in a way resembling 
their pre-print existence, demonstrate, however, that technology alone is not a sufficient 
motivation for change. Established scholarly practices remained resilient despite their 
incompatibility with new production technologies. 
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 The consequences of new organizational paradigms and codification are 
approached through an examination of Sha’arei Dura (Gates of Düren), a medieval 
compilation on kosher slaughter and the first Hebrew book printed in Poland (Cracow, 
1534). With its random progression, multiple authors and sources, and unstable 
transmission (even in print), this work characterizes traditional ashkenazic scholarship. I 
compare laws on prohibited blood in meat as they appear in this work with the same laws 
in two progressively more systematic sixteenth-century works. New methods of legal 
reasoning compromising between tradition and legal innovation met with strong 
ideological and legal criticism when presented in the context of the older work, but, when 
they appeared as glosses on the newer code, opposition waned. The new organizational 
context thus facilitated such innovations. 
 Subsequently, I explore the communal rupture that permitted such a staunchly 
traditional culture to adopt new organizational modes. The significance of communal 
continuity for traditions of legal scholarship is approached through a case study – a 
chronological comparison of ashkenazic halakhic approaches to firstborn cattle, a complex 
issue combining ritual and monetary law. I examine the legal tradition as it existed in the 
German communities until their rupture in the sixteenth century and the subsequent 
changes when the original communities were erased and reconstructed in Eastern Europe. 
Scholars who saw themselves as loyal disciples of the ashkenazic tradition, such as Rabbi 
Isserles, effected these transformations. Reconstructing his legal arguments and pointing 
to subtle shifts in emphasis and logic allows me to demonstrate how scholars who found 
themselves in a new environment, far from the medieval ashkenazic communities with 
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their pious self-image and traditional logic of custom, were, in fact, subtly but surely 
reinventing the tradition they were purporting to perpetuate. 
Having traced this overarching change in the second unit, in the third and final unit 
of the dissertation, comprising two chapters and a case study, I shall examine the fate of 
one specific halakhic genre in this period, namely responsa, and the vicissitudes of this 
genre throughout these changes. Responsa, or She’elot u-Tshuvot (questions and answers), 
are epistles written by rabbis in response to halakhic questions usually relating to a specific 
case posed by colleagues or students. Instead of following the roughly chronological arc of 
the previous units, this final unit’s progression follows the “life-cycle” of a responsum, 
from the initial handwritten letter to its publication in printed collections of responsa, which 
are then consulted by scholars. This genre, which has existed ever since Jewish law was 
practiced, had a specific role and took on a particular form in the early modern period. In 
its epistolary stage, discussed in the first of these chapters, it functioned as an important 
mode of communication for the establishment of halakhic discourse. The responsa in 
printed collections, as the second chapter of this unit will show, retained many 
characteristics of the earlier stages of the responsum. These earlier stages include not only 
the epistolary original but also the subsequent stages of collection, consultation, and 
transmission in manuscript. The presence of these remnants in sixteenth-century printed 
responsa collections positions them as the ideal genre for examining the fate of halakhic 
texts that were not easily converted to codifications and thus retained traces of the more 
flexible organizational practices exemplified by ashkenazic likutim. 
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The nature of the individual responsum as a holistic self-enclosed unit – that is, a 
finished work whose value derives from the selection and ways in which the particular 
source material within it are combined, rather than the halakhic knowledge that can be 
extracted – means that responsa cannot truly be abstracted into units that are integrated 
within the system of the Shulḥan Arukh. The halakhic conclusion of a rabbi in a responsum 
can usually be encapsulated and added to the system; however, the responsum as a unit, 
with the specificities that stem from the question at hand and the particular author’s own 
approach, can find its full expression only in a different, more heterogeneous, 
organizational scheme. As such, responsa remained, in many ways, the answer to halakhic 
codifications, a reminder that this form of religious legal inquiry can never be entirely 
systematized. The peculiarities of printed collections of responsa, with their miscellaneous 
contents and lack of homogeneity or internal structure, highlight the difficulties of a culture 
transitioning from one regime of knowledge organization to another. 
This interim stage, I argue, should not be considered a mere prelude to a more 
systematized future, but, rather, a type of order in its own right, in which scholars attempted 
to preserve the fluid forms of medieval ashkenazic organization among new technologies, 
changing paradigms, and communal rupture. In his seminal Early Modern Jewry,3 David 
Ruderman argued that, rather than representing a nascent Enlightenment order with some 
atypical elements that needed to be discarded, early modern Jewry was characterized by 
blurred boundaries in matters of religious and social identity. In line with Ruderman’s 
                                                     
3 David Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry: A new cultural history (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 
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argument, I contend that, in the world of scholarly culture and intellectual history of 
halakha, blurred boundaries, were, likewise, a dominant formative characteristic rather 
than a trivial defect on the path towards a desired, neatly ordered system. The tangled 
transitory phase of halakhic scholarship in early modern Ashkenaz should not be ignored 
in favor of its more clear-cut successors; rather, its complexity can be regarded as a rich 
and fruitful phenomenon in its own right that holds the key to understanding the revolution 
in progress. 
Moreover, although it may seem counterintuitive at first, indefinite borders have 
certain benefits over distinct boundaries: As I argue in the third unit, responsa represent 
that which does not lend itself to codification in halakha. Placing the trajectory of responsa 
into its context of scholarly practices will highlight the advantages of this decidedly 
unstructured form of organization for scholarship. As the final case study will emphasize, 
responsa bring out aspects of Jewish law that the process of codification obscures. These 
aspects of halakha not only accentuate differences in the scholarship of ashkenazic 
religious law prior to the sixteenth century and thereafter, but they also lie at the basis of 
an alternative justification for the authority of halakha, which is based on heterogeneity, 
dialogicity, and argumentation, rather than on unification, systematization, and universal 
order. 
2.   
The tendency to separate halakha from history has also found expression in Jewish 
historiography, which began with an almost disdainful treatment of halakha as irrelevant 
or even pejorative to Jewish history and gradually gave way to more positive attitudes and, 
UNIT I, INTRODUCTION 
 
12 
ultimately, to approaches that took halakha seriously as a historical source. The earliest 
modern attempt at a complete history of the Jewish People, Heinrich Graetz’s nineteenth-
century Geschichte der Juden, already recognized the central place of halakha in Jewish 
scholarship, albeit not as a positive factor. Far from considering it a valuable asset, he 
deplored halakha as detrimental to the development of true Jewish culture. Graetz lauded 
figures such as Maimonides, the medieval philosopher-rabbi, whereas he sometimes 
praised rabbis engaged only in the study and interpretation of halakha for their cerebral 
abilities but then criticized them for their intellectual limitations.4 In a description of Polish 
Jewry, Graetz conjectured that the flourishing halakhic scholarship affected the entire 
“trend of Jewish thought in Poland,” but he was tellingly critical of its effects, attributing 
everything from the awkward speech and gestures to the dishonest behavior of Polish Jews 
to their preoccupation with halakhic scholarship.5 
                                                     
4 For instance, Graetz writes as follows on the ashkenazic rabbis who came to Italy in the 15th 
century: “They re-indoctrinated with their prejudice and narrowness of vision the Italian Jews, who were 
making determined efforts to free themselves from the bonds of the Middle Ages.” On Rabbi Joseph Kolon: 
“Endowed with extraordinary penetration, and fully the equal of the German rabbis in the depth of his 
Talmudic learning, Joseph Kolon was celebrated in his day as a Rabbinical authority of the first magnitude.... 
On scientific subjects and all matters outside the Talmud, he was as ignorant as his German fellow-
dignitaries.” Graetz Jewish History (Philadelphia: JPS, 1891) 4: 294-5. 
5 Graetz described how this “talmudic deportment” went along with “ungraceful shrugging of the 
shoulders and a peculiar movement of the thumbs,” as well as a degeneration of the language into a 
“ridiculous jargon.” This “hairsplitting” went so far as to cause a “false wit” that led Jewish traders to outwit 
and trick non-Jews in business. “Together with their language the Polish Jews lost that which really 
constitutes a man and were thus exposed to the scorn and contempt of the non-Jewish society…. Children 
were put to the study of the Talmud at a tender age, certainly to the detriment of the natural development of 
their minds.” Graetz, Jewish History, 4: 640-1. 
The most central Polish rabbis of the 16th century are described as follows: “The fame of the 
rabbinical schools of Poland was due to three men: Shalom Shachna, Solomon Lurya, and Moses Isserles. ... 
Had he [Luria] been born in a better, a more intellectual epoch, he would have been one of the makers of 
Judaism, perhaps another Maimuni. But being the son of an age of decadence, he became only a profound 
and thorough Talmud scholar.” Graetz, Jewish History, 4: 634. 
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Leopold Zunz had a much less negative view of halakha. Approaching Jewish 
history from the perspective of philology, the entire moral and mental activity of a people, 
and thus all its texts, were crucial.6 In Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur (1818), often 
considered the founding document of a historical study of Judaism, he counts halakha 
among those “literary products of the Jewish people” that require close examination in 
order to write a scholarly history of the Jews.7 Zunz introduced halakhic writings as 
belonging not to theology but to the realm of “the State … in the field of law-giving and 
jurisprudence, where some excellent work written by Jews is waiting for our scientific 
treatment.”8 He appreciated halakhic literature as a window onto the development of 
Jewish law and jurisprudence, and, in this vein, suggested a comparison of Jewish tort law 
to its equivalent in Roman Canon law.9 His own historical work did not deal with halakha 
specifically, but he provided information about rabbinical figures and occasionally used 
responsa and other halakhic sources for data on Jewish religious and daily life.10 Moritz 
Güdemann, a nineteenth-century Austrian rabbi and historian, opened one of his works 
                                                     
6 Thus, as Leon Wieseltier put it, “Zunz’s pioneering approach to Jewish texts bequeathed to 
subsequent Jewish historiography perhaps its fundamental premise: that the scope of the Jewish historian’s 
activity be no less wide than the scope of Jewish life itself.” See Leon Wieseltier, “Etwas Über Die Judische 
Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography," History and Theory 20, no. 2 
(1981): 139. 
7 “Gehen wir nunmehr zu den litterarischen Producten des jüdischen Volkes überm so fragt sich vor 
allem, was den ihr Inhalt sei?” Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur,” in Geschriften von dr Zunz 
(Berlin: Gerschel, 1875-6), 1: 7. 
8  Zunz, Geschriften, 1:9: “Verlassen wir den Unterthan der Kirche und verweilen bei dem des 
Staates; so sehen wir uns in das Feld der Gesetzgebung und der Jurisprudenz versetzt, worin manches 
treffliche Werk von Juden geschrieben für unse wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung daliegt.” 
9 Similarly, Zunz recognized that many central Jewish literary figures were halakhists. The tosafists 
are important for the “bisher nicht versuchte Characteristik des jüdischen Rechts und die Geschichte der … 
reichen jüdischen Rechtspraxis.” Zunz, Geschriften, 1: 29. 
10 For example, he uses medieval halakhic sources as preserved in Sefer ha-Mordekhai as sources 
for the games that children played in medieval Ashkenaz. 
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with the insight that, although the Torah may have been understood as Gesetz (law) or 
nomos,11 it should, more correctly, be understood as Lehre or “teachings.” He viewed 
halakha as an important part of Jewish culture inasmuch as it belonged to Jewish education 
and pedagogy. This led him to publish an important collection of sources about halakhic 
scholarship that contributed to the “Geschichte des Erziehungswesens und der Cultur der 
Juden.”12 He regarded these sources as important not only as law, but more broadly, as a 
field of knowledge that was both studied and taught and, as such, also as a larger part of 
Jewish educational culture. 
The next generation of historians was more inclined toward social and political 
questions than toward issues of intellectual history or rabbinics. Their works do accord an 
important role to halakha, but their scholarly focus is trained upon other elements of Jewish 
history. Simon Dubnow’s History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, despite its focus on 
Jewish communal and political autonomy in the diaspora, recognizes the halakha as central 
to Jewish “inner life,” as he called Jewish autonomous culture and society.13 Dubnow’s 
                                                     
11 Moritz Güdemann, Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Unterrichts und der Erziehung bei den 
deutschen Juden Von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf Mendelssohn (Berlin: Hofmann & Comp, 1891), 3. 
12 Güdemann was not always favorably impressed by the contents of these works. He calls the 
fifteenth-century compilation of Rabbi Israel Isserlein’s teachings, Leket yosher, “Eine interessante Quelle 
fur die Cultur und Unculturgeschichte der deutschen Talmud-Hochschüler im 15. Jahrhundert,” In Moritz 
Güdemann, Geschichte des Erziehungswesense und der Cultur der Juden in Frankreich und Deutschland 
von der Begründung der jüdischen Wissenschaft in diesen Ländern bis zur Vertreibung der Juden aus 
Frankreich (X.-XIV. Jahrhundert) (Wien: Hölder, 1880), 16. 
13 Alongside his interest in the ḥeder and yeshiva as prime examples of Jewish self-governed 
institutions in 16th-century Eastern Europe, Dubnow also explained, “The high intellectual level of the Polish 
Jews was the result of their relative economic prosperity. As for the character of their mental productivity, it 
was the direct outcome of their social autonomy.... For the enactments of the Talmud regulated the inner life 
of Polish Jews....” Thus, Jewish self-government meant that Jewish law was once again important, which 
explained its scholarly flourishing in this period. 
See Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland (Philadelphia: JPSA, 1916), 1:121-
2. 
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work acknowledged halakha by alluding to important rabbis and some of their works. He 
describes the creation of new codes, mainly the Shulḥan Arukh, including some reactions 
to it and Rabbi Isserles’ ashkenazic gloss of this code.14 Salo Baron’s rejection of Graetz’s 
“lachrymose history” led to a very different kind of Jewish history, with a noticeable social 
bent and a commitment to compare the status of the Jews to that of other corporations in 
any given period. Although Baron regarded halakha positively as part and parcel of Jewish 
culture, he did not devote special attention to this area.15 Halakha was examined primarily 
inasmuch as it provided a view of Jewish worship and practice, not as an intellectual field 
per se. His treatment of the early modern period mentions the Shulḥan Arukh and its 
importance, but the focus of his investigation lies elsewhere.16 His volume on Poland-
                                                     
14 Dubnow finds himself more at ease when discussing Rabbi Isserles’ disagreement with Rabbi 
Luria regarding the study of philosophy, which came up almost as an aside in a handful of letters amidst their 
vast works and collections of halakhic responsa. Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, 1:123-
126. 
15 In his volume of A Social and Religious History dedicated to intellectual achievements, titled 
“Hebrew Language and Letters of the High Middle Ages,” for instance, Baron dedicates an entire chapter to 
Hebrew “Belles-Lettres,” but merely mentions briefly Maimonides' “Summary,” his biggest work, which is 
halakhic. The late medieval “Western Compilations” of halakhic material can be found in a chapter focused 
mainly on liturgy and dedicated to “Worship.” Salo Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, 7: 62. 
This chapter opens with a quote by F.C. Grant: “No religion in the world can be thoroughly understood if its 
normal daily worship of God is left out of account: for here it is where the pulse-beat of every genuine religion 
is to be felt.” The halakhic miscellanies are of interest insofar as they relate to religious worship: “the 
aforementioned juridical miscellanies entitled Sefer ha-pardes, Ha-orah … and Sefer isur ve-heter have 
given us deep insights into the entire realm of legal practice and ritualistic thinking of the founders of Jewish 
learning in Western Europe.” He explains that none of these “deserve the name prayer book,” as “they also 
included many other legal materials ... admixtures from other domains of law” (Baron, A Social and Religious 
History, 7: 122). Baron is searching in these sources for “worship” and “daily life,” but what of those halakhic 
discussions throughout: where do they fit in the phenomenon of “Hebrew Letters,” are they there only to 
regulate worship? 
16 In his justification of the periodization 1200-1650, he writes: “Intellectually, too, the period ... 
represented the completion of the medieval Jewish codification and its final fruition in the Shulchan Arukh, 
the Karo-Isserles Code, together with its major commentaries.” Immediately after this line, he moves on to 
discuss kabbalah. Baron, A Social and Religious History, 9: vi-vii. 
See also in Baron’s chapter on humanism: “Nor did the Polish Jews remain unaffected by the 
Renaissance. Some of them engaged in the study of science, at least in so far as they could from Hebrew 
books.... The two giants of Polish rabbinic learning in sixteenth-century Poland, Moses b. Israel Isserles and 
Solomon b. Yehiel Luria, became engaged in a lively dispute over the merits of philosophic studies, which 
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Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages even dedicates an entire chapter to the “Extraordinary 
Creative Élan” of Poland’s “Golden Age,” but the discussions of halakhic culture are, in 
line with the broad outlines and social focus of the work, restricted to general statements.17 
In sum, Jewish histories in the twentieth century contain frequent nods to the crucial 
significance of rabbinic scholarship. Allusions to its vitality and energy and the use of 
positive adjectives such as “giant” and “luminary” when introducing a rabbi’s name 
abound; occasional references mention a polemic, but real in-depth studies of the 
development of halakha were not part of these scholars’ orientation. Conversely, most 
scholars interested in halakhic texts were not historically minded. History and halakha 
remained separate. An exception to this approach was Chaim Tchernowitz, also known as 
Rav Tzair, a talmudist who taught the likes of Bialik in Odessa and died in New York in 
the mid-twentieth century. He wrote from a decidedly historical perspective, explaining 
                                                     
as we shall see in a later chapter, ended in the victory of the anti-Maimonist Luria” (Baron, A Social and 
Religious History, 16: 56-7). This is the very same controversy as the one mentioned by Dubnow. 
17 While acknowledging that halakha is clearly important to the Jewish intellectual and cultural past 
and that its practitioners were cultural heroes, Baron’s orientation precludes further specific attention to 
halakha. Throughout his work, there is often mention of the “intellectual leaders,” and the “talmudic learning 
of their day,” the “giants” of a certain century, rabbinic “vitality,” “intellectual expansion,” and so on. For 
instance: “By the end of the sixteenth century, the most glorious chapters of Polish Jewish learning had 
already been written. No longer were there halakhic giants like the rabbis Solomon Luria, Moses Isserles, 
and Mordecai Yaphe, who revived the glory of rabbinic scholarship for all of Ashkenaz, indeed of world 
Jewry. Yet the continued growth of rabbinic studies on the broad plateau of mass education, combined with 
the work of a larger number of fine scholars, compensated by the quantitative spread of Jewish learning, for 
the lack of some of its earlier profundities....” Once again, he quickly turns to other intellectual fields such as 
kabbalah, moral philosophy, Yiddish Bible translations, and belles-lettres (Baron, A Social and Religious 
History, 16: 310). The description of Lublin mentions  its: “...famous academy of learning, successively 
headed by such luminaries as Rabbis Solomon b. Yehiel Luria and Meir b Gedalia ... respectively” (Baron, 
A Social and Religious History, 16: 13); “...the famous Cracow rabbi Jacob Polak...” (Baron, A Social and 
Religious History, 16: 26); “...the truly distinguished rabbinic authority Jacob Polak...” (Baron, A Social and 
Religious History, 16: 60). 
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that he was not interested in “what” the halakhic contents were but, rather, “how they came 
into being” and the ways in which halakha influenced life, and vice versa.18 
Tchernowitz criticized his predecessors’ tendency to limit themselves to 
biographies, writing that they “invested all their strength and energy in the creators rather 
than the creations, so that the frame is much broader than the picture itself.”19 Believing in 
the value of historical study for achieving an understanding of the essence of halakha, he 
wrote that his goal in writing a history of halakha was “to reveal ultimately the secret of its 
creation.”20 His approach was both concentrated on halakha as well as historical and 
contextual; however, his ultimate goal, revealing the secret of halakha, remained largely 
internally-focused. Tchernowitz’s interpretation of the historical elements also remains, in 
many ways, indigenous. The studies are structured around important works and polemical 
moments in halakhic history, providing some of the political, geographic, economic, and 
physical milieu for the action, but consulting the external (non-Jewish) context only in a 
limited fashion.21 In any event, his three-volume Toldot ha-poskim (History of the Jewish 
codes), the third volume of which treats the early modern period in depth, remains one of 
the fullest portraits of the history of halakha.22 
                                                     
18 Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-halakha (The history of halakha) (NY: Jubilee Committee, 1934-
5), vii (emph. in original): שנתהוה. באיךשנתהוה אלא  במהכללו של דבר אין הספר עוסק בחומר אלא בצורה, לא   
19 Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-halakha, vi:  מצד שני, חכמי ישראל האחרונים כרנ"ק...גראטץ והלוי ועוד...השקיעו
כל כחם וגבורתם ביוצרים יותר מביצור, באופן שהמסגרת היא יותר רחבה מן התמונה עצמה, ולפיכך אם הם לא הספיקו להוכיח על 
 חיבור ההלכה עם החיים ועל השפעת גומלין שביניהם.
20 Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-halakha, vii:  ושיגלה, ביחוד, את סוד הבריאה שלה ואת עילת כל העילות וסיבת כל
 הסיבות לאצילות הראשונה שלה ולהפצת אורה.
21 His works were never translated from the Hebrew. In the United States, he taught Talmud at the 
Jewish Institute for Religion, founded by the reform rabbi Stephen Wise as a training school for rabbis “for 
the Jewish ministry, research, and community service,” rather than joining an academic establishment, yet 
another way in which his work did not fully reach a general public. 
22 Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim: kolel shalshelet ha-posḳim tekhunat ḥiburehem ṿi-yesodei 
shiṭotehem be-darkhei ha-horaʼah mi-tḳufat ha-geʼonim ʼad ha-Shulḥan-ʼarukh ṿe-nosei-kelaṿ. (The history 
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The study of Jewish history has changed immensely since its beginnings in the 
nineteenth century, and halakha has increasingly found a place in these studies. As this is 
a brief overview, I outline only in very general fashion some of the more recent approaches 
that touch upon early modern halakha in Ashkenaz, focusing on responsa in particular. 
Halakhic sources have been studied in three general ways: as source material that provides 
circumstantial evidence of Jewish life in a particular time and place; as the Jewish 
equivalent of traditional intellectual history, focusing on great figures and/or great works; 
and as a window into Jewish legal, ethical, political, and philosophical theories. The first 
approach consists essentially of dissecting responsa literature in an attempt to recover 
empirical information about the lives and times of its questioners and respondents, thus 
neglecting the halakhic discussions themselves. The second approach treats responsa as 
primarily a source of historical information about their authors, or about specific works, 
schools of thought, and intellectual debates. Such studies provide crucial information about 
the history of Jewish learning, but nonetheless forego the opportunity to analyze the 
halakhic contents, regarding them only as portents of historical data to be added to a 
“succession of major thinkers and works” in Jewish culture, without fully exploring the 
role of the historical dimension for the intellectual achievements of these rabbis. The third 
                                                     
of the Jewish codes. The history of Hebrew law in the period of its codification: the codifiers and the codes, 
their principles and methods, from the Geonim to the Shulḥan Arukh and its commentators), 3 vols. (NY: 
Jubilee Committee, 1946-1947). Elon’s Jewish Law is similarly large and treats the topic with significant 
depth, but it is focused primarily on the legal, not the historical, dimension. His focus on contemporary Israeli 
law also means that he is more interested in the judicial part of halakha (that which parallels secular legal 
systems) than in the religious part (such as ritual law). 
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approach relates to halakha not as a source for other information but as a valuable field of 
study in and of itself. 
The particular topics of interest in halakhic sources depend on the orientation of 
different schools of research. The establishment and growth of fields such as Jewish 
thought (maḥshevet Israel) and Jewish legal theory (mishpat ivri) have contributed 
immensely to the study of halakhic sources. The latter school was established by 
Menachem Elon, who sought to integrate principles of halakha into the modern Israeli legal 
system. Among the scholars who pursue this approach, halakha is understood primarily as 
law, and halakhic texts are analyzed for characteristics of the particular author's legal 
theory.23 Legal approaches to halakha can result in important insights, but they risk 
obscuring the aspects of halakha that are intellectual and scholarly rather than purely legal. 
Those interested in Jewish thought, on the other hand, will search halakhic sources for the 
larger belief system of its authors, often attempting to tease out the meta-halakhic beliefs 
embedded in these texts. Some of these approaches search for allusions to philosophy in 
halakhic sources, leading to what one historian has called a “needle-in-the-haystack” 
                                                     
 23 Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1973), 3:1485. This 
work emphasizes the importance of responsa for the study of halakha, comparable to “collections of judicial 
decisions in other legal systems.” Elon explains that Ashkenazic responsa of the early modern period are 
“difficult for continuous study” because they introduce “theoretical discussions of the Talmud and rishonim 
(earlier commentators) that were not directly relevant to the question posed.” 
 The framing of halakha within the field of legal theory and Jewish thought has led to studies by more 
recent scholars, such as those put forward in volumes edited by Avinoam Roznak, New Streams in Philosophy 
of Halakha. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2008) and Explicit and Implied Theoretical and Ideological Aspects 
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 2012). Contributors to these volumes, for instance, examine halakhic writings in order 
to analyze the authors’ stances as legal formalism or positivism. 
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approach to sources, in which reams of rabbinic literature are examined in search of rare 
references hinting at something else.24 
Others yet wish to discover the historical circumstances or worldview of a halakhic 
author by trying to isolate the halakhic argumentation from its “a-halakhic aspects,” which 
are then read as consequences of “external” factors, such as political, social, or 
philosophical crises impinging upon the rabbi’s thought (and finding expression in the form 
of apologetics, for instance). This approach yields important insights, but it also rests on 
the assumption that there is a form of halakha that is “pure” – read: non-historical – 
effectively divorcing the halakhic text from the history within which it is embedded. This 
attempt at separation, however, risks eliminating the most interesting issues, as it is 
precisely the story of how halakha develops in history that can shed light on Jewish 
intellectual and cultural history, something that Israel Ta-Shma’s groundbreaking work on 
late medieval Ashkenaz has made boundlessly clear.25 
Halakhic material remains a useful treasure trove for historical detail and realia, 
and is still, justly, being used as such, although its current use entails more qualifications 
and a greater consciousness of the dangers in assuming that halakhic material is a direct 
                                                     
24 Eliyahu Stern, The Genius: Elijah of Vilna and the Making of Modern Judaism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014), 5. Stern relates this term to the search for signs of “modernity” or “secularization” 
in the writings of traditional rabbis. 
25 Ta-Shma’s writings on the interaction of custom and halakha in Ashkenaz that connect the 
material with the intellectual aspects of halakhic history include: Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-
kadmon (The ancient ashkenazic custom) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 16-22; idem, “Halakhah, minhag u-
meẓiut be-Ashkenaz, 1000 – 1350” (Halakha, custom and reality in Ashkenaz, 1000-1350), in Kneset 
meḥkarim (Collected studies) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2005); on medieval halakhic interpretation: “Halakha 
minhag u-masoret be-yahadut Ashkenaz ba-me’ot ha 11-12” (Halakha, custom and tradition in the Jewry of 
Ashkenaz in the 11th-12th centuries), Sidra 2 (1987); idem, Minhag Ashkenaz, 9-10, 16, 93-103; and on print: 
“Ha-Gra ve-ba'al Sha'agat Aryeh, ha-pnei Yehoshua ve-sefer ẓiyun le-nefesh ḥaya: le-toldoteihem shel ha-
zramim ha-ḥadashim ba-sifrut ha-rabanit erev tnu'at ha-haskalah,” Sidra 15 (1999): 181-191. 
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window onto lived life. The study of halakha in terms of cultural and intellectual history, 
however, has not been sufficiently explored. Jacob Katz once complained that his 
predecessors wrote “rabbinical biographies, never a history of Halakha itself.”26 Katz 
himself did, of course, lavish extensive attention on halakha. A student of Karl Mannheim, 
Katz was interested in social history and used halakha as a barometer for rabbinic authority 
and communal obedience.27 Conversely, he also used sociology as a tool to illuminate 
halakhic texts, introducing the concept of “ritual instinct” to explain why some halakhic 
interpretations that seemed inconsistent from a purely legal or logical halakhic perspective 
made complete sense if one takes sociological theories into consideration.28 His scholarship 
exerted a crucial influence on the historical study of halakha.29 
As intellectual history has come to incorporate increasingly varied and 
sophisticated approaches, drawing upon social and cultural history; material and book 
history; histories of science; knowledge-organization; media studies; linguistic theories; 
and more, these approaches have been brought to bear on the study of halakha. Many recent 
studies of halakha are especially promising in their complex and wide-ranging 
                                                     
26 See the introduction to Jacob Katz, Halakha and Kabbalah (Jerusalem, 1986). 
27 His studies showed, for instance, how the eighteenth century marked a break from the past, as 
rabbis were newly concerned with accommodating problematic existing practices in halakhic decision 
making. The novel element was that Jewish communities now had a “neutral society” available for their 
assimilation and therefore were no longer solely subjected to rabbis and the community leadership, a 
phenomenon to which the rabbis were becoming sensitive. See Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: The Social 
Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870 (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1973); idem, 
Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1958). 
28 Jacob Katz, Goy shel Shabat (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 1984). 
29 Hayim Soloveitchik, Halakha, kalkala, ve-dimu’i aẓmi: ha-mashkona’ut bi-yemei ha-beinayim 
(Pawnbroking in the Middle Ages: A study in the interrelationship between halakha, economic activity, and 
self-image) (Jersualem, Magnes, 1985). 
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approaches.30 In the realm of early modern Ashkenaz, Elhanan Reiner has, more than any 
other scholar, contributed to the analysis of halakhic texts, informed by deep understanding 
of the texts themselves and their embeddedness within the broader material, social, and 
cultural contexts, such as scholarly practices (in his work on teaching casuistry and in his 
seminal article on changes in ashkenazic learned society),31 material history (i.e., the 
pinkasim of the traveling secondary elite),32 communal structure (in his work on the urban 
                                                     
30 These include: Haym Soloveitchik, Yeynam, sachar be-yeynam shel goyim: Al gilgula shel 
halakha be-olam ha-ma’aseh (Principles and pressures: Jewish trade in gentile wine in the Middle Ages) 
(Israel: Am Oved, 2003), a “thick” description of the historical, social, and cultural context in which a certain 
halakhic topic (in this case, “gentile wine”) is embedded. Jay Berkovitz’s study of rabbinic self-fashioning 
through responsa indicates an understanding of halakha not only as a legal text but also as a work written and 
published with an audience in mind: “The Self-Portrait of a Seventeenth-Century Posek: Between Biography 
and Autobiography,” in Yosef da’at : Studies in Modern Jewish History in Honor of Yosef Salmon, ed. Yossi 
Goldstein (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2010). Among other works are Amnon Raz-
Krakotzkin’s study of book history and censorship:  Ha-ẓensor, ha-orekh, ve-ha-tekst: ha-ẓensura ha-katolit 
ve-ha-dfus ha-ivri ba-me’ah ha-16 (The censor, the editor, and the text: Catholic censorship and Hebrew 
print in the 16th century) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2005)]; Elliot Horowitz’s readings of halakhic sources as part 
of ritual and culture: “The Eve of the Circumcision: A Chapter in the History of Jewish Nightlife,” in 
Essential Papers on Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, ed. David Ruderman (NY and 
London: NYU Press, 1992); Zeev Gries’ essays on the history of Jewish print: The Book in the Jewish World: 
1700-1900 (Portland, OR: Littman Library, 2007); Talya Fishman’s sweeping study of textualization in 
Jewish cultural and intellectual history in the Middle Ages: Becoming the People of the Talmud: Oral Torah 
as a Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); 
Maoz Kahana’s analysis of responsa, Me-ha-Nodah bi-Yehuda la-Ḥatam Sofer: Halakha ve-hagut le-nokhaḥ 
etgarei ha-zman (Halakhic writing in a changing world, from the ‘Noda b’Yehuda’ to the ‘Hatam Sofer’, 
1730-1839) (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 2015), which traces the ascendancy of new conceptions of the ideal 
Jewish scholar; Tirẓa Kelman’s study of knowledge organization and print in Yosef Karo’s writings, “Ktuvot 
be-et barzel ve-oferet be-dfus: mahapekhat ha-dfus ve-yeẓirat ha-ḥibur Bet Yosef” (Written in a metal pen 
and lead in print: The print revolution and the creation of the work Bet Yosef), Pe’amim 148 (2016): 9-27, 
and many others. 
31 Elhanan Reiner, “Tmurot be-yeshivot Polin ve-Ashkenaz ba-meot ha-16 ve-ha-17 ve-ha-vikuaḥ 
al ha-pilpul” (Transformations in the Polish and Ashkenazic yeshivot during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and the dispute over pilpul) in Ke-minhag Ashkenaz ve-Polin: Sefer yovel le-Chone Shmeruk 
(According to the custom of Ashkenaz and Poland: Studies in honor of Chone Shmeruk), ed. Israel Bartal, 
Ḥava Turniansky, and Ezra Mendelsohn (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Press, 1993). 
Elhanan Reiner, “me-Ever le-gvulot ha-Haskala: Tmurot be-tavnit ha-limud ve-ha-yeda ba-ḥevra 
ha-yehudit ha-masortit ba-et ha-ḥadasha ha-mukdemet” (Beyond the realm of Haskalah: Changing learning 
patterns in Jewish traditional society) in Yashan mipnei ḥadash: Meḥkarim be-toldot Yehude Mizraḥ Europa 
u-be-trabutam, Shai le-Emanuel Etkes (Let the old make way for the new: Studies in the history of the Jews 
in Eastern Europe and their culture,A gift to Emmanuel Etkes), 2 vols., ed. David Assaf and Ada Rapaport-
Albert (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 2009): 2: 289-311.   
32 Elhanan Reiner, “Darshan noded madpis et sfarav: Perek alum be-toldot ha-tarbut ha-’ivrit be-
eropah ba-meah ha-17” (A wandering preacher prints his books: a hidden chapter in Jewish cultural history 
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community),33 print history, (in his study of rationalism in early modern Ashkenaz),34 and 
the organization of knowledge (in his study of the Shulḥan Arukh).35 His work – in true 
early modern ashkenazic fashion, both published and private, written and oral36 – has 
inspired countless scholars, including this one, to consider halakha as a form of Jewish 
intellectual history deserving treatment as such, combining halakhic textual analysis with 
the wealth of tools available for the study of the history of knowledge at large. 
  
3.  
I utilize tools from legal theory and history, and, mainly, from the “history of knowledge,” 
that is, print and book history, social and cultural history (especially the history of scholarly 
cultures and erudite practices), media studies (such as network theories), and studies of the 
organization of knowledge in order to tell the story of this revolution. An additional 
obstacle facing attempts to treat halakha as a form of intellectual history is the challenge 
of defining an enterprise as intellectually complex and religiously broad as halakha. These 
difficulties have led to a limited assessment of its significance. Typically translated as 
“Jewish Law” because of its prescriptive and regulative religious role, halakha has been 
                                                     
of 17th-c Europe) in Ḥut shel ḥen: Festschrift for Ḥava Turniansky, ed. Israel Bartal et al. (Jerusalem: Zalman 
Shazar,  2003 ), 123-157. 
33 Elhanan Reiner, “Aliyat ha-kehila ha-gedola: Al Shorshei ha-kehila hayehudit ha-’ironit be-Polin 
ba-et ha-ḥadasha ha-mukdemet” (The rise of the large community: On the roots of the Jewish community in 
Poland in the early modern period), Gal-’ed 20 (2006): 13-37. 
34 Elhanan Reiner, "The Attitude of Ashkenazi Society to the New Science in the Sixteenth 
Century," in Science in Context, 10, no. 4 (1997): 589-603. 
35 Elhanan Reiner, “The Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of the Modern Era: Manuscript versus 
Printed Book,” Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 10 (1997): 85-98. 
36 Reiner’s unpublished articles on the correspondence of Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles (“Al sod 
hakaat ha-ẓur”) as well as his seminar on ashkenazic halakha at the National Library of Jerusalem in the 
summer of 2017 come to mind. 
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considered a purely legal enterprise. Accordingly, legal theory is often considered the most 
appropriate tool for its analysis, and this approach has resulted in numerous illuminating 
projects and studies, which have significantly guided my research in this dissertation.37 The 
definition of halakha as purely legal has also affected some of the historical approaches to 
such sources, which consider halakha as important for historical study only as evidence of 
religious life and ritual or for the study of social and communal life and of rabbinic 
authority. The relevance of halakhic literature is not limited, however, to a strictly legal 
realm; its importance as a (at times even the most) significant field of scholarship and 
religiously venerated intellectual enterprise means that halakha occupies a much broader 
place in Jewish culture than its analogy to legal texts might imply. Imagine the position of 
lawyers and legal study in a culture where the law is the most central form of divine 
revelation. Halakha thus has the potential to serve as a rich source for the study of an entire 
cultural and intellectual universe and should be studied as such. 
This dissertation studies halakhic scholarship as a form of cultural and intellectual 
history, analyzing its texts as sources for the history of knowledge and studying its 
participants as members of an erudite culture. Halakha is a particularly intriguing field for 
intellectual history precisely because it defies the generic borders that are drawn (often 
artificially) around cultural realms. Halakha possesses not only a legal, religious, 
intellectual, and scholarly dimension; it is also simultaneously popular and elitist; 
                                                     
37 This field was pioneered by Elon. In Israel, mishpat ivri is studied mainly at the law departments 
of the major universities. Some of its most prominent scholars include Naḥum Rakover, Moshe Halbertal, 
Ḥanina ben-Menaḥem, Yair Lorberbaum, and others. Outside of Israel, it is studied in projects and groups 
such as the Jewish Law Association, YU Cardozo Law School’s Center for Jewish Law and Contemporary 
Civilization directed by Suzanne Stone, the more recent Julis-Rabinowitz Jewish Law Program at Harvard 
Law, the various Gruss programs in Jewish Law at Harvard Law, NYU Law and Penn Law. 
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theoretical and practical; and mundane and imaginary. It can thus reveal complex 
interactions between knowledge and culture, without being limited to a particular class, 
institution, or discipline. My own study concentrates mainly on the works of halakhic 
scholars, a very particular intellectual class; but the broader place of halakha, I believe, 
permits such a focus without blocking out the many other elements that are interwoven 
with halakhic scholarly culture into the larger fabric of Jewish law. 
This approach aligns with developments in intellectual history in general, which 
have increasingly come to recognize the importance of historical context of all kinds – 
social, cultural, material, technological, political – even (or, perhaps, especially) for the 
history of something as abstract as texts and knowledge. As Peter Burke points out in A 
Social History of Knowledge from Gutenberg to Diderot, the very recognition that 
knowledge has a history, that truth does not develop in a vacuum, but, instead, is influenced 
by other elements, was, not too long ago, still a controversial notion.38 Pioneers of media 
studies such as Marshall McLuhan had, of course, already considered the effects of 
dissemination technologies upon information.39 Using a historical orientation, Elisabeth 
Eisenstein’s Printing Press as an Agent of Change represents one of the earliest attempts 
to connect technology to the development of knowledge in early modern Europe. 
As Eisenstein argued, print influenced some of the most important developments 
of the period, including the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the scientific revolution. 
                                                     
38 Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge from Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2000), 6. 
39 He is most known for his famous phrase “the medium is the message,” introduced in his book, 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (NY: Mentor Press, 1964). 
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Subsequently, scholars have studied the effects of print on everything from the law through 
popular literature to the public sphere, to name but some examples.40 Others have discussed 
at length the ensuing debate on technological determinism and its limits, and I shall refer 
to it in the chapter of this dissertation that deals with print specifically. Technology is still 
considered a crucial element of intellectual history, especially in this period, but the history 
of knowledge has significantly refined its earlier focus upon print technology alone by 
including perspectives from social and cultural history, book history, media studies, and 
studies of material history and knowledge organization, resulting in a complex 
interdisciplinary field. Roger Chartier’s works, including l’Ordre des Livres and Inscrire 
et Effacer, reflect on the impact of print and knowledge re-organizations in complex and 
inventive ways.41 Countless studies, from Steven Shapin’s A Social History of Truth to 
Anne Goldgar’s Impolite Learning,42 have shown the importance of including the social 
element in studies of intellectual history. Anthony Grafton’s work on erudite culture, 
scholarly practices of reading, and his inquiries into the hidden cultural intermediaries at 
the printing house has proven the need to adopt social, cultural, and material perspectives,43 
                                                     
40 Robert Mandrou, De la culture populaire au XVII et XVIII siècle (Paris: Stock, 1964); David J 
Harvey, The Law Emprynted and Englisshed: The Printing Press as an Agent of Change in Law and Legal 
Culture 1475-1642 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2015); David Zaret, Democratic Culture: 
Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
41 Roger Chartier: Inscrire et effacer (Paris; Seuil, 2005), L'ordre des livres (Paris: Alinea, 1992) 
and The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987); Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, Histoire de la lecture dans le monde 
occidental (Paris: Seuil, 1997). 
42 Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680-1750 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science 
in Seventeenth-century England (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994). 
43 Anthony Grafton, Worlds Made by Words: Scholarship and Community in the Modern West 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); the Culture of Correction in Renaissance Europe (UK: 
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as have Ann Blair’s contributions on note-taking practices, knowledge management, and 
organization in her books, such as The Theater of Nature and Too Much to Know.44 I apply 
these new perspectives, in addition to approaches from legal theory and the history of law, 
to analyze the disruption of ashkenazic scholarly culture in the early modern period. My 
frequent reference to actual halakhic cases and my focus on issues such as materiality and 
the methods of knowledge production and dissemination, as well as the connections 
between scholarly culture and the community attempt to do justice to this approach. 
The first unit’s focus on compilations as a form of organizing knowledge seeks to 
meld questions of material transmission with issues of organization, manuscript culture, 
and specific approaches to text, law, and religion. The complex of themes at the core of the 
second unit – technology, organizational paradigms, and community – aim at presenting a 
nuanced and complex model of a knowledge revolution in Jewish history. In studying the 
shift from manuscript compilations of halakha to printed codifications, I integrate a 
discussion of the material and technological impact of the printing press with an 
exploration of abstract questions of organizational structures and socio-cultural questions 
of scholarly culture, communal identity, and legal traditions. Notwithstanding the reductive 
nature of such distinctions when taken too strictly, one can say that manuscript culture is 
inherently miscellaneous and flexible, whereas print culture is inherently structured and 
                                                     
British Library, 2011); Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, “‘Studied for action’: how Gabriel Harvey read 
his Livy,” Past & Present 129 (1990): 30-78. 
44 Ann M. Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); “Note Taking as an Art of Transmission,” Critical Inquiry 31, no. 1 
(Autumn 2004): 85-107; Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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stable.45 Once the technological determinism associated with Eisenstein’s initial 
formulations of the printing press as an agent of change is thus attenuated, the distinction 
between manuscript and print culture becomes all the more useful for examining how 
societies interact with texts.46 Utilizing such perspectives for studying this particular 
episode in the history of halakha has helped me develop a better understanding of Jewish 
intellectual developments. Moreover, the application of these perspectives to Jewish 
culture helps to clarify, and sometimes slightly adjust or question some of the narratives of 
intellectual history in early modern Europe. 
 
4.  
The main, perhaps most obvious, conclusion from this research is that forms of 
organization matter; they impact the knowledge being organized, in this case, religious 
legal knowledge. A culture that organizes its texts in compilations and one that favors 
systematic, structured, comprehensive and complete codifications will, consciously or not, 
treat these texts differently; such variances inevitably find expression in transmission, 
scholarship, and adjudication of texts. Ashkenazic culture before the sixteenth century did 
not differentiate sharply between law and custom when collecting works that included 
responsa amidst lists of laws, customs, and communal decisions; those offering legal 
                                                     
45 See Michael Johnston and Michael Van Dussen, “Introduction: Manuscripts and Cultural 
History,” in The Medieval Manuscript Book; Cultural Approaches, ed. Michael Johnston and Michael Van 
Dussen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4-5: “Late medieval manuscript culture was 
inherently miscellaneous, with texts being compiled alongside other texts throughout a manuscript’s 
history…. The dominance of miscellaneity is a unique feature of manuscript culture. Miscellaneity also 
existed within print culture, of course, but in a much more circumscribed way.” 
46 Johnston and Van Dussen, “Introduction,” 2. 
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interpretations of these texts operated under the assumption that the two realms were closer 
than later halakhic authorities imagined them to be. Rather than separating law from 
custom and establishing a hierarchy between those fields, as many later halakhic works 
implied, traditional ashkenazic scholarship saw no strict difference. As more thoroughly 
structured forms of organization became popular, however, these distinctions grew. 
My inquiries into the world of knowledge organization and Jewish law have led to 
numerous additional insights and perceptions. As many of the more recent explorations of 
print and manuscript culture have, in fact, shown, manuscript culture extended into the age 
of print. Although the two represent strongly distinct approaches, they often coexist and 
overlap. Rather than weakening the case of manuscript versus print culture, such 
qualifications, in fact, serve to explain and illuminate phenomena in the history of early 
modern halakha. For instance, Eliezer Galinsky, who prepared a recent edition of Rabbi 
Isserles’ Torat ḥatat (the Torah of the guilt-offering) on the laws of slaughter, studied a 
manuscript47 that belonged to a pupil of Rabbi Isserles and sheds light on some scholarly 
practices from their bet midrash (house of study).48 
In most early modern printed books, every page would have only one printed page 
number, typically on the recto side of a page. The specific folio would, then, be referenced 
by page number and folio (a or b). In such a book, then, only one page number is visible at 
a time. We refer to the side with the number as folio ‘a’ of that page, and the reverse is 
folio ‘b’ of the same number. The notes in this student’s manuscript have shown, however, 
                                                     
47 Paris Ms44. 
48 Galinsky also uses this manuscript to support his notion that the source references that were 
inserted into the printed Torat ḥatat stem from Rabbi Isserles himself. 
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that Rabbi Isserles followed a different system in referring to the number of the page that 
could be seen when consulting the book. He called the page with the number printed on it 
(usually on the left in Hebrew books) folio b of that number, and the facing page (usually 
on the right in Hebrew books) folio a of the same number visible on that page. (Thus, a 
page that we would conventionally call 3b, he would call 4a.)49 These rather 
unconventional (and perhaps quite trivial) discoveries about Rabbi Isserles’ practice of 
referring to printed sources while teaching underline very meaningful truths about the 
relationship between manuscript and print culture: Not only did the two overlap, they did 
so in more complex ways than we tend to imagine. Much has been made of the 
standardization of the page that print instituted and its potential for scholarly 
communication and cooperation. Rabbi Isserles utilized the potential of the standardized 
printed page very consciously when he arranged his printed Torat ḥatat to correspond to 
the structure of the most popular printed edition of the most popular earlier source on the 
same topic,50 showing his attunement to the potential of print and the stabilization of the 
                                                     
49 Rabbi Isserles used a similarly unexpected practice when he referred to passages from Mordekhai, 
a compilation of ashkenazic sources that was printed as a run-on gloss of the Talmud, with divisions wherever 
a new talmudic chapter begins. Thus, on a page of Mordekhai where a chapter changed and a title was printed, 
the text of the Mordekhai appeared, interrupted by the name of the new chapter (for instance, “Gid hanashe,” 
the sciatic nerve, the name of chapter seven in tractate Ḥulin), after which the text continued. Rabbi Isserles 
would often refer to the text as at the end or the beginning of a chapter, depending on whatever chapter title 
was visible on that printed page, whether the current chapter or the next one. Everything after the chapter 
title was thus called “the beginning of chapter Gid hanashe” (as is also our convention), but everything before 
the title was called “the end of chapter Gid hanashe” (the name of the title visible on the page, although it 
was the end of some other chapter).What Rabbi Isserles meant was not that this quote belongs to the ending 
of the chapter being named, but rather, that on the page where the passage in question appears, it is written 
before the title –  which was the name of the next chapter. In addition, Rabbi Isserles would often correctly 
reference the page on which the passage in question was printed, but the talmudic chapter was sometimes 
off. Galinsky explains that the Venice editions of the Talmud that had the Mordekhai printed at the end had 
no running headers declaring which chapter it was. 
50 Galinsky, “Introduction,” in Isserles, Torat ḥatat, 17. 
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page. Simultaneously, however, this example shows that these very same standardized 
printed pages were used in unexpected ways while teaching. If we consider this in further 
depth, it is a natural choice to refer to the visible number or title in the context of oral study 
and group teaching – even if that reference is to a printed work. When looking up 
something on one’s own in a printed book, however, this method makes little sense. 
This example makes it clear that, although print culture initiated an immense 
revolution that changed almost everything about the ways in which cultures interacted with 
texts, the myriad manifestations of these changes were all but clear-cut. One cannot simply 
conceive of print and manuscript culture, oral and textual approaches, as two entirely 
separate realms, the one disappearing, with all its attributes, to make way for the other. The 
period during which this coexistence of print and manuscript culture was at its most intense 
is around 1500, my period of focus.51 While the scales were already tipping in favor of 
print culture, manuscript culture was still very much in play at this time, especially for the 
active scholars whose scholarly culture and practices were, to a great extent, still grounded 
in manuscript culture. 
Modified and nuanced models of print versus manuscript culture can thus 
illuminate rabbinic scholarly culture of the sixteenth century in meaningful and sometimes 
unexpected ways. The second chapter of this second unit examines the connections 
between print technology and organizational paradigms, especially codification. This 
chapter includes a discussion of the polemics of Rabbi Ḥayim ben Beẓalel against 
                                                     
51 Johnston and Van Dussen, “Introduction,” 3: “1500 …by then the printed book had taken off and 
the balance had tipped against the hand-copied codex. The manuscript book would not become obsolete for 
several centuries, but by 1500 the future belonged to Gutenberg.” 
UNIT I, INTRODUCTION 
 
32 
codification, which have been cited by numerous historians to exemplify opposition to the 
Shulḥan Arukh,52 and which I relate to the ashkenazic anti-codificatory approach to 
halakha.53 This paradigm shift, as any other such shift, however, played out not only – or 
mainly – as polemics; it finds its strongest expression at the level of small changes in 
scholarly practices, in legal weight, in source preference and in textual organization. The 
case studies included in this unit are crucial for the elucidation of such changes. When 
pinpointed and understood as markers of a culture, these small changes add up to a 
revolution in ashkenazic halakha. 
The printing press, however, was not an unrestricted agent of change; as we shall 
see, technology’s impact upon the knowledge that it disseminates is not direct and absolute 
but involves the mediation of many other factors. The case studies in this unit exemplify 
how printed codifications enabled innovative forms of halakhic reasoning. Once again, 
however, these novel forms of reasoning do not emerge immediately from the printed 
codifications. During the period under discussion, halakhic interpretation relied on both 
kinds of halakhic rationale that I present – the logic of custom and transmission on the one 
hand and the logic of law and reasoning on the other and on two kinds of textual 
organization– the compilation and the code. These possibilities wax and wane and take on 
different forms, depending on the vicissitudes of history. The sixteenth century in 
Ashkenaz was a turning point from compilatory logic of custom to the codificatory logic 
                                                     
52 For instance, Eric Zimmer, Gakhalatan shel ḥakhamim (The fiery embers of the scholars) (Beer 
Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 1999). 
53 Elhanan Reiner suggests this in his fundamental article, “The Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of 
the Modern Era.” 
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of law. A comparison to other early modern European cultures highlights this dynamic. 
Around the same time as the halakhic upheavals discussed here, the British common law 
began to be printed, undergoing a similar change. Slowly but surely, lawyers and judges 
began to prefer the printed law reports to what had been called “the common learning” of 
common lawyers, typically obtained orally.54 Just as Rabbi Luria complained that students 
were now studying from books rather than from the mouths of authors, giving more 
credence to anything in writing than to what they heard from a living scholar,55 so, too, 
early modern lawyers were concerned that their students relied on reading rather than on 
receiving oral instruction in the Inns of Court.56  
Promising as these parallels are, the differences are even more instructive. For 
instance, the rise of printed collections of English common law that came to replace earlier 
reliance on the unwritten “common learning,” in fact, supported the conservative legal 
forces. As common law is precedent based, the primary foundation for legal authority is a 
prior ruling by a judge. A reliable source of precedent is, therefore, crucial. As Ian Williams 
has argued, printed reports of cases were increasingly viewed as having more “credit” or 
reliability, meaning that they were considered true records that a case had, indeed been 
brought before a court and decided in the manner reported. Once the printed collections 
were considered more reliable, the reasoning of precedent was simply transposed onto 
                                                     
54 Ian Williams, “‘He Creditted More the Printed Booke;’ Common Lawyers’ Receptivity to Print, 
c. 1550-1640,” Law and History Review 28, no. 1 (February 2010): 39-70. 
55 See Shlomo Luria, Yam shel Shlomo on tractate Ḥulin: 'והנה שגו בזה מאחר שראו שכ"כ בספרו שכך הלכ
חי וצוח ככרוכיא שאין הדין כן בראיות ' אם יעמוד א, בספר יאמינו' מה שכ, כי כך העניין הרע אשר לפניהם, ו להדיא"כ הקאר"אמרו כ
ה הנסמכים מרובים והלומדים "ובפרט האידנא שבעו, ראשונה' לא יחושו לדבריו כאשר כתבתי בהקדמ, בקבלה' גמורות או אפי
...מועטים  
56 Williams, “‘He Creditted More the Printed Booke,” 68. 
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these sources, effectively limiting the much broader array of non-printed precedent such as 
the manuscript and oral recollections of lawyers, thus curtailing legal innovation. This 
dynamic played out differently in the case of halakha because of the presence of pre-
existing traditions of legal interpretation and adjudication by means of reasoning or 
“calculus,” as I call it (in which alternative opinions, majorities, minorities, and extenuating 
circumstances are weighed, measured, combined and subtracted to arrive at a conclusion). 
This example illustrates how comparative perspectives can clarify aspects of the 
development of Jewish law: Printed halakhic codifications in Ashkenaz invited innovative 
modes of reasoning, whereas printed common law reports in England supported 
conservative law. This indicates that one must take into consideration additional factors 
such as the available alternatives for legal reasoning in a given culture and the existing 
models of legal authority before drawing conclusions based solely on technology. Print 
can, thus, have varied effects on different legal systems, depending on their earlier makeup 
and traditions. It is therefore critical that interpretations of law and the history of knowledge 
not leap directly from print technology to legal thought but, rather, isolate the dynamic, 
then take into consideration added factors that are no less important in the consideration of 
how the organization of knowledge affects its contents. 
Insistence upon the explanatory limits of print technology, however, does more than 
merely impel the historian to consider additional and mediating factors; it also suggests 
that knowledge could be transmitted without any fundamental change, regardless of 
organizational factors. Adrian Johns has presented one such argument for early modern 
England by offering the many errors, variabilities, and differences among printed books at 
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the time as evidence that the printing press did not guarantee stable transmission.57 One 
can likewise provide such examples from the history of halakha, countering, for instance, 
that Maimonides wrote the halakhic codification par excellence, which was transmitted in 
relatively stable form, even in an age of manuscript transmission. Ashkenazic culture was 
not only highly traditional but also its very halakhic logic was, in many ways, structured 
on notions of traditional transmission such as local difference, custom, and personal 
reception. The suggestion that such a strongly traditional culture changed so dramatically 
in the wake of the printing press, then, seems questionable, especially in the wake of this 
discussion of the limits of technology. Surely, it would take more than the printing press 
for a knowledge revolution to occur. The final chapter of unit two suggests one of these 
additional elements. 
By introducing the idea of a legal tradition, the non-textual approaches and 
underlying rules of a scholarly community, this chapter examines how the very resistance 
to textualization, and the high reliance on non-written elements turned out to be a major 
weakness for the transmission of ashkenazic law as it had been practiced traditionally. The 
prominence of non-textual traditions of legal scholarship in this particular halakhic culture 
represented a danger because precisely such traditions cannot be transmitted in the event 
of communal discontinuity. The case study in that chapter illustrates the crucial role of 
those scholarly culture and legal traditions that are not transmitted textually; no new texts 
were discovered, no old texts were destroyed between the fifteenth-century Western 
                                                     
57 Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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ashkenazic examples and their sixteenth-century Eastern counterparts, but, somehow, legal 
traditions had shifted; and it made all the difference. 
The third unit of the dissertation explores the life cycle of the early modern 
responsum, from letter to printed collection, placing these texts within the framework of 
scholarly culture and erudite practices. Considering halakhic scholarship as a learned 
practice and, therefore, comparing it to the erudite practices of its surroundings has been a 
helpful tool in gaining a deeper understanding of halakhic scholarship in early modern 
Europe. For instance, practices of keeping letter books has helped clarify some of the 
peculiarities of sixteenth-century collections of responsa, such as the (divergent) types of 
material included, the (low) degree of editing in these collections, and the (dis)order of 
their contents. In another example, scholarly practices of compiling personal archives for 
reference, which were frequently consulted by colleagues, has shed light on early modern 
rabbinic practices of writing, collecting, and publication that were previously unclear, thus 
exposing the dynamic nature of scholarly research that emerges precisely from less 
organized books. 
In addition to shared practices and some geographical overlap, the resemblances 
are often morphological; actual cases of direct influence and contact are rare. Nevertheless, 
my dissertation research has benefited tremendously from comparisons to early modern 
phenomena and studies of these phenomena. It is my hope that the implications of my study 
can extend beyond Jewish history and contribute to early modern and intellectual history 
in general by serving as a comparative basis for other erudite cultures. The focus on 
scholarly practices that are ideologically neutral and often shared cross-culturally renders 
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this study especially useful for comparative purposes and it highlights the relationship of 
attitudes, meanings, and dogmas to scholarly practices. For instance, my analysis of the 
communications network that emerges from rabbinic responsa benefited from ideas about 
humanist epistolary networks, a comparable web of scholars that existed at the same time 
and in similar regions. This comparison has led to a better understanding of how letters of 
responsa constituted a halakhic discourse in time and space by creating a partially public 
sphere, a so-called “forum” that determined the acceptable forms of legal reasoning. 
The commonalities between the humanist République des Lettres and what I call 
the Rabbinic Republic of Letters are striking, but so are the differences. There are various 
connections between the humanist Republic of Letters and its Enlightenment successors, 
as well as with empirical science, such as shared techniques and a certain degree of overlap 
between their members. Many have taken this one step further, arguing that the 
collaborative aspect of humanist correspondence was, in essence, a precursor of the 
philosophies of empiricism and the openness of the Enlightenment.58 Comparison to the 
early modern Rabbinic Republic of Letters can serve to qualify such theories, presenting 
an example of a similarly collaborative intellectual network that did not develop in such 
ways. The contemporaneous rabbinical parallel serves to emphasize the importance of the 
early modern characteristics of the Republic of Letters, such as the communicative and 
discourse-building force of epistolary networks, for their own sake instead of reading them 
in terms of later evolutions. 
                                                     
58 To give but one example, see Charles B. Schmitt, “Science in the Italian Universities in the 
Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities 
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1984). See n1010 in this dissertation. 
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As an inquiry into the interaction of knowledge and technology, my study generates 
insights that go beyond the specific culture and corpus it investigates. My focus on the 
advantages and possibilities of less systematized organizational cultures has fostered the 
conviction that any study of the history of knowledge would benefit from considering non-
ordered scholarly cultures not as immature stages in a teleological progression to increasing 
systematization but as scholarly cultures in their own right, with unique and meaningful 
approaches to knowledge. Different forms of organizing knowledge, such as compilations 
versus codifications, are alternative modes of textual organization that do not relate to one 
another hierarchically – that is, they do not imply that one is superior to the other in quality 
or that one represents the final product of its counterpart, which is merely a preliminary 
phase. Rather, the varieties of modes of knowledge organization are alternatives, each with 
its own possibilities and limitations, advantages and disadvantages, and each with its own 
approach and implied philosophy about knowledge, in this case religious knowledge and 
law. Although the compilation has certain deficiencies – it lacks a comprehensive structure 
making it is difficult to navigate or obtain an overview, it has the advantages of flexibility, 
personalization, and the capacity to contain different and incommensurable types of 
information. In a more current vein, digital culture encourages ordering and controlling 
information; however, the internet’s lack of linearity and multifarious contents resists this 
control. This current tension makes my emphasis on multiplicities of organization and the 
early modern “loss of disorder” particularly relevant.
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THE INHERITED TRADITION 
The Organization of Halakhic Knowledge in the Age of Manuscript Likutim 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Historians constantly face the risk of anachronism, but it is especially acute regarding the 
history of knowledge. Because the state of knowledge organization in any given period is 
usually not made explicit or articulated consciously, even great shifts in the organization 
of knowledge can be easy to overlook. Using a variety of methods ranging from numerical 
analysis through literary and social studies, to cultural and material history, historians have 
determined many ways in which changes in the organization of knowledge intersect with 
technology, culture, and society. However, these interactions take place in ways far more 
complex than we might expect. Earlier modes of organization do not instantaneously 
evaporate at the appearance of new technologies or social change. In fact, bodies of 
knowledge often tend to perpetuate their organizational state without immediately or 
necessarily responding to shifts. In the face of radically changed circumstances, novel 
possibilities, and unprecedented new requirements, earlier modes of producing, 
transmitting, and organizing knowledge can persist with surprising tenacity, even when, at 
times, this seems counter-intuitive given new circumstances. Once we cease to conceive of 
changes in knowledge organization as a progression of neat breaks and clear transitions, it 
becomes possible to detect moments of overlapping paradigms and adaptations of older 
organizational regimes to new methods in ways that are often unexpected and surprising 
from our vantage point.  
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 The persistence of older forms of knowledge is a particularly strong force in deeply 
traditional scholarly cultures, which place a distinct value on continuity, such as Ashkenaz. 
Therefore, this culture’s adaptation to changes in the history of knowledge requires close 
attention not only to the novel elements, but also to the traditional elements and their 
adjustment to change. Moreover, changes in the history of knowledge, while always at risk 
of being overlooked, are even harder to notice the more successful they were. The more 
fundamental the changes, the more obvious the resulting organizational forms appear. The 
shift that took place in the early modern period was so profound and thorough that it 
determined the shape of halakha thereafter, the influence of its reorganization persisting to 
this very day, thus making it difficult to imagine that halakha was ever organized differently 
than the ways familiar to our contemporary experience. In order to appreciate the 
significance of the change that took place in the early modern period, then, it is crucial to 
compare early modern knowledge-organization not only to our current ideas of 
organizational possibilities, but to depart, instead, from the forms of organization that 
preceded the early modern period. An inquiry into the state of the organization of halakhic 
knowledge in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Ashkenaz is, therefore, paramount. 
Utilizing the scholarship of bibliographers and historians of Ashkenaz in the Middle Ages, 
and studies of manuscript culture more generally in medieval Europe, this discussion aims 
to ascertain the traditions of knowledge organization that preceded the halakhic writings of 
the early modern period. This study will thus facilitate an understanding of the sources of 
various forms of organizing halakhic knowledge in the early modern period that stem from 
these older traditions and enable comprehension of the depth of the change that followed.  
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 This discussion will encompass the period beginning with the decline of Ashkenaz 
in Western Europe at the end of the thirteenth century until the end of the fifteenth. Starting 
roughly around the time of the Rindfleisch massacres of 1289 in Germany and the 
expulsion of the Jews from France in 1306 and continuing with the Black Death in the mid-
fourteenth century, the political situation of the Jews in this part of Ashkenaz was 
deteriorating in terms of security and stability. The many evictions and persecutions led to 
the breakdown of communities and the flight of many Jews to other areas. The level of the 
development of halakhic activity in this period corresponds to the moment after the apex 
of the twelfth-century tosafists, who were known for interpretations of the Talmud based 
on textual comparison and logical hermeneutics. Around the end of the thirteenth century, 
the formulation of these innovative explanations waned. In 1293, when Rabbi Meir of 
Rothenburg (b. ca. 1215) died in the fortress of Enisheim, Alsace, after years of 
imprisonment, the tosafist period definitively ended. The time span that followed this 
period is often regarded as an epoch of intellectual decline in Ashkenaz, as the creativity 
and virtuosic thinking of the earlier tosafists was replaced by the “mere” compilation of 
halakhic summaries.59 The writings of some of his most illustrious students, Rabbi Asher 
                                                     
59 Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim (History of the Jewish codes) (New York: Jubilee 
Committee, 1946-7), 1:15. Tchernowitz calls this entire period from the Arba Turim (14th c.) to the Shulḥan 
Arukh (16th c.) “the period of decline and narrowing” (תקופת הירידה והצמצום). See also Güdemann’s discussion 
of such compilations in terms of intellectual decline throughout. Moritz Güdemann, Das Jüdische 
Erziehungswesen und der Cultur der abendländischen Juden während des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit 
(Wien: Hölder, 1880). 
See also Israel Ta-Shma, “Halakha, minhag u-meẓiut” (Halakha, custom and reality) in Kneset 
meḥkarim: Iyunim ba-sifrut ha-rabanit bi-yemei ha-beinayim (Collection of studies: Inquiries into the 
rabbinic literature of the Middle Ages) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2004), 16. He considers the so-called 
“Renaissance of the twelfth century” to end around 1350. The peak of the tosafist period is placed in the first 
quarter of the thirteenth century and the decline in the beginning of the fourteenth, which saw “a great decline 
in all senses of the term…” 
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ben Yeḥiel, Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel, and Rabbi Meir ha-Kohen will be discussed in 
the following pages, with special focus on the organizational profile of their works. The 
chapter will end with the further decline of Jewish intellectual activity in Western Ashkenaz 
in the late fourteenth century, after the period of the students of Rabbi Rothenburg ends, on 
the one hand; and with the organizational changes that resulted from the advent of print 
technology in the last third of the fifteenth century, on the other.  
Scholars such as Ephraim Elimelech Urbach, Israel Ta-Shma, Malachi Bet-Arié, 
and Simcha Emanuel have, each in their own way, paid special attention to the development 
of halakha in this period by studying its main authors, works, and techniques, and have 
established a firm basis for further study. They have not always attempted to bring to the 
fore the broader implications of these findings on the attitudes towards halakhic 
knowledge. Scholars of medieval methods of knowledge organization in Europe in general, 
such as Malcolm Parkes, Stephen Nichols, and Mary and Richard Rouse, have adopted an 
approach that can provide valuable insights into Latin manuscripts. Their methods, 
however, have not been sufficiently applied to the realm of Jewish history. I will integrate 
the studies of the former scholars with the context and insights provided by the latter, 
aiming to add a crucial perspective to the study of the development of halakhic writing in 
the post-tosafist period.  
This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of likutim, manuscript compilations of 
halakhic texts that were the main form of Jewish legal writing in this period. These 
compilations were often miscellaneous collections. The connections between the 
materiality of manuscript collections and their often miscellaneous contents have been 
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explored by scholars of Latin and vernacular medieval manuscripts, most notably in a 
volume edited by Stephen Nichols and Siegfried Wenzel.60  More recently, Lucie 
Doležalová and Kimberly Rivers edited Medieval Manuscript Miscellanies: Composition, 
Authorship, Use, which included contributions seeking to define and distinguish particular 
types of miscellaneous compilations and varying levels of coherence versus unity.61 Within 
the broad category of halakhic compilations, it is also possible to distinguish between 
several kinds of likutim: Some are closer to typical literary works, containing primarily the 
input of one author who is providing his personal intellectual contribution on a more-or-
less determined topic; some are closer to anthologies, works that offer a selection of 
sources, abridged, or in full; some provide legal conclusions, while others merely 
summarize material; others, yet, are almost entirely unedited, and appear closer to notes 
and jottings, rather than representing a unified work; some are strongly identified with a 
known author, while others are the work of multiple, sometimes anonymous hands over an 
                                                     
60 The Whole Book: Cultural Perspectives on the Medieval Miscellany, ed. Stephen Nichols and 
Siegfried Wenzel (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996). 
61 Medieval Manuscript Miscellanies: Composition, Authorship, Use, ed. Lucie Doležalová and 
Kimberly Rivers (Krems: Medium Aevum Quotidianum Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der materiallen Kultur 
des Mittelalters, 2013).  
Notable definitions and distinctions are, for instance, Greti Dinkova-Bruun’s differentiation 
between primary miscellanies and secondary miscellanies, in which the former was a compilation created by 
one compiler at one point in time, whereas the latter is the result of various primary miscellanies combined 
with no rhyme or reason at different points in time. Greti Dinkova-Bruun, “Medieval Miscellanies and the 
Case of Manuscript British Library, Cotton Titus D.XX.” in Medieval Manuscript Miscellanies, 14-34. 
Similarly instructive is the codicological unit versus the composite manuscript, in which the former was put 
together in one action whereas the latter is made up of several codicological units, a distinction Peter Gumbert 
already introduced in Peter Gumbert, “Codicological Units: Towards a Terminology for the Stratigraphy of 
the Non-Homogeneous Codex,” Segno e Testo 2 (2004): 17-42.  
Another useful term, introduced by Derek Pearsall is the distinction between anthologies and 
commonplace books as opposed to truly miscellaneous volumes, as well as his notion of “spasms of planning” 
to denote miscellaneous collections that seem to include coherent units here and there. See Derek Pearsall, 
“The Whole Book: Late Medieval English Manuscript Miscellanies and Their Modern Interpreters,” in 
Imagining the Book, ed. Kelly Stephen and John J. Thompson (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 17–29. 
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undetermined period of time; some have been copied often enough to be considered a 
known work, while others did not survive; some are aimed at more popular audiences than 
others, and many do not appear to be aiming at any audience at all.   
As this chapter develops, I will touch upon these different properties of 
compilations. My primary interest, however, is not in one specific type of likut, but, rather, 
in their broader organizational character. I employ the term likut not as a classification of 
genre, but rather, as a form of organization that compiles rather than unifying. The likut is 
neither a genre nor a specific work; it is the material embodiment of a paradigm of 
organization. Likutim, very broadly speaking, designate any compilation of halakhic textual 
material that is open, both in its contents and its structure, and personal in its nature. My 
inquiry focuses on the functions and uses of the likut and its underlying logic, which 
continued to determine practices of knowledge organization and approaches to halakhic 
knowledge well into the fifteenth century and beyond. 
 In the next section of this chapter, I offer a definition of the likut as an organizational 
principle, contrasting it to the codification. Next, compiling as a practice of copying is 
contextualized more specifically for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and different 
motivations for compiling are considered. The discussion of compiling as a scribal practice 
is followed by a closer inquiry of compiling as something more significant, namely, a mode 
of organization. Sections four to six analyze two related organizational characteristics that 
significantly distinguish manuscript likutim from other halakhic writings: First, they are 
fundamentally open, both in content and in structure; likutim are characterized by flexibility 
and adaptation. These compilations were created by freely collecting and customizing 
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material, sometimes copying it verbatim, at other times paraphrasing, summarizing, 
arranging it in whichever way the scribe saw fit, and augmenting it with glosses and new 
texts. Second, they are highly personal, as likutim were usually transmitted and copied by 
those who had a personal connection to the author (students, sons, or colleagues). A likut 
subsequently provided material for the creation of one’s own likutim, either by itself 
providing the basis for additional material, or by copying information from the former likut 
into one’s own compilation.  
Moreover, the likut’s openness and its personal nature are connected: as the 
compilations were created for personal use, they were always adapted and customized, and 
individual likutim differed widely from one another. Published works, on the other hand, 
are considered more stable and closed. In the context of manuscript publication, the notion 
of personal works versus published ones requires further clarification, which section seven 
advances, together with the question of how the general lack of stability of manuscript 
transmission affects the nature of published compilations. 
 In section eight, I discuss the ways in which rabbinic responsa specifically relate to 
compilations in terms of the organizational structures that this genre privileges. The period 
under discussion can be considered “the age of likutim” in Ashkenaz. The likut may seem 
to be an arbitrary method of writing halakhic texts, its prevalence merely a result of 
contingent factors such as technical limitations, an unstable political situation, and a 
general decline in intellectual creativity in the realm of halakha. Certainly, the use of 
likutim, as any other method of collecting, studying, and transmitting knowledge, was 
determined by technical, intellectual, social, and political circumstances, and responded to 
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specific situations, possibilities, and needs. A closer look at the order and logic underlying 
various examples of likutim, however, can reveal specific ways of approaching knowledge 
and thinking about halakha, which are explored, respectively, in sections nine and ten.  
As a whole, this chapter will indicate how pervasive the likut was in post-tosafist 
Ashkenaz, not only as a method of note taking, but also as a genre of halakhic writing. 
Most of all, however, it is, as I will argue, an approach to knowledge. From the perspective 
of knowledge organization, the likut represents an approach that is active, creative, open, 
highly personalized, and flexible. As this chapter’s epilogue argues, this flexibility will 
become ever harder to uphold with the growing systematization of halakhic texts.   
 
2. THE COMPILATION AS AN OPEN FORM OF ORGANIZATION 
The likut is a quintessentially medieval and ashkenazic form of organization, for reasons 
that will be explored later, but the varieties of organizational models, and the logic that 
governs each such method, which the current section discusses, apply equally to different 
times and places. The following paragraphs will present such a more general definition of 
the likut. What distinguishes a likut from other forms of halakhic organizing and collecting 
is its openness. Other forms of halakhic knowledge organization, most notably, halakhic 
codes, similarly strive to collect various materials in one place in a searchable manner.  
Codes and compilations are both primarily concerned with collecting, 
summarizing, paraphrasing, and, in some cases, providing interpretations, conclusions, and 
additional insights into a body of texts. The first step in creating a code is often the process 
of collecting all the disparate material. Although this initial collection, which can resemble 
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a compilation, is frequently a first step towards codification, compilations are more than 
just the rough material for the creation of codes, and compiling must be viewed as a distinct 
practice of organizing knowledge, with its own characteristics and uses. Codifications are 
usually closely connected to authoritative legal projects, while compilations have a looser 
relationship to determining the law; but the legal or intellectual project and its 
organizational structure are two separate elements and should, thus, be considered 
separately.62 The following paragraphs will define compilations versus codes purely in 
terms of their structure and organization. 
 Organizationally, codes generally attempt to be complete and cover every facet of 
a certain topic, even where there is little need to comment upon or add to certain 
components. They aspire to address their topic in a specific order that assigns every 
component a particular location, without repeating the discussion in another area. The 
specific locations of the components follow a certain logic, as they are placed within one 
fully integrated and continuous organizational scheme. This renders a code easily and 
systematically searchable. In a successful code, the user expects that nothing will be 
missing. In terms of finding aids, we can contrast the index, which presents the reader with 
thematic insight, to the table of contents, which is merely a shorter version of the work.63 
                                                     
62 Generally, codifications also aim at determining the bottom-line of the law, but this is not 
necessarily so, and we can find examples of works that are organized as codifications without subscribing to 
such a legal project; Sefer Miẓvot Katan, for instance, is a codification, as will be discussed in the following 
passages, but it does not attempt to determine the final law in a definite manner and will, for instance, present 
differences of opinion. Similarly, Orḥot Ḥayim, also mentioned below, is structured like a code without 
presenting final legal decisions. 
63 Mary A. Rouse and Richard H Rouse, Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts and 
Manuscripts (Michigan: Notre Dame University Press, 1991), 198, call it the simplest of finding devices. 
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The arrangement of an index need not be alphabetical;64 it can be logical, thematic, 
chronological, or it may follow some other order that was intuitive to its users. Unlike the 
compilation, where a table of contents provides a more contracted version of the work but 
adds nothing more, the table of contents in a code can be used for more meaningful 
searching, similarly to an index. In a code, the table of contents reflects the fact that the 
work’s arrangement and division follows a logical order, which, as a whole, presents a 
comprehensive and complete scheme of the topic at hand. In the case of codes of halakha, 
the religious life cycle, the biblical weekly readings, or the Talmud were oft-used 
structures. Unlike the chapter headings of a code, tables of contents in compilations do not 
necessarily present the reader with an intuitively accessible additional structure. It is simply 
a reiteration of the contents of the work itself and thus presents, at most, an overview of 
the contents in shorter form. 
 The paradigmatic example of a halakhic code is Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, 
composed around 1170-1180. The topic of this code is the entirety of Jewish Law and its 
organizational scheme is a thematically (one may even say, philosophically) logical one, 
which begins with the monotheistic foundations of the law. An additional example is the 
Arba Turim, (Four columns/pillars) written by Rabbi Yacov ben Asher (Cologne ca. 1269-
Toledo ca. 1343). 65 This work covers only Jewish Law that applied in daily life in the 
                                                     
64 Alphabetical indexes were used as finding devices in the Latin milieu only in the following stage 
of organizing material. A combination of particular cultural changes (the growth of the learned community 
from monastic culture to the schools), conventions (the use of the distinctiones in sermons), and changes in 
mentality – a utilitarian approach to knowledge (see Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 204) led to a break with the 
more traditional forms of organization.  
65 The author’s illustrious father was Rabbi Asher –also known as ROSh. The Arba Turim can most 
definitely be considered a code, but it is not as paradigmatic as the Mishne Torah and has many elements that 
resemble a compilation, most importantly the retention of multiple opinions and the paraphrasing and quoting 
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fourteenth century; its organization is roughly thematic and, at times, chronological. Sifrei 
miẓvot, or “Books of commandments,” a genre of halakhic writing that attempts to 
enumerate and explain all 613 positive and negative commandments may also be 
considered a kind of code. Maimonides’ Mishne Torah, the quintessential code, in fact, 
started out within this genre, as is evident in its introduction. The works in this genre aspire 
to be complete and comprehensive, and they list every one of the 613 commandments in 
its place. Sifrei miẓvot usually employ an organizational scheme that is accessible, either 
by means of an intuitive structure or, for instance, by following the order of the weekly 
biblical readings, as is the case in the Sefer ha-ḥinukh (The book of education), written 
anonymously in thirteenth-century Spain. The Sefer miẓvot gadol, (Large book of 
commandments), also known by its acronym SMaG, is one of the most famous thirteenth-
                                                     
of various sources rather than distilling them into a seamless whole. Rabbi Yacov’s introduction clearly stated 
the need for a work that would manage the growing multitude of information, as he explains, “Because our 
days in exile have become long, and our strength has waned ... and the disagreements have grown, and the 
opinions have multiplied...” He claims first to have wanted to write only the laws of blessings, “As our Sages 
of blessed memory have said, ‘A man should go to a sage and be taught the laws of blessings so that he does 
not arrive at enjoying God’s world without permission (me’ilah).’ Therefore ... I will stand up and wander 
around ... and understand in books. And I will collect two or three crumbs ... from the words of the [different] 
authors. And I will compile a book on the topic of prayers and blessings and will arrange for every single 
thing its appropriate blessing before and after....” 
Once he finished this task, he explains that he decided to compile laws from an additional field: “I 
sought to compile also the laws of the Sabbath and the holidays and the megilah and Ḥanukah and Rosh 
Ḥodesh and fasts, because these are things that come up often at known points in time.” More and more fields 
are added to these until the entire four volumes of the Arba Turim emerge.  
Ultimately, however, this is not merely a compilation of compilations. Arba Turim rearranges, 
organizes, streamlines, and summarizes the material to a certain degree, with a result resembling a code in 
many ways. Menachem Elon characterizes Arba Turim as the “middle way” between the extremely 
codificatory Mishne Torah, on the one hand, and the expansive and inconclusive Talmud, on the other. See 
Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes 
(Philadelphia: JPS, 1994), 3:1286. 
On the work’s position “between” Ashkenaz and Sefarad, see Israel Ta-Shma, “Between East and 
West: Asher b. Yeḥiel and his son Rabbi Ya’akov,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, 
vol. 3, ed. Isidore Twersky and Jay Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 179-196 and 
Judah D. Galinsky, “Ashkenazim in Sefarad: The ROSh and the Tur on the Codification of Jewish Law,” 
Jewish Law Annual 16 (2006): 3-23. 
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century works in this genre.66 Although written by a scholar from Coucy, he composed it 
between 1239 and 1247, after his wanderings in Spain, during which he also preached. It 
is divided into two main parts, namely the positive and the negative commandments of 
several fields of halakha (family law, foods, torts, the Temple, etc.), and one section for the 
non-biblical commandments (such as the laws of Ḥanukah). Others, such as Sefer yere’im 
(Book of the God-fearing) by Rabbi Elazar of Metz (twelfth century) have a much more 
intricate structure.67 
 Compilations, on the other hand, do not aspire to be complete, meaning that they 
need not cover every aspect of a certain topic, but, instead, can skip around within a topic, 
based on the specific need of the compiler, the availability of material, or his particular 
interests. Moreover, a compilation need not be as systematically organized as a code; the 
order can be more random, the organizational scheme much looser, and the same topic can 
                                                     
66 On the Sefer miẓvot gadol, see Judah D. Galinsky, “Rabbis, Readers, and the Paris Book Trade: 
Understanding French Halakhic Literature in the Thirteenth Century,” in Entangled Histories: Knowledge, 
Authority and Jewish Culture in the Thirteenth Century, ed. Elisheva Baumgarten, Ruth Mazo Karras, 
Katelyn Mesler (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 73-93. 
67 Sefer yere’im by Rabbi Eliezer of Metz (12th c.), was rearranged, abridged, summarized, and 
supplemented. Rabbi Ḥayim Yosef ben David Azulai (1724-1806), in his bibliography Shem ha-gdolim (The 
names of the great), remarks that the printed version does not resemble the manuscript versions that he saw, 
which are longer. In fact, the printed work is less than a third of the manuscripts in length. Sefer yere’im is 
divided into pillars and hooks (seven pillars, nearly every pillar has “hooks,” the “hooks” are arranged 
according to the gravity and seriousness of the punishments for transgressing these commandments); on the 
hooks, he “hangs” the individual commandments (positive or negative). Every individual commandment 
includes the relevant source material, from the biblical through the talmudic, geonic, etc., with some 
discussion woven through. There is a table of contents arranged thematically according to his particular 
system. In his conclusion, Rabbi Eliezer proclaims: “I concluded the commandments and their sub-
commandments as I planned, and I calculated them as I found them in the book of Yehudai Gaon of blessed 
memory, and I conflated them as 464 [rather than 613] because in some places, I conflated two 
commandments as one, and blessed is our Rock, who helped my heart succeed this far, to complete that which 
was in my heart, this book….” The work is based on the Baal halakhot gedolot, a Sefer miẓvot written by 
Rabbi Shimon Kayara (or Rabbi Yehudai Gaon – as the author seems to have believed).  
On Ba’al halakhot gedolot in Ashkenaz, see Ta-Shma in Kneset meḥkarim, 1: 33, 54. See also 
Avraham (Rami) Reiner, “Le-hitkabluto shel Sefer halakhot gdolot be-Ashkenaz” (On the reception of the 
Sefer halakhot gdolot in Ashkenaz) in Limud ve-da’at be-maḥshava yehudit, ed. Ḥaim Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: 
Ben Gurion University Press, 2006), 95-121. 
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be treated in more than one place. As a result, a compilation can contain material from 
different registers of knowledge that cannot readily be unified and streamlined into one 
organizational scheme. Compilations, thus, are not as reliable as codes, as they do not 
aspire or promise completeness, and their less systematic order makes them more difficult 
to search. Compilations, however, have the advantage of being more flexible in three ways: 
First, as compilations do not strive to be complete and comprehensive, only relevant 
information is included, without the need to touch upon every component of the topic at 
hand. In this it is unlike a code, which must at least mention every element that comprises 
its topic, even when it is uninteresting, repetitive, or not innovative. Second, a larger variety 
of different kinds and genres of material can be included in a compilation, despite the fact 
that they are not easily integrated into one organizational scheme. Finally, the addition of 
material over time does not necessarily require re-arranging the whole compilation. New 
material, whether newly discovered or newly generated, can simply be tacked onto the end 
of the compilation or to the end of one section.68  
 It is worth noting that the distinction between compilations and codes is not a binary 
one. Some compilations are systematically organized but still include knowledge from 
different generic registers that do not fit together seamlessly into one continuous 
organizational scheme as the information in codes do. Similarly, codes sometimes are not 
entirely systematic and include some repetition, or they may be incomplete and contain 
                                                     
68 For a discussion of the advantages of flexibility in knowledge organization, see, for instance, 
Michael Hunter, “Mapping the Mind of Robert Boyle: The Evidence of the Boyle Papers,” in Archives of the 
Scientific Revolution: The Formation and Exchange of Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. Michael 
Hunter (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 1988), 135-136. 
UNIT I, CHAPTER 1: THE INHERITED TRADITION 
 
52 
gaps. There is a spectrum that separates the two poles – a perfect code and – (though this 
may be a contradiction in terms) a perfect compilation – from one another, and most works 
will fit somewhere along that spectrum, rather than squarely at one of the poles. The most 
basic body of Jewish legal texts, the Talmud, is in most ways structured similarly to a 
compilation; it is not entirely systematized, and includes digressions, repetitions, and 
discussions of similar issues in separate places, which makes it hard to search and not easily 
accessible.69 Moreover, it is not complete or comprehensive, and contains many lacunae. 
The Talmudic discussion, over generations of redactions, tried to fill in some of its own 
gaps by bringing texts from parallel bodies of halakhic knowledge such as the Jerusalem 
Talmud or the Tosefta into the conversation. It also, at times, investigated internal 
contradictions by comparing similar statements from disparate parts of the Talmud and 
attempting to resolve the differences. Notwithstanding these unifying efforts, the Talmud 
                                                     
69 Menachem Elon, in chapter 32 of his magnum opus, Jewish Law, considers the main dilemma in 
the writing of any form of halakhic summary to be the degree of codification. By codification, he primarily 
means the process by which halakha is detached and distilled from its expansive, messy, and often 
inconclusive Talmudic textual source and transformed into a more manageable and decisive summary. Elon 
classifies halakhic summaries according to the degree to which they summarize the Talmud. Works of psikah, 
or adjudication, provide only the ultimate halakhic conclusion, whereas other types of halakhic summary 
retain some of the Talmudic discussion that precedes the conclusion. Elon places Mishne Torah on the most 
extreme end of summary, entirely transforming the Talmudic source material and retaining no connection to 
it but the very essence. He considers the Arba Turim the perfect balance; it summarizes, on the one hand, but 
retains a connection to the Talmudic source-material, on the other. See Elon, Jewish Law, 3:1138-1148. 
Elon’s considerations are, of course, accurate, but it is important to include the dimension of order 
and reorganization in addition to his dimension of summary versus retention of the original sources. This 
added dimension of order allows us to distinguish between various additional kinds of halakhic summaries 
based not only on the degree to which they summarize but also on the nature of their structure. 
See also Judah Galinsky, “Ashkenazim in Sefarad,” 3-23. Galinsky agrees with Elon’s 
classification, but places Elon’s more platonic distinction within the historical context of Rabbi Asher and 
his son Yacov and their move from Ashkenaz, where study focused on the Talmud, to Sfarad, which relied 
heavily on codes such as Mishne Torah. Rabbi Yacov actively chose the “middle way” that organizes halakha 
as a code but is nonetheless more expansive and provides different halakhic opinions and references to the 
Talmudic texts. He did so in order to make his father’s Ashkenazi form of study accessible to the sfardic 
study practices, which were more code-oriented. 
UNIT I, CHAPTER 1: THE INHERITED TRADITION 
 
53 
is far from a codified body of knowledge. This is not to say, however, that the organization 
of the Talmud is completely open; every Talmudic tractate has one main topic, and the 
tractates, in turn, are grouped according to their more general subject-matter, based on the 
six sdarim (orders) of the Mishna, the source that the Talmud is explicating. For instance, 
the mishnaic order of Nashim (Women) includes tractates such as Gitin (Divorce 
documents), Nidah (Menstrual Impurity), Kidushin (Marriage), and topics relating to 
family law. Because of this rudimentary order, it is possible for a work of scholarship that 
focuses on the Talmud to be structured like a code, although it would require some degree 
of re-organizing and consolidating of the material. 
 Many later scholars attempted to create such aids to facilitate access to the Talmudic 
body of knowledge. Some, such as Rabbi Yiẓḥak al’Fasi (Algeria 1013–Spain 1103, also 
known as RYF), did so by re-producing a more distilled version of the text, leaving out the 
non-legal discussions, thus creating a narrower, more unified genre of texts (those texts 
pertaining to the legal genre), whose smaller dimensions are easier to survey. Others did so 
by creating cross-references with newer, more systematic codes of Jewish Law, such as the 
sixteenth-century Rabbi Joshua Boaz’s Ein mishpat (Fount of justice), which refers 
talmudic passages to the correct locations in Arba Turim and Maimonides’ code. Certain 
schools of interpreting the Talmud sought to integrate the body of knowledge and 
streamline it by comparing passages in one place in the Talmud to similar ones elsewhere 
in order to illuminate differences and harmonize contradictions. The most famous example 
of this are the tosafists, who, in the words of a sixteenth-century rabbi, “made the whole 
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Talmud into one perfect sphere.”70 Because so many products of halakhic scholarship are 
centered on the Talmud, they often follow its order and thus display compilation-like 
organizational characteristics. 
 Some compilations were created by using a pre-existing code, glossing the code’s 
contents, and inserting new material into these glosses. Occasionally, compilations were 
created simply by arranging a collection of material based on the pre-existing code’s 
organizational structure without relating to the contents of the code in any meaningful way. 
The reverse phenomenon – a code based on a compilation – does not exist, strictly 
speaking, as creating a code would require completely re-organizing, streamlining, and 
filling in the missing parts of the compilation on which it is based. This would entail 
devising a structure, placing the material in its proper location, transforming different types 
of writing into a consistent register, and filling in gaps; and streamlining and integrating 
the new whole. In sum, codifications are complete, consistent, and stable, while 
compilations are open, uneven, and flexible. This distinction is valid in general, and often 
relevant; but it is especially crucial for understanding late medieval Ashkenaz, where the 
compilation becomes dominant as a practice of organizing writings, as a form of structuring 
works, and as an approach to textual knowledge and halakha writ large.    
3. THE THIRTEENTH  AND  FOURTEENTH CENTURIES:  
COMPILATION AS A SCRIBAL PRACTICE 
The compilation’s open form of organization is, in many ways, a result of specific practices 
of writing and copying. The practice of copying other sources for one’s own use, as well 
                                                     
70 Shlomo Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, first introduction to tractate Ḥulin (Cracow, 1633).  שאשעהו ככדור
 .אחד
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as the practice of collecting one’s material based on or surrounding other works, often 
results in compilations. Both of these practices were highly important in early modern 
Ashkenaz. One of the most significant innovations of the medieval ashkenazic sphere, in 
comparison to earlier Jewish centers, is the growth in the practice, primarily by students, 
of putting down in writing the interpretations, commentaries, and teachings that were being 
studied in the bet midrash (house of study),71 an innovation that ultimately created the need 
for likutim.72 The growth of this practice of writing is noticeable in fields as varied as 
interpretations of midrash, of mystical texts, and of piutim (liturgical poems); it is even 
truer of talmudic commentary and interpretation, the most central tosafist activity.73 The 
                                                     
71 Reuven Bonfil, “Mytos, retorika, historia? Iyun bi-megilat Aḥima’aẓ,” (Myth, rhetoric, history? 
A study of the scroll of Ahima’aẓ) in Tarbut ve-hevra be-toldot Israel bi-yemei ha-benayim (Culture and 
society in Jewish medieval history), ed. Reuven Bonfil, Ḥaim-Ḥillel Ben-Sasson, Yosef Hacker (Jerusalem: 
Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1989), 99-135. Bonfil characterizes the transition of Jewish society from “orality” 
to “textuality” in the Middle Ages; in terms of sheer volume of written Hebrew texts, he explains that the 
Middle Ages are on the other side of a “great manuscript divide” compared to earlier periods.  
On the scarcity of manuscript remnants in Hebrew that precede the ninth century when compared 
with remnants of Latin manuscripts from the same period, which number over 1,600, see Malachi Bet-Arié, 
“Palimpsest Munchen: Sridei megilah mi-lifnei ha-me’ah ha-shminit,” (The Munich palimpsest: remnants of 
a scroll from before the eighth century) Kiryat Sefer 43 (1968): 415. He ties this to the halakhic prohibition 
to write down the oral Torah.  
See also A. Samely and P. Alexander, “Artefact and Text: Recreation of Jewish Literature in 
Medieval Hebrew Manuscripts,” Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library 75 (1993): 8-9, as quoted 
in Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud: Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish 
Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 7-8. When Fishman discusses the process 
of “textualization,” she means, “this slow and unconscious cultural process, during the course of which the 
society in question came to ascribe greater value to the authority of the inscribed word than it did to oral 
testimony....” Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 9. The growth in the practice of writing down 
is a significant phenomenon, even if we leave aside the question of consequences and significance, such as 
the changing conceptions of authority and its sources and the different value assigned to oral as opposed to 
written text. 
72 See Israel Ta-Shma, “Review of Ephraim Kupfer, ed., Tshuvot u-psakim me’et ḥakhmei Ashkenaz 
ve-Ẓarfat,” (Responsa and rulings from the sages of Ashkenaz and France) Kiryat Sefer 51 (1977): 480. Ta-
Shma succinctly describes the results of this growth in written material in this review: “With the spreading 
of Torah study in the big and small towns of Ashkenaz during the whole extended period of the activity of 
RaShY and the tosafists, a wide and varied spectrum of opinions developed that touched upon halakhic theory 
and practice, in responsa and in talmudic interpretations, in books of commandments, and in collections of 
custom, and the students needed specific notes, in order not to tax their memories too much.” 
73 Although the tosafist school was also active in genres other than halakha, such as biblical exegesis, 
piut (poetry), mysticism, and theology – see, for instance, Ephraim Kanarfogel, The Intellectual History and 
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tosafist studies were typically centered on one specific talmudic sugya (a discussion or 
issue, usually a section within a specific tractate), often taking into account the 
interpretations of these issues by their predecessor, Rabbi Shlomo ben Yiẓḥak (known as 
RaShY). As a result, their insights took the form of a commentary arranged by tractate and 
chapter of the Talmud.74 As the tosafists’ studies centered on the talmudic text and most of 
their notes derived from the study hall, it made sense for them to record their teachings as 
a discussion parallel to the talmudic section under study. The discussions and 
interpretations would be added to RaShY and the relevant part of the talmudic discussion; 
hence the name tosafot (additions). 
 Students not only took notes, they also copied from the writings of their teachers or 
colleagues. The order of the sugyot of the Talmud was, in this case, also the order that 
developed most spontaneously for these writings, as it followed both the text that was at 
its center and the manner in which the studies took place.75 The writings were, at times, 
                                                     
Rabbinic Culture of Medieval Ashkenaz (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2012) – this discussion will 
limit itself to the organization of halakha in all its different forms. 
See Simcha Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot: Sefarim avudim shel ba’alei ha-tosafot (Fragments of the 
tablets: lost books of the tosafists) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2006), 2. 
74 See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 2. 
75 For a discussion of hagahot, meaning notes on a text or glosses, see Shlomo Zalman Havlin’s 
entry on “Hagahot” in the Encyclopedia Judaica online: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/haggahot 
(Jewish Virtual Library: The Gale Group, 2008).  
For an explanation of the meaning of the word, in the sense of correcting as well as clarifying and 
explaining, see Yakov Shmuel Shpigel, Amudim be-toldot ha-sefer ha-ivri, vol. 1: Hagahot u-megihim 
(Chapters in the history of the Jewish book, vol. 1: Scholars and their annotations) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan 
University Press, 1996), 32-34; 143-193, on the developments of glosses from a method of correcting 
canonical texts to a way of organizing remarks and halakhic writings of all kinds. On page 158, Shpigel 
distinguishes these two actions as glossing something (i.e. correcting a text), on the one hand, versus writing 
glosses on something, on the other; that is, commenting and reflecting upon the work. Our discussion of 
halakhic texts written and organized as glosses on other halakhic works relate mainly to the second kind 
mentioned. 
For instances of earlier organization of responsa according to tractates, see, for example, Fishman, 
“Rabbinic Compositions in Qayrawan,” Becoming the People of the Book, 67-71. They were aware of 
ge’onim, corresponded with them, and also drew up lists of ge’onic responsa and responsa from other places 
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noted as glosses in the margins of the relevant part of the text or as a separate commentary 
organized in the same way.76 There were, however, also instances in which the evolution 
of the writings did not follow any specific organizational scheme. Emanuel, who studies 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manuscripts (in an attempt to unearth fragments of 
earlier tosafist works that might have been copied within the later manuscripts), explains: 
 ...the students encountered in the course of their studies in the bet midrash texts that 
did not fit the framework of the tractate that was being studied, and for this reason, they 
could not have been included in the tosafot on the Talmud that the students wrote in front 
of their rabbis…. In order to preserve these texts, the students wrote books of likutim, a 
kind of memory notebook into which they brought whatever seemed important to them, 
without any order or system.77 
 
 Thus, in addition to the halakhic writings that were organized in a manner that 
reflected the mode of teaching and study, we also note the presence of a more general kind 
of halakhic “memory notebook” into which other written material was copied and studied, 
or in which witnessed behavior and oral statements were recorded. Students who became 
rabbis in their own right took their notebooks with them, which is what Ta-Shma calls the 
“private book of compilations that every scholar has and that was passed on as an 
inheritance from father to son and from rabbi to student.”78  
                                                     
and compiled them according to the order of the tractates. Sefer ha-yashar of Rabbenu Tam or Rabbi Eliezer 
bar Nathan (Mainz, 12th c.) are examples of tosafist compilations that included their interpretations of the 
Talmudic text (not originally according to its order), plus additional material of theirs, plus students’ 
summaries of their rabbis’ opinions. 
76 Seder Olam of Rabbi Simḥa of Speyer, which was lost, was, according to Urbach, most likely 
organized by tractate. See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 160 and Efraim Elimelech Urbach, Ba’alei ha-tosafot: 
toldoteihem, ḥibureihem, shitatam (The tosafists: their history, works, approaches), 2vols., 4th ed. (Jerusalem: 
Mosad Bialik, 1986)1: 417-418. According to Emanuel, it is impossible to know how the lost work was 
organized. 
77 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 250. 
78 Ta-Shma, “Review of Kupfer,” 480. הלוא הוא ספר הליקוטים הפרטי שהיה ביד כל חכם, ושעבר בירושה מאב
עיבודים וקיצורים סייעו , מחיקות, גליונות והוספות. נקל לשער את דרך מסירתם של ספרי הליקוטים מדור לדור. לבן ומחכם לתלמיד
כפי הפשטים , ‘ובאו אחרים תחתיהם, ורעיונות שנראו חשובים בעבר שוב לא נראו כך, לחדשיםספרי ליקוטים ישנים ” לגלגל“
  המתחדשים בכל יום
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As students and sons inherited these compilations, they added to and removed from 
them, rearranged them and edited them according to their particular needs. As the era of 
the great tosafists began to wane, towards the end of the thirteenth century, the creation of 
innovative interpretations of the talmudic texts that were generated and studied alongside 
them gave way to simpler, piecemeal summaries of practical halakha that did not reinterpret 
the talmudic text. The organizational principle of the compilation became one of the most 
prevalent forms of halakhic writing in Ashkenaz. Moreover, in the course of the thirteenth, 
and, mainly, the following century, the compilation of such collections turned into an art 
form in its own right and the composition of notebooks such as these became the central 
textual focus of scribal energies. 
 Compilation as a practice of collecting and transmitting texts was gaining ground 
in thirteenth-century Europe. The scholar of medieval manuscripts Malcolm B. Parkes 
describes the thirteenth century in the following terms: “the age of the compiler had 
arrived.”79 This phenomenon has a parallel in the world of halakhic scholarship at the same 
                                                     
79 Malcolm B. Parkes, “The Influence of the Concepts of Ordinatio and Compilatio on the 
Development of the Book,” in Scribes, Script and Readers: Studies in the Communication, Presentation, and 
Disemination of Medieval (London: Hambledon, 1991), 35-69. 
See also Armando Petrucci, Writers and Readers in Medieval Italy: Studies in the History of Written 
Culture, trans. Charles Radding (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), who discusses the shift from the 
unitary work to the miscellany and relates it materially to the shift from scroll to codex (the latter begins 
earlier, obviously); he also distinguishes anthologies and excerpts written separately and successively over 
time from the category of miscellanies (which are “finished” works). He concludes, “One has the impression, 
indeed, that it was only toward the end of the Gregorian age or immediately afterwards that the model of 
miscellaneous book as incoherent, inorganic, and reduced purely and simply to being a container of 
heterogeneous texts –  a model already in use in Egypt’s Christian community – was introduced into European 
written culture. This phenomenon seems of greatest importance because the inorganic miscellaneous book 
ends up being one of the greatest and most significant novelties of book production in the eighth century.” 
Petrucci, Writers and Readers, 16. 
 See Mariken Teeuwen, Intellectual Vocabulary of the Middle Ages (Brepols: Turnhout, 2003), 237-
239 – under “compilare, compilatio, compilator,” she points out the pejorative source of the word (to plunder, 
pillage...) and notes, “In medieval definitions of the terms, it is often stressed that the compilator, as opposed 
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time and place. In Jewish Ashkenaz of the thirteenth century, the intellectual practice 
shifted away from creating new commentaries and intervening in the interpretative 
tradition and turned increasingly toward putting halakhic sources, summaries, and 
conclusions into textual form. In that century, noting, reflecting on, and copying 
summaries, quotes, and pieces of knowledge from disparate halakhic sources and collecting 
these into compilations, yalkutim or likutim (the verb le-laket means “to harvest/collect”)80 
became the predominant mode of relating to halakhic information.  
 The likutim contained primarily summaries of halakhic opinions and excerpts of 
interpretations, usually based on the tosafist tradition, but they also included other halakhic 
material, such as minhagim (customs), shmu’ot (transmissions of oral matters), psakim 
(lists of halakhic rulings and decisions), takanot (rabbinic ordinances), practical halakhic 
instructions, and also tshuvot, rabbinic responsa to (usually) practical halakhic questions. 
Depending on the scribe, a likut could also contain additions, such as personal glosses and 
copies of opinions or responsa from the author’s rabbi or father. The purpose of such a 
compilation was not only to have a repository in which to store information that memory 
                                                     
to the compositor or -> auctor, in principle adds no matter of his own.” She points out that the term was used 
mainly in this more negative sense until the second half of the twelfth century (plagiarizing, stealing, “illicit 
borrowing,” etc.). “This changed in the thirteenth century, when the genre of florilegia began to flourish in 
all kinds of areas ... the activity of compiling became more prevalent and sophisticated, and it was only then 
that the terms compilare, compilatio and compilator became firmly rooted in the vocabulary of the 
phenomenon.” See Alastair Minnis, “Nolens Auctor Sed Compilator Reputari: The Late Medieval Discourse 
of Compilation” in La Méthode Critique au Moyen-Age, ed. Mireille Chazan and Denis Gilbert (Brepols: 
Turnhout, 2006), 47-63, on the shift in discourse concerning compilatio around the thirteenth century. 
80 In modern Hebrew, the word is suggested by the Academy for the Hebrew Language as the 
translation of “anthology”; their explanation for the word is as follows: , שירים(ילקוט הוא אוסף של יצירות ספרות 
  כחלופה לאנתולוגיה משמשות גם המילים אסוּפה וקובץ. כגון נושא או תקופה, מה במשותף-שיש להן דבר) סיפורים קצרים וכדומה
While likut or yalkut can be used to mean “anthology,” I consider compilations to be a less edited and 
organized collection of texts, not necessarily meant for external readers, whereas anthologies are carefully 
curated, organized, and aimed at an external audience. 
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alone could not preserve, it was also a working tool, a usable archive that served the scholar 
in his studies,81 containing a collection of halakhic texts that focused mainly on conclusions 
and summaries directed at determining actual halakha.82 Compiling was not merely a 
scribal practice and form of transmission; it was an organizational approach. Some of the 
most important ashkenazic halakhic works in this period were themselves organized in 
compilation form, and more attention will be devoted to these works later.  
 Historians have advanced various reasons for this shift in focus from tosafot to 
likutim. Urbach points out that the period between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries 
is known in German legal history as “the period of the law books,” and, according to him, 
a similar tendency can be seen in the Jewish milieu. “These law books are not books of 
laws, nor are they the fruit of official lawmaking; rather, they are private summaries of the 
law as it is practiced, and such summaries can also be found in books of halakha of poskim 
                                                     
81 Parkes shows how the shift from monastic to scholastic culture (and thus a shift in focus from the 
spiritual to the rational) leads to changes in the layout of books (from glosses on the bible to compilations). 
These compilations required investing thought in the organization of the compilation, which brought to the 
fore the issue of organizing compilations specifically. This new focus on organization was also reflected in 
book production, where organization was newly emphasized in many different ways (tables of contents, 
rubrication, alphabetical lists, cross-references, etc.). A shift in needs led to a shift in book production; order 
and organization thus mattered in new ways. Parkes, Scribes, 35-69. 
In the Jewish world, an increase in textual material, and perhaps other changes, such as reduced self 
esteem, as discussed above, led to the need to collect and summarize material. There are several options as 
to the organization of such a compilation. Organization in itself did not become as central a concept to Jewish 
manuscript production as it was in the Latin scholastic world. However, the question of how (not) to organize 
remained a decision that every compiler had to make, and it is this phenomenon that is important here. 
82 See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 8: “The specific ways of the German sages reached their apex at the 
end of the thirteenth century, precisely as the original creation diminished. The sages of Germany invested 
their industriousness in writing various types of yalkutim, which assembled fragments upon fragments from 
the writings of the tosafists, without adding almost anything from their own Torah. The collectors (melaktim) 
did not intend to present their own innovations in their books, and their entire goal was to present the student 
with the largest amount of texts that he might need at every stage of his studies.” 
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(legal deciders) in Ashkenaz.”83 Urbach repeatedly mentions the low self-esteem and 
humility of the tosafists in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the high esteem 
in which they held their predecessors.84 Ta-Shma connects this humble preference for 
collecting and summarizing the practiced law over the desire to innovate and generate new 
material by virtuosic legal interpretation to the ashkenazic pietist tradition. In his opinion, 
the compilation enterprise allowed the ashkenazic students of the tosafists to engage with 
tosafist material without engaging in their masters’ sophisticated intellectual feats. This 
enabled the students to continue the tosafist project while also upholding the pietist value 
of humility, “merely compiling” for the sake of knowing how to implement the practical 
halakhic decisions.85  
 The two interpretations mentioned above consider the type of contents of the work 
to be directly tied to its organizational structure, associating the tendency to compile with 
lower intellectual aspirations. Scholars of the phenomenon in the Christian world have 
linked the increasing focus on working tools in the world of thirteenth-century Latin 
manuscripts to the shift from the monastic tradition of study to the scholastic approach to 
text, which generated new needs and emphases. Parkes considers the emergence of the 
Latin compilation a sign of a shift from a more spiritual monastic approach to the text to a 
                                                     
83 See Urbach, Ba’alei ha-tosafot, 1: 345. התקופה שבין 1200 לבין 1500 ידועה בתולדות המשפט הגרמני
. אלא הם סיכומים פרטיים של המשפט הנהוג, ״ ספרי משפט אלה אינם ספרי חוקים ואינם פרי חקיקה רשמית.כ״תקופת ספרי המשפט
.  וסיכומים מעין אלה יש למצוא גם בספרי ההלכה של הפוסקים באשכנז  
84 See Urbach, Ba’alei ha-tosafot, 2:585: “…the repeated chorus in those days was: ‘We are not 
great scholars like the earlier ones.’” 
85 Ta-Shma, quoted in Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 5. ,חיבורים כמו ספר התרומה לר’ ברוך ב”ר יצחק מוורמייזא
ג לשר מקוצי הם ניסיון ”י מווינה וסמ”אור זרוע לר ספר, ר יואל הלוי”אליעזר ב’ ה לר”ספר הראבי, א ממיץ”ספר יראים לר
ולשלבו כחלק אורגני בספר פסיקה נטול פלפול ונעדר משא ומתן נרחב  ,מונומנטלי לסכם את ההישג ההלכי של מפעל התוספות
 ...בהלכה
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more rational scholastic approach, while Ta-Shma’s analysis of Hebrew compilation 
highlights the humility inherent in the transition from creative interpretation to mere 
compilation. This can be helpful for considering some of the differences between the two 
cultures; in the Hebrew case, for instance the intellectual bent of the tosafists, who preceded 
the age of compilations, was more scholastic in nature than their successors, unlike the 
Latin case, where the scholastic approach replaced a the monastic one. Thus, the same 
modes of organization can carry different religious meaning depending on the culture that 
preceded it. In the Latin context, the shift from monastic study which clung to the order of 
the canonical texts to a different order that was easier for scholastic use signified a more 
rational approach, whereas, in the case of the tosafists, the writing down of texts and 
summaries marked an abatement in interpretational license and creativity. This comparison 
also cautions against any attempt to interpret religious and intellectual attitudes directly 
from the structure of works alone. Comparing these cultures of compilation is, therefore, 
especially productive not at the level of religious psychology but, first, at the level of 
practice and of knowledge management. Only after having arrived at an understanding of 
the organizational practice in its own right can one proceed to add social, communal, 
cultural and legal context, after which it becomes possible to advance more far-ranging 
interpretations. 
Emanuel, for his part, suggests an explanation that considers the issue primarily 
from the perspective of managing knowledge. He considers it excessive to interpret these 
tendencies as immediate results of either external surroundings (German legal traditions) 
or internal religious attitudes (ashkenazic pietism), especially since he disagrees with 
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Urbach and Ta-Shma, who saw these compilations as mainly a German phenomenon. 
Emmanuel regards compiling as a general ashkenazic phenomenon, present in the French 
realm as well as in Germany.86 Moreover, he thinks that the rise of the phenomenon is 
closely related to the rapid growth in textual material, which required a digest in order to 
become more manageable and to facilitate applying the law.87 Thus, Emanuel’s 
interpretation views this phenomenon, first, at the more neutral level of scholarly practice, 
building a much steadier basis as a starting point for subsequent inquiries into religious 
attitudes and cultural comparison. 
Richard and Mary Rouse, who study the organization of medieval manuscripts in 
the Christian world, discuss the main shifts in the organization of manuscript texts. They 
describe the first such change in the Middle Ages as the progression from the use of 
memory as the primary search device, “the era in which one literally searched one’s 
memory,”88 to an increased use of artificial search devices. Rouse points out that many 
compilations “were in effect ‘finding devices’ in themselves.”89 Collecting material in a 
concise manner made it easier to obtain an overview and to find specific pieces of 
information. Emanuel emphasizes a similar use for Hebrew compilations; with the increase 
of varied written halakhic texts in the ashkenazic medieval tradition, by the thirteenth 
century, a very large number of halakhic texts were already in circulation. This posed 
                                                     
86 On the provenance of the compilation Sefer ha-trumah, see Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 6. 
Notwithstanding the name of the author, Rabbi Barukh of Germaiza, he was not from Worms, but rather, 
French. 
87 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 5-6. 
88 Mary A. Rouse and Richard H. Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 193. See also Thomas Clanchy, From 
Memory to Written Record, 3rd ed. (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), who notes this shift in the 12th-13th c. 
regarding official and legal record keeping (not scholarship). 
89 Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 196. 
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intellectual as well as technical problems, as it became steadily more difficult to master all 
the material necessary in order to study a topic, and the sheer amount of material was 
almost impossible for scribes to copy in its entirety. The challenge was thus not only one 
of memory but also of management. “The solution to these problems is found by means of 
compilers and summarizers, who collected into one work all the books of the previous 
generations and gave to the scholars one work within which many commentaries can be 
found.”90 Providing a brief and concentrated version of a larger body of information that 
was spread over disparate works and writings, the compilation made it easier to locate 
information. 
 At the organizational level, we can thus generalize and say that ashkenazic likutim 
were knowledge-management tools. Parkes mentions that the emphasis on utility is evident 
in many thirteenth-century compilations: “Thirteenth-century scholars paid close attention 
to the development of good working tools ... this led to the development of the notion of 
compilatio both as a form of writing and as a means of making material easily accessible.”91 
Mary and Richard Rouse also point out the function of compilations as tools: “These 
compilations were a new kind of literature in many ways, not the least which is that they’re 
designed, not for reflective reading, but for seeking out specific information.”92 Many of 
the Hebrew likutim were similar tools. Writing a likut was a way of copying and 
summarizing only the necessary material. The likut functioned as a form of concentrated 
                                                     
90 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 7. 
91 Parkes, Scribes, 58. 
92 Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 197. 
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archive that not only contained collections of earlier halakhic material but also provided a 
place for the owner to add his own material that had been copied, collected, and created. 
In view of the Rouses’ discussion of contemporaneous compilation practices in the 
Latin world, Jewish scribes may, it seems, simply have shared the scribal methods and 
writing practices popular in their surroundings. It is at this level of practice that the two 
forms of compilation can most usefully be compared, namely, as a form of information 
management. It was necessary for all those who wished to engage in halakhic activity to 
possess as much halakhic textual material as they could bear to copy or have copied. 
Compilations were created in order to make the copying more manageable and to facilitate 
an overview and comparison of the multitude of materials. Moreover, the dispersion of 
Jewish communities after the Rindfleisch Massacres and Black Death, which led so many 
Ashkenazic scholars to wander in the process of their studies,93 may also have increased 
the need for portable collections of halakhic texts. 
In addition to responding to the growing volume of textual material, it becomes 
necessary to address the issue of finding information within the compilation itself, 
especially as the compilation grows larger. Along with the increased use of compilations 
as a working tool came increasing sophistication in the techniques of organizing and 
representing this knowledge. To this end, the pages of medieval compilations were often 
                                                     
93 See Elhanan Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” [Between Ashkenaz and Jerusalem] 
Shalem 4 (1984): 27-62. See also Judah Galinsky, “Of Exile and Halakha: Fourteenth-century Spanish 
Halakhic Literature and the works of the French exiles Aaron ha-Kohen and Jeruham b. Meshulam,” Jewish 
History 22 (2008): 81-96. Another explanation for the creation of compilations (especially those centering 
on custom) can be found in Rachel Mincer’s study of compilations of Ashkenazic custom, which she relates 
to the displacement of communities and their need to preserve traditions in their new locations. See Rachel 
Zohn Mincer, “Liturgical Minhagim Books: The Increasing Reliance on Written Texts in Late Medieval 
Ashkenaz” (PhD diss., JTS, 2010) and Judah Galinsky, “Ashkenazim in Sefarad,” 3-23. 
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laid out in ways that aided searching. Parkes states, “Compilation was not new ... what was 
new was the amount of thought and industry that was put into it, and the refinement that 
this thought and industry produced. The transmission of these refinements onto the page 
led to greater sophistication in the presentation of texts.”94 He lists several techniques of 
these layout methods that belong to the so-called non-verbal “grammar of legibility.”95 
Some of these techniques, such as rubrication and the marking of a citation by inserting 
dots above the beginning (..) and ending (:) of the citation, are not so common in halakhic 
manuscripts from the same period.96 Some of the other methods, however, such as running 
headlines, can be found frequently. Malachi Bet-Arié, in his study of thirteenth-century 
Hebrew manuscript compilations, points out that such methods became more frequent and 
more developed in the thirteenth century. He points out other techniques, such as the use 
of differences in scale by employing bigger letters for the initial words of units, and he 
notes continuous growth in the use of such devices to shape reader’s understanding of the 
text.97An additional way of simplifying searches started to become routine at this time. As 
Mary and Richard Rouse point out, “the simplest finding device was the list of chapter 
headings prefaced to the work.”98 In the Latin context, the Rouses explain, “Tables of 
                                                     
94 Parkes, Scribes, 58. 
95 Parkes, Scribes, 1-17. 
96 The equivalent of quotation marks in Hebrew writings are the abbreviations   וז״ל(“ve-ze leshono” 
[and this is his language]) and עכ״ל (“ad kan leshono” [until here his language]), but those are found in the 
body of the writings and thus not as easy to spot – they are the equivalent of regular quotation marks, but not 
a technique or particular finding aid developed for likutim specifically. In some manuscripts, you also find 
actual quotation marks, but within the text, not above or around the lines; they are less prominent than the 
examples Parkes provides. 
97 Malachi Bet-Arié, Unveiled Faces of Medieval Hebrew Books (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2003), 
59. “In this respect [finding techniques in layout], Hebrew manuscripts unquestionably display an 
evolutionary process that was radically accelerated in Europe in the thirteenth century.” 
98 Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 198. See also Parkes, Scribes, 54. 
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chapters can be found in earlier books. But with the mid-twelfth century, such tables in 
Latin works become the norm, rather than the exception....”99 This “simplest finding 
device” is also present in many kinds of likutim. The table of contents, called a reshimat 
simanim (list of signs) or rashei prakim (heads of chapters), is, in a sense, a concentrated 
version of the likut itself, thus applying the process of summarizing and concentrating to 
the compilation, providing an even briefer version and enabling an overview.  
Intellectually, this shift implied a move away from scholarly interpretation and a 
move towards summary and paraphrase, although some exceptions can be noted. More 
importantly for our purposes, however, is not the question of scholarly project versus 
summary, but, rather, the organizational aspects shared by these writings, most 
significantly, openness. 
 
4. OPENNESS OF CONTENTS: MULTIPLICITY 
The two following sections will inquire into two aspects of the likut and its openness: 
contents and structure. These characteristics will be discussed more generally, as well as in 
context of some of the more famous halakhic works of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. As mentioned, likutim of all kinds existed. Some of these were merely personal 
notes and excerpts, while others resemble our notion of books in many ways. In the process 
of listing the main ashkenazic works of halakha in this period, I inquire whether the 
openness of the likut can be said to apply to these works. If these works can indeed be 
                                                     
99 Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 197. 
UNIT I, CHAPTER 1: THE INHERITED TRADITION 
 
68 
characterized as likutim, then the element of openness is central for our entire 
understanding of the development of ashkenazic halakha in the early modern period.    
The most important examples of halakhic works from this era, the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, were copied often, eventually printed, and are thus known to us. These 
are: Sefer Raviyah, (Book of Raviyah), a compilation written by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yoel 
ha-Levi; Sefer ha-terumah (Book of the offering) by Rabbi Barukh of Germaiza;100 
Sha’arei Dura (Gates of Düren) by Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Düren;101 Sefer ha-Mordekhai (Book 
of Mordekhai) by Rabbi Mordechai ben Hillel; Or zarua (Sown light) by Rabbi Yiẓḥak of 
Vienna; Hagahot Asheri (Glosses on Rabbi Asher) of Rabbi Yisrael Krems; and Hagahot 
Maimoniot (Glosses on Maimonides) of Rabbi Meir Kohen. In this section, the 
characteristic openness of the compilation will be related to the aspect of its contents; the 
variety of types and genres of writing that can be found in compilations. The subsequent 
section will consider the characteristic openness of the compilation in terms of its structure, 
and discuss each of these works individually. 
                                                     
100 On Sefer ha-trumah, see Yoel Friedman, “Sefer ha-trumah le-Rabbenu Barukh ben rabbi Yiẓḥak: 
megamot, mivneh, ve-nusaḥ” (Rabbi Barukh ben Rabbi Yiẓḥak’s Sefer ha-trumah: Agenda, structure and 
editions) (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2013). 
101 See Jacob Freimann, “Das Sefer Amarkal al Hilkhot Yayin Nesakh” in Festschrift zum Siebzigsten 
Geburtsage David Hoffmann’s. Gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern, 3 vols., ed. Shimon Eppenstein, Meir 
Hildesheimer, Joseph Wohlgemuth (Berlin: Louis Lamm, 1914), 421-422n4. Freimann believed that 
Sha’arei Dura is from the 14th century. 
Rabbi Yeshaya Nathan Freilich, who published Sha’arei Dura ha-shalem (Complete Sha’arei 
Dura), ed. Yeshaya Nathan Freilich (Varnow, 1940-1), disagreed, claiming that Rabbi Yiẓḥak must have 
lived in the mid-13th century. Others still believed that he lived in the mid-14th century; see Yisrael 
Elfenbein’s introduction to Minhagim yeshanim mi-Dura: minhagim shel kol ha-shana me-Ashkenaz mi-
me’ah ha-13 (Old customs from Düren: customs of the entire year from Ashkenaz in the 1300s), ed. Yisrael 
Elfenbein (New York, 1948), especially 132-134, and see Israel Ta-Shma, “Al sefer isur ve-heter shel Rabenu 
Yeruḥam ve-al R’ Yiẓḥak mi-Dura,” (On the book of prohibition and permission of Rabenu Yeruḥam and on 
Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Düren) Sinai 64 (1969): 254-257. 
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 The contents of most ashkenazic likutim were not narrowly defined; typically, they 
were neither author-specific nor culled from one single type of halakhic writing. Likutim 
from this period encompass source material from a range of authors, periods, and types of 
halakhic writing. A likut is sometimes identified with one individual (either the scholar who 
created it or the prominent rabbi whose opinions are included within), but the material 
included in the likut derives from a wide variety of rabbinic figures, periods, and genres, 
which are not clearly differentiated or classified. Various halakhic textual material, such as 
witnessed custom; oral testimonies; exemplary documents; rulings; ordinances; 
correspondence; manuals; and so forth, were often included within the same compilation. 
These works were “inorganic” collections, to use Armando Petrucci’s term.102 If a scribe 
were to create a code, these distinct types of halakhic material would have to be processed 
and transformed before they could be placed within one continuous organizational scheme. 
In the ashkenazic likutim, however, they can often be seen alongside one another.  
 We tend to consider psakim (concluding decisions), ḥidushim (novellae), minhagim 
(customs), shmu’ot (statements that were transmitted orally), tshuvot (responsa), takanot 
(ordinances), and many other types of halakhic texts as significantly different genres. 
Within likutim, however, all of these types of text can be found, often side-by-side or 
intermingled. Practical manuals or professional literature constitute another form of 
halakhic writing often included in compilations. These were written for specific religious 
professions such as Torah scribes, ritual slaughterers, circumcisers, etc.103 They contain 
                                                     
102 Petrucci, Writers and readers, 16, and see in this chapter n79.  
103 See Israel Ta-Shma, “Kavim le-ofyah shel sifrut ha-halakha be-Ashkenaz ba-me’ah ha-13-14,” 
(Characteristics of halakhic literature in Ashkenaz in the 13th-14th centuries) in Alei sefer 4 (1977): 20-41, 
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instructions that often combine textual material (copied from earlier manuals) with oral 
teaching and observed, experienced tradition.104 Professional literature and other manuals 
understandably follow a practical step-by-step order. In some cases, these manuals 
circulated separately. As such manuals were very short, they were often added to 
compilations, copied within them, and preserved alongside other material in compilations. 
In sum, the variety of the material means that the looser, more heterogeneous form of 
compiling, rather than codifying, was more appropriate for the creators of these ashkenazic 
likutim. 
 Another marker of this flexible nature is the fact that most ashkenazic books of 
likutim did not have titles or names that indicate one topic; instead, they are referred to 
simply as “Likutei (the likutim of) Rabbi so-and-so.”105 Alternately, terms such as yalkut (a 
noun similar to likut), nimukei (remarks of), yesod (foundation), matbe’a (coinage), seder 
(order), or kuntres (quire/booklet)106 are used to refer to such works. Other terms are 
                                                     
where the concept of “professional literature” is explained. For instance, sidrei get (orders of divorce), which 
detail the ways in which a divorce document must be (first) written and (then) handed over or sent by a 
specially appointed messenger and (later) received, will usually follow the logical order of the necessary 
actions. The same is true for written instructions on conducting the ceremony to release a woman from 
levirate marriage (ḥaliẓa). Another manner of organizing practical instructions is in the form of a poem, 
which can facilitate memorization; this is particularly useful for the kind of practical laws and instructions 
that need to be carried out manually “in the field.” Rabbi Mordechai ben Hillel’s laws of slaughter and 
examination, for instance, are, unlike his compilation (known as “the Mordekhai”), written in the form of a 
poem. Professional literature is distinct from both codes and compilations. It resembles codes in the sense 
that it attempts to cover every relevant step, but it is much more limited in its scope and depth than standard 
halakhic codes. Moreover, they often are found as parts of larger compilations. 
104 See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 249, who presents an example from the Hilkhot bdika (laws of 
examination, usually related to ritual slaughter) of Rabbi Yaakov of Eppenstein (from a dated responsum, we 
learn that he lived in 1326). 
105 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 250. 
106 See Avigdor Aptowitzer, Sefer mavo RAvYh (Introduction to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yoel ha-Levi) 
(Jerusalem: Mekiẓe Nirdamim, 1984), 85, on Rabbi Eliezer ben Yoel ha-Levi’s interchangeable use of 
“kuntresim” and responsa. Salo Baron translates the word kuntres as “a quntres (handbook, probably derived 
from the Latin commentarius).” See Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews: Volume VI 
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gilyonot (also, booklets), psakim (rulings), or koveẓ (booklet). At times, a compilation is 
referred to in terms of the main book that was (ostensibly) being glossed: for example, “the 
Mordekhai of rabbi-such-and-such,” will refer to a certain rabbi’s compilation based on 
Sefer ha-Mordekhai, itself a compilation from the thirteenth century. Generally, titles of 
likutim are used interchangeably. One and the same work was often given different names 
by different scholars, with no “official,” consistent and generally accepted name attached 
to the work. 
Some of the terms used in titles of a likut highlight one type of halakhic writing. 
“Piskei ...” refers to rulings, for example; “Minhagei...” to customs; “Tshuvot...” designate 
responsa, and so forth. These “titles” will usually correspond to the material that sets the 
tone for the majority of the contents of these compilations. It rarely means, however, that 
a compilation contains exclusively the kind of material alluded to by the title. A collection 
                                                     
– Laws, Homilies, and the Bible, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 49. Baron is referring 
to RaShY’s own accumulation of written texts, which his students (the tosafists) referred to as RaShY’s 
“kuntres.” 
On the term kuntres, see also Malachi Bet Arié, Codicologia Ivrit [Hebrew codicology] (Accessed 
via Academia.edu, pre-publication internet version 2.0, 2013), 228-239. 
It is worth noting that the term “commentarius” itself, however, had many uses (some referring to 
an intellectual activity such as writing a commentary, and some merely referencing a material phenomenon 
– “notebook” etc.). See, for instance, Teeuwen, “The most common method of teaching in the Middle Ages 
consisted of the reading of a(n authoritative) text, which was simultaneously explained and commented upon 
by a master. This activity of explaining and commenting on a textbook was, from late Antiquity onwards 
throughout and beyond the Middle Ages, commonly referred to by the verb commentary ... the result was 
called a commentarius ... and the writer of the commentary was called a commentator. Terms which could 
be used with similar meanings are exponere ... annotare ... glossare ... etc. One should note, however, that 
commentari and its derivative commentarius had more meanings than just this narrow one. [examples: 
register, record, things that need remembering, ‘commentari’ as a derivative of ‘con’ and ‘miniscor’] ... With 
reference to literary works, the verb was used to refer to the writings of note-books or treatises in general, or 
to the jotting down of short notes to aid one’s own memory.... Commentarius was used for ‘booklet’ (of a 
synoptic nature), ‘register,’ ‘enumeration,’ or even ‘translatio’; commentator had the meaning of ‘composer 
(author) of a literary work’ in general, in addition to the more specific meaning of ‘writer of a commentary.’ 
... The diverse meanings of commentari which were used in Antiquity continued to exist in the Middle 
Ages...” Teeuwen, Intellectual Vocabulary, 235-236. 
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would sometimes be called a “Koveẓ tshuvot,” (booklet of responsa) for instance, but this 
does not necessarily mean that it contains purely – or even predominantly – responsa. The 
various compilations of responsa of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, for example, are usually 
termed “responsa,” but contain a wealth of other halakhic material. Conversely, a collection 
of teachings from Rabbi Rothenburg compiled by a student who was learning with him 
during his incarceration, Sefer tashbeẓ (“Book of taShbeẒ”, an acronym for Shimon bar 
Ẓadok, the student), is considered a book of customs, but also includes other material, such 
as rulings and responsa (indeed, the “t” in the acronym of the title probably stands for 
tshuvot, meaning responsa). 
 This openness when it comes to the variety and uneven nature of the likut’s contents 
can be observed not only among the countless unknown manuscript compilations, but also 
among some of the most important works of halakha from Ashkenaz. When considering 
some of the more important ashkenazic works of this period, the variety of types of halakhic 
material that they include stands out. The thirteenth- and fourteenth-century ashkenazic 
compilations include rulings, customs, manuals, responsa, and many other types of 
material; often minimal or no efforts were made to unify the styles and the form of these 
different writings. All the main ashkenazic works of halakha contain more than one type 
of halakhic writing (usually several).107 An early example is the compilation by Rabbi 
Eliezer ben Rabbi Yoel ha-Levi (the abovementioned “Raviya”), the teacher of Rabbi 
                                                     
107 In the words of Emanuel: “...the main method of the sages of Germany at the turn of the thirteenth 
century... They collected their entire teachings in one work, which was organized according to the order of 
the Talmud, more-or-less; and they embedded in it also explanations of Talmudic issues, responsa, and more. 
Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 134-135. 
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Yiẓḥak of Vienna, who wrote Or zarua. Rabbi Eliezer’s work is known as “Sefer Raviya” 
or “Avi ha-ezri,” and contains a mixture of responsa and dinim (laws) on the topic of the 
holidays, blessings and prayers, and ritual slaughter, arranged according to the talmudic 
tractates. Both Or zarua and Mordekhai, similarly, contain halakhic summaries, glosses, 
rulings, and responsa. A collection of responsa is appended to Or zarua. These responsa 
were mainly – but not exclusively – written by the compiler himself. In Sefer ha-
Mordekhai, responsa, many of which stem from Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, are included 
throughout. One distinct genre of halakhic likutim prepared by collecting and compiling 
fragments were books of “isur ve-heter” (prohibition and permission), short, practical 
collections usually of basic laws, mainly concerning kosher food and slaughter, designed 
for use by local rabbis. One such work that became very widespread was Sha’arei Dura, a 
compilation of the laws of kosher foods and menstrual purity, which includes a wide variety 
of halakhic contents; testimonies, oral transmissions, and textual sources, mainly copied 
from several predecessors such as Sefer ha trumah.  
 More importantly, these compilations often reveal indifference to the question of 
diverse genres. There are, for instance, manuscript compilations of material associated with 
Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Düren that are distinct from Sha’arei Dura and usually called Minhagim 
mi-Dura (Customs of Düren). In several copies of this compilation, the title uses the term 
minhagim (customs) while the colophon of the very same manuscript refers to the 
compilation as containing psakim (rulings).108 Sha’arei Dura itself had many names. It is 
sometimes referred to as “Sha’arim,” or “Dura,” or “Isur ve-heter” often followed by the 
                                                     
108 See Elfenbein, Minhagim yeshanim mi-Dura, 130-131. 
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name, not of the author, but of the specific scholar who owned and annotated that copy.109 
The end of each section in Hagahot Maimoniot contains an appendix titled “Tshuvot 
Maimoniot,” (Maimonidean responsa) in which Rabbi Meir added additional tosafist 
material that consists mainly, but not solely, of responsa related to that section.110 
Appending material, rather than rearranging and integrating, is typical of a compilation, as 
opposed to a code. 
 This open manner of bringing together sources from different halakhic registers, 
authors, and times is one of the main characteristics of likutim. At the contingent level, it 
is a simple way of coping with too much textual information, enabling the collection of a 
variety of texts without the need to rearrange or process the material. On a deeper level, 
this process reflects a more fundamental approach. Likutim unify multitudes of disparate 
halakhic material without, at the same time, contending that these sources are homogenous, 
comprehensive, or form an ultimate collection.  
 
5. OPENNESS OF STRUCTURE: FLEXIBILITY  
The Spanish milieu in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries saw the writing of several 
important halakhic works that were structured as codes, such as the Orḥot ḥayim (Ways of 
life) by Rabbi Aaron ha-Kohen,111 who emigrated from southern France to Majorca; the 
                                                     
109 See Israel Isserlein, Trumat ha-deshen (Venice, 1519), §97, for an example and Dvileiẓky 
“Introduction,” Sha’arei Dura, ed. David Dvileiẓky (Bnei-Brak: Elon, 2016), 2, for more examples of 
scholars who had “their” Sha’arei Dura.  
110 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 10. 
111 Rabbi Aaron ha-Kohen (c. 1260-1330). Shlomo Zalman Havlin suggests that Orḥot ḥayim was 
preceded by a compilation referred to simply as “Kol bo” (compendium), which he began prior to his 
expulsion and continued to work on and revise during his wanderings. Eventually, Orḥot ḥayim was printed 
as though it were a separate work under this title in the 15th century. “Orḥot ḥayim is thus a more elaborate 
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Sefer meisharim/Toldot Adam ve-Ḥava, (Book of righteousness/History of Adam and Eve) 
written by Rabbi Yeruḥam ben Meshulam,112 who likewise fled southern France for Castile; 
and, of course, the Arba Turim by Rabbi Yacov ben Asher, who left Germany and wrote 
this work in Castile. These works contain primarily halakha as well as strands of custom, 
but their complete, integrated, and systematically organized nature places them in the realm 
of codes, rather than personal and open compilations.113 The collections of halakhic 
material created in Ashkenaz, on the other hand, were almost all organized like 
                                                     
and better structured version of the Kol bo,” writes Galinsky. In this case, the work started out as a 
compilation in Ashkenaz and was then rearranged, elaborated, updated, and systematized into a code in 
Sefarad. See also Galinsky, “Of Exile,” 84. 
112 Rabbi Yeruḥam ben Meshulam (c. 1290-1350)’s compilation of halakha, Sefer toldot Adam ve-
Ḥava (late 13th-early14th c.) is organized according to the life cycle of man – “man” here is used intentionally 
– with Sefer Adam (The Book of Adam) representing all the aspects of life until marriage, and Sefer Ḥava 
(the Book of Eve) man’s life from marriage until death. The author was preoccupied with creating a thorough 
structure and systematic scheme for the work. However, Rabbi Yeruḥam’s decision to build this structure 
also meant that many other parts were wedged in by means of awkward associative bridges in unexpected 
places. For instance, the laws of desecrating the Sabbath in case of emergencies is placed near birth, because 
many cases when the Sabbath may be violated involve caring for those who are weak, such as newborns and 
women after birth. See also Judah Galinsky, “‘A Straightforward Path for All’: Jeruham the Exile and His 
Recensions of the ‘Guide to Justice’ (Sefer meisharim),” Jewish Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (2008): 251-68. 
113 For a discussion of the fact that all these authors emigrated from Ashkenaz but wrote these codes 
in Sfarad, see Galinsky, “Of Exile,” 87, who explains, “The unique literary character of both the Meisharim 
and the Toldot Adam ve-Ḥava lies in their elaborate tables of contents.” This alone points to their being codes 
rather than compilations. 
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compilations.114 This section presents a short overview of these important examples115 and 
                                                     
114 A further example, which is not as strictly “ashkenazic” as the other works discussed here, and, 
indeed, seems to occupy middle ground between a sfardic codification and an ashkenazic compilation, is 
from Italy: Shibolei ha-leket by Rabbi Ẓidkiyahu ben R. Avraham Rofeh, (13thc.). This compilation of 
responsa, rulings, and custom centered on laws of prayer and holidays: it contains a list of the twelve arugot 
(flowerbeds) into which the work is divided, with a one-line description of every item. A selection of topics 
from the work includes: prayer, Sabbath, blessings, the new month, Purim, Passover, the “intermediate” 
holidays, fast days, etc. 
Shibolei ha-leket was consciously reorganized on the basis of a less organized compilation that 
preceded it. Scholars have found other manuscript collections from the same author, which were most likely 
based on the notes of Rabbi Ẓidkiyahu himself, containing a collection of source material later to be worked 
into a finished compilation. This collection of notes, which came to be known later as Ma’aseh ha-ge’onim 
(The actions of the geonim.), however, is not a finished work, and it did not have a real title. In fact, the name 
Ma’aseh ha-ge’onim has no real meaning and is simply derived from the first passage of the collection. See 
Shibolei ha-leket, helek sheni, vol. 2, ed. Rabbi Simḥa Ḥasida (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1988), 
introduction. 
The work is organized according to the aforementioned “flowerbeds,” which each focus on one 
topic, and it concludes with a poem that hints at the order of the topics and the number of items in the book, 
yet another sign of careful planning and editing on the part of the author. 
In the introduction, the author mentions his name, as the person who wrote the work. The 
introduction includes an opening in which the author explains that he “stood up to wander in the fields of 
wise men and harvested among the stalks,” in order to make it easier to study halakha. In this introduction, 
he also quotes his rabbi, Rabbi Yehoshua di Trani’s use of the trope of dwarves standing on the shoulders of 
giants to justify the fact that his work sometimes dares to decide in favor of one esteemed precursor over 
another. These elements from the introduction highlight both the idea of an external audience being exposed 
to the work, as well as its coherence as a thought-out and defined, finished project. The connection between 
broadly published works and authorship, as opposed to works circulating privately and lacking authorship, 
will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
Shibolei ha-leket was printed in Venice in 1546 by Daniel Bomberg under this title, based on a 
manuscript compilation. In fact, the work that was printed was closer to a work based on Shibolei ha-leket 
than to a printing of the book itself: it was abridged in some places, different source material, including more 
recent sources, had been added, and the name of the author was omitted. Although the book seems like a 
finished unit, the author clearly encourages his readers to continue compiling, adding, and removing from 
his book as they see fit: 
 ... עומר שכחה ופיאה והיה  וכל משכיל אשר ימצא את קומצו מבורץ גדוש או מפורס בגרגר או קורט לקט ופרט
 כי נראה פן תקדש המלאה ימלא את ידו ויוסיף שנית לקיים בו מצות פתיתה...ויכריעני לכף זכות כי לשם הקודש היתה כוונתי
115 One perhaps lesser-known example: Sefer ha-agudah (collection) of Rabbi Alexander Zuslein 
ha-Kohen (Ehrfurt, d. 1349), which was printed in Cracow, 1571 by Rabbi Yosef Katz (known for his 
responsa collection, ShUT she’erit Yosef). From the first printed edition, it seems that 16th-century Jews 
almost forgot this work. Its order approximated that of the tractates. In the first printed edition, the 16th-
century editor mentions that the work had no title (Sefer ha-agudah le-R. Alexander Kohen simply means 
“collection of R. Alexander Kohen”),  שמחבר הספר הזה ספר האגודה לרוב ענותנותו לא קרא שמו על ספרו. והנה מצאתי
ק ורנקוורט ”ר זויסלין מק”ר אלכסנדרי הכהן ושנוי שמו היה מהר”ספר האגודה עשה אותו גדול ששמו מהר‘ו: בספר ישן וזה לשונ
ל”עכ’ ך”ר ז”והוא ה  
איך אסף בקיצור נמרץ ישנים גם חדשים מכל אשר לפניו, כי יש שקבץ גם כן הכל אבל באריכות ויש שהניח הישנות 
סדר טהרות וקדשים וזרעים שלא דברו ממנו רוב ’ התורה בשיתא סדרים אפי בסמכו על הגמרא ואלפסי, אבל מחבר זה חבר כל
וכל מה שחדשו מי שקדמוהו כתב גמר פסק ההלכות וגם כסה תשובות אשר לא נמצאו בפוסקים שלפניו כאשר לא היה סוף ’ הפוסקי
מה שדלה דלה ממעיין התלמוד בבלי כל מחברי ספר על התלמוד כי אחריו לא מצא ספר מפורס על כל התורה. ועוד הוסיף מדיליה 
וירושלמי בלבו הרחב ושכלו הזך חדושים הרבה עד מאד מה שלא נמצא בספרים שקדמוהו תמהתי ורעיוניי על משכבי למה הוא מונח 
 ... בדור הזה בקרן זוית
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examines to what extent they constitute compilations rather than codes in their structure.  
 The majority of ashkenazic works of halakha do manifest some overall structure, 
albeit not a strong one. Sometimes this is simply the result of the work upon which the 
compilations were based.116 In other cases, the creator of a likut broke up the older works 
that he was copying by summarizing the necessary parts (either quoting word-for-word or 
paraphrasing)117 and adding a new layer made up of his own material, the notes from his 
rabbi or relative, another likut, or other newly acquired material. In these cases, 
organizational framework did not stem from the works that were being used as source 
material; the compiler had to decide upon the order for noting the summarized parts. Rabbi 
Mordekhai ben Hillel’s Sefer Mordekhai (or Mordekhai, for short) is the prime example of 
this kind of compiling. Written in the thirteenth century, this collection contains the laws 
from the Talmud, the divergent talmudic opinions, and those of Rashi and the tosafists, the 
customs and laws of later authorities, and responsa. Structurally, Mordekhai chose to 
follow the order in which the laws appear in Rabbi Yiẓḥak al’Fasi’s eleventh-century 
extraction and summary of the applied laws in the Talmud, known as “the RYF,” which 
itself follows the order of the talmudic discussion.118 As the RYF follows the Talmud, which 
is not a code, the order of Mordekhai, is, like that of the RYF, more akin to a compilation 
than to a code. Moreover, as Mordekhai presents information only intermittently, it can 
                                                     
116 Emanuel explains the main techniques for organizing such compilations: “These books 
[likutim]...were created in two opposing ways: either by writing new books, on the one hand, or by updating 
old books, on the other.” Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 7. 
117The former was, according to Emanuel, more typical for the German sphere, whereas the latter 
was common in many works stemming from France. See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 7. 
118 See Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” 27-62. 
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thus not be considered a comprehensive collection of the material in the RYF either. Its 
structure is thus clearly that of a compilation. 
 Similarly, Rabbi Yiẓḥak ben Barukh of Germaiza’s thirteenth-century compilation 
Sefer ha-trumah, presents practical halakhic summaries primarily of tosafist opinions. In 
addition to these practical summaries and psakim, which relate to concrete questions that 
occurred to Rabbi Barukh and others, the work contains other types of writing, more akin 
to scholarly investigations. It is organized by topics (phylacteries, Sabbath, slaughter, etc.), 
which, in turn, are arranged according to the order of their treatment in the Talmud. In the 
case of Sefer ha-trumah, the compilation follows the talmudic discussion very closely – to 
the extent that it often preserves repetitions where the Talmud discusses a similar topic 
several times, rather than removing the repetitions in favor of a more consistent structure. 
Moreover, not every single topic of the talmudic discussion is of interest to Rabbi Barukh, 
and some issues are, thus, skipped. Although there is, on the one hand, considerable effort 
to create a clear structure, the repetitions and the skipping highlight the fact that it is 
organized as a type of compilation summarizing and glossing on the talmudic corpus, rather 
than as a unified code. The order of the tractates does not really create an entirely contained, 
complete, and unequivocal system of organization. In addition to discussing one topic in 
various places, the Talmud does not mention every possible law that a thirteenth-century 
compiler may want to add, meaning that an arrangement that follows the Talmud will not 
include every item of halakha. The author of Sefer ha trumah thus had to add sections to 
UNIT I, CHAPTER 1: THE INHERITED TRADITION 
 
79 
the organizational structure of his compilation, such as sections for the laws of writing 
phylacteries and mezuzot.119  
 Or zarua, written by Rabbi Yiẓḥak ben Moshe of Vienna (d. ca. 1250), is one of the 
most important ashkenazic works from the period. The author’s voice and intellectual 
interventions are strongly palpable. Organizationally, it is structured like a compilation, 
with topics roughly but not entirely following the order of the tractates, without mentioning 
every item discussed in the tractates in the work. The author begins with an introduction 
explaining the book’s title: his favorite verse in Psalms begins with the words “Or zarua 
la-ẓaddik”120 and its final letters spell out the name “Akiva.” Akiva the sage was said to 
have interpreted the deepest meanings of the Hebrew alphabet, and, for this reason, Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak explains, he prefaces his work with an interpretation of the mystical work attributed 
to Rabbi Akiva, which delves into the secrets of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak goes on to explain that he decided to begin with the laws of charity (ẓdakah), in 
accordance with the verse from Genesis 18:29, “and they shall keep the way of the Lord, 
to do justice (lit. ẓdakah) and judgment.” The rest of the work is organized according to 
the tractates of the Talmud, apart from the collection of responsa, which is appended to the 
end of the book rather than being integrated into the work in a more streamlined manner. 
In Sha’arei Dura, the part dealing with the laws of salting slaughtered meat is divided into 
                                                     
119 For example, in many compilations based on Mordekhai, sections with laws on specific topics 
were added, such as the laws of phylacteries and mezuzot, the order of a divorce document, laws of official 
documents, etc. See Shmuel Kahan, “Rav Mordekhai ben Hillel ha-Ashkenazi” Sinai 14 (1944): 41, and 
Yiẓḥak Sofer, “Hilkhot ẓiẓit mi-tokh sefer Mordekhai Katan le-Rabbenu Shmuel mi Shlittstadt,” (The laws 
of fringes from the book Mordekhai Katan by our rabbi Shmuel of Shlittstadt) Hizei ha-giborim 9 (2016): 
128-175. 
120 Psalms 97:11, “Light is sown for the righteous…” 
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ten subdivisions, called she’arim or “gates,” hence the name of the work. After the ten 
sections on meat, the other laws simply follow one another without any definite structure.  
 Another type of compilation method used only the structure of a pre-existent work 
as the basis for organizing its material. This is similar to the way in which a gloss comments 
on an earlier work, but with the difference that there is very little connection to the pre-
existent work itself. The most important examples of these are the Hagahot Asheri of Rabbi 
Yisrael Krems, which is organized as a gloss of Piskei haROSh (Rulings of the ROSh, 
Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, c.1250-1327). Similarly, Hagahot Maimoniot of Rabbi Meir 
Kohen uses Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah as a basis. Although their titles often include the 
word “gloss” (hagahot) and their organization may resemble that of a gloss externally, the 
result has little in common with the original work it is supposedly glossing.121 Whereas 
glosses tend to explain, expand, and engage with the material they are glossing, this is not 
the case for these compilations. Rabbi Ḥayim Yosef David Azulai, a seventeenth-century 
rabbi who wrote a bibliographical work, describes Hagahot Asheri in this manner: “The 
known thing is that Hagahot Asheri are innovations from our early rabbis and they were 
made to lean on the psakim of ROSh and they have no relevance to the words of ROSh 
themselves, but, rather, with the words of the Talmud that ROSh mentions.”122 These 
compilations use the organizational structure of an earlier work without engaging the 
contents of the work that is supposedly being glossed. In some cases, the likut may simply 
                                                     
121 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 10. In the words of Emanuel: “Usually, glosses come to elucidate the 
work or to remark upon it, but in the case of the gilyonot [glosses, lit. sheets, papers] that we are discussing, 
they are appended to the margins of the work in an artificial manner, and they do not, in fact, have anything 
to do with the work that is written within.” 
122 Ḥayim Yosef David Azulai, Yosef omeẓ, §48 (Jerusalem, 1961), 68b. 
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have started out being written on the margins of another work,123 in which case it 
technically resembled a gloss. In terms of explicating that work, however, it is not really a 
gloss but merely a compilation that makes use of another work’s structure.124 
 Thus, far from being entirely random, many of the important ashkenazic likutim do 
manifest some rough structure. In the case of certain works, such as Or zarua, for instance, 
the author’s remarks attest to the fact that he consciously re-organized the compilation on 
the basis of his less organized earlier collection.125 Or zarua, Mordekhai, Sefer ha-trumah 
and Sefer Raviya, to name a few, were all organized according to the tractates of the Talmud 
(if not necessarily the internal order within every tractate). The other above-mentioned 
ways of organizing likutim were, similarly, quite intuitive to a readership versed in halakha. 
None of these works, however, were comprehensive, consistent, or unified in their 
treatment of the talmudic tractates they followed. In sum, while they were somewhat 
structured, they could, at most, be considered somewhat ordered compilations, but most 
definitely not codifications. 
                                                     
123 An example of this: the tosafist Rabbenu Tam, for example, seems to have written some psakim 
in his copy of the Sefer miẓvot katan, where he had some blank pages, some in his maḥzor, and some in yet 
another work. See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 280-281. 
124 More comprehensive, better-known, or more systematically organized halakhic books provide a 
better basis for a search. For this reason, Sifrei miẓvot (works that attempt to enumerate all the biblical 
commandments), such as Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Corbeil’s Sefer miẓvot katan, (and, in a sense, Maimonides’ code 
Mishneh Torah, which is presented in the introduction as an elaboration on the genre of Sifrei miẓvot), works 
that distill only the halakhic aspects of the Talmud, such as Rabbi Yiẓḥak Alfasi’s work, or other lists 
detailing many laws, such as Piskei ha-ROSh, were useful as an organizational basis for these compilations. 
125 In Or zarua, we often see formulations such as “I wrote such-and-such [a summary] in my 
compilation … and could not find it [in the source] …”   ...ואני כתבתי בליקוטי שיש ...ולא מצאתי אותו בירושלמי in 
Yiẓḥak of Vienna, Or zarua, Laws of meals, §190 (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2010), 1:166; or, for 
instance, “...and after writing this, I saw in my compilation…” ...ואחר שכתבתי זה מצאתי בליקוטיי שכתבתי. Yiẓḥak 
of Vienna, Or zarua, Laws of the eve of Sabbath, §38 (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalayim, 2010), 2: 48. 
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 Similar observations about the lack of codification can be made when considering 
the tables of contents, the only search aid – if at all – prevalent in these likutim. Sefer ha-
trumah, for instance, was compiled together with a list of “simanim” (sections, signs) 
created by Rabbi Barukh. The conclusion of the work explains the use of this list as follows: 
I wrote this book and he who looks at the simanim will understand and realize that 
they are hints. If he will see in them something akin to his question, he will often also find 
there explicitly the explanation of the thing, in short, with some proofs in a brief manner; 
however, within the book, there where the siman will point him to go see, there he will find 
everything to clarify, the proofs and reasons at length, as is necessary....126 
 
 In many other cases, it is not the author of the original compilation who created this 
list, but a later scribe: An abbreviated list of the contents for the fourteenth-century 
compilation Or zarua by Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Vienna was created by his son, Rabbi Ḥayim. 
Alongside Sefer ha-Mordekhai, there soon appeared the Mordekhai katan, literally the 
“Little Mordekhai,” a shorter version of the work compiled by his student, Rabbi Shmuel 
of Shlittstadt (Selestat). Virtually every famous likut either contains such a list, or a list is 
made for the likut shortly after having been written. Not necessarily written as finding aids 
for the fuller version of the text, some of the lists were used independently as an abridged 
version of the compilation.127 Unlike an index, however, the table of contents provides an 
                                                     
126  Barukh of Germaiza, Sefer ha-trumah, introduction to the simanim:  אני ברוך ב״ר יצחק פירשתי ספר
זה ויבין וישכיל הרואה בסימנים האלו שהן רמזים, אם יראה בהם מעין שאילתו גם שם ימצא מפורש בהרבה מקומות בירור הדבר 
קצרה אותם בתוך הספר אשר יורינו הסימן ללכת לראות שם ימצא הכל מבואר כסדר ....בקוצר עם קצת הראיות דרך  . In most of 
the extant manuscripts, this list can be found at the beginning of the work, but in some of them, the list is 
divided according to its subtopic, and every topic is listed before its section, rather than in one list at the 
beginning. 
See Yoel Friedman, “Sefer ha-trumah: The Character of the Book, the Topics, and the Time of the 
Work’s Composition,” in Barukh of Germaiza, Sefer ha-trumah: Laws of Ḥallah and the Land of Israel, ed. 
Yoel Friedman (Kfar Darom: Makhon ha-Torah ve-ha-areẓ, 2016), 15. See also Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 288-
289. 
127 In the Latin works discussed by the Rouses, the tables of contents of thirteenth-century 
compilations would soon become alphabetical indexes. In the Jewish world, the use of compilations and 
tables of chapters as a finding device supplement the use of memory at about the same time as the same shift 
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overview of the work without reorganizing or unifying. It does not remove repetition or 
consolidate the contents, nor does it rearrange the entries into a more accessible scheme 
(such as by topic, alphabetically, or otherwise). The tables of contents of these works, thus, 
reflect the extent to which likutim were not organized in a complete, comprehensive, or 
systematic manner, and thus possessed a looser structure.  
 Compilations are thus open and flexible in two main ways: the structure of the 
material and the selection of its contents. Whereas codes are complete, comprehensive, 
thoroughly structured, and contain only material that can be placed within one unified 
structure, compilations are partial, flexible, varied, and less consistent in terms of structure 
and the kinds of material included. Most of the halakhic works created in Ashkenaz in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries conform to this description of likutim. Some of these 
compilations strove for some degree of organization, clearly underwent some editing, and 
exhibited a certain logical order. Others were entirely haphazard collections of various 
                                                     
discussed by the Rouses. The comparison ends, however, with the move to alphabetical order, as almost no 
Jewish works existed that employed alphabetical organization. This, however, need not puzzle us, as, “The 
use of alphabetical order ... was not inevitable; once introduced, its acceptance was neither immediate nor 
widespread.” Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 204.  
For Jewish alphabetization, see Bella Hass Weinberg, “Predecessors of Scientific Indexing 
Structures in the Domain of Religion,” in The History and Heritage of Scientific and Technological 
Information Systems, ed. W. Boyd Rayward and Mary Ellen Bowden (New Jersey: American Society for 
Information Science and Technology, 2004), 126-134. Hass Weinberg studies the earliest alphabetical 
indexes in Hebrew, including Masoretic lists. The first manuscript citation index (not a compilation) was 
probably Mafteaḥ ha-drashot [The key to sermons] by an unknown author (some claim it was Maimonides). 
Significantly, as the title implies, this was created for the use of preachers, just as were the works studied by 
the Rouses. Judah Galinsky points to a plan (which never came to fruition) for the creation of an alphabetical 
compilation of Jewish law, by a late fourteenth-century scholar from Castile named Shmuel ben Ẓadok ibn 
Shoshan. See Judah Galinsky, “On Popular Halakhic Literature and the Jewish Reading Audience in 
Fourteenth-Century Spain,” JQR 98, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 323-324. 
For perhaps the first Hebrew encyclopedia, see Debra Glasberg Gail’s doctoral dissertation on Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak Lampronti: Debra Glasberg Gail, “Scientific Authority and Jewish Law in Early Modern Italy” (PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 2016) (see Columbia University Academic 
Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8N58MNN). 
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kinds of halakhic textual material. But it can definitely be said that all likutim were 
fundamentally open and flexible. 
 
6. ASHKENAZIC LIKUTIM: MORE THAN A PRACTICE OF COLLECTING  
Having shown how these ashkenazic halakhic writings were overwhelmingly organized as 
compilations, which I defined as open and flexible, I will now turn to the second aspect of 
the likut: its personal nature. This requires some reflection on the difference between 
unique and strictly personal compilations on the one hand, and the compilations that were 
reproduced often enough to have become well-known, on the other. Most ashkenazic 
likutim were singular collections that no other scribe reproduced but were at most recopied 
and incorporated by others, often peers or students of the author, (which is why fragments 
from older likutim can often be found in new contexts, such as in new compilations, 
alongside other new material).128 The original likut, however, was often lost.129 Certain 
compilations became very popular and were eventually printed. This phenomenon does not 
always depend on a conscious original authorial decision; the more complete, innovative, 
prestigious, more available, or for some other reason superior likutim would eventually 
become important and oft-copied, whereas the others fell by the wayside and were not used 
by anyone other than the author.130 The former likutim were eventually printed, whereas 
                                                     
128 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 245. 
129 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 253. For an example of a collection of psakim that was, for the most part, 
lost, existing now only partially and in manuscript, see Rabbi Yeḥezkiahu ben Yaakov of Magdeburg’s Piskei 
ha-RYCh (Rulings of Rabbi Yakov Yeḥezkiahu), which contains rulings organized according to the tractates. 
See Emanuel Shivrei luḥot, 220n9. 
130 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 250. :חשיבותם של ספרי הליקוטים ומהימנותן של העדויות שנמסרו בהם אינן אחידות
יקוטים שחכמי הדורות שלאחר מכן הסתמכו עליהם, אך היו גם ספרים שכתבו עליהם, כי אלו הליקוטין מן הדרך הישר ישנם ספרי ל
ו שמעולם לא הורו רבותי כך”נוטין, כי אין ממש בכל מה שכתב וחלילה וח … 
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the latter ones fell into oblivion.131 Sheer chance also played a role, of course, and, in some 
cases, even important and prestigious manuscript compilations were lost.132 
 I have characterized ashkenazic likutim as open in their contents and structure and 
personal in their nature. The personal aspect of likutim is manifested in several ways: First, 
they were circulated via personal connections – from rabbi to student and from father to 
son. As a result, the particular order of the likut and its composition were adapted to the 
needs, interests, and material available to the persons who were involved in its 
transmission. Bet-Arié explains that the personal aspect was more characteristic of Hebrew 
manuscript compilations in the Middle Ages than of manuscripts in the Latin milieu during 
the same period. Hebrew manuscripts in Ashkenaz were, for the most part, individually 
produced, with no institutionalized central authority controlling these scribes, as was the 
case in monastic scriptoria in the Latin environment, for instance. Bet-Arié links the fact 
that so many of these scribes were copying the work for their own use to the likelihood of 
the scribe’s intervening and editing as he copied, with his own opinions and needs in mind. 
“Less than half of [the thousands of medieval colophons examined] were copied by 
                                                     
131 For a study of such a “forgotten” likut that was not copied often and did not make it into print 
until an academic press published it in the twentieth century, see, for example, Efraim Kupfer’s edition of 
Tshuvot u-psakim me’et hakhmei Ashkenaz ve-Tzarfat (Responsa and rulings from the sages of Ashkenaz and 
France), ed. Ephraim Kupfer (Jerusalem: Mekiẓei Nirdamim, 1973). This work is based on Bodleian Ms. 
692. The manuscript includes a variety of material from different authors and places, including parts of other 
works that were copied into it. It also includes a collection of 337 sections with responsa, halakhic inquiries, 
and other material. Kupfer explains that this collection of 337 sections is an unpublished likut and describes 
it as follows: בעל ’. אסופות’ ‘לקוטין,‘בפי חכמי אשכנז וצרפת בשם ז סימנים, שייך לסוג חיבורים הנקרא ”חיבור זה של של
יהודה הכהן, ’ הדינים של ר’ גרשום מאור הגולה, מס’ הליקוטין שלנו, הכניס בו: תשובות הגאונים, מספר המקצועות, תשובות מרבי
אליעזר ’ ראים של רי’ ת, מס”ן, מספר הישר של ר”י מצפנת פאנח של הראב”י ומספרי דבי רש”מספר מעשה המכירי, תשובות רש
מאיר בר ברוך מרוטנבורג ועוד.’ ממיץ....תשובות ר  Kupfer also mentions certain halakhic opinions of Rabbi Simcha 
of Speyer that have reached us only as recorded by others, but are copied in his name in this compilation. See 
Kupfer, “Introduction” in Tshuvot u-psakim, 11-12; 25-26. 
132 On the fate of some of these lost books, see Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, chapter 7. 
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professional, or even semi-professional, or even casual scribes commissioned by private 
people to produce books for them; the rest were prepared by learned users of books or 
scholars for their own personal use.”133 The personal nature of creating a likut in practice, 
therefore, means that the resulting compilation tended to be intensely individual; the scribe 
adapted the material by omitting, abridging, adding, and combining as he saw fit. A 
consequence of this personalized production is the need for a reader to be familiar with a 
particular compilation in order to be able easily to locate elements within it, unlike codes, 
which present a far more accessible structure. 
 Thus, the personal nature of the likut is closely related to its openness. This raises 
the question whether well-known likutim, should be excluded from this categorization of 
being inherently open. I have shown that, while more established likutim do at times 
demonstrate some form of organization, they nevertheless remain squarely within the realm 
of compilations, rather than codes. In terms of structure, then even these works can be said 
to be inherently open. But does their published nature somehow negate their openness? 
This problem is considerably more challenging, since publication, in many ways, 
contradicts the openness of the likut as I defined it; publication seals a work and renders it 
a distinct whole, while also severing the personal connection between the work and its 
consumer. However, publication – especially in a manuscript culture – is no straightforward 
concept. Even published halakhic works, it will become clear, are much less of a distinct, 
closed, or stable work than we might assume. 
                                                     
133 Bet-Arié, Unveiled Faces of Medieval Manuscripts, 62. 
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 Discussing publication in the pre-print era entails several challenges. First, the 
sharp technological difference that so clearly distinguishes between the pre-publication and 
the post-publication stages of printed books is lacking in published manuscripts. In 
addition, the frequent practice of repeated and continued authorial editing in manuscript 
culture makes it difficult to decide when a work is “finished” and, thus, when it crosses 
over from the realm of the author to the readership. Moreover, the situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the author, or others, would often make significant changes in 
the work as they copied, glossed, or otherwise appropriated a work.134 Thus, the three 
markers typically used to identify publication: the technological barrier that changes the 
material presentation, the work’s completion, and the boundary separating the author from 
the readership are all more difficult to pin down for manuscript publication than they are 
for print publication.  
 The strongest candidates for the distinction of “published works” in the realm of 
Ashkenazic halakha are those likutim that were copied often enough to be have circulated 
broadly, such as Or zarua, Sefer ha-Mordekhai or Sha’arei Dura. While the majority of 
likutim from this period do not belong to this category, these works represent the most 
important halakhic writings, the likutim that circulated and survived into posterity. These 
important ashkenazic halakhic works do display some elements of a finished work; their 
frequent copying suggest stability; their titles, introductions, and association with specific 
                                                     
134 See Ta-Shma, “The Open Book,” John Rylands Library Bulletin 75, no. 3 (1993): 17-24; Haym 
Soloveitchik, “History of Halakhah: Methodological Issues: A Review Essay of I. Twersky's ‘Rabad of 
Posquières,’” Jewish History 5, no. 1 (1991): 75-124, especially the section on “Bibliographical 
Foundations,” which deals with medieval “texts in flux,” 82. 
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authors implies a distinction between readership and authorship; and, as we have 
mentioned earlier, their somewhat structured state can indicate a finished work with a 
degree of completeness, internal coherence, and unity. Significantly, these are also the 
likutim that eventually made it into print. If we wish to consider the logic of the likut as a 
defining organizational approach to Jewish legal knowledge in this period, beyond a mere 
method of note-taking, we must show how characteristics such as openness and personal 
nature equally apply to these published works, such as Sefer ha-Mordekhai or Sha’arei 
Dura.135 
 Is it, then, possible to think about manuscript compilations such as Mordekhai or 
Sha’arei Dura as “published works,” and, if so, would this negate their open nature? These 
well-known halakhic compilations do seem to have been created with an audience in mind. 
They appear to contain many of the trappings of a product intended for other readers, such 
as titles and introductions. They could thus, perhaps, to some extent, be considered 
“finished works,” in that they usually cover a stated body of contents and have an accessible 
structure, suggesting that they are more complete than their unknown counterparts. Do 
these aspects mean that these well-known works were distinct from the other likutim of the 
period, which were characteristically personal?  
                                                     
135 Following Petrucci’s distinction (see n79 here) between the inorganic, heterogeneous 
miscellanies, similar to what I call compilations in this chapter, on the one hand, and published anthologies 
(collections of excerpts written at one point in time with some sort of overarching unifying principle), on the 
other, we can explain the distinction between real compilations, or likutim, and what I call “published likutim”  
(such as Or zarua or the Mordekhai) in similar terms: the “real” likutim lack any sense of stability, unification, 
or authorship, and are thus miscellanies, whereas the “published likutim” are closer to anthologies, in that 
they do have some unifying principle, are published and transmitted with some degree of stability, and thus 
can be seen as homogeneous entities. Later in this chapter, however, I will show that the “published likutim” 
are also barely worthy of the label “anthologies” because, even in their published state, they retain too many 
of the characteristics of the unstable, heterogeneous, and ever-changing compilation to be considered an 
anthology. 
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 First, I shall consider some of these ways in which works like Sefer ha-Mordekhai 
or Or zarua were, perhaps, different from the typical likut, such as a distinct publishing 
moment, a title, an introduction, or a notion of unified authorship. Historians of manuscript 
have suggested ways of demarcating the moment of publication for medieval manuscripts. 
For instance, one could note the different stages that precede publication: the creation of a 
first draft, a working copy, and, finally, a fair copy.136 We have evidence of something 
similar for Or zarua, namely, parts of the untitled notebook compilations of the author, 
Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Vienna, on the one hand, and the finished likut, titled Or zarua, on the 
other. Rabbi Yiẓḥak clearly intended his earlier compilations to be primary repositories, 
archives with no particular form, which were to provide the basis for more finished and 
more organized works. Using the earlier notebooks as a basis for collecting material, Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak eventually composed Or zarua, in which he presented his own interpretations and 
halakhic conclusions. Notably, the finished product has a title, unlike the earlier versions.137 
The existence of these different drafts could buttress a claim that works such as Or zarua 
were indeed inherently different from the typical ashkenazic likutim, since they appear to 
be finished products of a long editing process. 138 
                                                     
136 See Daniel Hobbins, Authorship and Publicity before Print: Jean Gerson and the Transformation 
of Late Medieval Learning (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 161. 
137 The same can be said for other such likutim, such as the aforementioned Shibolei ha-leket. 
Scholars have found other manuscript collections from the author of Shibolei ha-leket that are most likely 
based on the notebooks of Rabbi Ẓidkiyah himself; they contain a collection of source material later to be 
worked into a finished compilation (see n114 here). 
138 The author of Sefer Raviya may also have used a similar process. There are many references in 
later halakhic works and compilations to another work from the same author titled Aviasaf. According to 
Aptowitzer, Aviasaf was a preliminary compilation including all sorts of halakhic material that the author 
may have planned to edit and use for a new work. See Aptowitzer, Sefer mavo RAvYh, 88 and 126. Aptowitzer 
suggests that Rabbi Eliezer first collected many of his writings, then arranged them into a larger collection 
with a high degree of order (cross-references and attempts to place all similar topics together), but 
nevertheless also many “dis-orders,” as Aptowitzer calls them (identical topics discussed in separate places). 
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 As mentioned, most typical likutim of the period did not have titles, or, if they did, 
different names were used interchangeably to refer to one and the same likut, with no 
generally accepted name for the work. By contrast, the titles of the published likutim 
(Raviyah, Mordekhai, Sha’arei Dura, Sefer ha-trumah, and so forth) could be taken as yet 
another marker of publication, signifying that these compilations were made for an 
audience beyond the scholar’s own use. Moreover, some of the published works, such as 
Or zarua, for instance, had introductions, indicating that the author is addressing an 
external reading audience, as opposed to personal likut-material. Similarly, the author of 
Sefer ha-trumah wrote an introduction (in some manuscripts it is found at the end) 
explaining the title: “This book is called Sefer ha-trumah (offering, contribution, gift) 
seeing as its attributes are gifts to schemers;139 its foundations are to teach shrewdness to 
the foolish; if a person comes upon some mistake/lapse in this [the book], he can read and 
find his desire....”140 
                                                     
These elements point not only to an overall intention to edit and organize but also to the messy process of 
creating a larger work out of a disparate collection of writings. Simcha Emanuel, however, has shown that 
Aviasaf is most likely a continuation of the first work, now focusing on the tractates that deal with family and 
tort law. Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 86-93. 
139 Proverbs 24:8 ,“Whoever plots evil will be known as a schemer,” but also, “its attributes are 
taken from esteemed predecessors” (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Gitin 67a).  
140 Barukh of Germaiza, Sefer ha-trumah, introduction: 
יען כי מדותיו הם מתרומות בעלי מזמות, קדושי צור שוכן רומה, יסדתיו להורות לפתאים ערמה, אם זה הספר נקרא ספר התרומה, 
 יקרה לאיש משגה מאומה, בו יקרא וימצא שמה חפצו מאור תעלומה..
Rabbi Benzion Benedict in his book Merkaz ha-Torah be-Provence  [the Torah center in Provençe] 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1985) suggests the translation – compared to the Babylonian Talmud, 
Tractate Gittin 67a:  אקיבע’ שמעון שנו מדותי שמדותי תרומות מתרומות מדותיו של ר’ אמר ר , which means that 
“trumah” in the title refers to Rabbi Barukh’s personal qualities (knowledge), which are taken from those of 
his esteemed predecessor – most notably Rabbi Yiẓḥak ben Rav Shmuel or R”Y ha-zaken (the Elder), the 
famous tosafist. 
See also Simḥa Emanuel, “Ve-ish al mekomo mevo’ar shmo: le-toldotav shel R. Barukh ben 
Yiẓḥak,” [And every man in its place, his name is specified: on the history of Rabbi Barukh ben Yiẓḥak] 
Tarbiẓ 69 no. 3 (Spring 2000): 423-440. 
See also Galinsky, “Rabbis, Readers,” 77-78. 
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 A further characteristic of a published work as opposed to a compilation made only 
for one’s personal use is the clear identification of authorship, distinguishing between 
readers and the scribe himself. The book of Mordekhai is known simply by the name of its 
author, Mordekhai ben Hillel. Emanuel points out that one reason for Mordekhai’s 
popularity is related to the tragedies that befell the Jews in the author’s location (including 
Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel himself) at the end of the thirteenth century. Mordekhai was 
considered the most recent and complete repository of German halakha after the 
destruction of these communities, and the compilation was studied, copied, abridged, and 
glossed countless times.141 Thus, a case could be made for the unified sense of authorship 
that this work exudes. 
 Should these likutim, then, be considered significantly different from their unknown 
counterparts? Are they less personal and less open because they were published? Perhaps, 
then, the likut’s characteristic flexible, heterogeneous approach to halakhic texts should be 
confined to the private note taking methods of scholars, or considered only as a preparatory 
stage for creating finished works? If that were so, my case for considering compilations as 
the salient feature of ashkenazic scholarly culture in this period would be compromised, as 
these characteristics would be limited to a mere compositional practice rather than 
typifying a culture of knowledge as a whole. It seems, however, a mistake to draw too sharp 
a line between these compiling practices and the main ashkenazic works of halakha at the 
time. Upon closer inspection, even the characteristics such as titles, introductions, and 
authorship, which can be markers of published works, are not as clear-cut in the case of 
                                                     
141 See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 9. 
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likutim as we might have expected based on our own contemporary conceptions of what 
constitutes a finished work, as the following section will argue. In order to understand 
whether the ashkenazic halakhic compilation was merely a practice of collecting or a 
broader attitude to knowledge, we must consider these elements of publication from the 
point of view of manuscript publication, rather than using our own assumptions, which are 
based on the world of print. 
 
7. PERSONAL VERSUS PUBLISHED IN A MANUSCRIPT CULTURE 
The concept of publication is never a straightforward notion, even for printed works, as 
ideas of textual stability, authorial control, and passive readership are, to a certain degree, 
always constructed, idealized concepts.142 These idealizations tend to use notions from the 
world of print as the basis for constructing the paradigm of publication. Ultimately, the 
realization that such notions are highly idealized and constructed was also brought to bear 
on print itself (as can be witnessed in Adrian Johns’ refutation of Elizabeth Eisenstein’s 
idea of a print revolution). In the case of manuscript publication, however, a much deeper 
revision of the idea of publishing is needed before this term can meaningfully apply.  
 Robert K. Root already advanced the models of publication by means of patronage 
in his 1913 article on Boccaccio and Petrarch, and Chaucer scholars discussed the model 
of reading out loud as a type of publishing. Other models, such as ecclesiastical licensing 
for religious works, the pecia system of the universities, and commercial reproduction by 
                                                     
142 See Roger Chartier, Inscription and Erasure: Literature and Written Culture from the Eleventh 
to the Eighteenth Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 
especially the introduction, “Aesthetic Mystery and the Materialities of the Written,” vii-xiii. 
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artisans for specific clients, can be added to these.143 More recently, Richard Sharpe studied 
the rich material regarding Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, in an attempt to understand 
the meaning of publication in the late eleventh century,144 and Pascale Bourgain’s study of 
manuscript circulation of texts contributed to more nuanced understandings of what 
determines success for a text and what drives demand.145 Stephen Nichols, in his 
introduction to a volume of Speculum devoted to medieval philology, remarked on the 
problematic use of terms such as “publication” for medieval works due to their “strongly 
marked semantic associations with the lexicon of printing.”146  Thus, defining these works 
simply as “published” is imprecise. This section argues that even those works, which, at 
first glance, appeared to us as published, finished, closed and public works were, at their 
core, private, unfinished, open, and flexible.  
                                                     
143 For a discussion of some of these, see Felicity Riddy, “Publication before Print: The case of 
Julian of Norwich,” in The Uses of Script and Print, 1300-1700, ed. Julia Crick and Alexandra Walsham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 29-49, which deals mainly with the ways in which a public 
was made conscious of the existence of a work in order to create an initial demand. See also the dissertation 
of Deborah McGrady, “Constructing Authorship in the Late Middle Ages” (PhD diss., University of 
California, 1997), which considers articulations of the relationship between poet and text through scribes, 
bookmakers, and patronage. On the pecia system, see Graham Pollard, “The Pecia System in the Medieval 
Universities” in Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts and Libraries: Essays Presented to N. R. Kerr, ed. Malcolm 
B. Parkes and Andrew G. Watson (London: Scolar Press, 1978), 145-161. 
144 Richard Sharpe, “Anselm as Author: Publishing in the late Eleventh Century,” The Journal of 
Medieval Latin 19 (2009): 1-87. 
145 Pascale Bourgain, “The Circulation of Texts in Manuscript Culture,” in The Medieval Manuscript 
Book: Cultural Approaches, ed. Michael Johnston and Michael Van Dussen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 140-159. 
146 See Stephen G. Nichols, “Introduction: Philology in a Manuscript Culture,” Speculum 65 (1990): 
1-10, (especially page 6). On the notion of 12th-14th-century authorial participation in the reproduction of 
their books (a form of publication) and its similarities to notarial practices of drafting, registering, and 
preserving ‘authorized’ texts, see Petrucci, “Minute, Autograph, Author’s Book,” in Writers and Readers, 
145-168. 
Bet-Arié makes similar points for Hebrew manuscripts and warns scholars not to place too much 
trust in manuscripts as the true witnesses of medieval texts. In “Transmission of Texts by Scribes and 
Copyists: Unconscious and Critical Interferences,” John Rylands Library Bulletin 75, no. 3 (1993): 33-51, 
Bet-Arié uses citations from scholars, scribes, and copyists who express concern about these topics to point 
out the essential instability of manuscript copies and the lack of authorial control over authorized versions. 
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 Daniel Hobbins attempted to create a more manuscript-appropriate model of 
publication by coining the terminology of a “series of publishing moments” to describe the 
process by which Jean Gerson’s works were published in the late Middle Ages. He 
distinguishes between the stages of “initial delivery,” “revision by the author,” and 
“participation of others,” in editing and adapting the work. Jean Gerson, who Hobbins used 
as his example, was an exceptional figure, even for the Latin milieu of his time. The 
massive distribution of his writings and the sense of authorship and control he exerted over 
his works made it possible for scholars to distinguish between these different publishing 
moments, such as the “coterie readership” versus the “mass market,” the “initial text” 
versus the “emendations,” and the author’s own emendations versus the “public 
participation.”  
 For manuscript likutim, it would be pointless to attempt to create such a model of 
publication, since these elements are hardly applicable to likutim: there was not a “mass 
market” of any kind; the standard copying procedure involved heavy emendation and 
adaptation; and one cannot pinpoint “authorship” that is distinct from a “readership.” In 
the age of likutim, these stages never remain in a temporal sequence, and the stages of 
“initial publication,” “authorial revision,” and “participation of others,” crisscross back and 
forth in patterns so complex that they can barely be traced. In the case of likutim it is 
impossible to establish a qualitative difference between a work that circulated only among 
family and students, on the one hand, and a work that was circulating more broadly, on the 
other.   
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 Moreover, the form of transmission of many of the published works of ashkenazic 
halakha testify to the inherent textual openness that characterized Ashkenaz as a whole. 
The lack of consistency in the dissemination of these more established works questions 
their stability. Even as they maintained a strong connection to the original compilations 
from which they were reproduced, copies of likutim that became well known rarely 
remained unchanged. They were treated just as compilers tended to treat all their source 
material, that is to say, very freely. The process of adding, shortening, summarizing, and 
glossing the original material as needed created many different ‘editions’ of the same 
original likut. Thus, while there are some differences between personal compilations on the 
one hand, and likutim that were created for broader use and publication, on the other, in 
terms of textual stability, there is no clear demarcation between a personal compilation and 
a published likut.  
 For instance, the case of Sha’arei Dura. Most smaller manuals of this kind, called 
books of isur ve-heter, were intended for practical consultation and customized and 
personalized for different localities and users. For that reason, compilations of this kind 
showed more variations across copies than any other, and identical copies of such manuals 
were rare. In the words of Emanuel: “Laws of isur ve-heter were decided in Ashkenaz in 
large part based on local and personal traditions; therefore, the life-span of most of the 
works on these topics was short.”147 Following generations, in turn, utilized this work for 
further personalization, adaptation, and compilation. The case of Sha’arei Dura was 
exceptional in that it survived for so long, perhaps because it not only served for a practical 
                                                     
147 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 238-9. 
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purpose but also it became the basis for textual scholarship on these topics. However, even 
Sha’arei Dura, which did survive, was copied in such varied and inconsistent ways that 
even the various printed editions of this work bear little resemblance to one-another.148 
Other works such as Sefer ha-trumah likewise circulated in various ways, and, while the 
work’s overall structure usually remained intact, discrepancies, such as sections that are 
present in some manuscripts but not in others, can be found in many dozens of cases.149 
 Additionally, it is difficult to determine whether a work is transmitted in a 
sufficiently continuous way to claim that it is one and the same work being disseminated 
and circulated broadly. Sha’arei Dura, for instance, started out as a work for a very close 
“coterie,” as the  one-line introduction explains: “So said the author: see, my friends have 
begged me to write for them a work of isur ve-heter, and I will explain it for them in brief, 
and I will start with...”150 This work, initially circulated as a personal favor for the author’s 
friends, subsequently became one of the most studied and most frequently printed works 
of halakha.151 However, the manuscripts of Sha’arei Dura that circulated vary greatly. 
There was, for example, no consistency regarding the amount of entries; they are divided 
into anywhere from thirty-four to forty-one sections. Countless rabbis had “their” 
                                                     
148 The editor of one contemporary edition calls the first seven printings “seven first editions.” See 
Dvileiẓky “Introduction,” in Yiẓḥak of Düren, Sha’arei Dura, ed. David Dvileiẓky (Bnei-Brak: Elon, 2016), 
17. See also Chapter 3 in this dissertation on the transmission of Sha’arei Dura throughout the early modern 
period. 
149 See Friedman, Sefer ha-trumah, 8-131 (Chapters 1 and 2). 
150 Yiẓḥak of Düren, Sha’arei Dura, introduction: אמר המחבר הנה הפצירוני חבירי לכתוב להם אסור והתר
והדחה בעשר שעריםואפרש להם בקוצר ואתחיל בדין מליחה   
151 Rabbi Moshe Isserles in Torat ḥatat (Cracow, 1559) describes Sha’arei Dura as “a staple and 
can be found in the hands of every man ... in this most recent generation, when this book has been copied 
and printed several times because every man desires it ... and that is how the books have fallen into the hands 
of many, little and great.”  הוא מורגל ונמצא ביד כל אדם...בדור האחרון הזה אשר נעתק ונדפס הספר הזה כמה פעמים כי כל
ז נפלו הספרים ביד רבים קטנים וגדולים”אדם חושק בו...וע  
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manuscript copy of Sha’arei Dura. It was based on Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Düren’s work together 
with layers of glosses but often resulted in a different work altogether.152 Every subsequent 
scribe made the work his own by redoing it based on his interpretation or on the 
manuscripts and oral teachings of his rabbis. Rather than circulating broadly, the likut went 
from circulating among a smaller coterie to circulating among a somewhat larger one. By 
the time the work was circulating broadly enough to be considered “published,” it had been 
emended so often from scribe to scribe that it would be hard to determine whether the 
published work was the same work as the original, or, for that matter, whether the many 
copies could be considered the same work at all. 
  A further example is Or zarua, which was edited and re-arranged, abridged and 
customized on countless occasions. Rabbi Yiẓḥak himself continued adding to and 
amending the work throughout his life, as new material became available. One of the 
editors of the most recent version remarks upon the many contradictions and lack of unity 
in this work, explaining these with the fact that Rabbi Yiẓḥak “did not edit the work in an 
overall, organized manner.”153 His son, Rabbi Ḥayim, created an abridged version, which, 
in fact, became the work that was referred to in posterity by the name Or zarua. The original 
work became known as “the large Or zarua.” Even the title – seemingly such a clear way 
                                                     
152Rabbi Yacov Weil, Rabbi Israel Isserlein, and later Rabbi Shlomo Luria and Rabbi Moshe Isserles 
were among the many who had “their own” Sha’arei Dura, including glosses that students often wrote based 
on their rabbi’s teachings. Some of these evolved into works in their own right (Rabbi Isserlein’s Lamed-vav 
she’arim [36 Gates] and Rabbi Isserles’ Torat ḥatat, for instance), while others remained closer to glosses 
(Rabbi Luria’s complete glosses on Sha’arei Dura, which were first printed in the margins of the work in 
Basel and Lublin in 1599). 
153 Shalom Klein, “Introduction,” in Or zarua im piskei MaharaḤ, 3 vols., ed. Yacov Farbstein, 
Shalom Klein, Yair Suzman, et al. (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2010), 1:16-17.  רבינו לא ערך כנראה
 בצורה כללית ומסודרת את הספר...
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of distinguishing between personal compilations and a published, finished product – is thus 
not fixed. It is also difficult to attribute clear authorship. Rabbi Ḥayim’s own son, named 
Rabbi Yiẓḥak after his grandfather, the first author, also edited the work and added 
contributions that are included in the body of the work. 
 Similarly, the Mordekhai on Halakhot ktanot (Small laws) – the laws of scribes – 
was not authored by the eponymous Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel, but by Rabbi Shmuel of 
Shlittstadt.154 Different scribes also changed the order of the material; we have versions, 
for instance, that do not start with the laws of charity. Thus, although Mordekhai is the type 
of compilation that to some extent attains the continuity and status of a published, finished 
work, it also undergoes many abridgements and adaptations. The fourteenth-century Kiẓur 
Mordekhai (Abridged Mordekhai) or Mordechai katan (Little Mordekhai) by Rabbi 
Samuel of Shlittstadt is the most famous example of this phenomenon. Mordekhai became 
the basis for glosses and insights of later figures, such as Hagahot Mordekhai. Rabbi 
Shmuel Shlittstadt’s and Rabbi Samson of Jerusalem’s glosses on the Mordekhai are but 
two examples of this phenomenon, but countless other scholars have “their Mordekhai.”155 
These become, in a sense, entirely new likutim. 
 Moreover, Sefer Mordekhai, ostensibly the product of its author, was, in fact, not 
issued in its final form by him. Numerous fragments of the book were authored by 
descendants and students. In the manuscript of the Mordekhai that is located in the Bodleian 
Library, when Mordekhai ben Hillel’s name appears in the part covering the talmudic 
                                                     
154 For more on this figure, see Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” 1-10. 
155 See Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” 30. 
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tractates Brakhot through Bava Kama, it includes the standard blessing for the living, 
whereas, in the latter tractates, his name is followed by “of blessed memory,” implying that 
he had died before the completion of the work. Moreover, the compilation was copied and 
emended in so many different ways that, eventually, two versions became accepted and 
were treated almost as two different works, the Mordekhai Rheinus of the Rhine area, on 
the one hand, and the Mordekhai Ostreikh of the Austrian territories, on the other. 
Consequently, there is no one “original” Sefer Mordekhai.156 This was common knowledge 
among scribes and scholars, who did not expect unity or consistency, and rabbis can often 
be seen to make remarks to that effect. Rabbi Moshe Isserles, for instance, writes in one of 
his responsa to a student of his not to adapt a law based on the specific formulation found 
in the Mordekhai: 
In any case, it seems wrong to emend anything because of this as long as you do 
not find this [formulation] in an old book, because you are familiar with the Sefer 
                                                     
156 See also the study of Shmuel Kohen on Mordekhai and its composition in a series of articles titled 
“R’ Mordekhai ben Hillel Ashkenazi,” Sinai vols. 9-16: 9(1941-1942): 257-262; 10(1942): 209-216; 
11(1942-1943): 260-277; 12(1943): 99-106; 13(1943-1944): 294-308; 14(1944): 314-323; 15(1944-1945): 
64-74; 16(1945): 247-255.  
Some of his conclusions regarding the multiple authorship and lack of unified composition of 
Mordekhai are usefully summarized in Asher Siev’s introduction to ShUT Sheerit Yosef (New York: Yeshiva 
University Press, 1984), 33-37. Siev focuses on the reception of Mordekhai among 16th-c. scholars.  
Polish scholars who used Mordekhai in the 15th and 16th centuries were aware of the variety; they 
often mention which version of Mordekhai they are using and ask colleagues about their copies. Here is one 
example from the responsa of Rabbi Yosef Kolon (Italy, 16th century): ShUT MaharYK, §50 גם מצאתי במרדכי
מי  יימר “כירה (שבת מו:)  ר משה תמצא כתוב שם, בשלהי פרק”ט וחשבתי שגם במרדכי של מהר”ר שמואל מומילאונ”של קרוב הח
”דמזדקק לה חכם  
Rabbi Israel Isserlein (15th c., Germany-Austria), wrote in Trumat ha-deshen, §96: “Our Mordekhai 
uses a different formulation than yours regarding this legal decision.” מרדכי שלנו חלוק בלשון משלכם בפסק זה. In 
the same work, §186, he emphasizes that, “Our Mordekhai does not contain even a hint or reminder of this 
statement…” במרדכי דילן לית מזה לא רמז ולא רמיזה. 
Rabbi Yoel Sirkis (1561 Lublin -1640 Cracow) writes in his glosses on the Shulḥan Arukh (Oraḥ 
ḥayim, §682): “However, it is known that many halting formulations can be found in this book because it 
was copied earlier in different ways, this one lengthens and that one shortens…”  מיהו כבר נודע דהרבה לשונות
 .מגומגמים נמצאים בספר זה באשר מועתק מלפנים בכמה פנים זה מאריך וזה מקצר
Clearly, there was a traditional knowledge among scholars that the Mordekhai as it was transmitted 
to them was not a unified work by one author, and that one should treat the work as such and not rely on 
specific quotes and individual formulations. 
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haMordekhai and its manner of conversing,157  because it contains many stuttering 
formulations since it is compiled and composed from many books, and many glosses and 
laws ended up inside it mistakenly and abridged, and maybe this is one of them.158  
 
It was common knowledge among halakhic scholars that the Mordekhai was a likut 
and should thus not be used as a basis for legal interpretations that hinge on specific 
formulations or linguistic analysis. Some manuscripts of Kiẓur Mordekhai contain 
colophons informing the reader that what is unclear here should be checked in other such 
abridgements.159  
In sum, it would be a mistake to consider the more famous likutim as essentially 
different from their unknown counterparts. These published works of halakha are not 
inherently different from the personal likutim in terms of structure and contents. They 
remain structured as compilations rather than as codes. While published likutim do 
sometimes lean toward a certain type of content, often reflected in the title of the likut, even 
these never contain solely one type of halakhic material. Publication did not truly stabilize 
these works and they continue to circulate in wildly different varieties. One cannot truly 
distinguish between a published likut and a personal one. All the above elements are 
related, as the openness of the likutim invites an approach to text that is fluid, open, and 
personal. The likut style can thus be considered the main characteristic of all ashkenazic 
                                                     
157 II Kings 9:11.  
158 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §100.5. For more on the correspondent, see Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
מ״מ אין נראה להגיה משום זה דבר אחד כל זמן שלא נמצאהו בספר ישן. כי אתה ידעת את ספר המרדכי ואת שיחו כי 
ינים רבים שלא במקומן בקצרה ואולי לרוב נמצאו בו לשונות מגומגמים להיותו מלוקט ומחובר מספרים רבים, ובאו בתוכו הגהות וד
  זה אחת מהן.
159 See Frankfurt am Main, Goethe Universität m.s. Heb qu.(47) of a Mordechai kaẓar (digitized 
link via JNUL) והמגמגם בקיצור זה עיין בקיצורי אחר. 
UNIT I, CHAPTER 1: THE INHERITED TRADITION 
 
101 
halakhic textual activity in this period, making the paradigm of openness central for an 
understanding of this scholarly culture. 
 Scholars interested in studying manuscript publication often adapted their models 
from the world of print publication to fit the reality of the manuscript. Hobbins, as we have 
seen, suggested a “series of publishing moments” rather than one clear publishing moment 
as a model of publication more appropriate for manuscript publication. In outlining his 
stages of manuscript publication, Hobbins cautions that “we should resist thinking of these 
three categories as a strict temporal sequence,”160 nevertheless, he considers this emended 
model reliable. When applied to likutim, this lack of temporal sequence is not merely a 
caveat – it is a rule. As my analysis of likutim regarding the other elements of publication 
has shown, this statement applies beyond the question of a distinct “publishing moment” 
to the entire premise of manuscript publication.  
 The Medieval Manuscript Book, a more recent volume of articles, pushes beyond 
the attempts at revising concepts from print culture for the study of manuscripts, opening 
with the statement that manuscript culture should be theorized on its own terms, rather than 
based on the vocabulary of print.161 This is the approach taken by the current chapter in 
considering the likut. As the analysis in this section has shown, choosing such an approach 
for our current topic is no coincidence: In fact, the editors of The Medieval Manuscript 
                                                     
160 Daniel Hobbins, Authorship and Publicity before Print, 156. 
161 Johnston and Van Dussen, “Introduction: Manuscripts and Cultural History,” in The Medieval 
Manuscript Book, 1-17. Several contributions to this volume are very relevant to the current topic, such as 
Jeffrey Todd Knight, “Organizing manuscript and print: from compilatio to compilation,” 77-96, which 
insists on viewing the medieval works in the context of the other writings that they were compiled with, 
claiming that the fluid and miscellaneous nature of medieval manuscript culture is essential to understanding 
its works. Pascale Bourgain, “The Circulation of Texts in Manuscript Culture,” 140-160, is likewise a crucial 
case study of ways in which manuscripts did circulate in a manuscript world. 
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Book state that “Late medieval manuscript culture162 was inherently miscellaneous, with 
texts being compiled alongside other texts throughout a manuscript’s history.”163 Clearly, 
compilation, miscellaneous organization, and manuscript culture are deeply intertwined. 
Therefore, late-medieval ashkenazic likutim can only be understood from the point of view 
of a manuscript culture.164 
The open structure and personal nature of these works perpetuated the practice by 
which they were created. Reiner notes this dynamic in the case of Mordekhai: “Its compiled 
nature, its variety in sources in time and authority, and its unclear editing [nusḥaot], led to 
a flexible and free approach toward the book. This approach permitted the penetration of 
new material into it throughout the years.”165 The likut is not simply a scribal form, nor is 
it limited to a type of work that was prevalent in this period; rather, it is the epitome of an 
entire scholarly culture. Paul Zumthor’s notion of mouvance, which he used for his study 
of medieval poetry, may be the most useful one for our purposes. Zumthor has pointed out 
that the imperfect means of transmission, the complicated nature and expense of producing 
a written text, the relative scarcity of the necessary materials, and the absence of 
mechanical means for reproduction in the Middle Ages led to innumerable minor and major 
                                                     
162 They designate this period as roughly 1100-1500. Johnston and Van Dussen, “Introduction: 
Manuscripts and Cultural History,” 2. 
163 Johnston and Van Dussen, “Introduction: manuscripts and cultural history,” 4.  
164 The miscellaneous nature of manuscript compilations relates closely to the material specificities 
of manuscript, as the introduction of Nichols and Wenzel’s The Whole Book already emphasized. It is 
nonetheless, possible, of course, to speak of non-miscellaneous manuscripts and, vice-versa, of miscellaneous 
printed compilations, such as, for instance, in Jeffrey Todd Knight, Bound to Read: Compilations, 
Collections, and the making of Renaissance Literature  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013). 
165 See Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” 30.  
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variants that conspired to an “essential instability in medieval texts themselves.”166 This 
characteristic, which he called mouvance, was a fundamental aspect of medieval textuality, 
an essential flexibility that presupposes neither an idea of “the work” as self-contained nor 
the “original author” of such a work. It also relates to the lack of clear and distinct titles, 
authors, or, for that matter, “publishing moments” for so many medieval texts.167 This 
fundamental flexibility is expressed more strongly in certain types of works than in others; 
for likutim, it is in many ways its defining characteristic. 
 
8. RESPONSA IN THE AGE OF LIKUTIM  
One must consider the place of responsa in the organization of halakhic knowledge of the 
late thirteenth and fourteenth century within the context of likutim. Most likutim included 
responsa; by the same token, compilations consisting primarily of responsa, called “kivẓei 
tshuvot,” often included all kinds of non-responsa material. The history of the organization 
of responsa is, thus, an integral part of the likut tradition. Very few earlier collections of 
responsa from the tosafists in the twelfth and early thirteenth century remain. They are so 
rare, in fact, that Soloveitchik and Ta-Shma claimed that there was simply no tradition of 
preserving these responsa.168 According to Ta-Shma, the lack of preserved responsa 
                                                     
166 Paul Zumthor, Toward a Medieval Poetics, trans. Philip Bennett (Minneapolis and Oxford: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 46. 
167 The antiquarian and bibliographer Ernst Philip Goldschmidt already suggested similar insights 
when showing the problematic results of trying to catalog medieval works by author or title. See Ernst Philip 
Goldschmidt, Medieval texts and Their First Appearance in Print (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 
86-96. As he concludes on page 116: “What I have tried to demonstrate is that the Middle Ages for various 
reasons and from various causes did not possess the concept of ‘authorship’ in exactly the same significance 
as we have it now…The invention of printing did away with many of the technical causes of anonymity, 
while the movement of the Renaissance created new ideas of literary fame and intellectual property.”  
168 Soloveitchik explains that, in contrast to the sfardic tradition, (and to some extent even compared 
to the German tradition in Ashkenaz), responsa in France were not a literary genre. “Questions were asked 
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collections suggests that responsa were viewed as important for the practical purpose of 
communicating a decision but not worth preserving as precedents. Emanuel, on the other 
hand, supports Urbach’s idea that collections of responsa probably did exist, but they were 
copied into later likutim from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which is the context 
in which they can now be found.169 These thirteenth- and fourteenth-century collections 
“are not simply a collection of responsa, rather, they also contain many fragments from the 
different works of halakha available to the compilers – parts that are mixed with and 
inserted between the responsa.”170  In other words, the lack of Kivẓei tshuvot from the 
Middle Ages does not stem from the absence of a tradition of preserving responsa; rather 
it came about because responsa were preserved and transmitted in the same way as all other 
halakhic material, namely, in compilation form. 
                                                     
and responses were written, but these creations were seen as livres des [sic] circonstance.” See Haym 
Soloveitchik, Halakha, kalkala, ve-dimu’i ‘aẓmi: ha-mashkona’ut bi-yemei ha-beinayim (Pawnbroking in the 
Middle Ages: A study in the interrelationship between halakhah, economic activity, and self-image), 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1985), 83. He posits that their preoccupation with dialectical hermeneutics closed 
them off, to some extent, from engaging in other types of halakhic writing, even though they were, of course, 
aware of responsa from other areas and periods in history and were exposed to these texts. The ashkenazic 
tradition was one of the study hall, Soloveitchik explains, and not one of responsa, “and when these 
adjudicators approached the creation of books, these teachings [responsa] did not take a central place in their 
consciousness.” Soloveitchik, Halakha, kalkala, 84. 
Ta-Shma was of the opinion that the earlier ashkenazic authorities did not preserve their responsa 
because they did not regard them as normative legal literature as much as they considered it scholarship; 
therefore, they were interested in the intellectual analysis. Ta-Shma opposed this to Sfarad, where the 
responsa were written as normative legal decisions and treated as precedent. Ta-Shma attributes a shift in 
Ashkenaz in the late 13th century, where more responsa were being preserved, to “…a total change in 
principle regarding the framework of responsa as a normative literary form.” See Ta-Shma, Kneset meḥkarim, 
1:121 and 2:173-179. See also Urbach, Ba’alei ha-tosafot, 102-104, 250, 316. 
169 Emanuel was particularly convinced of this hypothesis after finding many different manuscripts 
in which the same responsa were copied and paraphrased in disparate ways and in different locations 
throughout these manuscripts, without any particular effort to mention explicitly that this was a copy from a 
reponsum. Many responsa were probably copied in this manner, which means that they were preserved, but 
difficult to identify as responsa because of the method of copying. See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 271-272. 
170 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 37. 
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Emanuel attributes the tendency of copying other halakhic material within the 
collections of responsa as,  
stemming from the large size of the books written by the tosafists, on the one hand, 
and the high price of books, on the other, which limited their dissemination. Scholars could 
not transcribe an entire copy of these works for themselves and were thus forced to satisfy 
themselves by copying selected sections from them. The compilers chose the sections that, 
at the time, seemed to them important, and they also had to estimate which sections would 
be necessary for their studies in the future.171   
 
In other words, collections of responsa resembled other likutim, both in the 
motivation behind them and their attitude to source material. One should not, therefore, 
necessarily expect that separate collections of responsa exist simply because such separate 
collections were the norm later on. Emanuel gives an example of the practice of adding 
responsa to one’s compilation; a scholar complained about a colleague from whom he had 
requested “...your responsa and letters, which I looked forward to seeing,172 as I wanted to 
peruse them and compile them in my compilation.”173 To the scholar’s chagrin, the hosts 
refused and “showed them to me on Sabbath, shortly before the meal,” which left him with 
no time to properly study the texts, and with no means of copying them, as writing is 
forbidden on the Sabbath.174  
The era of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg is the beginning of a new chapter in the 
history of ashkenazic collections of responsa. In the preceding period, only a small amount 
of responsa from ashkenazic authorities survived at all, not to mention any author-specific 
collections. Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg and his students did attempt to collect responsa from 
                                                     
171 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 37. 
172 Ibid.,חליתי פניהם להראות לי  
173 Ibid.,לחברם בחיבורי  
174 See Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 251. This is also mentioned in Urbach, Ba’alei ha-tosafot, 362-363. 
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their predecessors in special collections containing mainly tshuvot. In the words of Ta-
Shma: 
From the end of the thirteenth century, the picture changes. The change can be 
traced to Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, the foremost authority of thirteenth-century Ashkenaz. 
He painstakingly collected the responsa of authorities of Franco-Germany who preceded 
him and arranged the responsa thus amassed in an archive along with his own responsa, 
which he diligently recorded and organized as well.175  
 
 Emmanuel explains that from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards, 
“there was a concerted effort to collect the responsa of the tosafists and their psakim 
(halakhic decisions) in special compilations” in Germany. From the types of responsa 
collections that Emanuel lists, it becomes clear that these works are an integral part of the 
larger phenomenon of likutim: “... Some of the compilations that resulted from this are the 
Mordekhai, Hagahot Maimoniot, and several collections of the responsa of MaharaM of 
Rothenburg.”176  These collections do not contain responsa alone; they are the very same 
halakhic compilations discussed above. 
 Emanuel opens his edition of the responsa of Rabbi Rothenburg that all the 
manuscript compilations at the basis of his edition, as well as those of all the other 
important editions, are not devoted solely to the responsa of Rabbi Rothenburg.177 In line 
                                                     
175 Israel Ta-Shma, “Introduction,” to Mafteaḥ ha-she’elot ve-ha-tshuvot shel ḥakhmei Ashkenaz, 
Tzarfat ve-Italyah (Index of the responsa of the sages of Ashkenaz, France, and Italy), ed. Eliav Shoḥetman 
and Berakhyahu Lifshits (Jerusalem: The Institute for Mishpat ivri, 1997), x. 
176 Simcha Emanuel, “Tshuvot MaharaM mi-Rotenburg, Dfus Prag,” (The responsa of Rabbi Meir 
Rothenburg, Prague edition) Tarbiẓ 57, no. 4 (1988): 559. 
177 Simḥa Emanuel, “Introduction” in Tshuvot MaharaM mi-Rothenburg ve-ḥaverav (The responsa 
of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg and his circle), ed. Simḥa Emanuel (World Congress of Jewish Studies: Jerusalem, 
2012), 16. 
ם שעומדים כבר על מדף הספרים, ”כל הקבצים הכלולים במהדורה זו, כמו כל ארבעת הקבצים האחרים של תשובות מהר 
ם מרוטנבורג, וכן פסקים ”ם מרוטנבורג. בכולם משולבות גם תשובות רבות שאינן של מהר”אינם מוקדשים אך ורק לתורתו של מהר
“דו לפני העורכים של קובצי התשובות. שהועתקו ממגוון רחב של חיבורים שעמ  
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with the general characteristics of likutim, the collections of Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa 
do not contain exclusively his own writings. They comprise selections of all material that 
was available to his students and relatives at the time of editing, including responsa from 
periods as diverse as the twelfth, thirteenth, and even as early as the eleventh century, but 
also ranging into the fourteenth century. 
 A look at one exemplary manuscript from Emanuel’s discussion of the different 
manuscript collections of Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa is sufficient to confirm that these 
collections of responsa share the characteristics of the other ashkenazic likutim. One 
important manuscript source for Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa was a larger compilation 
named Sefer Sinai (Book of Sinai). This compilation belonged to Rabbi Meir’s brother, 
Rabbi Avraham, and it included all kinds of material. Emanuel describes several 
manuscript copies of Sefer Sinai, amongst others, Ms Berlin.178 First, we note that the 
compilation of Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa is part of a larger compilation of material that 
includes not only his responsa. In fact, the first thirty entries have no connection to him 
whatsoever and are copied from the responsa and rulings of Rabbi Yiẓḥak the Elder (a 
tosafist). Additional responsa from a variety of authors are spread throughout the 
compilation. Rabbi Avraham also included the shmu’ot or oral testimonies that were 
collected by Sa’adya, Rabbi Meir’s son-in-law. Some of these testimonies have a 
connection to Rabbi Rothenburg; others do not. The compilation also includes some of 
Rabbi Meir’s ḥidushim (novellae) on tractate Bava Batra of the Talmud. There is a table of 
                                                     
178 See Emanuel, “Introduction” in Tshuvot MaharaM, 28-33. 
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contents, which is simply a list, without any overall structure.179 There are also different 
layers of glosses and comments spread throughout the manuscript. A relatively early source 
for Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa, this manuscript, nevertheless, displays all the 
characteristics of likutim mentioned earlier. As is to be expected, later compilations that 
include material from Sefer Sinai will cause these “likut-characteristics” to increase 
exponentially, as they copy from this compilation and from others, and edit, select, and 
summarize in line with the creation of new likutim. 
 Similarly, the manuscript collection that lies at the basis of the most important 
printed collection of Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa, ShUT MaharaM Rothenburg (Prague, 
1608), is a compilation that was itself copied from three different earlier manuscript 
collections, from three different times and scribes. One part was copied by a student of 
Rabbi Ḥayim Ḥefeẓ-Zahav, who lived in Cologne in the late thirteenth century. Another 
compilation that becomes part of the manuscript at the basis of the printed book of Rabbi 
Meir’s responsa was edited by someone from the circles of Rabbi Yedidya of Nürnberg, a 
student of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg. Yet a third was edited in the second half of the 
fourteenth century. All of these compilations were themselves assembled and copied from 
earlier collections of which different manuscript copies still exist. Some of the copyists 
added marginalia; others reorganized responsa and created their own tables of contents, 
while later copies sometimes included the marginalia of earlier copies in the body of the 
work. Rather than being compiled as clearly defined monographs of Rabbi Rothenburg’s 
                                                     
179 The list contains two sets of numberings: a continuous one for the whole compilation and a 
separate one for the section of responsa. 
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responsa, the manuscripts are thus a result of collecting, compiling, and copying, without 
any organizational distinctions between the different time periods or authors. One 
generation would keep the copied responsa of the previous generation and add to this the 
responsa of their own time period. Peers and students then, in turn, copied and combined 
the text with responses from other times and places. Some of these compilations were 
passed on as separate booklets180 onto which new ones were added. Scribes and scholars 
often copied selections from these, sometimes mixing them with material from other 
sources.181 In some cases, responsa preceded, were appended to, or in some other way 
added to other works by the author.182  
                                                     
180 Sing. kuntres: booklet, quire (see n106 here). 
181 For a description of the second edition of the responsa of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, see Emanuel, 
“Tshuvot MaharaM mi-Rotenburg, Dfus Prag,” 1 -32. 
182 See Yakov Shmuel Shpigel, Amudim be-toldot ha-sefer ha-ivri, vol. 2: Ktiva ve-ha’ataka 
(Chapters in the history of the Jewish book, vol. 2: Writing and transmission) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan 
University Press, 2005), 235, who discusses this phenomenon. He explains, “The location of this section [the 
responsa] was not set, and it could be anywhere.” Spiegel lists examples, including the tosafist Rabbi Yacov 
Tam, who added his response to the end of his compilation Sefer ha-yashar (which, as Rami Reiner and 
Simḥa Emanuel’s studies have shown, was composed like a compilation despite the first impression created 
by its introduction); Rabbi Avraham ben David (also known as Ra’avan), whose responsa are located in two 
separate places in one volume of his work; and the so-called Raviya (Rabbi Eliezer b. Yoel Ha-Levi), who 
placed them at the beginning of his compilation and then scattered throughout. 
See also Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 135-142, on Sefer ha-ḥokhma (Book of wisdom) by Rabbi Barukh 
of Mainz, which is no longer extant. Emanuel found a collection of more than thirty responsa which probably 
had their origins in Rabbi Barukh’s collection (many authored by him, but others copied from his 
contemporary, Ra’avan). They were hidden in plain sight – in the Prague printing of Rabbi Meir 
Rothenburg’s responsa and in manuscripts that belong to the “family” of the manuscript at the basis of the 
Prague edition. Responsa were thus inserted in such manuscript compilations in no particular order; an author 
would even copy his own responsa alongside the responsa of colleagues in his collection. 
Israel Ta-Shma also mentions this phenomenon in his introduction to the Index of Responsa for 
Ashkenaz: “Now there were indeed Ashkenazic scholars, mostly in the twelfth century, who collected a 
florilegium of their responsa – say, in adding a selection of such responsa to other works they authored. 
Examples include the responsa appended to the Sefer Or zarua by R. Yiẓḥak b. Moses of Vienna in the first 
half of the thirteenth century; the smaller selection appended to R. Eliezer b. Nathan of Mainz’ s Sefer 
Ra’avan, from the first half of the twelfth century; and the collection appended to R. Eliezer b. Yoel Ha-
Levi’s Sefer Ha Raviya, from the second half of the twelfth century. But they sought no exposure for their 
responsa beyond such limited undertakings, and as a result, only a small fraction of their responsa is extant.” 
See Ta-Shma, “Introduction” to Mafteaḥ ha-she’elot ve-ha-tshuvot, ix. 
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 Of all the halakhic materials being collected (halakhic opinions and rulings, 
customs, ordinances, etc.), responsa were the most difficult to organize systematically, to 
abstract, unify, and arrange into a code. Almost every responsum was – at one point – a 
letter. These individual letters were crafted, finished texts, which makes it difficult to pull 
out the individual bits of discrete information that compose it.183 A responsum is a holistic 
unit, rather than a modular piece of writing. A respondent pulls together elements from 
different periods, sources and sections of halakha, depending on the topic, and crafts it into 
a letter with a salutation, signatures, details regarding the case, etc., as needed. Placing this 
in an organized code is thus not easy. Responsa, therefore, can be collected and compiled, 
but not very easily placed within a legal codification. The difficulty inherent in organizing 
responsa beyond the most basic level of compiling and creating a table of contents makes 
them a perfect fit for the era of likutim, in which the organizational system was sufficiently 
flexible and tolerant of heterogeneity. This fit between responsa and likutim also explains 
why it is important to examine the genre of responsa as we follow the growing 
systematization of halakhic knowledge in the following centuries. 
 
9. THE MANUSCRIPT LIKUT AS A PARADIGM IN ASHKENAZ 
Harold Love, in his study of scribal publishing in the seventeenth century, explains the 
“...root sense...of publication as a movement from a private realm of creativity to a public 
                                                     
183 One of the manuscript collections of the responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel that circulated 
clearly underwent such a process, seeing as the responsa are organized by topic. This did no small violence 
to the original responsa, which were pulled apart and reorganized in ways that makes the original writings 
difficult to reconstruct. See Ephraim Elimelech Urbach, “The Responsa of R. Asher b. Yeḥiel in Manuscript 
and Print,” Shnaton ha mishpat ha-ivri (1975): 1-153, and specifically page 3. 
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realm of consumption.”184 It is clear why private is associated with creation, as opposed to 
public, which relates to consumption, and this is a useful theoretical distinction to make 
when conceiving of publication. However, such a distinction is not applicable in the case 
of likut culture, where there is no clear moment of publication, and thus no singular clear-
cut move from private to public, from production to consumption.185 In blurring the 
distinction between private and public, likutim also reflect the lack of distinction between 
producing and consuming, as the likut is simultaneously the method of consuming 
information and the resulting product. 
As we have seen, the characteristics of openness and personalization are not a result 
merely of the likut’s being a first draft for a more organized finished work. What we 
perceive as messiness, heterogeneity, and lack of unity are in fact core characteristics of 
these likutim. Even when a likut is “published,” it remains personal, and even when it is 
“finished,” it remains open. The logic of the likut with its flexible, multifarious approach 
remains. Most bodies of halakhic knowledge from this period in Ashkenaz – whether well-
known and oft-used or entirely obscure – were situated somewhere near the “compilation” 
pole of the code-compilation spectrum, and all shared the characteristics of likutim. 
The nature of these likutim was a result of the combination of specific scholarly 
practices and particular needs in the environment where they were produced. Creating a 
likut entailed both consuming information and producing material for further use. In one 
                                                     
184 Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), 36. 
185 This is true even without accounting for theories that oppose this distinction because they posit 
readership itself as a creative act. 
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of his responsa, when asked whether students are permitted to write during the intermediate 
days of the holiday, during which unnecessary forms of labor are prohibited, Rabbi Meir 
Rothenburg replied that those who do so while studying are permitted to do so, “because 
their writing is in itself their studying.”186 By writing, the student created the likut and 
“digested” or processed his learning. Our contemporary notion of a work that is a useful 
search instrument often centers on the opposition between a tool (used to create products) 
and the product that it creates. We tend to consider the code, which is complete, unified, 
and thoroughly structured, to be the better tool. This is true, however, when one sharply 
distinguishes producing from consuming knowledge, whereas the likutim discussed here, 
were simultaneously used for searching and for compiling. In order to be useful, therefore, 
they needed to collect a large amount of material while at the same time remaining open 
and heterogeneous. Their openness and flexibility was precisely what made them useful 
for reading and writing, searching and collecting – all at the same time. 
By the same token, the afterlife of a likut usually involved a scholar’s copying a 
likut in a way that gave preference to his personal needs over respect for the integrity of 
the likut that was being copied. The nature of the likut invited this treatment. As Reiner 
mentions regarding compilations that were based on Mordekhai, its loose structure invited 
the looseness of its future copies: “The imperfect editing and the un-sealed and incomplete 
character of the book created the possibility in later times for broad omissions, the addition 
                                                     
186 ShuT MaharaM mi-Rothenburg (Lvov edition), §119:  הבחורים הכותבים לעצמם דברים שצריכים ללמודם
 .הוא היתר גמור שכתיבתם זו היא למודם
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of remarks, insights, and later rulings within it.”187 This again underscores the connection 
between the nature of likutim as both a product and a method of consumption and its 
openness. There is always a gray zone, rather than a sharp distinction between a work that 
is “published” and a work that is not. Similarly, all types of reading, to some extent, also 
represent a form of writing, and vice versa. Such distinctions are exceptionally blurred in 
thirteenth- and fourteenth- century Ashkenaz. In the age of likutim, it is almost impossible 
to tell where the consumption of external knowledge ends and the production of an 
individual work begins. Writing likutim can thus be seen as the embodiment of the active, 
authorial role of the reader. Likutim are seen by some scholars as a sign of passivity and 
humility, usually, in the opinion of their creators, rightfully so, considering the intellectual 
decline compared to their predecessors. However, if we think of the connection between 
reading and writing that Robert Darnton sees highlighted in commonplace books, or of 
Michel de Certeau’s concept of reading as “poaching,” which reminds us that reading is 
never merely passive, we can appreciate the creativity and power inherent in “just” reading 
or collecting.188 The personal and open characteristics of the likut are thus, not only, 
                                                     
187 Reiner, “Ben Ashkenaz li-Yerushalayim,” 30.  עריכתו הלקויה ואופיו הלא-חתום והלא-שלם של הספר פתחו
 .פתח, בתקופות מאוחרות יותר, להשמטות נרחבות מתוכו ולהוספת הערות, השגות, ופסקים מאוחרים לתוכו
188 As Robert Darnton summarized, the interest in readership among certain literary scholars stems 
from their understanding of “…literature as an activity, the construal of meaning within a system of 
communication, rather than a canon of texts. Michel de Certeau’s notion of “consumer production” and 
“reading as poaching” in Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), xii-xiv, 165-176. Although in our case, there is less of a sense of two 
disparate camps (those in power on the one hand, the marginal on the other), likutim nevertheless highlight 
the active powers of the reader, who can choose to make what he wishes of the text he is reading and read it 
in ways not intended by the author. In this case, the reading is not subversive (not illegal poaching), but, 
rather, “le-laket” or “to harvest.” In its flexibility, openness to different types of sources, and freedom to 
select and re-arrange according to personal need, it is still more creative than the image of humility and 
intellectual decline usually associated with the period and the genre. 
On reading and readership, especially on readership as a creative act and the active role of the reader 
in creating the text’s meaning, see, for instance, Robert Darnton, “First Steps Toward a History of Reading,” 
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essential features of a certain type of literature; they represent practices of organizing, 
reading, and writing that reflect broader cultural approaches to halakhic knowledge.  
An attitude of looseness towards manuscript copying was not merely a practice of 
copying, it was a dominant cultural characteristic. In a recent introduction to a volume on 
the pre-print book, the editors explained that “The book is not only a medium for conveying 
prefabricated narratives and texts… a manuscript book is often instead constitutive of a 
community’s sense of itself; of the narratives, discourses, grammar, and metaphors with 
which a community will give an account of itself.”189 Something similar can be claimed 
about Ashkenaz and its compilations. As Yacov Shpigel describes it, studies have shown: 
“That the sons of Ashkenaz acted with complete freedom when they copied manuscripts, 
and allowed themselves to change, remove, or add to the source that stood before them, 
                                                     
in The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 
154-187; Stanley Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum: Is there a Text in this Class?” Critical Enquiry 2.3 (1976): 
465-486; Wolfgang Iser, “Interactions between Text and Reader” in The Reader in the Text: Essays on 
Audience and Interpretation, ed. Susan K. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980): 106-119; Kevin Sharpe relates the practices of note-taking in commonplace books to “any 
‘reading’…as an act of interpretation, an act of power ‘over’ the text…” As such, he considers them a 
“fissure” between the belief in one shared wisdom and a more skeptical view. Kevin Sharpe, Reading 
Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 190-191. 
In Martyn Lyons’ words, “Printing thus reduced the participation of the reader in editorial functions. 
He or she lost the freedom to manipulate and ‘signpost’ the text. Soon readers had no more to do except make 
separate notes for personal use. There was a significant change in the relationship between text and notes.” 
See Martyn Lyons, A History of Reading and Writing in the Western World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010), 37. 
Petrucci, Writers and Readers, 204, discusses the medieval ecclesiastical culture of continuous 
“reading-writing.”  
Darnton, in the New York Review of Books, wrote: “Reading and writing were therefore inseparable 
activities. They belonged to a continuous effort to make sense of things, for the world was full of signs: you 
could read your way through it; and by keeping an account of your readings, you made a book of your own, 
one stamped with your personality.” Robert Darnton, “Extraordinary Commonplaces,” New York Review of 
Books, Dec 21, 2000. 
189 Stephen Kelly and John J Thompson, “Imagined Histories of the Book: Current Paradigms and 
Future Directions,” in Imagining the Book (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 9. 
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almost entirely to their heart’s desire.”190 This can be observed across the many copies of 
even the most famous works of ashkenazic halakha. 
To summarize: the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Ashkenaz, the period that 
follows the apex of the tosafist age, is characterized by likutim. One of the main uses of a 
likut is to manage information. As Rouse succinctly put it, “These [compilations] are works 
designed to be used, rather than to be read.”191 The likut itself functions as a finding aid, 
and, more often than not in a manuscript age, compiling is also the necessary first step in 
creating a useable library. The likut serves as a mechanism for copying small parts of works 
and avoiding repetition and as a way of placing all the disparate pieces of knowledge within 
one large collection. Some historians associate these compilations with a decline in 
creativity. However, likutim allow for another type of creativity, namely, flexibility, 
adaptation, and customization. The likut is more than simply a genre; it is an attitude, a 
system of producing and consuming knowledge, a way of creating a library, and an 
organizational method as well. 
Likutim do not focus on one specific author or contain only one specific type of 
halakhic material (mina, shmu’ot, psak, ḥidush, tshuva). Rouse calls tables of contents the 
“simplest” type of finding aids because they do not change the make-up of the work; they 
do not create a new unity in which all the parts are rearranged; they simply summarize 
what is already there. The purpose of the likut is to bring together all the different types 
                                                     
190 Shpigel, Amudim, vol. 1, 108-109.  ,מסקנתם היא שבני אשכנז נהגו חירות גמורה בהיותם מעתיקים כתבי יד
   והרשו לעצמם לשנות, לגרוע או להוסיף במקור שעמד לפניהם, כמעט כאוות נפשם.
He relates this cultural tendency to the stricter Ashkenazic prohibition not to leave any (Torah) 
books uncorrected, claiming that this encouraged a culture of liberal correction throughout. 
191 Rouse, Authentic Witnesses, 221. 
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and varieties of halakhic sources that may be of useful, placing them side by side and 
mixing different types of text, different authors and authorities, and adapting and 
summarizing them in one place. Flexibility can be observed, as well, when it comes to 
unity of halakhic content matter. Some works are called “psakim,” some “minhagim,” and 
others “tshuvot,” but, in fact, almost every compilation has miscellaneous content, even if 
it is named after one type of halakhic writing.  
 Likutim make it possible to unify a body of knowledge without setting it in stone, 
to navigate its parts without fixing it to a degree that no longer allows for further adaptation. 
If the idea of publication, of authorship, of a finished work, is never entirely waterproof, 
especially in the case of manuscript culture, this is true even more so for likutim. The basic 
dynamic applies to most works of halakha,192 and, indeed, for many forms of reading and 
writing in general. The word for book or monograph, “ḥibur,” and the related word for 
author or creator “meḥaber,” come from the root of “to connect,” (le-ḥaber), combining 
and collecting – in other words, the author always also compiles. The world of likutim, 
however, raises this situation to a new level. Because of practical need and scholarly 
                                                     
192One of the most basic steps required for writing any halakhic work – indeed, for forming any kind 
of halakhic opinion – is to inquire into the pre-existing source material concerning the halakhic issue at hand. 
Add to this the fact that the writings of one generation can (and sometimes must) become part of the source 
material for the next, and it becomes clear that there is no sharp difference between collecting sources, 
processing them, and creating one’s own work; thus, a personal collection or reference work is not so far 
removed from a creative finished product. On the spectrum between the two, some scholars will eliminate 
most of the discussion of prior sources and focus on their own approach, while others will primarily collect 
all of the relevant sources and only hint at their own leanings. For others yet, it is only in the selection and 
form of organization itself that the scholar’s input can be perceived. If we wish to distinguish a self-contained 
“real work” as opposed to a mere working collection of sources by using such markers as: clear authorship, 
a thorough structure, a title, an introduction explaining the purpose of the work, and so on, this section has 
shown that even the best candidates for self-contained “real work” status from ashkenazic manuscript culture 
fall short on all these characteristics. 
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practices in the age of likutim, this active and personal approach is the most pervasive and 
basic approach to halakhic knowledge. 
Compilations, in this period, were far from perfect systems of knowledge 
management if we consider them from the perspective of more modern finding aids, which 
usually resemble codes. They were rarely comprehensive, never fully systematic, and 
culled from a variety of sources that in its diversity defied meticulous organization. 
However, when considered as systems of knowledge management broadly speaking, it is 
precisely this openness that allows for various possibilities. The dynamics of compilation, 
specifically its openness, flexibility, and tolerance for a certain degree of disorder made it 
possible to collect without having to unify, to summarize material without the need to make 
it consistent, to place different types of sources side by side without converting them into 
the same exact halakhic register; in short, to organize without giving up on the multitude 
of forms and sources of halakhic knowledge. As the following section will show, this was 
not merely a method of organization; it reflected an approach to religious law. 
 
10. THE LIKUT PARADIGM AND ASHKENAZIC APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS LAW 
The material fluidity, the organizational openness, and the personal nature of these 
compilations in profound ways also reflected ashkenazic halakhic culture’s approach to 
religious law as a whole.193 Whereas other halakhic cultures display a more strictly textual 
                                                     
193 This chapter points out the particular synergy between medieval manuscript technology and this 
particular halakhic culture. Because of this synergy, I argue, the growth of print as a reproduction technology 
was so disruptive for this specific halakhic culture. I do not, however, claim any simple cause and effect 
relationship between the method of organization and transmission and the halakhic approach. At most, I 
would argue that ashkenazic halakhic culture embraced this form of writing and its material realities because 
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focus with a preference for homogenous codifications and a centralized, unified legal 
authority, halakhic culture in Ashkenaz of the late thirteenth to fifteenth centuries relied on 
oral interpretations of a heterogeneous mixture of texts (some of which were barely 
“textual” texts – written testimonies of rabbinic behavior or oral transmissions). This 
approach, which privileged personal transmission and local custom, dovetailed with the 
limited authority of the textual in ashkenazic halakha.  
In Ashkenaz, the text by itself was not sufficient for halakhic decision-making; 
rather, the personal element of the rabbinic adjudicator and his tradition were crucial. The 
process of legal adjudication thus did not entail applying general principles to a stable 
textual canon, such as, for example, the principle to follow the majority of textual opinions 
(whether a numeric majority or in terms of importance). Rather, a rabbi’s own decision, 
based on his own transmitted laws, his oral and textual heritage, and his traditions of 
decision-making and hierarchy of sources were what mattered. Reiner describes this 
ashkenazic approach, which he relates to its fluid textual transmission: 
Among its sources of authority, besides the literary tradition, were local custom, 
that is, the oral custom of each community, which, in fact, was largely considered to 
override the literary tradition … the crucial point is that the written text was not necessarily 
seen as something perfect, authoritative; it generally reflected interpretations and rulings 
transmitted orally by teachers and heads of yeshivot, or written by the latter for ad hoc 
reference, but not as a final, approved source or legal rule. Medieval Ashkenazi culture had 
definite oral characteristics and its traditions were therefore fluid and limited in authority, 
both in time and in scope. Those who passed on these traditions never intended to create a 
                                                     
it reflected their approach to halakha so perfectly (or perhaps that this form of writing flourished because its 
material and technological elements were not in contradiction with the legal approach). 
In his Inscription and Erasure, Roger Chartier shows how this applies, in much more conscious 
choices, to literature, which comes “…to show how certain literary works appropriated objects or practices 
that belonged to the written culture of their time. The authors of these works transformed the material realities 
of writing and publication into an aesthetic resource, which they used to achieve poetic, dramatic, or narrative 
effects. The processes that bestowed existence on writing in its various forms, public or private, ephemeral 
or durable, thus became the very ground of literary invention.” See Chartier, Inscription and Erasure, x-xi. 
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comprehensive, binding legal corpus.… Ashkenazi culture was not based on a fixed text, 
and it certainly had no authoritative canon.194 
 
The ashkenazic halakhic landscape was thus varied, flexible, and ad-hoc, with a 
high degree of variation across geographic space and in time – much like the likut itself. A 
favored expression used to describe halakhic decision-making in Ashkenaz in this period 
is “every river runs its own course.”195 This expressed the idea that halakhic differentiation 
across separate local traditions and personal transmissions (for instance, by lineage)196 was 
                                                     
194 Elhanan Reiner, “The Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of the Modern Era: Manuscript versus 
Printed Book,” Polin 10 (1997): 91. For other such descriptions, see Yedidya Dinari, Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz be-
shilhei yemei ha-beinayim (The sages of Ashkenaz in the late Middle Ages) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1984), 
93-99; Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-kadmon (The ancient Ashkenazic custom) (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1992), 16-17; 22; 26n29; Israel Ta-Shma, Ha-sifrut ha-parshanit la-talmud (The literature of talmudic 
interpretation) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 75; Israel Ta-Shma, Halakha, minhag u-masoret be-
Ashkenaz, 1100-1350 (Halakha, custom and transmission in Ashkenaz, 1100-1350) (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1996), 61n11; Eric Zimmer, Gakhalatan shel ḥakhamim (The fiery embers of the scholars) (Be’er 
Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 1999), 256; Shlomo Zalman Havlin, “Rabbi Yeḥiel Ashkenazi ve-
tshuvotav: ḥakham Ashkenazi be-arẓot ha-islam,” (Rabbi Yeḥiel Ashkenazi and his responsa: an Ashkenazic 
sage in the lands of Islam) Shalem 7 (2002): 75-76.  
 meaning that every river runs its own course, and that this poses no contradiction ,נהרא נהרא ופשטיה 195
to the other river. This expression appears twice in tractate Ḥulin (18b and 57a) regarding laws of slaughter. 
For Ashkenaz, see Rabbi Yehuda Mintz, ShUT MaharY Mintz , §15, Rabbi Yosef Kolon, ShUT MahaRY 
Kolon, §37, 115, and Rabbi Israel Isserlein, Trumat ha-deshen, §19. 
This expression is not necessarily a pluralistic statement; see, for instance, in the responsa of Rabbi 
Moellin, §95, on whether a kind of wild rooster (Tetrao urogallus or Auerhuhn in German) and hen are 
kosher. There is a clear preference for the ashkenazic tradition over the sefardic one: “And whoever says that 
he has a tradition to eat the Auerhuhn, one should not rely on him, and even if he stems from a city or state 
where they do eat it, because our tradition is stronger, as … Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel wrote, when he was 
asked,… and he answered that one should not rely on them, because the tradition of Ashkenaz … is better, 
because the Torah is bequeathed to them [Ashkenaz] from their fathers; therefore, we privilege our tradition 
over theirs …. and even if the traditions were equal, can one go and be lenient there where people are stringent 
and abandon the tradition and customs of our fathers, even if the prohibition is merely rabbinical …? We do 
not act in this way, even more so if the prohibition is from the Torah, and this is so in the case of … every 
river and its own course.”  ומי שאומר שיש לו מסורת לאכון אוירהו״ן אין לסמוך עליו, ואפילו אם הוא מעיר או ממדינה שאוכלין
ורת דידן עדיף...שאין לסמוך עליהן דמסורת אשכנז שהוא חסידה עדיף שהתורה ירושה אותו, דהמסורת שלנו שהוא דוכיפת...ומס
להם מאבותיהם, הלכך ניסמי מסורת אחריני מקמי מסורת דידן....ואפילו היו המסורות שקולות אטו דאיכא למיזל במקום האוסרין 
עבדינן הכי, כל שכן באיסורא דאורייתא, וכן...נהרא אחר המתירין ולעזור המסורה ומנהג אבותנו אפילו באיסור דרבנן כגון...לא 
  פשטיה.
The importance of tradition is intensified in the case of kosher fowl and birds because their kosher 
status depends on the existence of a tradition that a particular breed is kosher. 
196 This pluralism in deciding which texts to prefer or which likut to privilege can be seen in the 
responsa of Rabbi Yehuda Mintz, ShUT MaharY Mintz , §15, where he mentions the issue of lineage in at 
least one case. The issue here regarded when extenuating circumstances of a particular case should be taken 
into account and when not. He answered that there are no fast rules [which he calls de’ot, or opinions] when 
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justified. The personal transmission of every individual tradition played a large role in 
halakhic decision-making and thus supported the existence of various incommensurable 
ways of interpreting and deciding law. This heterogeneous approach also precluded any 
expectation of unifying or universalizing the halakhic textual corpus, as textual authority 
was, in any event, not sufficient for religious law. One could not arrive at the correct law 
by simply applying principles of adjudication to a body of canonical texts. The decision 
about which principle of interpretation to apply to what kind of text in which situation was 
a matter of personal transmission. Rabbi Yacov Moellin (ca. 1360 Mainz-1427 Worms), 
when asked about using the principle of majority opinion for halakhic decision-making, 
answered that such issues require personal instruction and a tradition: 
This is a teaching that has no measure, one cannot teach one rule for this, because 
sometimes we go according to the majority of opinions and sometimes according to the 
most recent opinion, and sometimes according to whoever has the presumption of being 
right, and sometimes according to the plain sugya [talmudic discussion], and sometimes 
according to the more stringent interpretation, and sometimes according to the more lenient 
                                                     
it comes to issues of  working with halakhic texts: “…and when it comes to opinions, you know that every 
river runs according to its own course, and there where there was no custom or in a new situation, I heard 
that Rabbi Moellin of blessed memory, most of his decisions followed the Agudah, and I heard that Rabbi 
Weil followed the opinion of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg because he is from his lineage, because he is a relative 
of his, even though he wrote in his responsa that the custom is according to Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, and the 
Or zarua wrote that one should follow Raviya because he was a man of action [meaning his rulings came 
from actual decisions he made for real cases], and the Hagahot Maimoniot wrote, ‘we have nothing but the 
words of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, as he was a recent authority and knew all the earlier opinions,’ but, 
according to that, we should follow the Ba’al ha-turim, who was even more recent and knew everyone’s 
opinions, but some rabbis do not want even to read the Tur oraḥ ḥayim [Ba’al ha-turim’s work], deeming it 
for ba’alei batim [laymen]; in sum: it is difficult to extract a principle…” ות ידעת נהרא כפשטי׳ ובדבר ובענין הדע
שאין בו מנהג ובדבר חדש שמעתי שמהרר״י מולין ס״ל ז״ל רוב פסקיו הלכו אחר האגודה, ושמעתי שמהרי״ו ז״ל הלך אחר דעת 
מהר״ם לפי שהיה מתיחס אחריו שהיה קרובו אע״פ שכתב בתשובותיו שהמנהג כהרא״ש, והא״ז כתב שראוי לילך אחר ראבי״ה כי 
וההג״ה במיימ׳ כתב ׳אנו אין לנו אלא דברי מהר״ם שהיה אחרון והיה יודע דעת כולם׳ ולפ״ז היה ראוי לפסוק כבעל היה בעל מעשה 
הטורים שהיה אחרון והיה יודע דעת כולם ויש מהרבנים שאינם רוצים אפילו לקרות בטור א״ח ונותנין טעם שהבעלי בתים לומדים 
נא לבא בעי והחכם יתן אל לבו.סוף דבר קשה ךעמוד על העיקר אך רחמ –אותו   
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one, and sometimes according to custom. And all such things need a rabbi197 and a 
tradition.198 
 
It thus becomes clear why the textual corpus of ashkenazic halakha was far from 
stable. The fluidity of this ashkenazic approach went even further; it did not only justify 
different parallel strands of transmission, but it also recognized the right of a rabbi to make 
ad-hoc decisions. In Ashkenaz of the likutim era, all of halakha was like a likut, a living, 
changing, and personal body of knowledge, which could not be established in a stable, 
unified, and permanent form. One sixteenth-century rabbi characterized this ashkenazic 
approach in a manner so reactionary and polemical that it resulted in near caricature: he 
exclaimed that even one and the same rabbi could not possibly be expected to hold the 
same opinion about the same case on two consecutive days.199 The personal element was 
so much more authoritative than the text that even the very same adjudicator could think 
differently about the same case from one day to the next. This rabbi implied that, beyond 
every halakhic tradition consisting of a legitimate stream, like Heraclitus stated (to continue 
the river idiom), one can never step into the same stream twice; halakha, in the ashkenazic 
culture, was determined anew by every adjudication at every moment, based on the specific 
rabbi’s personal traditions and texts. 
                                                     
197 This expression, that such things “need a rabbi”(צריכה רבה) is taken from tractate Bava Meẓia 
101a, where it is used to designate law that could be learned only via direct transmission from a rabbi (in that 
case, Rabbi Yoḥanan) and could not have been achieved by means of reasoning. 
198 Yacov Moellin, ShUT MaharYL §171  מילתא דלית ליה קצבה דלא להודיע כלל על זה, דזמנין אזלינן בתר
רוב דעות וזנמנין בתר בתרא וזמנין בתר חזקת מריה וזמנין בתר סוגיא דעלמא וזמנין לחומרא וזמנין לקולא וזמנין בתר מנהגא וכל 
 כה״ג צריכא רבה וקבלה.
A similar issue, regarding whether a rabbi has the right to make an independent decision that 
contradicts that of his teacher, is described as follows by Rabbi Israel Isserlein, Psakim u-ktavim, §238: “I 
cannot explain more than this, because these issues require oral teaching from mouth to mouth.” ( אין לי לבאר
תלמוד מפה אל פה. יותר מזה, כי דברים אלו צריכין ) 
199 See Ḥayim ben Beẓalel, Vikuaḥ mayim ḥayim (Amsterdam, 1712), 4a. This is discussed at length 
later on in this dissertation, in chapter three on Sha’arei Dura. 
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This tradition thus found its perfect expression – materially, technologically, and 
organizationally – in the manuscript compilation. Manuscript transmission, with its 
“mouvance,” allowed for a constantly fluid and personal spread of halakhic texts; 
compilations, with their open, boundless structure and lack of strict generic principles, 
made it easier to preserve the heterogeneous nature of ashkenazic halakhic collections. 
Once a manuscript was no longer the primary form of transmitting halakhic text, this 
relationship between material, transmission-technology, organization, and halakhic 
approach, was no longer as synergetic. 
 
11. EPILOGUE: PRINT AND THE END OF THE AGE OF LIKUTIM 
The personal nature and flexibility that I have characterized as the essence of likutim has 
more affinity with manuscript technology and is, at least in essence (if not always in 
practice),200 rather incompatible with print technology. The projected audience of printed 
works tends to be the opposite of personal; they are more numerous than the author’s close 
circle and often anonymous. Moreover, the relative stability of reproducing a text by means 
of the printing press compared to a manuscript created by a scribe made printed works less 
flexible. For this reason, it is crucial to consider the advent of print in Ashkenaz as a 
technological change that will have profound repercussions, not only on the technical 
means of (re)production but also on a whole form of knowledge organization, indeed, on 
                                                     
200 As Bet Arié points out by contrasting Latin to Hebrew manuscript production in the thirteenth-
century, monasteries provided a form of almost mechanical, stable, and centralized reproduction of texts in 
manuscript form. Conversely, as Adrian Johns has shown, printed works, especially in certain eras, were not 
nearly as stable as we may imagine. See Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
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an entire culture of halakhic scholarship. Emanuel describes the procedure of assembling 
a collection of halakhic texts before the era of print:  
The assembling of a collection of books, whether small or large, used to be based 
before the invention of print on a combination of happenstance and personal initiative. 
There were books that came into one’s hands by coincidence – whether by inheritance or 
by means of an occasional purchase ... but every book lover in the Middle Ages knew that, 
in order to enlarge his book storehouse, he had to take an active role and copy – either by 
himself or by means of a paid scribe.201  
 
The way in which a scholar acquired his library and archive would change 
dramatically with the advent of the printing press. Bet-Arié’s findings that most of the 
ashkenazic manuscripts were copied for personal use dovetail with this insight, which 
highlights the element of copying as part of creating a personalized archive. “From now 
on,” Emanuel concludes in his chapter on the decline of likutim,“the printers are those who 
determine which books will be found on the market, and the scholar and learned individual 
become passive.”202 This change in needs also leads to a shift in the approach to halakhic 
knowledge. Likutim continue to be produced and reproduced in later periods. With the 
advent of print, older likutim are printed and studied, but the practice of compiling such 
works ceases to be the main method for consuming and producing halakhic writings.203 
The works are still canonical, that is, considered authoritative and important, but they are 
no longer paradigmatic in that their method of relating to textual material does not dictate 
                                                     
201 Emanuel, Shivrei Luḥot, 327. 
202 Emanuel, Shivrei Luḥot, 327. 
 בניתוח של אוסף ספרים אם קטן אם גדול מבוססת הייתה קודם להמצאת הדפוס על שילוב בין המקרה ובין 
אם בירושה מאבותיו אם בקנייה מזדמנת ...אך כל חובב ספר בימי הביניים  -היזמה האישית. ישנם ספרים שהגיעו לאדם בדרך מקרה 
בעצמו או באמצעות סופר שכיר...מעתה המדפיסים  -ידע, כי כדי להגדיל את אוצר ספריו צריך הוא לנקוט פעולה אקטיבית ולהעתיק 
” ו בשוק הספרים, והלומד והאיש המשכיל הפכו פסיביים.הם שקבעו אילו ספרים יימצא  
203 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 12. “This literature of (gilyonot) could have flourished more and more, 
almost infinitely, but the invention of print cut off its wings.”  
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the ways in which future generations relate to these halakhic texts.204 With the decline of 
likutim, the flexibility and the attitude of freedom to pick and choose, customize and adapt, 
makes way for a world in which knowledge in general, and halakhic knowledge in 
particular, becomes more universal and consistent, not only in its contents, but also in its 
organization. Of course, possibilities for flexibility and mixing remain, but achieving this 
is less obvious than in the period of likutim, when this form of compiling was the regnant 
and necessary “first step” in acquiring material for scholarship. 
Print thus signals the waning of an era no less than the beginning of a new one.205 
Statistics collected by Bet-Arié teach that, from the moment that print was invented, the 
number of manuscripts that were copied diminished drastically – halting what was until 
then a continuous rise in the pace of manuscript copying.206 Emanuel points out that there 
was a decline not only in the number of copied manuscripts but also in their quality and 
form. In addition to a quantitative decline in manuscript production, we thus see the old 
practices of manuscript copying disappear, and with them the practices of creating 
manuscript likutim. Their specific mind-set and attitude to halakhic texts allowed scholars 
                                                     
204 I thank Moshe Halbertal for introducing these terms and crystalizing this distinction for me. 
205 Emanuel, Shivrei luḥot, 325: “The invention of print in the last third of the fifteenth century 
brought extreme changes to the ways in which books were preserved. On the one hand, print made it much 
easier to preserve books. Dozens of works, and later even hundreds and thousands of works, were printed in 
one go in hundreds of copies, and in doing so the continued existence of these books was assured almost for 
eternity.... However, it seems that, as much as print has contributed to the preservation of printed books, in 
the same measure, print also raised the danger that lurks for works that had not yet been printed.” Emanuel 
focuses on lost manuscripts. Before print, the widespread practice of manuscript copying meant that there 
was a higher chance of a manuscript being copied several times and thus preserved, as any given manuscript 
had a higher chance of being reproduced by another scribe. In the age of print, manuscript copying was a 
disappearing practice and whatever was not being printed was more or less condemned to oblivion. 
206  Malachi Bet-Arié, “The Codicological Data-base of the Hebrew Paleography Project: a tool for 
localising and dating Hebrew medieval manuscripts,” in Hebrew Studies Colloquium, ed. D.R. Smith, P.S. 
Salinger (London: British Library Occasional Papers, 1991), 170. 
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to create their own highly customized archives and anthologies of sources. Manuscript 
culture remained important for personal use, such as copying works that were not yet 
printed, writing notes, personal glosses, letters, and manuscripts in preparation for 
publishing, but the line between personal and public, between notes and published work, 
becomes steadily more distinct. 
Although some continuation of these likut attitudes and practices can be observed, 
especially in the form of glosses207 and personal notebooks (pinkasim),208 the age of the 
printed book profoundly changed these practices of collecting, summarizing, and 
supplementing from generation to generation. The scholar would no longer summarize, 
omit, and add to the books as he did previously. At times, glosses were incorporated into a 
book and printed alongside it in later editions, but a printed book could not interact as freely 
with the handwritten personal glosses that surrounded it. The multiplicity of dissimilar 
                                                     
207 In the words of Reiner, on the continuation of the Ashkenazic scribal tradition through the 
printing of the glosses on the Shulḥan Arukh: “The noseh kelim, such as Sefer me’irat enayim, Turei zahav 
and Siftei kohen, became an integral part of the main text, and the authority of the Shulḥan arukh extended 
not only to the text as composed by Joseph Karo, but to the whole collection of texts that had become part of 
the canon by the very fact of being printed together with that text, first on the page around the text and later 
at the end of the volume. I believe that this process was the rule in regard to the acceptance of the printed 
book among the Ashkenazi intellectual elite: the Ashkenazi halakhic book at the beginning of the modern era 
retained certain features inherited from the medieval scribal tradition of knowledge transmission. In certain 
respects it was a kind of printed manuscript, that is, a text which, in the way it took shape, rejected the new 
communicative values of print culture and created a text with esoteric components, thus protecting its elitist 
position.” See Reiner, “The Ashkenazi Élite,” 98. 
208 The pinkas – a personal notebook – still exists for the purpose of writing observations, 
innovations, and glosses, and also for the purpose of copying manuscript elements that do not exist in print, 
such as books that were not printed or responsa from one’s rabbi. In that sense, the logic of likutim continues 
in the pinkas. It is, however, far from being the main way in which knowledge is transmitted, acquired, and 
organized, and it is now eminently personal as opposed to public. In an age of print, the pinkas (manuscript, 
personal, flexible) maintains the logic of the likut to some extent.  
See Elhanan Reiner, “Darshan noded madpis et sfarav: Perek alum be-toldot ha-tarbut ha-’ivrit be-
eropah ba-meah ha-17,” (A wandering preacher prints his books: a hidden chapter in Jewish cultural history 
of 17th-century Europe) in Ḥut shel ḥen: Festschrift for Ḥava Turniansky, ed. Israel Bartal et. al (Jerusalem: 
Zalman Shazar, 2003), 123-157, on traveling preacher/printers as those who print books based on their ever-
evolving pinkasim, inviting us to think of their rather haphazard pinkas as representing a useful logic for 
collecting and even publishing knowledge. 
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scribal copies reflecting a variety of interests, uses, and focal topics gradually declined. 
Printed books, with a fixed order determined by someone other than the scholar himself 
formed the essential part of a scholar’s library. 
The printing of halakhic material not only heralds something new, but also marks 
the end of the era of manuscript likutim. The practice of scribal copying was eventually 
displaced in favor of the printed work, and, with it, the practice of compiling declined. But 
what did the disappearance of this practice mean for the attitude associated with its 
openness, and the culture of the scholars who worked with its texts? This dissertation 
highlights this transition, studying the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a period of 
fundamental change for the organization of halakhic knowledge in Ashkenaz and 
examining the reconfigurations and adaptations that this engenders. The overarching theme 
is one of increasing textual universalization and systematization as a result of three factors: 
the advent of mass printing; the socio-cultural shifts in the ashkenazic communities; and 
the rising popularity of the code. The latter possesses great advantages – but also poses 
new problems – regarding the ways in which halakha is studied, determined, and 
understood. These three phenomena will be the focus of the next three chapters. 
Subsequently, two chapters will focus more closely on the place of responsa within these 
reorganizations, from their origins in rabbinic correspondence, through their place in the 
rabbi’s archive, and to their place in published books of responsa. The world of ashkenazic 
halakha that emerges from this study is one that adapts gradually and unexpectedly – 
perhaps even violently – to the new organizational situation. Its products in the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries become, in many ways, the foundations of halakha as 
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THE IMPACT AND LIMITS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Printing Fifteenth-Century Ashkenazic Responsa in Sixteenth-Century Italy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
FROM LIKUTIM TO PRINTED WORKS, FROM GERMAN LANDS TO ITALY 
 
Historians have long debated the extent and magnitude of the impact of print. This was 
done most famously by Elizabeth Eisenstein in her work on the “Print Revolution,” in 
which she claims that the ability of print technology to reproduce identical texts in a fixed 
manner, thus allowing for an unprecedentedly wide dissemination and readership, 
fundamentally transformed the European intellectual, religious, and scientific landscape. 
Many scholars, however, have contested her claim as overly technologically deterministic. 
Anthony Grafton,209 Adrian Johns,210 and numerous others have highlighted the 
continuities, rather than the breaks, between manuscript culture and print culture. They 
underscored the many ways in which manuscript technology was equally capable of stable 
reproduction and dissemination of texts, and, conversely, the manifold ways in which 
printed texts were unstable.211 These revisions challenge scholars to create more nuanced 
                                                     
209 See the contributions by Anthony Grafton, Adrian Johns, and Elizabeth Eisenstein in the volume 
"AHR Forum: How Revolutionary Was the Print Revolution?" American Historical Review 107 (2002): 84. 
210 Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998). 
211 Scholars have also pointed out many continuities between manuscripts and printed books where 
typology, aesthetics, and codicology were concerned, proving the point that these technologies were not 
considered to be fundamentally different by people at the time. For instance, see Wytze Gs Hellinga, Copy 
and Print in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1962); or Konrad Haebler, The Study 
of Incunabula (NY: Grolier Club, 1933), who points out the similarities between early type and handwriting 
at the time. 
For reflections on this in relation to Hebrew manuscripts and early printed works, see, for instance, 
Bet Aryeh “Ha-zikah she-ben bikurei ha-dfus ha-ivri le-ven kitve-ha-yad” (The connection between early 
Hebrew print and manuscripts) in Essays and Studies in Librarianship Presented to Curt David Wormann on 
his Seventy-fifth Birthday (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975). Bet Aryeh points out that, while some elements of 
print display continuity with the Hebrew manuscript practices that preceded it (mainly graphic elements, such 
as the similarity of early Hebrew type to Hebrew handwriting styles), other elements (mainly codicological 
ones) adopt the practices of the non-Jewish surroundings, such as the quires and the methods of keeping track 




inquiries into the role of print in the intellectual history of early modern Europe in order to 
address the specificities of the impact of print and the significance of its limitations. 
 This chapter seeks to apply such a more nuanced inquiry to Hebrew printing 
through discussion of the fifteenth-century ashkenazic works of responsa that were printed 
in Italy in the sixteenth century. I will investigate the changes that occurred when this 
textual material, which had heretofore circulated only in manuscript, was printed. Although 
the printing press did not bring about substantive changes solely by means of its new 
technology, nonetheless, fundamental transformations took place as the result of this shift. 
The impact of print was especially profound in the case of Ashkenaz. Prior to the 
advent of print, the practices of halakhic transmission in Ashkenaz were closely intertwined 
with manuscript culture, specifically through the semi-miscellaneous compilations known 
as likutim, by which halakhic material was compiled and copied. This was true both at the 
practical, technical level of material organization and in terms of some of the most 
significant intellectual characteristics of these works. The basic characteristics of these 
ashkenazic likutim – their flexibility, their local nature, their openness to a variety of source 
material, and the plethora of personal organizational decisions that every individual 
compilation reflected – are closely related to the practices by which they were transmitted. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the development of the printing press led to the end of 
likutim as the standard form of transmitting halakha. Scholars relinquished the habit of 
copying halakhic textual material in order to create their own compilations; instead, they 
                                                     
of quires and pages (this may be for technical reasons, as they are printed at non-Jewish presses or by Jewish 
printers who adopted and learned methods from non-Jewish presses) (see Bet Aryeh, “Ha-zikah,” 39). 




began to buy printed halakhic works. Consequently, the practices of creating halakhic 
manuscript compilations were slowly disappearing, and, with them, their characteristic 
textual approaches. The transition from manuscript to print thus was not merely technical; 
with the changes in the methods of transmitting knowledge came new agents, new 
audiences, and new considerations. 
 Changes in technology would have a significant impact on the ways in which 
halakhic works were collected, structured, presented, and organized. Print alone was not 
sufficient, however, to effect these changes. As this chapter will explore, often the editors, 
printers, and other individuals involved in the printing process were the agents 
implementing the decisions that transformed this body of literature in keeping with the new 
technological and intellectual landscape. The first part of this chapter identifies the new 
textual dynamics displayed in the first two fifteenth-century ashkenazic works of responsa 
printed in the sixteenth century. Through comparative analysis of the manuscript and 
printed versions of both Trumat ha-deshen (Offering of the ashes) and ShUT MaharY 
Kolon (Responsa of our master Rabbi Yosef Kolon), I show how the process of preparing 
these works for print transformed them into complete, closed, thoroughly organized, and 
comprehensive collections of one single category of halakhic material – responsa. The 
printed works thus became more generalized in their presentation, fundamentally 
distinguishing the printed book of halakha from manuscript compilations. This analysis 
emphasizes the transformative impact of print for the ways in which these works were 
reproduced, reorganized, and presented. 
 The process of transforming responsa from segments within manuscript 




compilations to independent printed works was neither the automatic outcome nor the 
inevitable result of the mechanical action of setting a manuscript in print. Rather, creating 
these works required conscious editorial intervention. Editors such as Rabbi Ḥiya David 
ben Meir, the editor of the first two works, actively transformed manuscript material into 
books that fit both the dynamics of printed works and the expectations that readers had for 
printed books. My analysis of the two works of responsa edited by Rabbi Ḥiya will show 
that extensive efforts were, in fact, necessary to achieve this result. 
 Moreover, given the extraordinarily profound gap between the dynamics of 
halakhic manuscript likutim and that of printed works, even an editor’s ability actively to 
create a printed work of responsa from manuscript compilations was not a given. The other 
works of fifteenth-century ashkenazic responsa printed in sixteenth-century Italy, which 
are discussed in the second part of this chapter, reflect the limitations of technological 
change alone. While these works were, indeed, printed, and, as such, display certain 
characteristics typical of printed works, the state of the materials and their prior manuscript 
transmission made it nearly impossible to transform them into printed works of responsa 
in the full sense of the word. Instead, they remained in form and organization identical to 
manuscript compilations, the only difference being their means of production and 
acquisition. There was, thus, an inherent dissonance between the nature of ashkenazic 
halakhic transmission and the characteristics of print-technology. This conflict would make 
print technology a particularly difficult challenge for ashkenazic scholarly culture. 
 The early modern period witnessed profound transformations in the world of 
halakhic scholarship, some of which related to the advent of print. These changes, however, 




were not instantaneous, nor were they straightforward. Print created new possibilities for 
transmitting halakhic knowledge and rendered other practices obsolete. The technological 
change in production generated new prospects for these works, and the agents involved in 
producing and transmitting them responded to those opportunities and shaped the literature 
according to the new dynamics of print culture. These changes were, however, neither 
immediate nor sufficient to fundamentally alter the organization of halakhic knowledge in 
Ashkenaz. The extent of editorial intervention necessary to print the books discussed in the 
first part of this chapter, as well as the organization of the printed works (or lack thereof) 
discussed in the second part, attest to this fact. As the dissertation will later explore, it was 
only in conjunction with other social, cultural, communal, and intellectual changes that the 
organization of halakhic knowledge would eventually shift in more fundamental ways. 
  
2.  TURNING LIKUTIM INTO PRINTABLE WORKS: DANIEL BOMBERG AND ḤIYA BEN 
DAVID 
a. Trumat ha-Deshen (Venice, 1519) 
The first work of ashkenazic responsa to be printed was Rabbi Israel ben Petaḥya 
Isserlein’s Trumat ha-deshen. Rabbi Isserlein (ca. 1390212 -1460, Wiener Neustadt) was 
considered one of the last and greatest rabbis of the ashkenazic tradition as it existed in its 
original geographical environs. The steady decline and eventual uprooting of ashkenazic 
communities in the Rhineland and Austria as a result of the expulsions and massacres that 
followed the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century led to a break in the continuity of 
the ashkenazic tradition.213 The new ashkenazic communities of Italy and, later, Eastern 
                                                     
212 His birthplace remains unclear – some claim it was Marburg, others Regensburg, Bavaria. 
213 See chapter 4 in this dissertation. 




Europe, maintained a strong sense of identification with their German-ashkenazic 
predecessors.214 When the textual products of this ashkenazic tradition were first being 
printed in Italy, however, not only geographical and chronological distance but also 
technological change separated them from their previous context. When Rabbi Isserlein 
died in 1460, the first Hebrew incunabula had not yet been printed. By 1519, when his 
writings left Bomberg’s printing press, Hebrew printing was well underway.215 The 
significance of this divide becomes especially clear in comparing the first printed edition 
of Rabbi Isserlein’s responsa to the same responsa as transmitted before print. 
 The printed Trumat ha-deshen [see image 1] makes an immediate impression of 
being, for a work of ashkenazic responsa, thoroughly edited, very complete, and 
unprecedentedly well-organized – so much so, in fact, that a tradition developed in 
Ashkenaz in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the responsa in Trumat ha-deshen 
                                                     
214 See Moshe Shulvass, “Ashkenazic Jewry in Italy,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 7 
(1952): 110–131. See the introductory chapter of Gershon D. Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the 
Eighteenth Century (LA: University of California Press, 2004): 1-21; see also the prologue by Mordechai 
Breuer, “The Jewish Middle Ages,” in German-Jewish History in Modern Times, vol. 1, Tradition and 
Enlightenment 1600-1780, ed. by Michael A. Meyer, trans. William Templer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996,7-77). 
On Central Europe, see Hillel Kieval, “Bohemia and Moravia” in YIVO Encyclopedia of the Jews 
in Eastern Europe, ed. Gershon Hundert (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 204; Otto Muneles, ed., 
the Prague Ghetto in the Renaissance Period (Prague: State Jewish Museum, 1965); Abraham Stein, Die 
Geschichte der Juden in Böhmen (Brünn: H Rickl Verlag, 1904). 
On minhagim (customs), see Rachel Zohn Mincer, “Liturgical Minhagim Books: The Increasing 
Reliance on Written Texts in Late Medieval Ashkenaz” (Ph.D. diss., Jewish Theological Seminary, 2012); 
and Lucia Raspe, “The Migration of German Jews to Italy and its Impact upon the Legacy of Medieval 
Ashekenaz,” in European Jewry around 1400: Disruption, Crisis and Resilience, ed. Lukas Clemens and 
Christopher Cluse (forthcoming) on the new ashkenazic communities. 
215 On the beginnings of Hebrew printing in Ashkenaz, see: Yeshayahu Sonne, “Tiulim ba-makom 
she-ha-meẓiut ve-ha-sefer – historia u-bibliografia – noshkim ze et ze” (Strolls in the place where reality and 
the book – history and bibliography – intersect), in Jubilee Book in Honor of Alexander Marx (Hebrew) (NY: 
JTS, 1950), 209-235. See also Avraham M Haberman, Ha-sefer ha-ivri be-hitpatḥuto (The Hebrew book and 
its development) (Jerusalem: Rubin Mas, 1968). 




were not based on authentic questions but were actually created by the author.216 Evidently, 
Trumat ha-deshen did not strike scholars of halakha in the early modern period as a typical 
work of responsa from fifteenth-century Ashkenaz. Its polished, tightly organized, closed-
ended, edited, and complete format aroused suspicion – the printed Trumat ha-deshen 
approached the prototype of a printed book more closely than any other ashkenazic work 
of responsa that would be printed in that century. Precisely this feature aroused suspicions 
about its authenticity, suspicions that soon became accepted knowledge. 
 Before the printing of Trumat ha-deshen, Rabbi Isserlein’s teachings circulated in 
several forms. An anonymous student of Rabbi Isserlein recorded one collection, Psakim 
u-ktavim (Rulings and writings). It includes 267 sections, amongst which are many 
responsa in various states of completeness and editorial intervention. The collection also 
includes material that is not responsa, such as testimonies regarding Rabbi Isserlein’s 
conduct and instances of oral transmission recorded by this student. For example, the 
collection includes a record of Rabbi Isserlein’s oral transmission of something that he had 
                                                     
216 For instances of this tradition, see Rabbi Shabtai Cohen’s gloss, Siftei cohen on Yoreh de’ah, 
§196:20, and Rabbi David ha-levi Segal’s gloss, Turei zahav on Yoreh de’ah, §328:2; for more examples and 
a discussion of the halakhic import of such an assertion, see Yedidya Dinari, Hakhmei Ashkenaz be-shalhei 
yemei ha-beinaim: Darkeihem ve-kitveihem ba-halakha (The sages of Ashkenaz at the end of the Middle 
Ages: Their ways and their writings in halakha) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1984), 303n223. Dinari attempts to verify 
whether the responsa were truly invented or authentic (mainly by comparing which responsa in Trumat ha-
deshen appear in a less edited form in Psakim u-ktavim or Leket yosher) and concludes that we cannot 
determine this with certainty. In any event, this tradition that Trumat ha-deshen was inauthentic is significant 
primarily because it emphasizes that Trumat ha-deshen indeed appeared out of place compared to other works 
of responsa from its time and location because the work was so thoroughly edited, organized, and complete. 
In that sense, the intuitions of those who considered it “invented” by Rabbi Isserlein himself are not incorrect. 
The basis for the book may have been authentic, but the level of editing was atypical for works from ashkenaz 
in general, and definitely for the 15th century.  
For more on this question, see this dissertation, chapter 6, section 2a. 
See also Yakov Shmuel Shpigel, Amudim be-toldot ha-sefer ha-ivri, vol. 2: Ktiva ve-ha’ataka 
(Chapters in the history of the Jewish book, vol. 2: Writing and transmission) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan 
University Press, 2005), 286. 




heard from his own rabbi, Rabbi Nathan Eiger (Eger, ca.1360 – Palestine, ca.1453).217 
Psakim u-ktavim was printed in 1519 together218 with Trumat ha-deshen, despite some 
overlap between their respective contents. 
The other extant collection from the school of Rabbi Isserlein is Leket yosher, 
                                                     
217 See Yuval, Ḥakhamim be-doram  (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1989), 172–194. 
218 The two were definitely printed at the same time; the three copies that I could consult (at the 
National Library of Israel, at the Center for Jewish History, in YIVO’s Strashun Collection, and from a 
private owner, Rabbi Shlomo Gottesman) all have the two works bound together. Of course, books were sold 
unbound, and they may often have been bought together and then bound as a unit. The Plantijn-Moretus 
museum has a copy of Trumat ha-Deshen alone [shelf mark B.3059(11)], as does Cambridge University 
Library, where it is bound with an unrelated work that was also printed by Bomberg in the same year, 
(S817.c.51.1).  
The two works have separate title-pages and Trumat ha-deshen concludes with its own colophon 
emphasizing the work’s “completion”  השלמה(three times), pointing to the separate nature of the works. 
Moreover, the signatures at the bottom of the leaves, which serve to direct the printers as to the order of the 
pages, are separate. Trumat ha-deshen ends with signature לא, and Psakim u-ktavim starts anew, from א, thus 
also indicating that they were printed as stand-alone works. In addition, the index (reshimat simanim) of 
Trumat ha-deshen has its own signatures for the quires and appears in different places in the copies I have 
seen (in the copy of the NLI, it appears after the title page before Trumat ha-deshen proper; in Gottesman’s 
private copy, it appears after the work). The index, too, may have been a stand-alone piece. This is in contrast 
to the table of contents of Psakim u-ktavim, which seems to be part of the work itself, as the signatures 
continue from Psakim u-ktavim itself to the table of contents at the end. It is, perhaps, also significant that 
Gottesman’s copy of Trumat ha-deshen is censored throughout, whereas Psakim u-ktavim is not, indicating 
that they were not bound together originally. I thank Rabbi and Malka Gottesman for allowing me to examine 
their copy and Theodor Dunkelgrün for checking the Antwerp and Cambridge copies for me. 
Conrad Gessner’s Pandectum sive Partitionum uniuersalium (Zurich: Christiphorus Froschoverus, 
1548) includes a section titled “De Grammatica Hebraica Chaldaica & Arabica & c.,” which is followed by 
a catalog of the books for sale in Venice by Bomberg with their prices (“Sequuntur libri aliquot hebraici 
Venetijs uenales, pretio quo singuli uenduntur adscripto monetae Venetae per libras & per solidos”). In that 
list, “Pesacim uchtauim”is listed (“id est iudicia & epistolae”) as being for sale for 1 lire (among the cheapest 
works on that page), while Trumat ha-deshen is not mentioned, possibly because Trumat ha-deshen was sold 
out but Psakim u-ktavim was not. This would mean that not only were they sold separately but also that the 
former was bought more often than the latter. Clearly, the more edited, organized work that was more “fit for 
print” was, indeed, bought more often.  
I thank Theodor Dunkelgrün for his help in examining this issue. See also Theodor Dunkelgrün, 
“The Hebrew Library of a Renaissance Humanist, Andreas Masius and the Bibliography to his ‘Iosuae 
Imperatoris Historia’ (1574), with a Latin Edition and an Annotated English Translation” in Studia 
Rosenthaliana 42/43 (2010-2011): 197-252 (esp. p. 226 n. 66). See also Aron Freiman, “Daniel Bomberg’s 
Buchverzeichnis” in Zeitschrift für Hebraïsche Bibliograpie 10 (1906): 38-42. 
Steinschneider’s catalog of the Bodleian lists the two separately and adds “cura Chijja Meir b. 
David” for Trumat ha-deshen (“Oblatio cineris”), but not for Psakim u-ktavim (“Decisiones et curia”). See 
Moritz Steinschneider, Catalogus Librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana (Berlin: Friedländer, 
1852-60) I: columns 1165-1166. 




collected by Rabbi Yosef (Yoizel) ben Moshe Ostreicher (1463–1475).219 Leket yosher 
contains a similar combination of responsa, psakim (rulings), and other halakhic 
material;220 however, this collection is centered mainly on psakim and hanhagot (customs, 
habits), whereas Psakim u-ktavim contains mainly responsa. In Leket yosher, the collector-
copier Rabbi Yoizel intruded by means of glosses and comments and often inserted himself 
into the writings, for instance by mentioning questions that he himself asked Rabbi 
Isserlein. He also often mentions the source from which he copied, whereas Psakim u-
ktavim’s anonymous author almost never does. The collection also includes a few sermons 
and hanhagot (customs) of a rabbi other than Rabbi Isserlein.221 Leket yosher was not 
printed until 1903.222 
When it comes to manuscripts of Trumat ha-deshen itself, there are no extant 
manuscripts of Trumat ha-deshen resembling the printed book.223 Edward Fram has 
                                                     
219 See Moritz Steinschneider in the catalog of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Hebraïschen 
Handschriften (2nd ed., Munich, 1895), 29, for a description of what is possibly an autograph of this 
collection. On Yoizel Ostreicher, see his introduction in Leket yosher as well as the foreword in Leket yosher, 
Oraḥ Ḥayim (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2010), ed. Yoel Katan and Amiḥai Kineret, 18-22. (Future 
page references to this work refer to this edition unless otherwise specified.) 
220 Leket yosher contains a mixture of copied material (such as responsa) and Rabbi Yoizel’s own 
notes, many of them observations. He emphasizes that he learned these while eating at his master’s table and 
even sleeping in his bedroom. When Rabbi Bruna visited Rabbi Isserlein, he declined to lead the grace after 
the meal, in order to watch Rabbi Isserlein do it and perhaps learn something new (see Leket yosher, 65-66). 
These examples demonstrate the close connection between copying of halakhic material and learning from 
one’s rabbi – not only from his writings but from all of his deeds – internalizing this knowledge and 
subsequently transmitting it. Copying responsa was but one way of doing so. We also see the social and 
moral weight associated with copying, to the degree that others tell Rabbi Yoizel that not sharing his copies 
after Rabbi Isserlein’s death constitutes a grave sin. 
221 Rabbi Shlomo Shpira (b. Speyer- d. Breslau 1453), see Yuval, Ḥakhamim, 245–256. 
222 Leket yosher, ed. Yacov Freiman (Berlin: Itzkovich Press, 1903-4). 
223 The absence of such a manuscript does not necessarily mean that it did not exist, as they may 
very well have lost track of the manuscript copy used by the printer as soon as the work was printed and it 
was no longer needed (whereas manuscripts not brought to a printer are more likely to be preserved). See, 
for instance, what happened to the manuscripts used to print books at Bomberg’s press: Avraham Haberman, 
Ha-madpis Daniel Bombirgi u-vet dfuso (The printer Daniel Bomberg and his press) (Safed: Museum for the 
Art of Printing, 1978), 21. 




described three manuscripts containing the same responsa as those included in Trumat ha-
deshen.224 Of the three manuscripts, two collections contain the same 354 responsa as the 
printed work, albeit in different orders. One of these manuscript collections225 contains a 
deed of sale, dated 1511, following the question of responsum §281; this means that at least 
the first part of the collection dates from before 1519, when Trumat ha-deshen was printed. 
This deed of sale is followed by the full response to question §281, along with the 
remaining seventy-four entries.226 The collection was written by three scribes and includes 
a table of contents, which was also penned by multiple scribes. The third manuscript that 
Fram describes contains only thirteen responsa from Trumat ha-deshen.227 
 Several elements make Trumat ha-deshen appear far more thoroughly edited than 
any other collection of responsa from the same place and time. For one, the responsa are 
very concise and self-contained. Each responsum has its own numbered section; each 
question is preceded by the word “Question” in larger type; and each response is preceded 
by the word “Response” in larger type. Almost every response opens with the same formula 
(“it seems”)228 and concludes with the same formula (“so it seems to me, in my humble 
                                                     
224 Dinari seems to think that Trumat ha-deshen was printed more or less directly from a manuscript 
that resembled the printed work. In any event, he does not delve deeply into the topic of the work’s form 
prior to print. See Edward (Yeḥezkel) Fram, “Al seder ha-tshuvot ba-mahadura ha-mudpeset shel sefer 
Trumat ha-deshen” (On the order of the responsa in the printed edition of Trumat ha-deshen), in Ale sefer 20 
(2008): 81–96, and Pinchas Roth, “Ha-siman he-ḥaser be-sefer Trumat ha-deshen” (The missing entry in the 
book Trumat ha-deshen) in Ale Sefer 21 (2010): 179–181. I thank Pinchas for his helpful comments and 
clarifications. 
225 Jewish Theological Seminary, JTS Ms7148 R1419. 
226 Fram assumes that the remaining responsa were copied on the basis of the printed book. See 
Fram, “Al seder ha-tshuvot,” 82. 
227 Ms Plut. I 8/6 in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana. 
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opinion”).229 This is not the norm for most other works of responsa, especially in Ashkenaz, 
where responsa are often only partially copied or merged with other pieces and where 
several responsum frequently appear under one and the same section number. 
 The consciously chosen amount of responsa in the collection is yet another 
characteristic that is atypical of likut culture. As mentioned, the work contains 354 
responsa,230 a number that corresponds numerically to the letters in the word “deshen,” 
hence the name of the book. This element points to the stable transmission of a closed-
ended work of set content, rather than the flexible, open-ended transmission practices of 
manuscript collections, in which various textual materials from different sources, genres, 
and authors would be copied in different combinations and orders by each individual scribe. 
Moreover, Trumat ha-deshen consistently omits the personal names of questioners 
and subjects in the responsa and replaces them with generic, anonymous names. 
Contemporary rabbis in Trumat ha-deshen are often referred to non-specifically, for 
                                                     
229 This also holds true for the JTS manuscript collections, except that “Question” שאלה and 
“Response” תשובה are sometimes replaced by just the first letters (“ש” and “ת,” in larger script), and the 
concluding formula is usually written in acronym form ד”ל לענ”כי . [see image 2] 
230 The count is not entirely accurate, as two variations of one responsum appear under different 
section numbers, albeit in slightly different form. The responsa in question are §230 and §236, concerning a 
document of divorce. The printed edition does mention, at the end of §236, that this response is identical to 
§230, adding “ve-ẓarikh iyun” (and this needs further study), which indicates that the editor, at least, is unsure 
of why this needed to be copied twice. Nevertheless, he does not remove it, perhaps because he believed 
there was a reason for including it twice, or perhaps simply because it would mean that the count of 354 
would fall short. According to the author of Leket yosher, Rabbi Isserlein was aware of the repetition and did 
not think it needed to be corrected – see Freiman, “Introduction,” Leket yosher Yore de’ah, Berlin edition, 
25. – that the section number in Leket yosher is not the same as in the printed Trumat ha-deshen (§247, as 
opposed to §230 or §236), may be further proof that Fram is correct about the existence of manuscript 
collections that did not resemble the corresponding printed ones. “ כתב בספרו שני פעמים תשובה זו (רמז) וידוע לו
 ”.ולא מחק האחת
Freiman, the editor of the first edition of Leket yosher, seems to see in this statement proof that the 
questions in Trumat ha-deshen were, indeed, real questions, for otherwise, why would the same question 
appear twice knowingly? Obviously, because it was indeed asked twice! However, even if this were the case, 
Isserlein would not have needed to copy a similar idea twice in his collection. 




example, as “one of the great scholars.” Comparison of those responsa to the equivalent 
documents as they appear in Psakim u-ktavim and in Leket yosher shows that the full names 
were present in earlier iterations of the correspondence231 and, thus, were removed for 
preparation of Trumat ha-deshen. 
Beyond the removal of specific names, other elements were also changed, resulting 
in creation of a more generic-looking work. Question §143 of Trumat ha-deshen, regarding 
a formulation in the prayer of Rosh ha-shana (the New Year), for instance, is clearly more 
edited than the same question in Psakim u-ktavim. The question in Psakim u-ktavim 
includes a part in which the questioner suggests his own theory about the correct prayer, 
and the exclamation “and the whole form of the prayer before and after this I desire to 
know.”232 The equivalent entry in Trumat ha-deshen is devoid of the questioner’s 
suggestion and of the exclamation. Similarly, in the answer in Psakim u-ktavim, Isserlein 
mentioned a relevant personal experience (having heard a relative recite the prayer in a 
                                                     
231 For example, §204 in the printed edition reads, “And I saw in the responsum of one of the great 
ones who wrote in the name of his rabbi, one of the great ones, that everything which is in the barrel... יתי ורא
 .בתשובת אחד מן הגדולים שכתב בשם רבו אחד מן הגדולים, דכל מה שהוא בחבית
In Leket yosher, Yoreh de’ah, hilkhot yayin nesekh, §12 (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2010), 
19, this is cited in the name of “השר,” which refers to Rabbi Shalom, who wrote Minhagei MahaRaSH,  אמר
ל בשם השר שבחבית קרי הפסד מרובה”מורי, כתב מהרי .This replacing of names can be observed in the manuscript 
versions of Trumat ha-deshen as well as in the printed version. (Compare to the same responsum in Ms JTS 
R1419, for instance, [the equivalent of §204 in the printed work is §319 in this manuscript,] where it is written 
the same way as in the printed edition, as “one of the great ones.”) 
For a theory related to the choice of generic names versus real names in citing rabbinic authorities 
in Trumat ha-deshen, see Naftali Yacov ha-Kohen, Oẓar ha-gedolim alufei Yacov (Bnei-Brak: Publisher 
unknown, 1968), 6: 50. 
ף ולמעלה (אחרי שנות ”מ שמביא סברת ותשובות מאחד מהגדולים שהיו משנות קו”ועוד בספרי הפוסקים זה דרכו שבכ
ל ורבו ”ש מווינא ותלמידו מהרי”יא רק בשם אחד מהגדולים בלי הזכרת שם כמו דעת מהרהגזירות קח וקט) באשכנז ואוסטרייך מב
ם מרוטנבורג ”ף כמו סברת תלמידו מהר”ל...ורק סברות גדולות שהיו קודם שנת קו”ם הלוי סג”הקדוש רבי אהרן וכן אפילו למהר
ל זה בספר הפסקים אבל בכתבים ותשובות שם כותב ותלמידיהם כמו האגודה וספר הטורים מביאם בשמם וכמו שראה דרכו בספרו וכ
ב”הכל משמם המיוחד בשם אומרו וכיו ... 
232 Psakim u-ktavim, §117. בראש השנה מלבד עולת החודש וכו’ באיזה מקום יש לאומרו...כי כמדומה שאין במקומינו
ר, וכל הנוסח מקודם ועד אחריו חפץ אני לדעת”כמו המנהג שכתוב במנהגי קלויזנע  




particular way), which is absent in Trumat ha-deshen. These changes have the combined 
effect of converting Trumat ha-deshen from a haphazard, personal compilation into a more 
structured, edited, and accessible book. 
 It was thus no coincidence that this work, so unprecedentedly organized, edited, 
and standardized – and so different from the manuscript context in which responsa were 
then circulating – was the first ashkenazic work of responsa to come off a printing press.233 
As mentioned, the dividing line between the ashkenazic communities of the German lands 
and their successors in Italy was also the border separating the pre-print era from the age 
of print. Ashkenazic responsa were doubly intertwined with manuscript culture. At one 
level, the connection to manuscript was essential to responsa in general, as the main source 
of responsa was epistolary, an element of learned rabbinic correspondence that was 
conducted in manuscript form. The connection to manuscript culture was even stronger for 
responsa in Ashkenaz than elsewhere, as their practice was mainly to preserve and transmit 
responsa in likutim.234 The likutim in which the ashkenazic responsa circulated prior to print 
were flexible, loosely organized, open, and varied in their halakhic content. This was 
related to the production process and the specific uses of manuscript compilations. Personal 
note-taking practices persisted to some extent in the era of print, by means of the archives 
                                                     
233 As for the question, why Trumat ha-deshen was, indeed, such a complete, organized collection, 
even in its manuscript state, Ta-Shma attributes this to the influence of Rabbi Yacov, the son of Rabbi Asher 
ben Yeḥiel (the 13th-century halakhist known as ROSh), who left Ashkenaz for Spain. Once in Spain, his son 
organized his father’s responsa according to principles, by dividing, editing, and re-arranging, and creating a 
table of contents. “... from then on,” Ta-Shma writes, “the situation changed,” and ashkenazic authorities, 
too, began to organize their responsa collections in this more sfardic style. The example Ta-Shma provides 
for this change caused by Rabbi Yacov ben Asher– Trumat ha-deshen (Ta-Shma, Kneset meḥkarim: Iyunim 
ba-sifrut ha-rabanit bi-yemei ha-beinayim (Collection of studies: Inquiries into the rabbinic literature of the 
Middle Ages) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2004), 121. 
234 See chapter 1 in this dissertation, especially sections 5, 7, 8 there. 




and manuscript notebooks (pinkasim) that scholars kept, and in the practice of writing 
manuscript glosses on other books, although these practices declined. The printed book 
became the primary method of acquiring a collection of halakhic textual material and the 
main way of creating and publishing a work of halakha. For works previously published in 
manuscript in more stable and closed-ended form, the variance between manuscript and 
printed work was, perhaps, somewhat less extreme. Writings that traditionally circulated 
in manuscript likutim, however, displayed more profound differences between their 
manuscript and print transmission. With this change in technology came a change in the 
approaches to, and expectations of, a work of halakha. This profound shift helps explain 
the choice of Trumat ha-deshen as the first work of responsa to represent the ashkenazic 
halakhic legacy. 
 How much of Trumat ha-deshen existed in such an organized, edited, manner 
before it was printed? It is fairly certain that Rabbi Isserlein already possessed a collection 
of responsa with many similarities to the printed book. Leket yosher and other writings by 
his students mention a “book” or some other known collection of writings by Rabbi 
Isserlein, indicating that he did maintain some collection of his own responsa. The 
introduction to Leket yosher includes a detailed listing of the myriad sources (both written 
and oral) that Rabbi Yoizel consulted. He also lists the various terms used to differentiate 
the types of source material: 
I created this book and organized it according to the order of the Arba Turim ... and 
everywhere I wrote simply, ‘he said,’ or ‘an occurrence,’ or ‘one time,’ or ‘he taught,’ [or 
‘a response’], it was written in his lifetime as he said or as I observed.... But there where I 
write ‘and I remember,’ or ‘I found,’ or ‘I copied,’ I wrote after his death. And there where 




I wrote ‘responsa,’ it is the responsum as it is written in the book that the gaon235 of blessed 
memory made....236 
 
We thus note a clear reference to “the book” that Rabbi Isserlein “made,” his 
collection of written responsa. Yedidia Dinari also assembled several early mentions of a 
work or book by Rabbi Isserlein, as opposed to simple citations of knowledge in his 
name.237 
 Pre-print sources rarely mention the work’s title and its connection to the number 
of responsa. The only references to the title in the printed work are in the colophon and on 
the title page, not in the work itself. The printed book opens with the following statement 
on its title page: “The Book Trumat ha-deshen. Composed and created by ... Rabbi Israel 
of blessed memory. Whose name is known in the gates238 and who is called among the 
Ashkenazim Our Teacher Rabbi Isserlein of blessed memory….”239 The significance of the 
exact number of responsa is stated explicitly in the colophon: “Praise and thanks be to the 
Master of Reality who strengthened our arms and helped us arrive at the completion of this 
beautiful work known to Israel240 and Judah, its name is Trumat ha-deshen because the 
number of its responsa are 354....”241 As mentioned, two of the extant manuscript 
                                                     
235 Gaon translates as an honorific like sage. For an illuminating summary of the evolution of the 
meaning of gaon throughout Jewish history, see Eliyahu Stern, The Genius: Elijah of Vilna and the Making 
of Modern Judaism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 146-153. 
חיברתי ספר הזה, וסדרתי אותו על סדר הראבע טורים...וכל היכא שכתבתי בסתם, דרש או מעשה, או פ”א או הורה,[או  236
תשובה], כתבתי בחייו כמו שאמר או כמו שראיתי...אבל היכא שכבתבי וזכרוני, או מצאתי, או העתקתי, כתבתי לאחר מותו. וכל 
ל”היכא שכתבתי תשובה היא התשובה שכתוב בספר שעשה הגאון ז ... 
237 See Dinari, Hakhme ashkenaz, 303, for examples. 
238 Proverbs 31:23. 
239 Trumat ha-deshen, title page:  ספר תרומת הדשן 
ל. אשר הניח ”ר איסרלן זצ”ל. אשר שמו נודע בשערים ונקרא בין האשכנזים מהר”ר ישראל זצ”חבר ויסד הגאון מהר
הנעלה המחזיק ידי עושי המלאכה בממונו. הלא שמו נקרא בחוצות אחריו ברכה לזכות הרבים בתשובותיו. ונדפסו ונחקקו על ידי 
ו”רגו מאנווירשה יצ”דניאל בומבי . 
240 Emphasized because it is also an allusion to the author’s first name. 
241 Trumat ha-deshen, first ed., colophon: 




collections of the responsa contain the requisite amount of sections and a reference to the 
title. The only part of these manuscripts that can be reliably dated to before the printed 
work, however, is the first part of one manuscript, up to §281, and a reference to the title242 
is found only at the end of that collection, which could have been completed after 1519. 
The second manuscript collection ends with the words, “This book was founded by the 
gaon, Our Teacher, Rabbi Isserl”243 and references the title (Trumat ha-deshen) and the 
amount of sections, but it could date from a later point – that is, after the work had been 
printed, and it does not necessarily mean that the collection was called Trumat ha-deshen 
before 1519.244 Another reference to the title and the number of responsa appears in the 
introduction to Leket yosher, where Rabbi Yoizel describes his work:  
And there where I wrote ‘responsa,’ it is the responsum as it is written in the book 
that the Gaon of blessed memory made [that was called Trumat ha-deshen because it 
contained 354 responsa like the lunar cycle which is 354 days] and everywhere I wrote ‘he 
wrote in his book,’ and I did not mention the term ‘responsum,’ it is because I did not know 
at the time that I wrote that law, that it was already written in his book until afterwards, 
when his book was revealed, then I wrote ‘it says in his book.’245 
 
                                                     
אל וביהודה שמו תרומת ”למת זה החבור הנאה הנודע בישרשבח והודיה לאדון המציאות אשר אמץ זרועותינו והגיענו להש
על שורש התלמוד ויסוד הפלפול סיני ועוקר הרים כל בר שכל ימצא שם ’ בנויי’ ן. והם דשנים ורענני”הדשן. כי מספר תשובותיו דש
בכף הצדק ובמאזני המשפט ’ אל לא ישקר וכל דבריו נערכים ומסוללים שקולי”חנינה כי נצח ישר  
242 At the end of JTS Ms7148 R1419  תם ונשלם שבח לאל בורא עולם ית’ ויתעלה וסימניו שנ”ד וסימנך דש”ן
 על כן נקרא תרומת הדשן
243 See also Fram, “Al Seder,” 81n3. 
JTS Ms 7149 R1532 ends with:                        תרומת הדשן תהלה לאל נותן’ נקר’ סיימתי ספ  
חותיך ועולותך ישן [ידשן]יזכור כל מנ   
244 As Fram mentions, whereas the first 280 sections definitely date from before 1511, the next 74 
were added later and according to the printed edition. See Fram, “Al Seder,”  מילא את החסר על סדר התשובות
מהדורה המודפסת מבוססת עליו ושלא הגיע לידינובמהדורה המודפסת או כתב יד שה . 
There is also a censor’s signature at the end of JTS Ms7148 R1419 dated 1598 (Domenico 
Irosolimitano). 
וכל היכא שכתבתי תשובה היא התשובה שכתוב בספר שעשה הגאון ז”ל [שקרא תרומת דשן משום שיש בו שנ”ד  245
ד ימים], וכל היכא שכתבתי כתב בספרו ולא כתבתי בלשון תשובה הוא משום שלא ידעתי באותו ”וך לבנה שהוא שנתשובות כמו היל
כ שנגלה הספר שלו, אז כתבתי כתוב בספרו. וכל היכא שכתבתי ”זמן שכתבתי אותו דין שהיה [אותו דין] כבר כתוב בספרו עד לאח
ה ובשאלה ראשונה אכתוב ההתחלה מן הכתב, ”יכא דאפשר אכתוב שמותם איל בכתב לחכמי ישראל, וה”שהשיב הגאון ז’ כתב, פי
 ובשאלה אחרונה אכתוב סיום הכתב בלשון נאום ישראל, ואם יהיה לי יותר אזי אכתוב יותר




 This passage clarifies that Rabbi Yoizel had access to his rabbi’s writings before he 
knew about the collection of responsa that would become the famous book. He apparently 
became aware of such a book only later, and therefore added “it says in his book” to the 
entries in his manuscript of Leket yosher that corresponded to the book Trumat ha-deshen. 
It is unclear whether, at that point, the number of sections was already 354 and the title 
already known. The introduction of Leket yosher does refer explicitly to the title and the 
354 responsa.246 Yet, in the first printed edition of Leket yosher, this line was bracketed, as 
it was added to the manuscript at a later date. As the author himself stated in the 
introduction, Rabbi Yoizel continued to edit Leket yosher throughout his life. Evidence 
suggests that the reference to the title was most likely added by Rabbi Yoizel himself, who 
died before Trumat ha-deshen was printed, meaning that he already knew the name of the 
book.247 One other pre-print reference to the title is found in a play on words by Rabbi 
                                                     
246 The use of 354 as corresponding to the lunar cycle has a precedent in other books. However, it 
may simply be a convention that someone followed in adding it to the manuscript later. Rabbi Yomtov 
Lipman Mühlhausen has a similar explanation for the amount of simanim in his collection (see Dinari, 
Hakhme ashkenaz, 302n218). 
247 Regarding the brackets in the first printed edition of Leket yosher (Berlin, 1903): It is not stated 
there why it appears in brackets. Freiman relied on a 1494 manuscript. For some reason, he did not think this 
line was part of the original manuscript of Leket yosher. Isserlein and his book are not referred to anywhere 
by means of the title Trumat ha-deshen in the rest of the introduction or in works that appeared before 1519, 
when Trumat ha-deshen was printed. The editor of the Makhon Yerushalaim edition makes the following 
remarks regarding the brackets in Freiman: 
ל, ”י כנ”י התברר, שהסוגריים בספר נבעו בדרך כלל מכך שלעיתים הוסיף המחבר משפטים בגיליון כתה”בהשוואה לכתה
שבין שני קטעים כך שחלק מהתיבות נכתבו על הגיליון, ודרכו של המהדיר הקודם [פריימן] היתה לסגור  או הוסיף קטע שלם ברווח
ד ”בסוגריים כל מה שלא היה כתוב בעמוד עצמו, גם אם מדובר על המשך המשפט של אותה פיסקה. אמנם בכל מהקום שהיתה לענ
ציינו בהערות שתיבות אלו הוכנסו מתוך מה שנוסף  -וף הספר י הכותב מאוחר יותר מאשר ג”משמעות לכתיבת תיבות מסויימות ע
בכותרת הפסקאות נכתבו בדרך כלל בגליון כתב היד’ וכד” תשובה“פלוני וכן ” כתב“וכן ” כתב בספרו“בגליון הספר: כך התיבות  . 
Leket Yosher, 26-27. 
Steinschneider in Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München’s catalog of Hebraïschen Handschriften, p. 
225, mentions that the manuscript of Leket yosher was corrected and emended often (“vielfach corrigirt und 
erganzt”) and on p. 227, he mentions ink from different times (“am Rande von frischerer tinte…”). As Rabbi 
Yoizel died in 1475, if he added the remark concerning the title, that would mean  the book already had this 
name before it was printed. The manuscript of Leket yosher does contain many later marginalia such as “ כתוב
 see Steinschneider, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 226). Pinchas Roth, who worked with an early) ”בספרו




Israel Bruna (ca. 1400–1480). In a responsum, he refers to Rabbi Isserlein’s contributions 
by using the word “trumot” (contributions/offerings).248 With regard to removal of personal 
names and the more generic phrasings of the responsa themselves, the two complete pre-
print manuscripts are identical to the printed ones, which supports the idea that the responsa 
from Trumat ha-deshen had already been prepared in this form by Rabbi Isserlein.249 
 In conclusion, some form of official collection of Rabbi Isserlein’s responsa that he 
himself had already, to some extent, edited, definitely seems to have existed. A connection 
to the title and the number of entries probably had evolved before the printed work. The 
existence of such a collection may have been one of the reasons why the publishers chose 
to print Trumat ha-deshen first.250 However, even for a collection as edited, complete, and 
easily adaptable to print as Trumat ha-deshen, the transition from manuscript to print 
transmission was not obvious. As Leket yosher, Psakim u-ktavim, and the variety of 
                                                     
manuscript of Leket yosher, related to me that the comments in brackets were added in the autograph 
manuscript by Rabbi Yoizel himself. 
248 ShUT MahaRI Bruna § 29 / ShUT MaharY Weil §164. See also Dinari, Hakhme Ashkenaz, 
303n221. 
in ד”ו קס”ת מהרי”ט = שו”ב כ”ת מהרי”שו  
  ועוד תמהני על הרב המובהק אשר תרומותיו תרומות 
249 I checked several of these at JTS: For instance, responsum §143 in the printed edition = §201 in 
the JTS Ms7148 R1419 =§ 242 in JTS Ms7149 R1532; the formulation is identical, omitting the personal 
names, etc. in comparison to the version in Psakim u-ktavim – this from the section that precedes the deed of 
sale in R1419. Thus, it seems that Rabbi Isserlein himself was the one to edit his responsa in such a way. 
250 Another possible motivation for choosing Trumat ha-deshen: Rabbi Isserlein represents the 
pinnacle of the rabbinic world of the fifteenth century, embodying the transmission from the generations that 
preceded him. As he is called in ShUT haBaḤ in a responsum of Rabbi Avraham of Brisk: “...we, in our 
lands, who in all our teachings drink from the wellsprings of the rabbi Rabbi Isserlein of blessed memory, 
who was from the sons of Ashkenaz, and the last of the last...” (ShUT haBaḤ ha-ḥadashot,§66). 
Rabbi Moshe Lima (1604-1658, Poland) writes in his gloss on Shulḥan Arukh: “And it is known that 
our Master Rabbi Israel of blessed memory, the author of Trumat ha-deshen, he is the greatest of the aḥronim 
(later ones) and it is from his wellsprings that we drink.” (Ḥelkat meḥokek, Even ha-ezer, §17:21). Rabbi 
Isserlein is seen as the figure who brings to the next generation the wealth of all the ashkenazic generations 
before the libels and persecutions. He is considered the final summation and repository of ashkenazic halakha. 
Perhaps this reputation played a role in his work being printed first. On the other hand, these 17th-century 
figures may have held such an image of Isserlein’s superiority precisely because his work was printed first 
(and in the best version). 




manuscript collections indicate, before they appeared in print, the responsa had circulated 
in many other forms besides the author’s “official” collection. The printed Trumat ha-
deshen was the product of extensive editing and re-organizing intended to shape it into a 
work appropriate for printing. 
 Trumat ha-deshen was edited by Rabbi Ḥiya Meir ben David, a rabbinical scholar 
and judge in Venice, who also wrote several responsa.251 Rabbi Ḥiya appears to have been 
a very active and sensitive editor. In the same year that Trumat ha-deshen was printed, he 
also edited a work called ShUT ha-Ramban (the responsa of Naḥmanides), which were, in 
fact, responsa from Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, not, as the title implied, from Naḥmanides. 
Rabbi Ḥiya was aware of this misattribution, stating on the title page that “every man of 
knowledge will accept the truth from whoever said it, even if they are not the responsa of 
Naḥmanides.”252 Rabbi Ḥiya edited many books at Bomberg’s press, including tractates of 
the Talmud. He also collected and printed the decisions of several rabbis regarding an 
infamous business controversy that took place in Venice in 1506.253 Rabbi Ḥiya seems to 
have been an editor who took his work very seriously and was aware that most readers had 
little appreciation for the difficult task of editing. At the conclusion of a collection of 
apocryphal talmudic tractates, printed in 1524–1526, Rabbi Ḥiya added an apology for any 
                                                     
251 There are several responsa by Rabbi Ḥiya Meir printed in ShUT Binyamin Ze’ev (§15, §38, §298, 
and §391). On Rabbi Ḥiya Meir, see Refael Natan Neta Rabinovitz, “Ma’amar al hadpasat ha-talmud,” in 
Dikdukei sofrim (Munich: Huber, 1877), 33–34n41. See also Haberman, Ha-madpis Daniel Bombirgi, 16. 
 .וכל איש מדע יקבל האמת ממי שאמרו ואם כי אינם מתשובות הרמב”ן 252
In that case, however, Rabbi Ḥiya explains that he was reluctant to interfere too much in terms of 
editing, as he had only this one manuscript. 
253 For more on the rabbinic involvement in the controversy between the partners Avraham Rafael 
Finzi and Emmanuel Norzi, see Alexander Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre in Sixteenth-century Italy: the 
pesakim of 1519,” in Abhandlungen zur Erinnerung an Hirsch Peretz Chajes (Vienna: Alexander Kohut 
Memorial Foundation, 1933), 149-193. 




errors; he also notes, in his own defense: “May any complainer first place his hand before 
his mouth and inquire into the nature of print and then he will be silent.”254 In Trumat ha-
deshen, too, a similar statement by Rabbi Ḥiya is printed in the apology: “And he who 
knows the labor of print and its characteristics will see with his mind’s eye that this is as 
precise and correct as possible, these are the words of ben David, Ḥiya Meir the printer.”255 
 Intensely involved in the printing process, Rabbi Ḥiya was highly conscious of the 
significance and pitfalls of his labor. Nowhere in Trumat ha-deshen is his intervention 
stronger than in arranging the order of the responsa and the creation of the table of contents. 
As mentioned, in none of the pre-print manuscript collections does the order of responsa 
resemble that of the printed Trumat ha-deshen. Clearly, the responsa circulated in 
manuscript in various orders, combinations, and forms that differed significantly from the 
printed work. The order of the responsa is especially important, as the responsa of the 
printed Trumat ha-deshen were organized in a very particular manner. The printed work is 
preceded by a table of contents (simanei Trumat ha-deshen) that reflects the work’s internal 
organization. The responsa in the book are organized topically, under a series of subject 
                                                     
254 Tractate Sofrim is one of the seven so-called “small tractates” or “external tractates” of the 
Talmud. It was printed by Bomberg in Venice in 1524–1526 together with Pirkei avot and two other “external 
tractates” (Smaḥot, Kalah) ה כי רבה היא על כן כל מצפצף וטורח גדול ומשא עצומה היתה עלי בלתי משוערת ליודעי המלאכ
 .ישים יד לפה בחקור אחרי טבע הדפוס ואז ידום
255  Trumat ha-deshen, apology ואני שפל המצב עמוס התלאות קטן שבתלמידים חיא מאיר בכהר”ר דוד זלה”ה
שגתי ואם באולי ימצא שמתי עיני על המלאכה לעשותה כהוגן ולהסיר מכשול וטעיות כפי האפשרי כאשר תשיג קוצר שכלי ומעוט ה
בו איזה שגיאות סהדי במרומים כי לא  במרד ולא במעל. והיודע מלאכת הדפוס ואיכתו יראה בעין שכלו היותו מדוייק ומתוקן ככל 
ציה”פה ווני’ האפשר אלה הם דברי בן דוד חיא מאיר המדפיס. במצוות ובבית דניאל הנז . 
“...And I, the lowly of stature [matzav] and full of hardships, the smallest among the students, Ḥiya 
Meir son of ... Rabbi David ... have set my eyes on the labor to do it properly and to remove any stumbling 
block and mistake according to my ability, as my slow mind and limited understanding can grasp and if 
perhaps there might be found in it some errors, my witnesses are in heaven that it was not done on purpose 
to mislead. And he who knows the labor of print and its characteristics will see with his mind’s eye that this 
is as precise and correct as possible, these are the words of ben David, Ḥiya the printer.” 




headers, starting with the laws of the Shema prayer, proceeding through the laws of prayers 
in general, blessings, festivals, and so on, and ending with the laws of testimony. The 
number of sections under a given subtitle is not consistent: “the laws of being fruitful and 
multiplying,” for instance, contains three sections, while “the laws of Sukot and the Lulav 
and Citron” contains twelve. The subject headings roughly resemble the order of the 
subjects as they appear in Rabbi Yacov ben Asher’s (Cologne, ca.1269–Toledo, ca.1343) 
Arba Turim (Four pillars/columns), first printed in Pieve di Sacco, in 1475.256 Arba Turim 
is a comprehensive collection of practical halakha, while Trumat ha-deshen, as a collection 
of responsa, is much more fragmentary. As a result, most subsections in the Arba Turim are 
not represented by a corresponding subsection in Trumat ha-deshen.257 
 Dinari noted that the order in Trumat ha-deshen does not perfectly correspond to 
that of the Arba Turim, and he conjectures that the order is a combination of Arba Turim 
and the order of Maimonides' halakhic code Mishne Torah.258 Fram, however, believes that 
the order of responsa in Trumat ha-deshen was created independently by the editor of the 
printed work. In comparing the order of the two complete manuscript collections of Trumat 
ha-deshen to the printed book [see image 3], it is clear that the printed responsa were 
organized by going through the order of the manuscript collection and beginning a new 
                                                     
256 See Haberman, “Melekhet ha-dfus ha-ivri be reshita” (The labor of print in its beginnings) in 
Masekhet sofrim ve-sifrut (Tractate on authors and literature) (Jerusalem: Rubin Mas, 1976), 277.  
This work is a compilation of halakhic summaries, organized into four main books (prayer and 
holidays; dietary laws; family law; damages and financial law), each organized internally according to 
smaller topics. See chapter 1 in this dissertation, n65 for more on the organization of Arba Turim. 
257 For example, the very first subject header in Trumat ha-deshen relates to the Shema prayer, while 
the Tur begins with the laws of waking in the morning, ritual handwashing, dressing, etc., and arrives at the 
Shema prayer about sixty subjects later. 
258 In his opinion, Isserlein at times chose to follow the order of yet another book, Maimonides’ 
halakhic code Mishne Torah instead of that of Arba Turim, thus creating an order that is an amalgam of these 
two codes.  




topic whenever necessary, placing subsequent responsa under existing topics as they were 
encountered. Thus, the first responsum in the manuscript,259 regarding the Shema prayer, 
became the first item in the first topic with its own subject header, the first responsum in 
the manuscript regarding laws of blessings became the first item under that subject header, 
and so on.260 The subject headers were then grouped together by thematic association. The 
order of the subject headers often resembles that of Arba Turim, which is also organized 
by topic. It is not completely identical to the order in Arba Turim because Rabbi Ḥiya did 
not follow the exact order of any particular work. Instead, he created his own order by 
placing related topics alongside each other.261 
 Yoḥanan Treves,262 who edited the first printed version of Mordekhai ben Hillel’s 
Hilkhot shḥita u-bdika (Laws of slaughter and checking, ca. 1550, Venice), described 
publication in his time as follows: “Everyone who has in his hands megilot starim263 brings 
                                                     
259 JTS Ms7148 R1419. 
260 See Fram, in Al seder ha-tshuvot, appendix 3. 
261 Fram, Al seder ha-tshuvot, 84. הארגון מחדש של ספר תרומת הדשן מראה שבתחילת המאה השש-עשרה הרעיון
וצא של המחשבה ההלכתית לארגן חומר על פי נושאים כבר הגיע לתודעת משווקי ספרים ורבנים אבל ספר הטור לא היה נקודת המ
 האשכנזית
262 Yoḥanan Treves (Italy, ca. 1490–1556), see Alexander Marx, “Rav Yosef Ish Arli be-tur moreh 
ve-ROSh yeshiva be-siena” (Rabbi Yosef d’Arli as a teacher and head of yeshiva in Siena), in Jubilee Volume 
in Honor of Levi Ginzburg’s Seventieth Birthday (NY: The American Academy for Jewish Studies, 1946), 
271-304. 
263 Regarding the term megilot starim referring to personal notes on halakhic matters, see 
Babylonian Talmud, tractate, Bava meẓia 92a, and RaShY there. 
See Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 21-22, for a discussion of the megilot starim 
mentioned in the Talmud. She discusses the distinction between “a syngrama, an authorized inscription 
accorded official status, and a hyponema, written notes for private use,” explaining that, Jews, similarly, 
“distinguished between texts that were intended for public reading and those that were mere jottings, aides 
de memoire. From the perspective of rabbinic culture, inscriptions in the latter category were ‘phantom texts’; 
these could be seen and silently read, but they merited no particular cultural attention and could not be 
adduced as sources of authority. Sages of the classical rabbinic period, geonim and medieval scholars, 
designated inscriptions in this latter category as ‘megilot starim,’ ‘scrolls to be sequestered’ – a term 
misunderstood by some later researchers.” 
The meaning of this term in earlier periods partially remains, primarily the personal and non-public 
aspect. Regardless of the precise meaning of the term in an earlier period, we can argue that this term is taken 
to mean something slightly different in a new context of writing and textual practices. In addition, the nature 




them out to the printers and they are a light to all.”264 Megilot starim literally means “hidden 
scrolls,” but here it was used to denote personal manuscripts. As the term “hidden scrolls” 
implies, the ashkenazic halakhic texts were not simply in manuscript in the material sense 
(denoted here by the use of “scrolls” rather than “books”); there was an additional aspect 
to their use and production, namely that these manuscript compilations were personal 
(“hidden”), and, consequently, not always obvious candidates for print publication. 
 The process of bringing ashkenazic halakhic manuscripts to print was, evidently, 
not just a technical step; it was part of a complex of changes that affected the practices of 
halakhic study in highly significant ways. By being printed, the manuscripts entered a 
public realm of readership. Even a skillfully edited manuscript text with concise, clearly 
separated sections, such as Rabbi Isserlein’s collection of responsa, differed fundamentally 
from its printed counterpart. The choice of which work to print first reveals much about 
the decision-making process of printers. Moreover, the editor’s decision to organize the 
work and to include a table of contents indicates some of the more important differences 
between manuscript compilations and printed works of halakha. These differences go 
beyond reproducing a more edited, clear, concise version of the text. The meticulous 
creation of a particular order, points, in the first place, to the expectation that a set group 
                                                     
of rabbinic Hebrew in this period – especially in flowery prose such as introductions, poems, letters, etc. – 
will often use terms with similar connotations from traditional sources without intending the precise same 
definition. 
For instance, a letter from 1524 is titled “Megilat starim” – see David Avraham and Uri Melamed, 
“Megilat starim le-Rabbi Avraham ha-levi: Igeret meshiḥit mi-shnat 284,” Shalem 8 (2009). See also Moshe 
Isserles, introduction to Darkhei Moshe (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1978), 35. 
See the introduction by Shmuel Glick, Kuntres ha-tshuvot ha-hadash (The new bibliography of 
responsa), 6 vols. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2006-2009), 1:70n333. 
264 Introduction by Mordekhai ben Hillel, Sḥitot u-bdikot, edited and glossed by Yoḥanan Treves 
(Venice: Press of Cornelio Adelkind, ca. 1550) כל מי שיש בידו מגילות סתרים יוצאים החוצה אל המדפיסים והיו למאורות 
. 




of responsa would be transmitted stably in the very same order, without tampering or 
personal selection of specific responsa. Similarly, the possibility of searching the work by 
means of a topically organized finding aid signals accessibility to a wider scholarly public, 
without requiring prior personal acquaintance with the contents as they had been arranged 
within a particular compilation. Thanks to the finding aid, simply understanding the topics 
is thus sufficient for gaining entry into the work. The inclusion of one table of contents also 
reflects the self-contained and homogenous nature of this printed work; it includes only 
those texts that can be part of one continuous table of contents; it meant that all the material 
derived from one author and represented variations of one kind of writing that could be 
ordered within a continuous organizational scheme. These interventions are a clear 
reflection of how significantly ashkenazic transmission had evolved over the course of the 
fifteenth century. 
b. ShUT MaharY Kolon 
In the same year as Trumat ha-deshen was printed, another work of ashkenazic responsa 
edited by Rabbi Ḥiya left Bomberg’s press. This was the collection of responsa from the 
pen of Rabbi Yosef Kolon (ca. 1418–1483), also known by his acronym “MaharYK” [see 
image 4]. Rabbi Kolon moved from Chambery, France to Northern Italy,265 where he 
taught, adjudicated, and wrote responsa. An analysis of this work provides evidence, from 
a different angle, of the efforts involved in transforming ashkenazic responsa for print.266 
                                                     
265 On his life and times, family, works, and method, as well as on the origin of the name “Kolon,” 
which is derived from “Columbo” – Dove (colombe), see Jeffrey Woolf, “The Life and Responsa of Rabbi 
Joseph Colon b. Salomon Trabotto (Maharik)” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1991). 
266 There are striking similarities between the language used in the title page of Trumat ha-deshen 
and that of ShUT MaharYK – Rabbi Ḥiya uses identical formulations in some cases. This is not surprising, 
as he was probably working on both at the same time: At the time when this colophon was being written, 




The colophon of Trumat ha-deshen concludes with a prayer:  
... just as we have merited the completion of this respectable and very useful book 
... so, too, shall we merit to print many, many more like this. And may He fulfill the idea 
and will of his highness our master Daniel Bombirgi, whose spirit moved him [Leviticus 
35:21], which God placed in his heart. To enter the labor of heaven. To print all the novellae 
to be found in the disseminations [nefoẓot] of Israel with the help of God....267 
 
 This statement places Trumat ha-deshen at the head of a larger project to print more 
writings that were still in manuscript. The word “nefoẓot” hints not only at communities 
situated throughout the Jewish world but, perhaps, also to the state of the manuscripts 
themselves. The responsa – spread across different manuscript collections – needed to be 
assembled and organized before they could be printed. 
 This is definitely the case for the responsa of Rabbi Kolon. Some of his responsa 
                                                     
Adar of 1519, the next work to be printed in this project, ShUT MaharYK, was already essentially ready, as 
the latter was finished in Iyar of the same year, barely two months later.  
Blessed is the Lord of existence who has not withheld from us today a just teacher who opens our 
[blind] eyes, leads the people on paved paths with his capacity for analysis and sharpness. He is the gaon our 
master Rabbi Yosef Kolon of blessed memory may he rest in Eden. Who bestowed merit upon the masses 
with his responsa. And enlightened the eyes of Israel with his novellae. And they have been printed and 
engraved by the elevated and praised by all, who strengthens the hands of those who do the labor with his 
possessions. His name is known in the gates, Daniel Bombergi of Anversa and the beginning of this grand 
labor was in the year 1519 in the great and cheerful city of Venice, which is under the rule of the lord may 
his honor be elevated. 
ברוך אדון המציאות אשר לא השבית לנו היום מורה צדק מפקח עיני עורות מוליך האנשים בדרך סלולה בבקיעותיו 
ע[מנוחתו עדן] ”ל מ”ר יוסף קלון זצ”ה הגאון מהר”ובפלפוליו. ה  
י המרומם ומפואר בפי כל המחזיק ידי עודי ”רבים בתשובותיו. והאיר עיני ישראל בחדושיו. ונדפסו ונחקקו עאשר זכה ה
ק בקריה ”ט לפ”הזאת בשנת רע’ הצחלת מלאכה המפואר’ ש והתי”המלאכה במאודיו. הלא שמו נודע בשערים דניאל בומברגי מאנוויר
ה”יה אשר תחת ממשלת השררה יר”ועליזה ווניזי’ רבת . 
שבח והודיה לאדון המציאות אשר אמץ זרועותינו והגיענו להשלמת זה החבור הנאה הנודע בישר”אל וביהודה שמו  267
על שורש התלמוד ויסוד הפלפול סיני ועוקר הרים כל בר שכל ’ בנויי’ ן. והם דשנים ורענני”תרומת הדשן. כי מספר תשובותיו דש
בכף הצדק ובמאזני המשפט איש אלקים נורא הוא ’ בריו נערכים ומסוללים שקוליאל לא ישקר וכל ד”ימצא שם חנינה כי נצח ישר
ה. ומכתיבת ידו יוכר ויודע טבע מחצבו. ובו ימצא כל איש לעדן את נפשו. ונתפלל לאל יתברך ויתרומם שמו ”ר איסרלן זלה”מהר
אמת כן נזכה להדפיס עוד כהנה וכהנה. וימלא  בכתב’ לעד ולנצח נצחים. כי כאשר זכינו להשלמת זה הספר הנכבד רוב התועלת הרשו
בלבבו. להכנס במלאכת שמים. להדפיס כל החדושים ימצאו ’ גי אשר נדבה רוחו ונתן ה”עצת ורצון הנעלה אדונינו דניאל בומביר
שפל המצב ק מהאלף הששי. ואני ”ר לפ”ד אייר עט”י’  י ובישועתו והיתה השלמת החבור הלזה ביום ו”בנפוצת? ישראל בעזרת הש
ה שמתי עיני על המלאכה לעשותה כהוגן ולהסיר מכשול וטעיות כפי ”ר דוד זלה”עמוס התלאות קטן שבתלמידים חיא מאיר בכהר
האפשרי כאשר תשיג קוצר שכלי ומעוט השגתי ואם באולי ימתא בו איזה שגיאות סהדי במרומים כי לא  במרד ולא במעל. והיודע 
ן שכלו היותו מדוייק ומתוקן ככל האפשר אלה הם דברי בן דוד חיא מאיר המדפיס. במצוות ובבית מלאכת הדפוס ואיכתו יראה בעי
ציה”פה ווני’ דניאל הנז . 




circulated in manuscript alongside other halakhic material from his school, such as 
testimonies from his students concerning their rabbi’s conduct in ritual and halakhic 
matters.268 Yet other responsa appear among the writings of contemporaries, students, and 
correspondents, such as Rabbi Bruna, Rabbi Yehuda Mintz, themselves authors of responsa 
that would eventually be printed, and Rabbi Yacov Margaliot, who authored one of the 
most important ashkenazic sidrei get (sing. seder get, instructions for writing divorce 
documents). Many responsa that were omitted in the first printed edition continued to 
circulate in manuscript and were printed only centuries later, in 1984.269 The newer 
publication contains about fifty entries collected from six different previously unprinted 
manuscripts. Some of these manuscript collections contained mainly responsa; others also 
contained a variety of halakhic material.270 One of the manuscript collections271 contained 
127 responsa, of which 83 do not overlap with the previously printed ones. There are signs 
that this latter collection was some sort of official manuscript, because every responsum 
contains signatures from two witnesses or a signature from the scribe who copied it. There 
are also several remarks from the scribe, such as “here it is missing,” and “I did not find 
more.”272 Once again, we see the flexible and undefined way in which the responsa were 
                                                     
268 See Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 239–240; one example is the manuscript Rashei prakim 
me-halakhot ve-dinim by David Modena, a student of Rabbi Kolon. This manuscript collection was evidently 
copied several times. 
A compilation of teachings, testimonies, behaviors, interpretations, etc. that he wrote as a student. 
269 ShUT haMaharYK ha-ḥadashim, ed. Eliahu Dov Pines (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1984). 
See Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 244–246, and 245n36, concerning individual responsa or groups of 
responsa mainly from MaharYK found in “various manuscripts containing halakhic miscellany,” such as MS 
Bibliotheque Nationale A10H (publ. Pines Ḥadashim, no.41), MS Parma 1334/3 (13031), fols. 315–318; 
Seder ha-get and MS Bodley-Oxford, Mich. Add.59 (21870), fols. 174 a–174b; shoresh 39.  
270 See Kolon, MaharYK Ḥadashim, ה (introduction). 
271 Ms Parma-Fiero 63, Stern collection. 
272 See Kolon, MaharYK Ḥadashim, ה (introduction) and 26. 




transmitted in manuscript and the co-existence of responsa with other genres of halakhic 
material, such as sidrei get and custom. 
 Additionally, there is a manuscript “mafteaḥ” (key), a list of short descriptions for 
311 responsa, including some of those printed in 1519. The list is dated within forty years 
of Rabbi Kolon’s death and clearly circulated in manuscript, as its multiple manuscript 
copies attest.273 The list opens with: “These are the simanim (signs, sections) of the 
questions and responses from our rabbi, the rabbi Yosef Kolon Tarbot, may his memory be 
a blessing, with the decision in short, without the awesome proofs.”274  Clearly, a large 
body of halakhic writings from Rabbi Kolon circulated in many different forms and 
contexts both before and after the printed work. 
 The fact that Rabbi Ḥiya was a direct student of Rabbi Kolon might suggest that he 
inherited some form of print-ready manuscript collection of responsa from his master. This 
was not the case, however, as is made clear by the number of responsa that had circulated 
in manuscript but were missing from the printed work. Rabbi Ḥiya’s tasks in creating the 
printed work, in fact, included tracking down and collecting the responsa. In the book’s 
introduction, he points out that that many more responsa are known to exist but his attempts 
to recover them were unsuccessful. Consequently, he explains, the printed work contains 
only those 195 responses that he managed to assemble:275 “And it is clear and known that 
                                                     
 Notably, the responsa that do overlap with the printed collection are all from the latter part of the 
book (root 77 and on). 
See Kolon, MaharYK Ḥadashim, 26 (introduction). Two of these lists are still extant in manuscript 
(British Museum and Cambridge – the former is signed by an “Eliezer” in 1517). 
274 See Kolon, MaharYK Ḥadashim, 4. 
275 The printed work claims to contain 195 roots, but, in reality, there are only 192. This is because 
one root is mistakenly labeled with a higher number, which skews the count from that point on. 




there are more of his responsa extant. Indeed, we have searched for them north and south 
and have not retrieved them. And forth and back, we have chased after them and it has not 
succeeded. And those that were to be found with us were printed with the help of Our 
Lord....”276 The colophon of ShUT MaharYK, was written by the printers, the brothers 
Adelkind.277 They mention both the challenges Rabbi Ḥiya faced in his editing and the 
dearth of good manuscript collections from which to print: 
And the work was completed distilled seven times, purified as in a smithy of silver. 
He removed from it the evil/stones [even/aven] of mistakes and the depths of errors, cleared 
of all slag, separated from all waste ... by ... Ḥiya ... and how great were the deeds of Ḥiya.... 
And if perhaps there can be found some mistake, it is not proper to blame him. And your 
complaint should not be on him. For the copy from which it was printed was entirely 
defective, and there were not in existence any properly edited books as would be needed 
for this labor. Therefore, he has not withheld from it to correct as much as capable. Also at 
nights his eyes did not see sleep due to the hard work and labor he had in this....278 
 
 A related form of editing carried out by Rabbi Ḥiya was selecting only his rabbi’s 
responsa. Unlike the responsa in most ashkenazic compilations, the work arranged by 
Rabbi Ḥiya contains only the responsa of Rabbi Kolon himself.279 The responsa in the 
                                                     
276 See Kolon, ShUT MaharYK (Venice, 1519), at the end of the table of contents. 
וברור וידוע כי יש עוד מתשובותיו בנמצאות. אכן צפון ותימן בקשנו אחריהם ולא השגנום: וקדם ואחור רדפנו להגיעם  
י ובישועתו”ואשר נמצאו תחת ידינו נדפסו בעזרת הש ולא עלתה בידינו. . 
277 Concerning them, see Ḥayim Friedberg, Ha-dfus ha-ivri be-medinot Italya,…me-reshit hitavuto 
v-hitpatḥuto (The history of Hebrew printing in the lands of Italy…since its beginnings) (Tel Aviv: Bar-
Yuda, 1956) 2nd ed., 60 fnt.1. 
ותשלם כל המלאכה מזוקקת שבעתי’ צרופה כבמצרף כסף. סוקל מאבן הטעויות ומעמקי מצולת השבושים מושלל  278
ר דוד ”ר חיא מאיר בכהר”רוחב שכלו ברחב ים הגאון מהר’ ה סיני ועוקר הרי”י ה”מכל סיג נברר מכל פסולת זורה כבמזרחת הוגה ע
מעשה חיא כאשר המופת יוכיח כי ’ והרוללים. וכמה גדולי’ הכרם ועדר ונכש השדה בלי יעלה עוד קמשוני מן’ ל אשר כלה קוצי”זצ
אשר ידו הגיעה שמה בדק ולא השאיר אחריו חסרות ויעה הגהותיו כל מחסה כזב ושקר. ואם באולי ימצא טעות מה אין ’ בכל מקו
נדפס היתה משובשת בתכלית ולא היו בנמצא ספרי מוגהים כראוי ומוכרח ראוי להאשימו. ולא עליו תלונתיכם. כי ההעתקה אשר ממנה 
כ ראוי לדונו ”למלאכה זו. אכן ממנו לא נחסר לתקן ככל מה שאפשר. גם בלילה שינה בעיניו לא ראה מרוב טרדט ועמל היה לו בו. ע
או ’ הפועלי’ ער. ובאולי השמיטו המדפיסיאם ימצא. הגם כי ברור לנו כי לא ימצא כי אם מעט מז’ לכף זכות וכל אחד יתקן המעוו
ת או אופכא בזה אין להאשימו וירצה מלפני האל יתברך פעלו וצדקתו תעמוד לעד. והיתה ”ש בדל”איזה אות או החליפו רי’ האומני
בירגא אדונינו דניאל בומ’ ד במצות ובבי”ל קינ”ב אדר רעט על ידי האחים מזרע ישראל בני ברוך אדי”כ’ השלמת הספר יום ד
רשה”מאננווי . 
As well as two responsa mistakenly attributed to him: root 74 is from Or zarua, not from Rabbi 
Kolon, and root 163 is from Rabbi Weil; see Shpigel, Amudim, 246. 




printed work are almost always signed “and peace be unto you, from me, Yosef Kolon, son 
of our master Rabbi Shlomo,” or with some other conclusion such as “and so it seems, in 
my humble opinion.”280 Although such signatures were often added later by scribes and 
editors, the consistent conclusions in ShUT MaharYK are still telling. In typical ashkenazic 
collections, the beginning and the end of a responsum were usually not clearly distinct, nor 
did all the responsa within a collection stem from one single author, making it almost 
impossible to consistently add a distinct opening and the same signature for every 
responsum. Thus, even if this was the work of Rabbi Ḥiya and not of Rabbi Kolon, the 
presence of the openings and consistent signatures is still remarkable and atypical. 
 As in his work on Trumat ha-deshen, Rabbi Ḥiya took his editing tasks further than 
simply polishing the text; he also organized the different segments of responsa. In this case, 
he calls the responsa “shorashim,” or “roots.”281 He also created a list of shorashim for the 
printed book, which functioned as the table of contents. He introduced it as follows: 
Seeing as these responses to questions, “their measure is longer than the earth and 
wider than the sea.”282 And in every responsum there are usually included useful issues 
apart from the one intended in the response originally. Therefore, I have awakened my 
inquisition and girded my loins. I, the lowly and the smallest among the students, Ḥiya 
Meir son of his honor the rabbi Rabbi David of blessed and pious memory. And I have 
inquired into the bottom of the depth of every single response. As much as my limited 
understanding and little mind permit. And I have made from every response one root on 
which the main part of the response is built. And the subsections that extend from it and 
the other laws that are not directly related to the question, I have placed in the book in the 
most succinct manner. It will be very useful for those perusing and looking in this book. 
And they will find what they want without hard work and labor. And the Lord, may He be 
blessed, will save me from errors and show me the wonders of his Torah, Amen, so may be 
                                                     
280 On medieval responsa, see Haym Soloveitchik, ShUT ke-makor histori (Responsa as a historical 
source) (Jerusalem: Shazar, 1990), who considers the presence of an opening greeting or a signature to point 
to minimal tampering with the question by copyists, as the opening greeting and concluding signature would 
have been the first things to remove. 
281 See Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 247. 
282 Job 11: 9. 






 There does not seem to be any clear source for the order that Rabbi Ḥiya uses to 
organize the different roots. Related or similar questions are often clustered together – for 
instance, a succession of roots all related to ritual slaughter,284 or a certain cluster addressed 
only textual problems from medieval sources.285 On the other hand, similar topics that 
could easily have fit within those groups tend to recur outside of the clusters.286 Rabbi 
Ḥiya’s remarkable editorial intervention in this case was not displayed in the ordering of 
the responsa. Rather, Rabbi Ḥiya's main intervention is the decision to call the responsa 
“roots” and the decision to add a mention of the halakhic distillation of every “root” into 
both the laws derived from it directly and the more tangential laws that follow from every 
responsum. Calling the responsa “roots” is a way of presenting the work as more generic 
and foundational, of highlighting the universal significance of these particular cases and 
rendering it possible to search the general categories of laws to which the specific responses 
relate.287 This intervention takes a random collection of specific responsa – which had 
                                                     
יען כי אלו תשובות שאלות ארוכי’ מארץ מדה ורחבם מני ים. ובכל תשובה ותשובה על הרוב נכלל בהם עניינים  283
ר ”שבתלמידים חיא מאיר בכהר מועלים זולת המכוון מאותה התשובה. לכן עוררתי רעיוני ושנסתי את מתני. אני שפל המצב הקטן
ל. וירדתי לסוף עומק דעת כל תשובה ותשובה. כפי קוצר השגתי ומעוט שכלי ועשיתי מכל תשובה שורש אחד אשר עיקר ”דוד זצ
תוכן התשובה בנויה עליו. וסעיפים המסתעפים ממנה ודינים אחרים אשר לא מעניין השאלה. העליתי על ספר בתכלית הקצור. יועיל 
ר”י יציני משגיאות ויוריני נפלאות תורתיו אכי”בספר הזה. ויושגו מבוקשם זולת יגיע ועמל. והש’ וגים ומעיינימאד לה . 
284 Kolon, ShUT MaharYK, Roots 33–40. 
285 Kolon, ShUT MaharYK, Roots 59–62. 
286 Kolon, ShUT MaharYK, Root 96, for instance, is also an explanation of a problem from one of 
the medieval sources discussed in roots 59–62; it could easily have been added there, but, instead, appears 
separately. 
287 It may be interesting to consider the use of “roots” in some of the legal decisions of sixteenth-
century rabbis in Italy such as Rabbi Yeḥiel Nissim da Pisa (ca. 1493-before 1572). In some of their halakhic 
writings, roots are used in a scholastic manner to set out the basic truths of a halakhic problem before arriving 
at a solution using logical deduction based on those roots (see Reuven [Robert] Bonfil, Ha-rabanut be-Italia 
bi-tkufat ha-renesans (The rabbinate in Italy during the Renaissance) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979), 162-163. 
Perhaps the decision to call the table of contents “roots” is a way of implying that these responsa can be used 
as a basis for further halakhic/scholastic reasoning. 




started out as halakhic correspondence and continued to be circulated in a variety of 
manuscript forms and contexts – and highlights its general aspect. The contents are no 
longer simply a collection of individual cases; rather, they are “roots,” precedents for 
something larger. 
 As mentioned, a manuscript “mafteaḥ” (key) listing 311 brief conclusions drawn 
from some of Rabbi Kolon’s responsa had been circulating in manuscript prior to the 
printed work. The mafteaḥ, too, contains clusters of related topics, but it is, likewise, not 
consistently organized and topics re-appear independently from similar entries. There are 
many overlaps between entries in the mafteaḥ and items in Rabbi Ḥiya’s list of “roots” that 
form the table of contents of the printed book, and it is informative to compare the two.288 
Several differences appear, such as variations in the order. Apart from a few entries that 
show up in the same order in both lists, mainly because they are sections of the same 
question or very closely related,289 there are few similarities between the ordering of Rabbi 
Ḥiya’s table of contents and that of the mafteaḥ. The above-mentioned manuscript of the 
mafteaḥ290 containing signatures was, if the signatures are to be believed, copied from some 
original manuscript. Dated 1517, it was thus copied just before the book of responsa was 
printed. Rabbi Ḥiya and the author of the mafteaḥ could very well have been composing 
their lists at the same time. There is a great difference, however, between creating a list of 
summaries of a rabbi's decisions and creating a list of the “roots” and “branches” that can 
                                                     
288 Many conclusions in the mafteaḥ have no equivalent in the printed responsa, but many others do. 
The number of conclusions – 311 – versus the number of roots – 195 – in the printed responsa should not be 
too misleading, as often more than one conclusion is derived from one “root.” 
289 For example, the equivalents of root 113a and 113b in the table of contents also follow one 
another in the mafteaḥ. 
290 British Museum Ms ADD27129. 




be derived from these decisions. 
 The mafteaḥ summarizes decisions made by Rabbi Kolon, and it is meant to be a 
stand-alone list. Rabbi Ḥiya’s table of contents, by contrast, is made to be used together 
with the book, functioning as search tool and highlighting the general relevance of the 
collection and the wide range of halakhic topics to which it contributes. The mafteaḥ is, in 
fact, similar to a list of psakim or halakhic rulings. Lists of psakim are found in many 
ashkenazic manuscript collections. Their goal is to list the decisions made by an authority. 
The lists testified that the authority had made a particular decision, without explaining or 
inquiring into the reasoning. When a number of different laws concerning very different 
topics are addressed in one responsum, they appear as different subsections of the same 
“root” in Rabbi Ḥiya’s table of contents. This is consistent with their use as a finding aid 
for the responsa. In the mafteaḥ, however, if disparate rulings followed from one 
responsum, the respective records of these different rulings are often no longer adjacent to 
each another. They are separated and placed near other entries that cover similar topics. 
For the use of the mafteaḥ, it did not matter whether different decisions were once part of 
the same responsum. The only relevant issue was the fact that the decisions were Rabbi 
Kolon’s final ruling. 
 The purpose of the table of “roots” was to extract and highlight the more general 
laws discussed within the book; thus, its most common formulation is “u-bo yevo’ar...” 
(...and in it will be elucidated...). The mafteaḥ’s goal, in contrast, was to provide a 
paraphrase of Rabbi Kolon’s ruling in a certain situation; its most common opening 
statement is “be’inyan” or “al d’var” (concerning...), followed by a short description of 




the specific case and the basis of the decision. Responsum §13 in the printed work, for 
instance, regarding a document in which a husband forfeits his right to any of his wife’s 
possessions but comes to regret it after she receives an inheritance, opens with a flowery 
greeting to Rabbi Gershom Treves, and includes the name of this scholar and relative to 
whom it is being addressed. The responsum then discusses the case. It ends with personal 
blessings to the addressee. The description in the mafteaḥ corresponding to this decision 
provides a brief summary of the case and the decision, without any of the reasoning: 
“Concerning Jacob [generic name], who wrote a document to Rachel [generic name], his 
wife...,” a short description of the issue, and a summary of the decision: “the will of her 
inheritance is a document of debt and this is included in her possessions, from which he 
completely forfeited his rights.”291 In Rabbi Ḥiya's table of contents, on the other hand, the 
response is formulated in more general prescriptive terms: “He who writes a document of 
forfeiting at the time of marriage also forfeits his rights to the will of her inheritance that 
the father made for his daughter at the time of marriage....” On the next line of the table of 
contents (under the same root number), Rabbi Ḥiya adds a further – even more general – 
conclusion that was mentioned in the process of the responsum itself: “He who says ‘my 
possessions go to so-and-so,’ this also includes all documents.”292 [see image 5] 
                                                     
291 See “mafteaḥ,” Kolon, MaharYK Ḥadashim, 310n223, (§128). 
292 See MaharYK Ḥadashim, 261- 329 for list of simanim. 
 י:”הסימנים של המפתח בכתברשימת 
על דבר יעקב שכתב שטר סלוק לרחל אשתו...שטר הירושה הוא שטר חוב והוי בכלל נכסיה ומהם נסתלק  -סימן קכח 
 לגמרי.
MaharYK (Venice,1519), table of contents: 
 ברשימת השורשים של הספר הנדפס:
שעשה האב לבתו בשעת חופה ובפרט אם כותב בשטר סילוק ’ כ משטר ירוש”הכותב שטר סילוק בשעת החופה מסולק ג
 ’.לי שום צד זכות בכל נכסי זוגתי ולא בכל מה שיש לה כו’ אי
 האומר נכסי לפלוני גם השטרות בכלל.




 Such differences in formulation are consistent throughout the documents. All the 
mafteaḥ entries use a succinct, specific paraphrase that focuses on the final decision, 
whereas all the “roots” in the table of contents distill and generalize, focusing on the larger 
laws at play. This accentuates the difference between the purpose of the mafteaḥ and Rabbi 
Ḥiya’s list of roots. The mafteaḥ was a traditional list of psakim that circulated in 
manuscript; it was meant to be used independently as a record of a rabbi’s decisions, thus 
transforming Rabbi Kolon’s responsa into a record of rulings. Rabbi Ḥiya’s list, in contrast, 
served as an accompaniment to the printed work, both as a practical finding aid for it and 
as a way of emphasizing the general legal applications of the collection of his rabbi’s 
halakhic writings, transforming it from an archive of correspondence into a series of 
important halakhic principles. The table of contents, comprising the first pages of the 
printed book, was an effective way to highlight the relevance of the particular responsa for 
general halakhic study.293 
 Rabbi Ḥiya, in his lament for the lost responsa, acknowledges that the number of 
responsa included in the printed work is entirely contingent on whatever he could recover. 
Nevertheless, as a final editorial flourish, he attempts to connect the numerical value of 
this number to a specific scriptural passage. He does so by means of some mathematical 
and linguistic gymnastics, connecting the number of roots and subsections that he created 
in his organization of the work to the word ‘entrance’: “...the count of the number of roots 
                                                     
293 At first blush, it may seem counterintuitive that the finding aid for a specific book is phrased in 
more general terms than the list of rulings, but this corresponds to the role of the finding aid of making a 
specific book accessible for a general audience, whereas the list of rulings was a typically ashkenazic halakhic 
text; a record of actual decisions made by an individual rabbi about a particular case at a specific time. 




is one hundred and ninety-five, and its subsections, two hundred and ninety-three. And the 
sign for the roots with the subsections is ‘The entrance (petaḥ = 488) of Your words gives 
light; it gives understanding to the simple.’”294 At the conclusion of the work, Rabbi Ḥiya 
wrote a short blessing and a prayer to merit printing many more books, followed by a poem 
honoring Rabbi Kolon. The poem points to a recurring motivation for printing responsa: 
publishing a printed collection of responsa as a posthumous tribute to the author, usually 
by his students.295 
 Unlike in the case of Trumat ha-deshen, Rabbi Ḥiya did not see any need to re-
arrange the roots of Rabbi Kolon’s responsa. This would soon change, however. The next 
edition of ShUT MaharYK was printed in Cremona in 1557. The editors rearranged the 
original table of contents to correspond to the organization of Maimonides’ code, the 
Mishne Torah, thereby transforming the table of contents into an index.296 They included 
Rabbi Ḥiya’s original statement concerning the roots, wherein he explains that he made 
every responsum into one main root with several branches in order to make it easier to 
consult. The editors then added their own remarks: 
And we, the printers of this awesome work for the second time, having seen the 
work and labor for he who wants to study when he is looking for any law (din) he must 
look through all the roots and branches one by one from the start until he finds what he 
                                                     
294 The verse is from Psalms 119:130. Kolon, ShUT MaharYK, end of simanim. 
ח דבריו ”ג. וסימן השרשים עם הענפים פת”ה וסעיפיהם רצ”הנערכים מפז. ומניין מספר השרשים קצ תמו סימני התשובות
יאיר מבין פתאים. וברור וידוע כי יש עוד מתשובותיו בנמצאות. אכן צפון ותימן בקשנו אחריהם ולא השגנום: וקדם ואחור רדפנו 
י ובישועתו”רת השלהגיעם ולא עלתה בידינו. ואשר נמצאו תחת ידינו נדפסו בעז . 
295 The responsa of Rabbi Shlomo Luria in Lublin 1574 were published close to his death. The title 
page includes an address to his students, encouraging them specifically to buy his book. Several extant copies 
of the first edition were also bound together with poems eulogizing Rabbi Luria, see chapter 5 in this 
dissertation. 
296 Jeffrey Woolf relates this to the centrality of Maimonides’ code as the main text for halakhic 
study in Italy at the time: “...it is safe to conclude that the Cremona printers assumed that their potential 
customers turned first to Maimonides when studying Halacha, and then searched for responsa related on the 
question before them” (Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 118). 




searches for. Therefore, we copied the roots and branches according to the order of the laws 
of Maimonides of blessed memory. And every inquirer will find that which he is searching 
for in its place, with signs for the laws where it belongs.... 297 
 
 This modification was not difficult to implement after Rabbi Ḥiya had already 
abstracted and listed the roots and branches in every response. The decision to choose 
Maimonides’ code as a guiding thread also incidentally highlighted the marked differences 
between responsa and codes: several of Rabbi Ḥiya’s “roots” were impossible to place 
under any existent category in Maimonides’ comprehensive halakhic code, inducing the 
editors of the Cremona edition to come up with new categories such as minhagim ve-
takanot (customs and ordinances) and yishuvim u-pshatim (justifications and explanations). 
They had to invent these because customs and ordinances as well as textual and scholarly 
explanations exemplify areas typical for responsa literature that cannot be found in more 
generalized legal codes. 
 One of the most important consequences of a work’s appearance in print is, of 
course, the opportunity to enlarge its circulation and readership. There is anecdotal textual 
evidence for this in the case of Rabbi Kolon’s work: as Rabbi Yeḥiel Ashkenazi of 
Jerusalem wrote in a responsum from 1565: “...and I will not quote the exact language here, 
because the responsa of the MaharYK are to be found in the home of every learned person, 
go read it there, etc., and I swear to the heavens that when I was in the area of Austria about 
                                                     
297 ShUT MaharYK, Cremona 1557, 
בור הנורא שנית בראותינו היגיעה והעמל  המגיע למעיין ברצותו לחפש איזה דין יצטרך לעיין כל ואנחנו המדפיסים זה הח
ל. וכל מעיין ימצא ”ם ז”השרשים והענפים אחד לאחד מראש עד ימצא מבוקשו. לכן העתקנו השרשים והענפים על סדר הלכות הרמב
יה שמה הרוח ללכת. ואף גם בזאת הקלנו עול המעיין ברצותו למצא מבוקשו על דגלו באותות לבית הלכותיו. ותורנו זו הלוח באשר יה
’ ד’ ג’ ב’ איזה דין שאינו מעיקר התשובה באמצעיתה או בסופה האותיות יגידו לו בגליון כי שמה קבענום מסמרות נטועים על דרך א
ל הנזכר ומקום הניח לנו הגאון ”ז ר חייא מאיר”כמנין הענפים והסעיפים המסתעפים מן השרש ההוא כאשר סדרם הגאון מהר’ וכו
א”פעלינו אכיר’ שכיבינן נפיק לוותן: ירצה על פני ה’ להתגדר בו  ולסדר לוח זו אל סדר הנכבד הזה וכי’ הנז . 




thirty-six years ago, this is the response that they relied on in Austria and Moravia....”298 
 Thus, less than half a century after the book was first printed, it had become so 
widespread that a scholar in Jerusalem was highly confident that “it can be found in the 
home of every learned person.” As he was referring to a printed version whose text was 
thus almost identical throughout the different copies, there was no longer any need, in his 
opinion, to quote his source verbatim. Instead, he simply instructs the addressee to “go read 
it there.” Another consequence of the responsa having been published in print, one related 
to the wider circulation of stable copies, is the fact that the responsa were pre-emptively 
self-censored. The Cremona edition is the first to be missing a responsum (root 192) that 
describes the anti-Jewish activities of the Dominican order in Mantua.299 
 The works of Rabbi Isserlein and Rabbi Kolon were printed in the same place and 
year, as part of the same ashkenazic tradition, but in many ways, they were very different. 
Rabbi Isserlein’s work was printed more than half a century after his death and in a location 
far from where he had lived, whereas Rabbi Kolon’s work was printed by one of his 
immediate students and in the same area where they had been written. Rabbi Isserlein died 
in Wiener Neustadt, in the region where the ashkenazic halakhists of the late Middle Ages 
flourished, and he came to be considered the capstone of that generation. Rabbi Kolon, 
                                                     
ולא אביא לשונותיו [של המהרי”ק] יען כי תשובות מהרי”ק מצויות בבית כל בר בי רב זיל קרי בי’ וכו’, ומעיד אני  298
יל אושטרייך זה לי כמו לו שנה, שעל זאת התשובה סמכולשמים כשהייתי בגל ...” 
Published in Simḥa Assaf, “From the Archives of the Jerusalem Library,” in Minḥa le-David: 
Jubilee Volume for David Yelin (Jerusalem: R. Mas, 1935), 233–235. See also, Woolf, “The Life and 
Responsa,” 249. 
Concerning Rabbi Yeḥiel Ashkenazi, see Eliezer Rivlin, Sefer toldot hakhmei Yerushalaim (A book 
of the history of the sages of Jerusalem) (Jerusalem: Salomon Press, 1927-1930), 108. 
299 See Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 248n48. See Meir Benayahu, Ha-dfus ha-ivri be-Kremona 
(Hebrew Printing in Cremona) (Jerusalem: Makhon Ben-Ẓvi and Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971), 198–199. 




although he died only 23 years after Isserlein, was no longer part of the older ashkenazic 
world; rather, he belonged to the ashkenazic “diaspora” in Italy.300 In addition to the break 
that resulted from the physical displacement of Jews and the disruption of functioning 
communities in the Rhineland, France, and Austria, many other changes impacted halakhic 
culture. When Rabbi Isserlein died, Hebrew printing was in its infancy, and the first 
responsa had not yet been printed. Rabbi Kolon, on the other hand, worked in a location 
where Hebrew printing was already viable. Certain types of works that had previously been 
less central to the ashkenazic halakhic tradition were becoming more dominant, 
specifically the genre of codes. The Arba Turim was printed in Rabbi Kolon’s lifetime, and 
Woolf notes the “pioneering ubiquity” of references to the Arba Turim throughout Rabbi 
Kolon’s responsa.301 
 Notably, both these works of responsa were, for the first time, no longer being 
copied in the personal context of a scholar’s building his own manuscript collection or 
having it prepared especially for him. Instead, the works were being printed for use by a 
larger, anonymous audience, who would incorporate the responsa into their own studies in 
a variety of new ways. This was unprecedented. The emergence of printed works of 
ashkenazic responsa was both an effect of larger changes in the landscape of the halakhic 
culture and itself a catalyst for further changes. The extensive editorial efforts required of 
Rabbi Ḥiya in order to transform these manuscripts into printable works attest to the depth 
of the changes in question. The remainder of the sixteenth century would see the printing 
                                                     
300 On the dynamics of a culture versus its “diaspora” after discontinuity, see chapter 4 in this 
dissertation. 
301 See Bonfil, Ha-rabanut, 15–16; 164–171; Woolf, “The Life and Responsa,” 109. 




of four other important works of ashkenazic responsa.302 These works were not edited 
comprehensively by a figure like Rabbi Ḥiya, and their organization shows that the 
difference between manuscript transmission and print culture was more than a technical 
issue. 
3. CONTINUITIES IN LIKUT CULTURE, MANUSCRIPT AND PRINT:  
a. ShUT MaharY Weil 
 
The first two ashkenazic works printed by Bomberg exemplify how printed works of 
responsa could result in a finished product very distant from the earlier ashkenazic forms 
of transmitting halakhic texts. The newly printed works were well-organized, thoroughly 
edited, searchable, standardized works of responsa, with an emphasis on their general use 
in halakhic study. Other works of ashkenazic responsa that were printed in Italy during the 
remainder of the century, however, did not follow the prototype of the two works from 
1519. For one, the state of the manuscripts of certain older ashkenazic works of responsa 
hindered this effort. These works had been transmitted for so long, and in ways so 
incompatible with print, that it would have required immense efforts to fashion them into 
printable works of responsa that resembled Trumat ha-deshen.303 Most importantly, the 
non-linear and all but immediate transition attests to the fact that practices of knowledge 
                                                     
302 The Cremona edition of Maharam of Rothenburg’s responsa is not discussed here. See 
Emmanuel, “Hashlamot le-tshuvot MaharaM mi-Rothenburg, dfus Kremona” in Ta-Shma: meḥkarim be-
mada’e ha-yehadut le-zikhro shel Yisrael M Ta-Shma, (Come and hear: studies in Jewish studies in the 
memory of Israel M. Ta-Shma), 2 vols., ed. Avraham (Rami) Reiner ( Alon Shvut: Herzog College, 2011), 
581-599. 
303 On the emerging culture of editing and correcting texts for print, see Anthony Grafton, The 
Culture of Correction in Renaissance Europe (London: British Library, 2011); Martin Lowry, The World of 
Aldus Manutius: Business and Scholarship in Renaissance Venice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1979). See also Yakov Mayer’s dissertation (forthcoming) on the efforts to create proper printable editions 
of Hebrew works, specifically the Jerusalem Talmud. 




organization and transmission do not change instantaneously simply because new 
technologies introduce novel possibilities. As will become clear, many of the deeply 
entrenched practices surrounding ashkenazic halakhic intellectual culture persisted to some 
extent in an era of print culture, resulting in printed works of responsa that were far from 
either well organized or effectively edited books. 
 Trumat ha-deshen and ShUT MaharYK were, each in its own way, outliers: the 
former because its author had already collected and edited the work to an extent that 
rendered it easier to print, the latter because of its proximity to the time and place of its 
printing. The other works of responsa that were printed in this period were, in a sense, more 
representative. Indeed, they exhibit more continuity with the culture of likutim than the two 
initial works would have led one to expect. Thirty years after Bomberg printed Trumat ha-
deshen, the responsa of Rabbi Yacov Weil were printed. [see image 6] The book was first 
printed in 1549, in Venice, by Cornelio Adelkind,304 almost a century after Rabbi Weil’s 
death;305 it was edited by Rabbi Meshulam Kofman.306 Rabbi Yacov ben Yehuda Weil, also 
known by his acronym “MaharY” Weil (1390–1453), was a rabbi in Nuremberg, among 
other places; he was a descendant of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, and a student of Rabbi 
Yacov Moellin, another author of important responsa. Rabbi Weil’s responsa were never 
collected systematically. Some of his responsa do not appear in the collection of responsa 
                                                     
304 Haberman, in “Melekhet ha-dfus, explains that Adelkind worked for Bomberg first and then 
established his own press. 
305 An introduction by Rabbi Dov Be’er Rosenzweig for the Makhon Yerushalaim edition mentions 
that the first edition was printed in 1523. See Rabbi Dov B. Rosenzweig, “Introduction,” in ShuT MahaRY 
Weil (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2001), 19. I have not found such an edition in the National Library’s 
bibliography of the Hebrew book or in any library catalogs. 
306 Kafman קאפמאן-probably Kaufman, and see Efrayim Zalman Margaliot of Brod, Ma’a lot ha-
yuḥasin, (Lemberg: Rohatyn, 1900), 3, who mentions Rabbi Meshulam Kaufman of Venice. 




named for him, but, instead, appear in the collections of other rabbis, some of whom had 
been his close contemporaries such as Rabbi Isserlein, and others born slightly later, such 
as Rabbi Israel Bruna (1400–1480), who married into Rabbi Weil’s family. Rabbi Bruna 
himself also wrote responsa, one of which mentions Rabbi Weil: “...until here is [quoted] 
the language of the gaon MaharYW Weil in his book which is in the hands of his son, my 
father-in-law....”307 There was, apparently, some sort of “book,” a manuscript collection of 
Rabbi Weil’s responsa, that had been passed on to Rabbi Weil’s son. Rabbi Bruna was 
evidently copying his quote from this collection. 
 The differences between the printed responsa of Rabbi Weil and the other two 
earlier printed works of responsa become clear when considering the make-up of the work: 
whereas Trumat ha-deshen is a homogenous collection (Psakim u-ktavim was printed as a 
separate unit),308 the responsa of Rabbi Weil were printed as part of a collection comprised 
of several disparate parts. The printed book is based on a manuscript collection that 
includes 193 responsa, most of which are from Rabbi Weil. In addition to these responsa, 
the book also contains many other kinds of halakhic materials that exemplify the various 
types of halakhic writings found in ashkenazic manuscript likutim. 
 The last sections of the responsa are not really answers to questions, but rather 
“sdarim.”309 These sdarim, or “arrangements,” are basically manuals, each a series of 
instructions that lay out a specific religious or legal ritual; they include instructions for a 
                                                     
307 In §254 of his own responsa עכ”ל בספרו אשר ביד בנו שארי הח”ר יוזל יצ”ו 
308 See my discussion of this in n217 in the current chapter. 
309 In this case: a seder ḥalitza, seder pidyon ha-ben, seder get and a harsha’a for a get (an official 
permit with witnesses from the husband to allow a messenger to deliver the divorce document to his wife 
instead of the husband). 




seder get – preparing and delivering a writ of divorce; a seder tshuva – a prescription for 
acts of repentance to atone for a specific misdeed;310 and a seder shvu’a d’orayta – 
instructions for taking an oath. These types of sdarim are often found in manuscript 
compilations, sometimes alongside responsa, at other times independently. They are not 
technically responsa, but, in terms of transmission practices, they ended up in the 
manuscript compilations of students in much the same way, namely, when a student copied 
written material from his rabbi’s archive. These sdarim sections of responsa are followed 
by several pages labeled “sermons” in the header.311 These were not individually titled as 
“sermons,” as the header suggests, but instead, “Rules of Repentance and the Day of 
Atonement and Sukot,” “Rules of the Day of Atonement,” and “Rules of Passover.” The 
period of the High Holidays and the Sabbath before Passover are times when the rabbi 
would traditionally deliver a sermon that related to the laws of this period; therefore, it 
stands to reason that these sections were, indeed, originally delivered as sermons about 
these laws, hence the header. The entire section thus includes three different types of 
halakhic writing (sdarim, responsa, and sermons). It concludes with a short statement: 
“Completed are the Responses and Questions and Sermons on Holidays of our Master the 
Rabbi Rabbi Yacov Weil of Blessed Memory.”312 
 This part is followed by several pages on the laws of ritual slaughter and the proper 
way of checking whether meat is kosher. These pages, taken together, make up a manual 
                                                     
310 For more on this tradition, see Marcus, Piety and Society: The Jewish Pietists of Medieval 
Germany (Leiden: Brill, 1981). 
311 The section numbers continue from the responsa and are §191, 192, 193. 
 נשלמו תשובות ושאלות ודרשות מימים טובים של מהר"ר יעקב ווייל ז"ל. 312




of instructions concerning ritual slaughter (“shḥitot u-bdikot”),313 which is separate from 
the responsa. This manual had been printed independently shortly before the printed 
responsa (Prague, ca. 1530),314 and would later be printed again by Adelkind in Venice in 
1551, and countless times after that. Versions of this manual had been copied separately in 
manuscript before the book had been printed, and such copying continued in this manner 
after 1530. The section numbers here do not continue from the previous section, thereby 
underscoring the discontinuity from the responsa; it is a separate unit that had been added 
to them. 
 This section on slaughter is followed by a collection of “dinim ve-halakhot” (rules 
and laws), a series of succinct laws. They are a miscellany of short statements, in no 
particular order, concerning highly specific rules, insights, and remarks. For example, a 
line about salting meat (§41) is followed by a few insights and scholarly remarks regarding 
a gloss on the Talmud (§42), which, in turn, are followed by a psak (ruling) about a 
marriage, containing a statement about the specifics of the case,315 a report of Rabbi Weil’s 
decision in the matter, and an extremely short mention of his reasoning. There are about 
                                                     
313 See Ta-Shma, “Kavim le-ofyah shel sifrut ha-halakha be-Ashkenaz ba-meah ha-13-14” 
(Characteristics of halakhic literature in Ashkenaz in the 13th-14th centuries.) in Alei sefer 4 (1977): 20-41, 
where the concept of “professional literature” is explained. 
314 Domb, who wrote the introduction for the Makhon Yerushalaim edition, mentions only Prague 
1549. The catalog of the Bibliography of the Hebrew Book (NLI) mentions that there is an earlier copy of 
the laws of slaughtering by Rabbi Weil; the authors of the catalog know of only one copy, with no title page. 
According to the colophon, this copy was printed in about 1530 in Prague at the press of Moshe ben Gershom 
ha-kohen. This copy is at the Bodleian Library, MBI-0201917. 
315 In this case (§45), “There was a woman in Prague whose husband disappeared and no one knew 
what happened to him and a very young girl, the daughter of Zanvil, spoke innocently how her father Zanvil 
Sh.r.ẓ.ẓ.? went with him into the field... (§45) 
ץ הלך ”אג נאבד בעלה ולא נודע מה היה לו ותנוקת בתו של זנוויל הסיחה לפי תומה איך שאביה זנוויל שרצ”אשה בפר
 ...עמו על השדה
י וייל דינין והלכות”מהר  




sixty of these “dinim ve-halakhot,” but none contain lengthy deliberations, explanations, 
or source material.316 
 In addition to these disparate units of Rabbi Weil’s material, which are by no means 
a homogenous collection of responsa, there are writings from entirely different authors, 
such as Rabbi Menaḥem of Meresburg317 and Rabbi Alexander Zuslein Kohen (d.1349). 
After the conclusion of the “dinim ve-halakhot,”318 a new title follows: “Ḥidushei aguda” 
(Collected novellae). This section is nine pages long and ends with another short 
concluding statement.319 Nowhere is it explicitly indicated that these were written not by 
Rabbi Weil but by Rabbi Kohen. The following section comprises several pages and its 
headers read: “Nimukei moreinu ha-Rav Rabbi Menaḥem Merzburk.” It contains almost 
ninety passages, each starting with the world “din” (rule) and dealing mainly with 
monetary, tax, and court issues.320 This part, which does not originate from Rabbi Weil, 
also closes with a short concluding statement.321 
 The printed responsa of Rabbi Weil are more akin to a likut, namely, a fairly random 
collection of several units of halakhic textual material that are not parts of a unified whole. 
The varied headers throughout the book emphasize this heterogeneity [see image 7]. This 
is entirely in line with the logic of creating miscellaneous manuscript compilations rather 
                                                     
316 With the exception of the very last one, which is slightly longer. 
317 Sometimes called R. Menaḥem Me'il zedek or R. Menaḥem Ha-me'ili, Germany, fourteenth 
century, wrote Me'il ẓedek, most of which was lost. The original work contained several hundred sections, 
most of which were decisions and responsa of other medieval authorities; only a few were penned by R. 
Menaḥem himself. 
 /סליקו להו דיני מהר”ר יעקב וויילא  318
319 The short line סליקו להו חידושי אגודה. 
320 One group of these entries is collected under one subtitle (dinei boshet), the laws of compensation 
for shame, but the others do not have any subtitles. 
321 The line ע”כ מנימוקי מה”ר מנחם ממירזבורק ז”ל. 




than a homogenous book. A compilation was usually passed from teacher to student, from 
father to son, with new parts added as the transmission continued. Indeed, several scholars, 
including the editor of the most recent edition of Rabbi Weil’s responsa, appear to think 
that the collection that served as the basis for the Venice edition was, in fact, the manuscript 
of Rabbi Weil’s own notebook or a copy thereof.322 The textual evidence for this includes 
Rabbi Israel Bruna’s mention of having inherited such a collection, as cited above. That 
reference, however, indicates only that Rabbi Weil kept a collection of his own responsa, 
which he passed on to his son. It does not offer information as to whether this collection is 
similar to the one on which the printed version is based, or whether the other units of the 
printed book were part of this original manuscript collection. In Rabbi Weil’s responsa, 
however, he mentions “our Master the rabbi Menaḥem of Meresburg, ... And many things 
and adjudications copied from this book, they are in my possession...”323 This statement 
makes it seem likely that the unit containing the texts of Rabbi Menaḥem of Meresburg 
included in the printed version was already part of the manuscript collection that the 
printers used and, indeed, dated to the collection of Rabbi Weil himself. 324 Thus, the 
                                                     
322 Rabbi Shraga Domb, who edited the Makhon Yerushalaim 2001 edition (see above). The 
introduction of the Makhon Yerushalaim edition by Rabbi Rosenzweig assumes that Weil himself collected 
and organized his work in this way. 
323 Weil §133: הרבה דינים שכתב וחיבר מהם ספר גדול...והרבה דברים ופסקים נעתק מספרו והם בידי 
324 On the other hand, the first editions contain some mistakes and omissions that are not consistent 
with the manuscript versions, which lead us to wonder whether Adelkind’s manuscript was not the original 
but, instead, a later manuscript copy. For instance, §69 in the first printed edition begins with the words  אבן
 etc., whereas the newer editions (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2001) contain nine words .פינה. יתר אמנה
that precede these, based on another manuscript (Ms Hekhal Shlomo) the editors do not explain anything 
about this manuscript. Of course, it could be that the words existed in the manuscript, and Adelkind 
mistakenly omitted them. 
Domb, in his introduction to another fifteenth-century work of responsa, seems to assume that the 
printed responsa of Rabbi Weil do, indeed, reflect his own personal manuscript collection (see Yonatan 
Shraga Domb, “Introduction,” ShUT MaharY Mintz [Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1991], 33): “Just like 
his rabbi, [Rabbi] Weil, who copied for himself at the end of his booklet [pinkas] of responsa a collection 




printed work is not a compilation created by the printers. In this case, it is not surprising 
that the compilation of the different units in the printed book are so reminiscent of practices 
that had been typical in creating and transmitting manuscript likutim in the time of Rabbi 
Weil. The printed book was, it seems, based on this very compilation, and printed in the 
form in which it had been found, without much editing. Moreover, the printers did not even 
give the book a real title; the name on the title page simply enumerates the three main 
components of the book: “Questions and Responsa and Laws of Slaughter and Checking, 
which were composed by the great rabbi, Our Master the rabbi Rabbi Yacov Weil of 
Blessed Memory, and also Novellae from Sefer aguda and the Nimukim of our master and 
rabbi, Rabbi Menaḥem Meresburg of blessed memory.”325 
  In short, the printed book of responsa of Rabbi Weil does not contain purely 
responsa, nor does it contain only material from Rabbi Weil. Although this seems strange 
for a printed book of responsa, it is very typical for manuscript compilations. The only 
aspect that hints at any serious organizational attempt to tie the whole book together and 
render it easier to navigate is the index of the printed book. The last fifteen pages of the 
printed work contain an index that is organized by topic;326 it shows where certain laws 
from the first part of the book are found, by section number as well as by page. The last 
                                                     
that he collected from Sefer ha-aguda and from Sefer ha-nimukim of Rabbi Menachem Meresburg, and for 
that reason those collections are found at the end of ShUT MahaRYW and in all the printed editions. 
325 Also: big/universal הכולל. 
Title page: ל, ועוד ”יעקב ווייל ז’ שאלות ותשובות והלכות שחיטה ובדיקה וחידושי דינין אשר חבר הרב הכולל מהרר
ל”רק זר מנחם מרזבו”חידושין מספר אגודה ונימקי מהר   
ק פה ויניציאה”ט לפ”דפס על יד קורנילייו אדיל קינד בשנת שנ  
326  “Rules of...”: marriage, repentance, levirate marriage, divorce, menstrual impurity and ritual 
bath, women, priestly impurity, marital contract and shiduchin (matchmaking), rabbinical issues, communal 
takanot (enactments), malshinut (slander), sabbath, taxes, charity, torts, oaths, documents, inheritance, and 
other issues related to death, judges, prohibitions, firstborn, joyful occasions, without any given order. 




topic section in this index is entitled “random laws,” and mentions the first page number 
of Nimukei MaharaM Meresburg and the Ḥidushei agada as well. This is another indication 
that, if the printers were using a pre-existing index, the works from these different authors 
had already been bound together in the manuscript collection. The index probably existed 
in the manuscript collection from which Cornelio Adelkind based the book; nowhere does 
the first printed edition mention the preparation of this index. 
 Although the different types of halakhic material (responsa, sermons, manuals, 
decisions) are separated from one another by concluding statements and opening titles, 
overall, there is an evident lack of effort to transform this manuscript collection into a work 
that is clearly defined in terms of subject matter, authorship, and genre. This impression is 
reinforced by the editorial decision to print these different types of writing in succession in 
the same book, without removing personal names and other specifics superfluous to future 
use, and by the fact that three different authors are printed together in the book, without 
clear indication or editorial explanation as to the reasoning behind this. Other than adding 
a new title page, which does not even include an original title, and writing a short 
introduction and a one line colophon to frame the work, there is no editorial intervention 
with the compilation in its manuscript form. It is, in many ways, a manuscript likut printed 
almost precisely as it was found. 
 After thanking God for his help in “printing this elevated book from start to finish,” 
327 the introductionpraises Rabbi Weil’s greatness, noting that “the author of Trumat ha-
                                                     
327 Weil, ShUT MaraY Weil, introduction (at back): 
ר יעקב איש ”י עמנו וישעך תתן לנו, להדפיס הספר הזה המעולה מהחל עד כלה חברו החכם הכולל מהר’יהי נא חסדך י
פשר, בקש  ל נכתב ונחתם, על דרך שאלות ותשובות אותו חבר, והיטב את כל אשר דבר, מי כהחכם הודיע”תם, על שם מקומו ווי




deshen, who moves the lips of those slumbering, mentioned him [Rabbi Weil] as a proof 
[authority] in his responsa very often...”328  Although Rabbi Weil was Rabbi Isserlein’s 
senior, it is clear that Trumat ha-deshen, which, by the time the work was being printed 
had already been in print for three decades, was the work with the more widespread 
reputation. 
b. ShUT MaharY Mintz  
The continuities between the practices of manuscript and print transmission of halakha are 
even more pronounced in the case of the responsa of Rabbi Yehuda Mintz. Rabbi Mintz 
was born in the German lands;329 he lived for an extraordinarily long time (about one 
hundred years) and died in Padua in 1509. His responsa were printed together with those 
of Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen (known as MaharaM of Padua), who had arranged for their 
printing. [see image 11] Rabbi Katzenelbogen was a student of Rabbi Mintz and married 
one of his granddaughters. Rabbi Katzenelbogen explains that even collecting and 
assembling the materials for the work was not an easy task: “I searched, and I did not find, 
because several intrigues and adventures have befallen the [writings],330 since in the year 
in which our rabbi died, his town, the city of Padua, was looted and the strangers took his 
                                                     
יושר, אמרות טהורות וצרופות, בעיון דק ובחריפות, ובהדמות מילתא למילתא, רוח מבינתו גילתה, הרבה חדושים ’ דברי חפץ וכתו
ועניינים אשר לא נודעו מלפנים, הוא היה יחיד בדורו, הוא זיוו הוא הדרו, אזן וחקר ותקן, ישיבות בארץ אשכנז הרביץ ושיכן, וכל 
ייה, ואין ברוחו רמיה, ובעל תרומת הדשן, אשר דובב שפתי ישן, הביאו לראיה בתשובותיו  לרוב על כל גדותיו ולכן דבריו סולת נק
כל המבקש דבר השם, ועד הנה לא ידע ואשם, אם בספר הזה יהיה בוחר, יהפוך לו אלהים לב אחר, ובקראו בו אז יחרץ ויגיע לו 
י בתומים, ”להיו על ראשו, וכאשר אל ביתו יאספו עיניו לא תחוס על כספו, אך יודה את יתענוג נמרץ, ותתענג בדשן נפשו, כאלו נזר א
 .חבלים נפלו לי בנעימים
328 Song of Songs 7:10, meaning here that he makes the preceding generations speak after their death 
by quoting them. יאו לראיה בתשובותיו לרובובעל תרומת הדשן אשר דובב שפתי ישן, הב   
329 It is not known exactly where. 
330 The Siege of Padua, 1519. See Frederick Lewis Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973). 




writings and tore and burned them, and only a fraction remained saved.”331 Ultimately, a 
brother-in-law of Rabbi Katzenelbogen who was a grandson of Rabbi Mintz, “...checked 
in his books here and there and found a few booklets/quires [kuntresim] hidden inside the 
books spread here and there, until he assembled sixteen psakim [decisions, adjudications] 
and brought them to me...”332 Thus, we know that, while Rabbi Mintz kept his own writings 
in manuscript, many of them were lost due to social unrest and that the sixteen published 
responsa are only a small sample of his oeuvre.333 It is not clear from the information in 
the introduction whether Rabbi Mintz himself chose to save the smaller quires with 
manuscript copies of his responsa inside his books or whether his grandson had kept them 
in this way. The grandson’s need to search for them may indicate that it was Rabbi Mintz 
who had preserved his own writings. Perhaps Rabbi Mintz had placed them inside his larger 
books, and in this way, the grandson inherited the writings along with parts of his 
grandfather’s book collection. 
 The format of some of these responsa suggests that Rabbi Mintz originally copied 
                                                     
331 Katzenelbogen, introduction to ShUT MaharY Mintz u-MaharaM Padua (Venice: Bragdin, 
1553): 
יגעתי ולא מצאתי כי עדו עליהם כמה טצדקי? והרפתקי באשר באותה שנה שנפטר רביו היתה קרית פדואה עיר מושבו 
 ... לשלל ושלטו ידי זרים בספריו לקרעם ולשרפם ומעט מזער הם אשר נשארו לפליטה
332 Katzenelbogen, Introduction to ShUT MaharY Mintz u-MaharaM Padua, 
’ איך בדק בספריו אנה ואנה ומצ’ ץ בן בנו ואמ”ל  י”ל ז”ררי מינץ ס”אמנם עתה בזמן קרוב בא אלי גיסי האלוף כמהר
אלי’ ו פסקים והביא”גנוזים בתוך הספרים אחת הנה ואחת הנה עד שקבץ יחד י’ קצת קונטרסי  .... 
333 The sixteen responsa that were published include one concerning inheritances and pledges to 
charity, several documents of engagements and questions regarding witness statements in these cases,  two 
permissions (“heter”) for women to remarry shortly after giving birth, a writ to the community of Treviso 
concerning the collection of funds and building of a synagogue and ritual bath, a response concerning a 
questionable Torah scroll, the calculation of a bar mitzvah for a leap year, a discussion regarding taking an 
additional wife in the case of infertility, a discussion concerning marriages of the anusim and the question of 
problematic witnesses, two pieces concerning a levirate marriages with complications, a famous case of 
mi’un (rejection of a betrothal with a minor), a question concerning the rights of a minyan (prayer quorum), 
which includes many smaller unrelated issues, and a discussion concerning the custom of wearing masks on 
Purim. 




them for his personal record. In many cases, he copied the responsa from his 
correspondence, and included the formal greeting to the person he was addressing, 
followed by a short recapitulation of the question and Rabbi Mintz’s answer to it, and he 
then closes with his signature.334 Often, the personal names are preserved; in a few 
instances, however, the addressees are made anonymous.335 It is not clear whether the 
occasional removal of personal details was Rabbi Katzenelbogen’s doing, but the fact that 
this was done inconsistently points to its having been done in the original manuscript copy. 
Sometimes, Rabbi Mintz’s introduction to the responsa explains his motivation for writing 
them in his records. For instance, he writes: “I said, I shall tell this law so that the later 
generation shall know for what reason I permitted Rabbi Mordekhai ... to marry a woman 
who was still breastfeeding....”336 Or, in another case: “Since Sir Amoẓ the elder ... told me 
and ordered me in defense of my own honor not to provide any of the wagging tongues 
with reasons to protest what I ruled regarding the maiden Fiorina Tam,337 the daughter of 
Rabbi Isaac of Rovigo....”338 The responsa are thus copied as a personal record in the 
interest of posterity, while also providing Rabbi Mintz with the material needed to defend 
                                                     
334 See, for example, ShUT MaharY Mintz, §8 and many others. 
335 See §6, “Peace unto you rabbi Ploni Almoni...” We cannot know, of course, whether this was 
changed by the editor Rabbi Katzenelbogen or whether this is the way Rabbi Mintz wrote it down for his 
own record. 
336 There is a halakhically mandated waiting time before a widow with an infant can remarry, in 
order to ensure that the child is not being neglected. This is specifically related to breastfeeding the child, as 
the rabbis feared that the new husband would discourage her from continuing to breastfeed her infant, so that 
she could conceive a  child with him. ShUT MaharY Mintz, §4: אמרתי אספרה אל חוק למען ידעו דור אחרון מאיזה
 ....טעם התרתי לרבי מרדכי פופשטלן לישא אשה מינקת
 ? ת״ם337
338 ShUT MaharY Mintz, §3: בהיות שהאדון אמו”ץ הישיש ר”ג קרובי הגאון מוהר”ר ענשכין יצ”ו אמ’ לי וציווני
גו ”ר יצחק מרובי’מ מת ה”כבודי שלא לתן פתחון פה לבעלי לשון לדבר כי על מה שפסקתני על אודות הבתולה פיורינא ת’ משו
ו”יצ ... 




his decisions should they be contested.339 
 The table of contents prepared by Rabbi Katzenelbogen, merely a series of short 
descriptions of the responsa, themselves, does not represent a significant attempt to 
organize the work.340 Except for selective editing, Rabbi Katzenelbogen, apparently, 
limited his work to collecting the few responsa he could find and printing a rudimentary 
table of contents. The only part of the book that seems to have been edited intensively is 
the section containing a seder get and a seder ḥaliẓa. The book was printed at the Bragdin 
press, the same press that would eventually print the first edition of Rabbi Yosef Karo’s 
ultimate code of Jewish law, the Shulḥan Arukh.341 The title page here also contains the 
                                                     
339 In another case, he opens with harsh words against the sender and then writes, “...and these are 
the words that were written to me that the excommunicated one mentioned above said to me, ‘look, this Rabbi 
Yehuda Mintz wrote that I transgressed the excommunication of Rabbi Gershom ... and see, this Rabbi 
Yehuda Mintz himself wrote about Rabbi Elijah Mizrachi that he is a great man in Israel and this same Rabbi 
Elijah Mizrachi he himself wrote to me that I may take two wives, and showed the response that  was sent, 
and this is the gist of the response...” ShUT MaharY Mintz, §10. In this case, we witness the afterlife of an 
excommunication responsum that is being contested by means of more responsa writing. This is followed by 
Rabbi Mintz’s justification of his decision and concludes: “therefore, I am hereby warning them as much as 
I can not to transgress the excommunication of the gaon may his memory be a blessing, and I asked the 
above-mentioned ḥakham Ezra Rosso that he shall tell and announce in public that which I wrote in this 
explanation that from what is known to him about this, from all of this it is clear...that the above-mentioned 
Gershon Bonofazzo? is excommunicated...” (ShUT MaharY Mintz, §10). 
ל שיאמר ויודיע ברבים ”ו הנ”עזרא רוש’ ל ובקשתי הח”ון זלכן הנני מזהירם כפי הכח הניתן לי שלא ימעלו עוד בחרם הגא
ל הוא מוחרם ”ו הנ”נו פאצ”ל דבר פשוט הוט כביעתא  בבותחא גרשון בו”אשר כתבתי בזה הדרוש במה שידוע לו על כן מכל הנ
 ...ומנודה לשמים
Rabbi Mintz is unimpressed by the excommunicated man’s attempt to defend himself, and he 
reiterates the excommunication. Here it is obvious that the public announcement is to be carried out orally 
and in a simplified manner, while the written explanation is kept for the elite, the rabbinical leadership. Rabbi 
Yehuda Mintz also chooses to keep a copy of this letter for himself. The response in §13 is a letter in which 
he writes that he received “stacks and stacks of the responsa of most of our brothers and rabbis in the land of 
Ashkenaz...” regarding a famous and controversial case. He adds his own opinion on the matter. 
340 The poem is introduced by a “Moshe son of the Ḥakham Rabbi Zekharya Kohen of Korfu,” an 
editor (his name appears as the editor on title pages of other books printed in Venice (various printing 
presses), such as Perush ha-mishnayot (Venice, 1548-9) and Akedat Yiẓḥak (Bomberg: Venice, 1547); this is 
followed by a folio with a poem. ספר אשר בו חן. כבוד וחן ימצא האיש אשר מוצא נותן לכספו צדיק הוא בלב בוחן. and 
ends with the words: “...a book which contains charm. Honor and charm will find/ the man who gives release 
(motza) to his money/ he is a righteous man with a discerning heart.” Some of the letters are emphasized and 
spell “Moshe Kohen.”  
341The title-page:  פסקים                            
הם סולת נקייה ובם ושאלות תשובות ספונות וחשובות ו  




words “shulḥan arukh,” namely, when it mentions the seder get and seder ḥaliẓa included 
in the printed work: “And besides these, a seder gitin and ḥaliẓa, ready like a set table [ke-
shulḥan arukh], which was collected and arranged and from it can be learned more good 
lessons.”342 The “set table” refers to the process of editing, which not only creates for the 
reader a collection of the important sources, but also arranges them in a useful and elegant 
manner. Rabbi Katzenelbogen explains this is the introduction: 
I also had a seder of gitin and ḥaliẓa, which I collected from kuntresim that were 
from the handwriting of our rabbi of blessed memory and a few things that his son, my 
father-in-law, the gaon of blessed memory, added after him. And because the things were 
not organized, because our rabbi wrote them as they occurred, therefore I, their student, 
have arranged the things each one in its place with signs, and I have given them signposts 
so that it will be easy for every teacher/decision-maker to find that which he seeks. And a 
little bit I have also added in a few places...343 
 
The folio that follows after the end of Rabbi Yehuda Mintz’s responsa344 contains 
a table of contents outlining the seder get, which is organized under topics such as “agents,” 
                                                     
 חידושים יפים ממתקים ומחמדים יסדום אבירי
ה’ל ה”ר יהודה מינץ ז”הרועים הגאון מהר  
יאריך’ ר מאיר מפדוואה ה”והגאון מהר  
 ימיו בטוב ושנותיו בנעימים. ובלעדי
 אלה סדר גיטין וחליצה מוכן
 כשלחן ערוך אשר קבצום
 :וסדרום והוסיפו מדלהון לקח טוב
the same decorative crowns as on the Shulḥan Arukh’s first edition 
ק”נדפס במצות האדון משיר אלוויז בראגדין שנת שיג לפ  
 פה ויניציאה
342 The title page: ובלעדי אלה סדר גיטין וחליצה מוכן כשלחן ערוך אשר קבצום וסדרום והוסיפו מדלהון לקח טוב 
 “like a set table...collected and arranged.” 
The seder get and ḥaliẓa that Rabbi Katzenelbogen mentions having found and added were 
described as having been “written in the hand of our rabbi.” We see that these writings are Rabbi Yehuda 
Mintz’s own manuscript copies of sidrei get, and that they, too, contain copies of other sidrei get, such as the 
one by Rabbi Kolon. These various manuscripts including letters, private records, and compilations were 
kept by Rabbi Yehuda Mintz. 
עוד היה בידי סדר מגיטין וחליצה אשר לקטתי מקונטר’ שהיה מכתיב’ יד רבינו ז”ל ודברים מעטים שהוסיף בנו חמי  343
כי רבינו כתב אותם כפי ההזדמן לכן אני תלמידם סדרתי הדברים איש איש על ’ ל אחריו ובהיות שהדברים היו בלתי מסודרי”הגאון ז
ת מקומות. ידו ואל רגלו בואתות והצבתי להם ציונים למען יקל לכל מורה למצוא את אשר יבקש. ומעט מזער הוספתי גם אני בקצ
 .ורבים מן המורים אשר בקשו ממני העתקתם לכן צרפתי אותם עם החבור הזה לאשר בלי ספק רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו
 נשלמו שאלות ותשובות ממה”רר יודא מינץ ס”ל ז”ל 344




“names,” “dates,” “how to treat the divorce document,” numbering altogether more than a 
hundred sections. [see image 13] The seder get itself follows after this outline; it is based, 
as mentioned in the quote, on Rabbi Mintz’s seder get, which Rabbi Katzenelbogen edited, 
collected, and composed from the former’s manuscripts. It is followed by several other 
such sdarim for preparing similar documents related to divorce and marriage.345 It is 
significant that these sdarim are the main elements that Rabbi Katzenelbogen mentions 
having edited and prepared thoroughly for the reader’s benefit. Although adding such 
documents to this printed work may seem a novel editorial decision, the practice of 
“editing” such sdarim is, in fact, wholly in line with the traditional practices of writing and 
transmitting sidrei get and other such manuals and model documents. A scholar would 
typically prepare his own seder get based on previous ones by rabbis and predecessors, 
editing and adapting them in line with his rabbi’s remarks, other sidrei get, and his own 
opinions and teachings. In fact, this seder get based on rabbi Mintz’s seder get includes 
one relatively long section copied from “our rabbi Rabbi Shimshon of blessed memory,” 
which is called a perush ha-get, an interpretation of the divorce document. 346 This section, 
indeed, includes many explanations of words and concepts related to the get rather than the 
more typical instructions. It continues for eight sections, the last of which concludes: 
                                                     
345 The seder ḥaliẓa is printed and followed by “the language of my master and father-in-law,” that 
is, the remarks by Rabbi Yehuda Mintz’s father-in-law, Rabbi Abraham Mintz, on the seder ḥalitza. The ktav 
hashba’at ktuva, which is signed, “copied letter by letter from the body of a ktav hashba’at ktuva, on which 
is signed my brave [amiẓ]relative the gaon ... Anshin of blessed memory, so states [neum] the preoccupied? 
[hatarud] Yuda Mintz.” This last document is apparently something that Rabbi Katzenelbogen found among 
Rabbi Yehuda Mintz’s manuscript collection, which the latter copied from yet another relative. 
346 After the first 109 sections, the subtitle reads, “This is the interpretation of a get of Rabbi 
Shimshon of blessed and righteous memory,” which contains a slightly longer section. This is followed by 
another seven sections that seem to belong to the same seder get, after which another eight assorted sections 
appear, bringing the total of entries in this seder get to 124. 




Until here the explanation of the words of the language of the get, things that I have 
not heard and no man has preceded me to my knowledge in these things. However, the 
“standing” that it says in the get, for instance, “he who is standing, she who is standing,” 
etc. … and other such laws, I have not written, and I will rely on the words of our rabbis 
and predecessors of blessed memory who have written at length and delved deeply, 
however, on the formulations of the power of attorney and the formulation “it is puzzling,” 
I have taken to explain them according to my limited understanding, and he who sees it 
should judge me favorably, because it is not my intention that this is for the sages, only for 
those smaller than I am, and I ask them to judge me favorably, blessed is the Lord who has 
given me the privilege to complete this explanation.347 
 
Rabbi Shimshon, the author of this part, thus added explanations only to items 
where he did not find an explanation in the past, whereas he explained that he will “rely on 
the words of our rabbis and predecessors” for the words that had already been explained to 
his satisfaction. This seder get within a seder get (within yet another seder get – that we 
know of, and this probably goes on even further) is followed by several more sections that 
Rabbi Katzenelbogen added, some of which are cited in the name of an earlier authority, 
some of which are merely summarized as a short instruction. Section §123, for instance, 
is, in fact, copied from Rabbi Isserlein’s seder get and is followed by a passage of critique, 
which concludes with the following words: “until here the language of my master and 
father-in-law the gaon his honor our master and rabbi, Rabbi AvYa Mintz of blessed 
memory.” 348 Likewise, the next and final section seems to be a copy of a divorce document 
signed by Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen himself, with some additional notes, for instance: 
                                                     
347 ShUT MaharY Mintz, table of contents for the get, §116 (end), 48a.  עד כה בביאור מלת לשון הגט
לא כתבתי ...ונהרות ומעינות' אמנם העמידה הכתוב בגט כגון העומד העומדת כו. דברים לא שמעתי ולא קדמני אדם ידעתי לדבר זה
י את לבי לבארם כפי קוצר האמנם על לשון היפויים והלשון יש לתמוה נתת. ה האריכו והעמיקו"ואסמוך על דברי רבותינו קדומנינו ע
ידנני לכף זכות כי אין דעתי לנסות לחכם אלא למי שקטן ממני ומבקש מהם לדונני לזכות ברוך המקום שזיכני לסיים זה ' דעתי והרוא
.הביאור  
348 Rabbi Isserlein’s words are concluded by עד כאן הועתק מגוף הכתב של מהר"ר ר' איסרלין ז"ל , followed 
by: ל"ה מינץ ז"ר אבי"ל מורי חמי הגאון כמהר"עכ...וגם הכתובה, ל"ר איסרלן ז"על זה הנמצא בסדר מהר. . The acronym AvYa 
refers to Avraham, the son of Rabbi Yehuda Mintz, who was Rabbi Katzenelbogen’s father-in-law.  




“On the 2nd of Shvat 1478, I prepared a get for Rachel daughter of Yosef, and her father’s 
name was Yos’l as a nickname, but I did not write this, because … although it says in the 
response of Rabbi Weil that … Also, the scribe, when he wrote, leaned the alef of bearta 
on the bet, ... and the witnesses did not sign yet, and I arranged it to be scratched and 
separated, in accordance with the Tur…”349 This last section was thus a copy of a divorce 
document for his own records, with some notes about his decision-making during that 
event. 
In fact, Rabbi Katzenelbogen’s emphasis on his extensive work, editing, and 
preparations for publication related to a halakhic genre that had traditionally been treated 
similarly in manuscript culture. Moreover, the main tropes that Rabbi Katzenelbogen 
mentions as having driven his decision to print his predecessor’s work are highly 
reminiscent of the era of manuscript likutim; he explains that he decided to print the work 
so that it could serve as a substitute for the traditional practice of copying from one’s rabbi. 
In this case, as Rabbi Katzenelbogen explains in the introduction, because so many students 
wished to copy these documents from his manuscripts, he decided instead to print the 
writings for them: “And many of the instructors have asked from me a copy of it, therefore 
I have added them to this work, since there is no doubt that the spirit of the sages will be 
satisfied with it.”350 [see image 12] 
                                                     
349 ShUT MaharY Mintz, Seder ha-get §124, 49ab:  ב' שבט רל"ח סדרתי גט לרחל בת יוסף והיה שם אביה
מ "מ...י מולין כתב המכונה"י ווייל שהמר"אף כי נמצא בתשובת מהר...יוסל בכנויו ולא כתבתי הכנוי כי נראה שהוא קצורו של שם
דיין וסדרתי והעדים לא חתמו ע' נגע בב' שהנקודה של א' של בארת לב' וגם הסופר בכתיבתו סמך א. א עיקר"תפשתי דברי מהרר
...לגררו להפרידו כדברי טור  
ורבים מן המורים אשר בקשו ממני העתקתם לכן צרפתי אותם עם החבור הזה לאשר בלי ספק רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו.  350
ך הוא ”ך ולפעמים זק באת להודיע שז”ולהיות כי באו בחבור הזה שמות המורים אשר לא נכרו בחוצות לפעמים מסיים בסוף הוראה ז
 .זלמן כהן וזק הוא יחס משפחה
ר יצחק קצנאילבוגן מפדואה”נאם מאיר בכמ . 




 The far more significant part of this printed work in terms of volume is not the 
responsa of Rabbi Mintz, but, rather, Rabbi Katzenelbogen’s own responsa. Rabbi 
Katzenelbogen presents the responsa of his elder as the more important part of the work, 
for instance, by placing Rabbi Yehuda Mintz’s responsa first, both in the title and in the 
book itself. The actual proportions, however, suggest something else: sixteen responsa are 
from Rabbi Yehuda Mintz, whereas Rabbi Katzenelbogen has ninety responsa. Rabbi 
Katzenelbogen created a separate table of contents for his responsa, and these are organized 
in a very basic fashion: the first thirty-seven are mainly about issues relating to family law, 
but no specific subtitle is given to this group.351 The second part has an explicit subtitle, 
namely, “monetary laws,”352 and contains twenty-six responsa. The last part is titled “rest 
of rules in a mixture”353 and contains twenty-six responsa. Within this basic division around 
three themes (family law, monetary law, miscellaneous), the individual responsa are not 
organized in any way.354 
 Rabbi Katzenelbogen concluded the section of his responsa with a play on words 
related to the number of responsa, that is, ninety, whose equivalent is the Hebrew letter 
ẓadi.355 He plays on the sound of ẓadi, explaining “and its sections are justice, justice 
pursue356 and go after a nice court.”357 Justice is ẓedek, similar to the letter, which is 
                                                     
351 Divorce, marriage, levirate marriage, a few releases enabling agunot (women whose husband 
disappeared) to marry, and a few questions regarding ritual purity. 
 דיני ממון 352
 שאר דינים בערבוביא  353
354 For example, within the first subsection, there is no attempt to place together all the responsa 
regarding divorce. These are clustered mainly in the first part of the responsa on women, but other responsa 
on the topic of divorce appear throughout this subsection. 
 צ 355
356 Deuteronomy 16:20. 
357 The interpretation of this verse in Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin 32b. 
ד יפה”ק צדק תרדוף הלך אחר ב”וסימניך צד   




pronounced ẓadik. Both the attempt at partially organizing the work and the wordplay on 
the number of sections hint at some awareness of the different nature of the printed work 
as opposed to the manuscript compilation. Indeed, this is the first case of a rabbi editing 
his own responsa and having the resultant work printed, albeit only as an appendix to the 
responsa of his master. Rabbi Katzenelbogen carefully apologized and expressed humility 
before his master and his writings, and then explained that his decision was ultimately a 
practical one: 
And I thought, what should I do with these, copy them or print them in order to 
spread them over the whole land? It will befall them as it says concerning the book of 
Hosea in the first chapter of Batra [Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bava Batra14b] – “as it is 
short, it will get lost,” which is why this book [Hosea] is placed outside of its order. 
Therefore, I have said, the time has come to bring pleasure to the students that I have 
established, who day in and day out have requested that I copy for them my questions and 
responses, which I have brought into existence. I said now I will stand up and 
connect/compose them with the decisions of my master and rabbi – our Rabbi of blessed 
memory, the above mentioned – and they will be a pair, although my responsa are not 
similar to those of my rabbi ... and therefore those of our rabbi have no place here, but in 
any case, as they are few and there is room to fear that they will be lost, I will connect them 
with those that emanated from me, and my bucket of squash will be a basis for his sharp 
pepper358 ... and he will not bear a grudge against me because one is jealous of every man 
except  one’s son and student. And I am his student. And considered his son...359 
 
 Because there were few writings by Rabbi Mintz, printing them alone posed the 
risk of their being lost. Considering this, in addition to the fact that Rabbi Katzenelbogen’s 
                                                     
358 A reference to Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yoma 25b טבא חדא פלפלתא חריפא ממלא צנא דקרי: one 
kernel of sharp pepper is preferable to a bucketful of squash. 
חשבתי מה אעשה באלה להעתיקם או להדפיסם להפיצם על פני כל הארץ יקרה להם כאשר אמרו על  הושע בפ”ק  359
תי אשר יום השעה לעשות נחת רוח לתלמידי שהעמד’ דזוטרא מרכס ולזה חברו אותו שלא במקומו בכן אמרתי הגיע’ דבתרא אייד
ל ”ו רבינו ז”יום ידרשו ממני להעתיק להם השאלות ותשובות אשר נתהוו על ידי אמרתי עתה אקום ואחבר אותם עם הפסקים של מ
מ ”מ’ כאן מקומ’ של רבינו אינ’ ל ויהיו להם  לצוותי בעלמא עם כי אינם דומים לשל רבינה כי מה לתבן את הבר ונמצא שאות”הנ
כאשר אתאי להתם ’ אחברם עם אשר יצאו ממני ויהא צנא מלא קרא בסיס לפלפלא חריפו’ לחוש דמרכס מאחר כי מעטים הם ויש
יפוק לאפי ולא יקפיד עלי כי בכל אדם מתקנא חוץ מבנו ותלמידו. ואנכי תלמידו. וחשוב כבנו. להיותי בעל בת בנו. ובני בנים כבנים 
 .ובעל כאשתו
  




own students were still asking him to copy his writings for them, he decided to print the 
two together. In terms of manuscript transmission, it is typical to see a student’s responsa 
alongside those of his own rabbi, and doing so in a personal manuscript compilation did 
not imply intellectual presumption or arrogance. In the case of print, however, the decision 
to place one’s writings alongside a rabbi’s and to publish them together is a statement in 
itself and thus requires the appropriate apologies. Similarly, the small number of Rabbi 
Mintz’s responsa would not have posed a problem in the case of manuscript transmission, 
as they would simply have been copied into larger archives and manuscript compilations. 
The concern that a small, printed, stand-alone booklet was too insignificant to survive was 
new. 
c. ShUT MahaRYL 
The final work to be discussed in this section is older in origin than the others, although it 
was printed later. The printing of this work takes us away from Venice, westward, to the 
printing press of Vicenzo Conti in Cremona. [see image 8] The gap between the forming 
of these manuscripts of responsa and their printing is wider than it was for the other works 
considered here: about 130 years separate the author’s death from the publication of his 
work in print. As a result, the variance in the continuity of personal connections by which 
the responsa were passed on from generation to generation is also greater. 
 Rabbi Yehuda Moellin (1365–1427, also known as MaharYL) constitutes the link 
connecting the fourteenth-century ashkenazic tradition, which ends with Rabbi Meir of 




Rothenburg, to the fifteenth century.360 From the manuscripts of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa, 
it is clear that they were transmitted in ways that are typical for likutim transmission. First, 
the manuscript copies of ShUT MaharaM mi-Rothenburg that were owned by Moellin’s 
students and copied from their rabbi’s manuscript often included responsa from Rabbi 
Moellin.361 Moreover, more than ten extant manuscripts of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa show 
that his responsa were copied alongside others in compiled manuscripts. None of these 
manuscripts were strictly copied from one author or one time period,362 nor are they limited 
to one type of halakhic genre.363 
 Some evidence indicates that Rabbi Moellin had at some point intended to collect 
his own responsa. Someone who presented himself as Rabbi Moellin’s personal scribe 
described some of the practices surrounding the responsa. This scribe claims that “...his 
                                                     
360 In fact, Simcha Emmanuel  believes that the manuscript compilation that formed the basis for the 
Prague edition of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg’s responsa belonged to Rabbi Moellin himself, who was possibly 
also its last editor (Simḥa Emmanuel, “Tshuvot MaharaM mi-Rotenburg, dfus Prague” (The responsa of 
Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, Prague edition), Tarbiẓ 57, no. 4 (1988): 35. 
361 Emmanuel, “Tshuvot MaharaM…dfus Prague,” 35. 
362 Some of these manuscripts include several responses from Rabbi Moellin alongside Rabbi Meir 
Rothenburg’s responses, (Mantua Ms33) or MaharYL’s responsa together with one from Rabbi Shalom of 
Neustadt, MaharYL’s most important teacher. In other manuscript collections, we see MaharYL’s responses 
alongside those of Rabbi Yacov Weil (Hekḥal Shlomo Ms3) and Rabbi Israel Isserlein, both of whom were 
more or less contemporaries of Rabbi Moellin. In the case of one manuscript, we see mainly the responsa of 
Rabbi Elḥanan “Ḥonlein” Katz (?), followed by a few responsa from MaharYL (Oxford Ms.). Differences in 
the versions show that the various manuscripts containing responsa from Rabbi Moellin were not all copied 
from the same manuscript source, and there are many differences as to which responsa are included in the 
different manuscripts. 
363 One manuscript, for instance, contains mainly customs of the MaharYL, known to us from the 
printed Minhagei MaharYL, with some of his responsa thrown in (Frankfurt Ms8.84). Other collections 
include an anonymous seder get followed by responsa of Rabbi Moellin. For a description of the manuscript 
versions, see Yiẓḥak Akiva Saẓ, “Introduction,” ShUT MaharYL (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1980), 
12-17. Moreover, responsa from MaharYL are found in various important ashkenazic compilations such as 
Customs of Rabbi Isaac of Tyrnau, ed. Shlomo Spitzer (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1979); Leket 
yosher of Yosef ben Moshe Ostreicher (1423–1488), and Sefer ha-egor, by Rabbi Yacov Landau (Naples, 
1490). These transmission practices continue the pattern of students copying responsa from their teachers 
alongside earlier responsa and later ones, and alongside other halakhic material, thus adding onto the 
compilations from previous generations. 




pure mouth MahaRY SeGaL agreed with me, at the time, in the summer of 1427, that he 
wanted to allow me to copy for him all his responsa that he wrote from the first day that he 
started teaching halakha ... to copy for him one compilation of his responses.”364 This was, 
to some extent, easier to do in this case, because Rabbi Moellin kept all of his responsa. As 
he apparently had nearly indecipherable handwriting, he would usually keep his own 
responses and send his questioners a clearer copy from his scribe’s hand: “and he sent every 
time the copy, and the original he would keep, so that a full chest had already 
accumulated.”365 [see image 9] The plan to collect all the responsa seems not to have come 
to fruition; after his death, his sons divided the responsa among themselves. The scribe 
tried, in vain, to collect everything, but ultimately compiled only a small selection, namely, 
160 responses of Rabbi Moellin. In addition to copies of responsa, the collection also 
contains testimonies of things that Rabbi Moellin had witnessed, for example, a heter 
(permission, release) that one of his rabbis, Rabbi Hillel of Erfurt, had provided in relation 
to a case of levirate marriage.366 Other materials were copied along with parts from Sefer 
MaharYL. Sefer MaharYL was written by a student of Rabbi Moellin, Rabbi Zalman of 
Sankt Goar, and it contains descriptions of conduct, teachings, and customs from his rabbi, 
                                                     
 it seems as if the scribe was allowed to copy one for himself as – שאעתיק לו חיבור אחד מתשובותיו 364
well. 
This introduction is copied in Yuval, Hakhamim be-doram: ha-manhigut ha-ruḥanit shel yehudei 
Germania be-shilhei yemei ha-beinaim (Sages in their generation: The spiritual leadership of German Jewry 
at the end of the Middle Ages) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1989), 111-113. (He mentions that it was first published 
in ha-mazkir 9 [1869]: 23.) 
365 See Dinari, Hakhme Ashkenaz, 278n117. See also Minhagei MaharYL (Cremona, 1558), 105b, 
at the end of the laws of mixtures. 
366 Yuval, Hakhamim, 157-166. On Sefer MaharYL and its manuscript transmission see Yisrael 
Peles, Sefer MahaRYL (=Minhagei MaharYL) al pi kitvei ha-yad ha-otografi’im shelo, ve-yiḥudo ke-ḥibur 
“merube arikhot” (The Book MaharYL [=the Customs of MahaRYL] based on his autograph manuscripts 
and its specificity as a “multi-edited” composition) (Ph.D. diss., Bar Ilan University, 2005). 




arranged according to the months of the year. It was printed in Savionetta a few months 
before the publication of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa.367 
 No known manuscript exactly resembles the printed version, although some extant 
manuscript collections that contain responsa by Rabbi Moellin have a similar order.368 
Rabbi Moellin’s responsa have been found across many manuscript collections, often with 
responsa from other rabbis, and sometimes with other responsa of his that did not make it 
into the printed version. The responsa in the printed book are not organized by topic, and, 
most likely, they represent a collection of a few smaller compendia of responsa that, in 
some cases, were organized around the different correspondents. This is evident from the 
fact that the sections are often clustered around the same recipients. For instance, §1–2 are 
to one person, §3–36 are to Rabbi Moellin’s brother, §37–40 to yet another person, and so 
forth.369 [see image 10] 
 The first printed edition contains many errors and omissions. The editors of a 
twentieth-century edition of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa found more than 200 responsa that 
                                                     
367 In Sefer MaharYL, the author laments the fact that he did not ask more questions of his rabbi 
when he still could and considers this a failure of his ( ממנו בחייו כל דבר ודבר ואוי לעונות שלא שאלתי ...’ p. 95). It 
is not only that collections of responsa often contain other halakhic materials, or that responsa can be found 
within manuscript collections that are focused on another type of halakha. Rather, manuscript collections 
often cannot be categorically identified as containing one type of halakhic writing. The organizing principle 
of such collections is often simply that of a personal pinkas or notebook in which a student copied his 
teacher’s responsa. In some cases, such as Leket yosher or Sefer MaharYL, the collection is a personal one 
that is part of a student’s apprenticeship and is centered around the student’s rabbi. Parts of these collections, 
too, were then copied by other students. Other items of interest that might be copied alongside the material 
could include responsa from earlier generations, other materials from the rabbi, such as his seder get or 
manual for slaughtering, customs, and teachings of the rabbi, and also writings from other authorities. Other 
students would then copy from or “inherit” these collections and add their own material. 
368 Saẓ, “Introduction,” ShUT MaharYL, 13; see discussion of manuscript collections above. 
369 Dinari, Hakhme, 259, also seems to agree with this. The editors of the Makhon Yerushalaim 
edition (see “Introduction,” ShUT MaharYL, 13) also remark that, although the manuscript collections are all 
written according to the German-ashkenazic ktiv maleh, the printed book uses the more recent ktiv ḥaser. The 
editor, however, occasionally forgot to change the form of writing.  




were not part of the first printed work.370 A printed halakhic work from 1547 – before ShUT 
MaharYL was printed – refers to Rabbi Moellin’s responsa by means of section numbers 
(simanim), which indicates that the organization of the sections in the first edition was 
preceded by a similar organization in some of the manuscripts.371 Personal names and other 
details were not removed. The title page contains a decorative border with references to 
Rome, such as a double-headed eagle and the inscription S.P.Q.R.372 A poem encouraging 
potential buyers to spend their money on this important work follows it.373 The table of 
contents is preceded by the following rhymed statement: “Here in this written table you 
can understand the place of the vision. The signs of the teachings to satisfy those who desire 
to search quickly.”374 The table of contents is, as the book advertises, indeed a helpful 
finding aid, but it is also quite simplistic, offering merely a briefly annotated list of the 
sections, without further meaningful reorganization. 
                                                     
370 The new edition of ShUT MaharYL (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1977) contains 211 
responsa from various manuscript sources not included in the first editions. 
371 Rabbi Izaak Stein, Biur on Sefer miẓvot gadol asher ḥiber Rabenu Moshe mi-Coucy. Nidpas 
shenit…im biur MaharR Isaac Stein u-biurei MaharR Elyah Mizraḥi (Venice: Bomberg, 1547). 
372 An acronym for “Senatus Populusque Romanis,” or “The Senate and the People of Rome,” a 
reference to the government of the ancient Roman Republic.  
The text reads: “Book of Questions and Responses composed by the great gaon, the head of the 
diaspora, our master Rabbi Yacov SeGaL, may his soul be shrouded in the shroud of the living, Amen, may 
it be His will.” 
סגל תהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים אמן כן יהי רצוןספר שאלות ותשובות חברם הגאון המופלא ריש גלותא מהרר יעקב   
373 Title page: 
 קדמו שרים אחר בוגנים? הודו לרכב בערבות
ל להיות גשם נדבות”אצל מן רוחו על ישרא  . 
 :נביא לבב חכמה ברוך שגמלנו טובות
 :חבר ספר אמרו שפר שאילות ותשובות
כתורמלו מוזהבו’ ערך כסף להן ראוי להביא : 
ר יעקב סגל”גאון מהרהלא הוא ה : 
The title page concludes with: “And the whole work was completed on Friday the fifteenth of Elul 
1556, here in the holy community of Cremona, which is under the rule of our master the King Phillipo, may 
his honor be exalted and his kingdom be elevated, printed by Vicinzo Conto with much inquiry [?], May God 
merit him to print and make many more books infinitely [Ecclesiastes 12:12]. Let the favor of the Lord our 
God shine upon us; establish for us the work of our hands [Psalms 90:17], Amen, may it be His will.” 
 הנה בהלוח הנרשם תשכיל לדעת מציאות החזון. סימני הדרוש להפיק רצון אשר יתאווה לחפש בחפזון 374




 A quick search in the National Library’s manuscript catalog lists numerous extant 
manuscripts of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa, not just from the fifteenth but also from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The responsa apparently went through many 
manuscript copies and renditions and existed in manifold contexts and versions; this 
explains the editors’ difficulty in finding a way effectively to edit the book. Moreover, it 
shows that the responsa continued to be transmitted in manuscript long after the printed 
edition of the book. Vicento Conti’s press also printed the second edition of Rabbi Kolon’s 
responsa (1557),375 in which the roots created by Rabbi Ḥiya were reshuffled according to 
Maimonides’ Mishne Torah. In both cases, Conti did not invest much effort in terms of 
editing and organizing. 
 The case of these printed works of responsa makes clear that, after Rabbi Ḥiya’s 
work at Bomberg’s press, there were few attempts to print ashkenazic works of responsa 
as independent, homogenous, self-contained, and efficiently organized volumes that 
contained only one author’s responsa under one title. In part, this may have been a question 
of effort; Trumat ha-deshen was the only work that the author himself had already edited 
in significant ways that rendered the manuscript especially appropriate for print 
publication. Given the state of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa in manuscript and then in print, 
                                                     
375 He also printed the responsa of Rabbi Nissim of Gerondi (1557 in two editions), along with a 
number of other works that deal with halakha in some form or another. Friedberg relates this to the burning 
of the Talmud in Italy a few years earlier and the ban on printing new volumes of the Talmud (Friedberg, 
Toldot ha-dfus ha-ivri be-Italya, 81): 
שקצפו של האפיפיור אך ורק על התלמוד בלבד יצא...לא הפליאו כי רבבות ספרים עברים הועלו במדינה על המוקדה, ..., 
שבאיטליה מספריהם...ובפרט אחרי ” עם הספר“פקידיו העושים רצונו בין התלמוד ובין הספרים העברים האחרים...נתרוקנו בתי 
יושנה, ובגלל כל זאת הכרע אולפנא, הישיבה הרמה...שעמדה תחת הנהלת הרב יוסף אוטולינגי...במטרתו להחזיר עטרה ל-פתיחת בית
קונטי לפתוח מוסדו על יסוד רחב, במצאו השעה מוכשרת, למלא באופן חלקי משאלות לבות רצונם של הדורשים ולרוות צמאון 
ולספק צרכי בני הישיבה’ הכמהין לדבר ה . 




clearly much additional effort in collecting, selecting, editing, and organizing the work 
would have been necessary before it could be published in a way that resembled Trumat 
ha-deshen. The organization of Rabbi Moellin’s responsa according to correspondents, an 
organization that most likely stemmed not from any conscious decision of the printers but 
simply from the way that the manuscripts had been collected, returns us to the origins of 
responsa in correspondence. Responsa were, in the first place, a part of learned 
correspondence. Their later transmission was part of the world of ashkenazic intellectual 
culture, which centered on manuscript likutim and their personal, flexible, and open-ended 
nature. 
 
4. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The complex and particularly slow and protracted way in which responsa entered the world 
of print highlights the immensity of the changes and challenges that ashkenazic halakhic 
scholarly culture faced in the age of the printed book. In his bibliography of responsa, 
Shmuel Glick notes that, in comparison to other genres of Jewish writing, the body of 
printed responsa literature was quite small before the eighteenth century.376 This was in 
part because so few works of responsa were suited for printing. The practices of knowledge 
organization in the ashkenazic world meant that responsa were usually preserved in likutim, 
not in individual collections of responsa. They were unorganized and barely edited, and 
usually were collected alongside various other halakhic texts. Moreover, because responsa 
were transmitted in loose compilations, just like other ashkenazic halakhic texts, every 
                                                     
376 See Glick, “Introduction” in Glick ed., Kuntres, 69. 




manuscript collection of responsa was different, especially as to who compiled it and for 
what purpose. This may explain why it appears that so few works of responsa were printed 
– there were, in fact, very few “works” of responsa. 
 Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo (1591–1655), in a letter in which he chastises an editor 
for wanting to print his writings, mentions the writing practices of his predecessors. The 
letter is reprinted in the introduction to Delemedigo’s Novlot ḥokhma (Basilea, 1629–
1631). In it, Delmedigo explains that his father, his grandfather, and their predecessors did 
not leave structured and complete textual works behind: “Only the psakim [rulings] and 
responsa that they answered, and the disputes and pilpulim [casuistic interpretations] that 
passed between them ... and those too, are spread, one here and one there, because they did 
not intend to collect and print them.”377 In short, there was not a strong culture of creating 
homogenous, unified, halakhic works in Ashkenaz; consequently, few textual materials 
from this culture were “print-ready.” 
 The piecemeal and indirect trajectory of responsa from manuscripts to printed 
books described in this chapter reflects a more nuanced interpretation of the question of 
                                                     
377 Yosef Shlomo, Delmedigo, Novlot ḥokhma, “Foreword” (Part of Ta’alumot ḥokhma) (Basilea, 
1629-1631). 
This quote is part of the foreword included by the editor of Novlot ḥokhma , Shmuel Ashkenazi, 
who decided to publish Yashar Delmedigo’s writings without asking for permission. Having discovered this, 
Yashar wrote him a letter of denunciation, which Ashkenazi includes in the foreword. In this letter, Yashar 
expresses some of his misgivings about printing works of Jewish knowledge (both mystical and otherwise). 
In response to Ashkenazi’s surprise that Yashar was unwilling to publish his writings, Yashar mentions that 
his father, his grandfather, and many other great rabbis and predecessors had not left behind complete 
writings: 
תמה על כמה גדולים ובפרט על רבותי אבותי שלמדתי גם אני היתי ’, ועל מה שכתב ותמית עלי שאיני מדפיס אי זה ספר כו
אצלם...שכל ימיהם למדו ולמדו ולא הניחו אחריהם רושם מחכמתם הנפלאה רק הפסקים והתשובות שהשיבו והויכוחים ופלפולים 
הנה כי לא כוונו לקבצם ולהדפיסם’ הנה וא’ שעברו ביניהם...וגם הם מפוזרים א  
    See also, Isaac Barzilay, Yosef Shlomo (Yashar) Delmedigo: His Life, Works and Times (Leiden: 
Brill, 1974). 




the primacy of technology versus intellectual culture and social scholarly practices. 
Printing a work, as opposed to copying parts of it into manuscript compilations, 
automatically situates it in a different register, with new possibilities and limitations. Rabbi 
Ḥiya’s treatment of Trumat ha-deshen and ShUT MaharYK, especially his efforts to fashion 
them into homogenous, organized books that would be searchable for general scholarly 
purposes, reflects these possibilities. This transformation, however, required no small 
amount of editorial efforts, even in the exceptional case of the manuscript material found 
by Rabbi Ḥiya, and all the more so for the other works discussed. 
 Later printers, it appears, did not follow in Rabbi Ḥiya’s footsteps. They did not 
create works that were self-contained, finite, homogenous, edited, well-organized, and 
generalized. Editorial practice, to some extent, replicated the practices of the scribes of 
halakhic manuscript compilations – sometimes very literally so, such as when tables of 
contents, combinations of material, and other elements are taken wholesale from their 
manuscript predecessors. At other times, continuities can be found in the editors’ approach 
to printing responsa. These would include a lack of distinction between different authors 
and types of halakhic material, the decision to print one’s own writings together with those 
of a predecessor, and explaining as merely alternative to making their own the reason for 
printing a work as merely offering students an alternative to their making manuscript copies 
of their teachers’ notes. Printing was not the most natural technology for reproducing and 
circulating these works of responsa, which were traditionally transmitted in more personal, 
flexible, and varied ways. This immense distinction cannot be bridged purely by means of 
production technology, nor even by active editorial intervention. 




Moreover, the standards and practices of editorial intervention were not a given, 
emerging ‘as-is,’ together with the printing press; rather, the culture of preparing works for 
print was itself a product of cultural developments. Or, as Martin Lowry put it regarding 
the expectations of editorship in Renaissance Italy, “the easy attitudes of the manuscript 
age died a hard death.”378 The dynamics of a work’s printing, in and of itself, have an 
important impact on how responsa are transmitted. However, as shown by, on the one hand, 
Rabbi Ḥiya’s extensive editorial efforts to produce the works discussed in the first part of 
this chapter, and, on the other hand, the lack of change as concerns the books discussed in 
the second part, print, though a significant factor, is not a sufficient explanation for the 
changes that would eventually occur. In the sixteenth century, great shifts would take place 
in the ways in which halakhic material was written, transmitted, and studied. Much of this 
was due to print technology and how it radically transformed the reach and form of the 
written text. These changes, however, occurred in tandem with other important 
developments in Jewish society and intellectual culture. The combination of these factors 
resulted in fundamental shifts in the culture of halakhic scholarship. Eventually, halakhic 
scholarly practices would change to such an extent that the genre of responsa would need 
to be reinvented; this process, however, was much slower and more complex, as the next 
chapters will explore. 
 
                                                     























































A page in Trumat ha-Deshen, comparing 
MS 7148 R1419, JTS and Venice, 1519. The 
clear division between question and response 
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A manuscript of the responsa of 
Rabbi Moellin, including a description 
that describes entries in relation to 
correspondence, suggesting this was the 
organizing logic for some of the responsa. 
 
Mantua ms. 33 sec.XV(1432) 
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Title page of Responsa of Rabbi Yehuda 
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Detail from seder ha-get in ShUT MahaRY 
Mintz, the “order of divorce” which Rabbi 
Katzenelbogen explains that he “arranged,” 
one of the few editorial interventions. 




NEW WORKS, NEW PARADIGMS 
The Disappearance of Sha’arei Dura 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will investigate the challenge that Ashkenazic scholarly culture in the 
sixteenth century faced as a result of the ascendancy of novel forms of organization. 
Although the question of organization may seem trivial, changes in organization, in 
fact, fundamentally confronted traditional rabbinical scholarship in Ashkenaz, which, 
as the previous chapters have shown, followed idiosyncratic and deeply rooted 
practices. The localized, personal, and eclectic approach to the organization of halakhic 
texts was at the heart of ashkenazic approaches to tradition, authority, religious law, 
and acceptable modes of reasoning. These practices, however, proved incompatible 
with the introduction of print technology and were influenced by the appearance of 
newer, more compatible organizational paradigms. My study reveals how 
organizational changes in halakhic scholarship affected this ashkenazic intellectual 
culture as a whole. It sheds light on the way that halakha began to resemble its current 
model and provides a close look at the process by which the ordering of knowledge 
shapes its contents. 
My work focuses on this organizational shift in sixteenth-century Poland, the 
center of ashkenazic halakhic scholarship in the coming century and a half. Continued 
persecutions, disasters, and expulsions, climaxing in the upheavals surrounding the 
wars of religion, led Jews to migrate in greater numbers from Western Europe to 
Eastern Europe. Rabbi Yacov Pollak (late fifteenth century) and his student, Rabbi 
Shalom Shakhna (d. 1558) are considered the forefathers of the Polish halakhists.379 
                                                     
379 See Elhanan Reiner, “Asher kol gdolei ha-areẓ ha-zot hem talmidav: R Yacov Polak, rishon 
ve-ROSh le-ḥakhmei Cracow” (Of which all the greats of this land are students: R Yacov Polak, the first 




Rabbi Shlomo Luria in Lublin and Rabbi Moshe Isserles in Cracow, were the two main 
pillars of sixteenth-century ashkenazic scholarship at its apex, and their approaches to 
the changing landscape lie at the center of this study. 
Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles both considered themselves the continuation of 
an older ashkenazic heritage. Despite conscious affirmations of continuity, these heirs 
of the medieval ashkenazic communities of the Rhineland indisputably faced a new, 
different situation. The geographical, economic, communal, legal, and political 
conditions of the Jews in Eastern Europe had changed immeasurably compared to those 
of their Western predecessors.380 Print technology was, at this point, a well-established 
part of the world of Jewish scholarship. Most of the basic works of halakha, such as the 
Talmud; the Arba Turim (Four pillars/columns) by Rabbi Yacov, the son of Rabbi 
Asher ben Yeḥiel (also known as ROSh); Maimonides’ Mishne Torah; the work of 
Rabbi Yiẓḥak Al’Fasi, and many others, existed in print. Print enabled Ashkenazic 
                                                     
and the head of the sages of Cracow) in Kroke - Kazimierz - Cracow, studies in the history of Cracow 
Jewry, ed. Elhanan Reiner (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 2001): 43-68. 
See Elhanan Reiner, “Tmurot be-yeshivot Polin ve-Ashkenaz ba-meot ha-16 ve-ha-17 ve-ha-vikuaḥ al 
ha-pilpul” (Transformations in the Polish and Ashkenazic Yeshivot during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries and the Dispute over Pilpul) in Ke-minhag Ashkenaz ve-Polin: Sefer yovel le-Chone Shmeruk 
(According to the Custom of Ashkenaz and Poland: Studies in Honor of Chone Shmeruk), ed. Israel 
Bartal, Ḥava Turniansky, and Ezra Mendelsohn (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Press, 1993), 48-50. 
380 See Ḥayim Hillel Ben Sasson, Hagut ve-Hanhaga (Theory and Practice) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 
1959), esp. 55-75; Gershon David Hundert, "Some Basic Characteristics of the Jewish Experience in 
Poland," Polin 1 (1986): 28; Adam Teller, "Telling the Difference: Some Comparative Perspectives on 
the Jews’ Legal Status in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Holy Roman Empire," Polin 22 
(2009): 109-141; on internal governance, Pinkas Va’ad Arba Araẓot (The Pinkas of the Council of the 
Four Lands), ed. Israel Heilprin (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1945); on cultural life, Israel Heilprin, Bet 
Israel be-Polin (The House of Israel in Poland), vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1948) and Majer Bałaban, Toldot ha-
yehudim be-Ḳraḳov uve-Ḳaz'imaiz, 1304-1868 (The History of the Jews in Cracow and Kazimirsz 1304-
1868) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2002); on socio-cultural and intellectual life, Elhanan Reiner, "The Attitude 
of Ashkenazi Society to the New Science in the Sixteenth Century," in Science in Context, vol. 10, no. 4 
(1997): 589-603; idem, “The Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of the Modern Era: Manuscript versus 
Printed Book,” in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 10 (1997): 85-98; idem, “Aliyat ha-kehila ha-gedola: 
Al Shorshe ha-kehila hayehudit ha-ironit be-Polin ba-et ha-ḥadasha ha-mukdemet” (“The Rise of the Big 
Community: On the Roots of the Jewish Community in Poland in the Early Modern Period”) in Gal-ed 
20 (2006): 13-37; Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim (The History of the Jewish Codes), vol. 3 (New 
York, 1946-1947); and Edward Fram, Ideals Face Reality: Jewish Law and Life in Poland, 1550-1655. 
(Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1997). 




scholars to become acquainted with a host of previously unfamiliar works, thus adding 
to their intellectual canon, as Elhanan Reiner has shown.381 Likewise, Reiner pointed to 
significant changes in the curriculum of the yeshiva 382 and the methods of Talmudic 
study.383 These changes, together with the new demographic and communal situation, 
also affected the position of the rabbi and his role. 384 
Print was a central catalyst for another change: the adoption of a new 
organizational paradigm for halakhic texts. Ashkenazic scholarly practices were, like 
most other halakhic traditions, centered on textual interpretation. The earliest 
ashkenazic scholars of Eastern Europe, however, opposed the publication of halakhic 
texts. There are no surviving writings from Rabbi Pollak, and hardly any written 
halakhic works from Rabbi Shakhna. This near absence of published writings385 is not 
accidental. Rabbi Shakhna’s son explained that his father consciously refused to write 
                                                     
381 Reiner refers mainly to works from the medieval Sfardic tradition that were printed in the 
first half of the 16th century, such as the works of Rabbi Yiẓḥak Abravanel, Rabbi Yiẓḥak Arama, Rabbi 
David Kimhi, Rabbi Yosef Albo, Gersonides, Rabbi Bahya ibn Pakuda, etc., which deal with biblical 
exegesis and philosophy (Elhanan Reiner, “Tmurot ,”589-603.) 
382 Elhanan Reiner, “Yashan mipnei ḥadash – Al Tmurot be-tochnei limmud be-yeshivot Polin 
ba-meah ha-16 ve-yeshivato shel Rema be-Krakow” (The Old because of the New – On changes in the 
lesson plans of the Polish yeshivot in the 16th century and Rabbi Isserles’ yeshiva in Cracow.) in Zekhor 
davar le-avdekha: Asufat ma’amarim le-zekher Dov Rappel, (Essays in Honor of Dov Rappel) ed. 
Shmuel Glick (Jerusalem and Bar-Ilan, 2007), 183-206. He discusses the study of astronomy, genealogy 
(Sefer yuḥasin, Book of heritage) metaphysics, mysticism (Zohar) and philosophy (Moreh nevukhim, 
Guide for the perplexed) as part of the curriculum in the yeshiva of Rabbi Moshe Isserles; see Elhanan 
Reiner, “En ẓarikh shum yehudi lilmod davar rak ha-Talmud levado” (A Jew does not need to study 
anything other than the Talmud). in Ta-Shma vol. 2, ed. Rami Reiner (Herzog College: Alon Shvut, 
2012): 705-746, on Vikuaḥ Pozna, (the Posen dispute) and the exchange between Rabbis Luria and 
Isserles in their reponsa (printed in ShUT Rema 5-7§). 
383 See Reiner, “Tmurot,” 9-80, about the change in place, form, and status of the pilpul method 
in the Ashkenazic yeshivot of the 16th and 17th century in comparison to their predecessors. 
384 See Jacob Katz, “le-Toldot ha-Rabanut be-motẓa’ei Yemei ha-Beinaim” (On the history of 
the rabbinate at the end of the Middle Ages) in Sefer Zikharon le Binjamim de-Paris (Essays in Memory 
of Benjamin de-Paris), (Tel Aviv, 1969):247-260; and Reiner, “Tmurot,” on the community rabbi vs the 
head of the yeshiva; Reiner, “Aliyat ha-kehila,” links the rise of large urban communities with a 
diversified economy to new halakhic approaches, chiefly those of Rabbi Isserles and Torat ḥatat. 
385 Some of his psakim (halakhic decisions) did circulate in manuscript, as mentioned by rabbis Luria 
(§21) and Isserles (§30) in their responsa. Examples of surviving manuscripts are located in the National 
Library of Israel, the Bodleian, and Columbia libraries (copies of individual “psakim” mainly touch on 
issues of marital status). 




down any of his halakhic decisions,386 in keeping with his own teacher’s tradition: “... 
the gaon our Master Rabbi Pollak also did not produce any books nor would he [they] 
copy in their home any responsa that these geonim sent to a distance…”387 Evidently, 
Rabbi Pollak did not even keep a copy of the responsa that he sent to others. Rabbi 
Ḥayim ben Beẓalel, the brother of Rabbi Loew ben Beẓalel, the so-called “Maharal of 
Prague,” provides a similar rationale for Rabbi Shakhna’s lack of written works.388 The 
founders of the Ashkenazic tradition in Eastern Europe thus appear to have had a 
negative, even hostile, approach, to the publication of written halakhic texts. As a result, 
they continued to rely on personal manuscript compilations even as printed works were 
gaining dominance. 
As mentioned in my discussion of manuscript likutim and the first attempts to 
print ashkenazic responsa,389 some types of halakhic writing are more amenable than 
                                                     
386 His son claimed that the reasoning behind this was to uphold the principle of hilkheta ke-
batrai (the law is like the latter authorities), and he feared that leaving behind writings would prevent 
future generations from making their own halakhic decisions. On the meaning of this formula, see Meir 
Rafeld, "The Halakha Follows the Later Sages,” in Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic Literature 
)1992:(  119-140; Israel Ta-Shma. "Hilkhata ke-batrai, Beḥinot histori’ot shel Klal Mishpati,” (The law 
is like the later authorities: historical aspects og a legal principle.) in Shenaton ha-mishpat ha-ivri: 
Annual of the Institute for Research in Jewish Law (1979): 405-423; Israel I. Yuval, "Rishonim and 
Aḥaronim, Antiqui et Moderni: Periodization and Self-Awareness in Ashkenaz” in Zion 57, no. 4 (1992): 
369-394, and many others. 
387 In mid-sentence, he switches to plural and goes from discussing only Rabbi Pollak to talking 
about both his father and Rabbi Pollak. I adapted the sentence for readability. (see ShUT Rema §25) וכן  
מ אשר ”הכה ”ל ה”ו זקצ”ר שלום המכונה שכנ”קבלתי הלכה למעשה מאדוני מורי אבי הגאון רבן ומאורן של כל בני הגולה מהר
גיאין בקשתי עם הרבה לומדים עולמים דזמנין סהעמיד תלמידים הרבה מסוף העולם ועד סופו מפיו חיים ומימיו שותים. וחי נפשי 
שיעשה פוסק ותשובתו היתה מחמת רוב חסידותו וענותנותו אשר היה ענו יותר מכל האדם אשר על פני האדמה. ואמר יודע  ממנו
תא ל כגון היכא דאיכא פלוג”א כאשר אכתוב מטעם דהלכה כבתרא, ואין רצוני שיסמכו העולם עלי, ר”אני דשוב לא יפסקו כ
ביני רבוותא והוא יכריע או לפעמים יחלוק ואין לדיין כי אם מה שעיניו רואות לכן יעשה כל אחד כפי הוראת שעה כאשר עם 
יעקב פולאק] שום ספר גם שום תשובה ששלחו למרחוק לא העתיקו בביתם ’ ף [הר”ט לא עשה נמי רבו הגאון מהרי”לבבו. ומה
יהם כיוהרא...ט אף כי היה נחשב בעינ”אלו הגאונים מה . 
388 Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim, 2 §2 (Amsterdam, 1712). [see this chapter, n457] ולזה מנעו הראשונים
מכל זה התימה ופלא מן הרב המופלא בדורו החסיד ’ מלחבר שום ספר מיוחד על דיני איסור והיתר לקבוע המנהג והלכה לרבי
חד על דיני איסור והיתר וקראו תורת חטאת ולא שת לבו לכל הדברים ל אשר חיבר ספר מיו”רלש ז”ר משה איס”הגאון מהר
ל ושמענו מפיו ”ר שכנא ז”מהר’ כ כי בעת שלמדנו יחד בשיבת הגאון המופל”נעלם ממנו ג’ האלה שכתבתי. ובלתי ספק לא הי
ר בסדר נכון ואמר נואש השערים מדורא אנחנו תלמידיו הפצרנו בו פעמים הרבה שיראה לחבר וללקט יחד כל דיני איסור והית
 .לסברינו ואין ספק שאינו אלא מטעם שכתבנו
389 See chapter 2 in this dissertation. 




are others to print’s more public and stable transmission. For example, independent 
works, comprehensive treatises, complete codifications, or commentaries dealing with 
a specific, defined text possess a rather stable structure and order that facilitates 
transforming them into a printed work. Print technology privileges textual stability, 
consistency, and broad dissemination to an anonymous readership, traits that were 
antithetical to the localized, personal, dynamic, and flexible ashkenazic textual culture. 
The ashkenazic scholarly culture’s preferred mode of writing – the personal 
compilation, with its layers of glosses and ever-changing eclectic contents – was far 
more compatible with manuscript than with print. In manuscript culture, a 
multidirectional dynamic can easily exist between the texts under consideration and the 
writings of the scholar studying those texts, allowing, for more flexibility, variation, 
and personal input. This profound incompatibility caused difficulties in printing older 
ashkenazic works, as discussed in the previous chapter. More significantly, ashkenazic 
scholars living in the age of these changes faced the challenge of studying, teaching, 
and transmitting their halakhic knowledge in this transformed world. 
This chapter will follow the sixteenth-century fate of one work, the Sha’arei 
Dura, a prototype of traditional ashkenazic halakha, as scholars attempted to contend 
with a changing culture of knowledge. The Sha’arei Dura’s incompatibility with print, 
combined with the growing dominance of the Shulḥan Arukh and its much more 
compatible alternative organizational scheme caused the former work – and, more 
importantly, its organizational paradigm – to disappear. This work, by Rabbi Yosef 
Karo (Toledo 1488-Safed 1575), printed in 1565 in Venice, is a codification of the 
whole body of Jewish Law applicable in the post-Temple period. The code is built on 




the basis of three authoritative works, all of them authored in a sfardic context,390 and 
its organizational scheme presents the strongest alternative, and therefore the greatest 
challenge, to traditional ashkenazic forms of organizing halakhic texts. I shall consider 
differing ways in which the cultural leaders of ashkenazic scholarship in the period, 
Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Luria, dealt with the tensions between the old and new 
paradigms of knowledge organization. Finally, the case study illustrates the profound 
effects of changes in textual form and organization on halakhic knowledge itself. The 
question of ordering knowledge was not just technical; it reflected deep-held attitudes 
about religious law and the legitimate ways of working with authoritative traditions. 
 
2. THE FIRST HEBREW BOOK PRINTED IN POLAND: SHA’AREI DURA 
Sha’arei Dura (The gates of Düren),391 the first Hebrew book to be printed in Poland, 
offers the best opportunity to study the challenges that traditional ashkenazic scholarly 
practices and its organizational paradigms had to face in the sixteenth century. Written 
by Yiẓḥak ben Meir of Düren, an older contemporary and disciple of Rabbi Meir of 
Rothenburg, who lived in the thirteenth century,392 Sha’arei Dura was a compilation, 
                                                     
390 These three-authoritative works are: Maimonides’ Mishne Tora, Rabbi Alfasi’s summaries 
of the Talmud, and Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s laws. Two out of three figures are sfardic. While the latter 
authority was, in fact, an Ashkenazic figure, Rabbi Karo used his law as it appeared in the work Arba 
Turim codified by his son Rabbi Yacov ben Asher, who lived and wrote in Spain. The Shulḥan Arukh is 
often described as a condensation of Rabbi Karo’s earlier work, Bet Yosef. The latter consisted of long 
glosses on the 14th-c Arba Turim, where Rabbi Karo added a lot of sources, many of them Ashkenazic. 
The Ashkenazic sources are presented to a much lesser extent in Shulḥan Arukh. As a recent dissertation 
by Tirẓa Kelman [forthcoming] has set out to prove, although the Shulḥan Arukh uses material from Bet 
Yosef, Rabbi Karo’s gloss on Arba Turim; Shulḥan Arukh is much more similar to Arba Turim than it is 
to Bet Yosef in terms of its contents and organization Thus, Shulḥan Arukh is not really a condensation 
of the Bet Yosef, which is how it is often presented. Therefore, the ashkenazic sources represented so 
strongly in Bet Yosef do not come across as strongly in his Shulḥan Arukh.  
391 Düren is a town in North-Rhine Westphalia, near Aachen and Cologne. 
392 See Jacob Freimann, “Das Sefer Amarkal al Hilkhot Yayin Nesakh” in Festschrift zum 
Siebzigsten Geburtsage David Hoffmann’s. Gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern, 3 vols., ed. Shimon 
Eppenstein, Meir Hildesheimer, Joseph Wohlgemuth (Berlin: Louis Lamm, 1914), 421-422n4. Freimann 
believed that Sha’arei Dura is from the 14th century. 




as was typical for its time and place.393 One can even term it a prototype of this type of 
halakhic transmission.394 It focuses on the laws of isur ve-heter (prohibition and 
permission), as the laws of kosher foods are sometimes called. The first sections of the 
work, named “gates,” deal with the process of salting meat to drain it of blood. 
Subsequent sections deal with kosher eggs, mixtures of milk with meat, and other such 
laws, sometimes followed by a section on laws of menstrual purity. 
Sha’arei Dura represents a personal manuscript compilation “par excellence.” It 
contains quotes and paraphrases from many earlier ashkenazic sources, in large part 
from Sefer ha-trumah (Book of the offering) by the thirteenth-century Rabbi Yiẓḥak of 
Germaiza, which was, in turn, also a compilation of earlier ashkenazic sources, making 
it a compilation of compilations. In addition to the central ashkenazic sources from the 
twelfth and thirteenth century, such as Rabbenu Tam, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yoel ha-Levi, 
Rabbi Moshe of Coucy, Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, and occasional references to 
eleventh-century ashkenazic authorities such as Rabbenu Gershom, Sha’arei Dura 
often cites “our custom” as an authoritative source, with no further identifying details. 
Israel Ta-Shma summarized this as follows: “…the custom of the rabbis of the author, 
and most often ‘the general custom’ (minhag ha-olam) …is mentioned tens of times in 
                                                     
Rabbi Yeshaya Nathan Freilich, who published Sha’arei Dura ha-shalem (Complete Sha’arei 
Dura), ed. Yeshaya Nathan Freilich (Varnow, 1940-1), disagreed, claiming that Rabbi Yiẓḥak must have 
lived in the mid-13th century.  
Others still believed that he lived in the mid-14th century; see Yisrael Elfenbein’s introduction 
to Minhagim yeshanim mi-Dura: minhagim shel kol ha-shana me-Ashkenaz mi-me’ah ha-13 (Old 
customs from Düren: customs of the entire year from Ashkenaz in the 1300s), ed. Yisrael Elfenbein (New 
York, 1948), especially 132-134, and see Israel Ta-Shma, “Al sefer isur ve-heter shel Rabenu Yeruḥam 
ve-al R’ Yiẓḥak mi-Dura,” (On the book of prohibition and permission of Rabenu Yeruḥam and on Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak of Düren) Sinai 64 (1969): 254-257. 
393 Especially among the subgenre of compilations that were narrowly focused on particular 
topics, usually practical ones. See Israel Ta-Shma, “Al Sefer isur ve-heter,” 254-257. 
 394 See Ta-Shma, “Kavim le-ofyah shel sifrut ha-halakha be-Ashkenaz ba-meah ha-13-14,” 
(Characteristics of the halakhic literature in Ashkenaz in the 13th-14th centuries.) Alei sefer 4 (1977): 20-
41; he explains the concept of “Professional Literature” and the centrality of Sha’arei Dura. 




the work in different ways, and they always outdo all the other considerations.395 
Sha’arei Dura opens with a short introduction: “So said the author: see, my 
friends have begged me to write for them a work of isur ve-heter and I will explain it 
to them in brief, and I will start with the laws of salting and rinsing in ten sections.”396 
This indicates that the author originally wrote down the compilation for personal 
acquaintances. Personal connections between relatives, teachers, students, and 
colleagues were the main channel for copying and transmitting halakhic writings in the 
German lands of medieval Ashkenaz, a fact that influenced the form and content of the 
writings. 
The work contains many layers, including earlier sources that Rabbi Yiẓḥak 
incorporated when he compiled his work and later glosses that were added throughout 
the ages. Some sources were contemporaries of the author;397 in some cases, scribes 
added fragments copied from other compilations such as Mordekhai and Or zarua. 
Others were glosses and commentaries written specifically about Sha’arei Dura, which 
were frequently copied together with the work itself. Rabbi Israel Isserlein, the author 
of Trumat ha-deshen,398 wrote glosses on the margins of his Sha’arei Dura, which were 
copied and studied as an integral part of the work. Every serious scholar of halakha in 
Ashkenaz had “his” own Sha’arei Dura, to which he added personal observations, 
                                                     
395 Ta-Shma, “Kavim le-ofyah,” 30. -גורם אחד ישנו, העולה בחשיבותו על כח סמכותם של חכמי המאה ה
, והוא: מנהג רבותיו של המחבר וביותר "מנהג העולם". מושגים אלו נזכרים בספר, בסגנונות שונים, עשרות פעמים והם 12
 מכריעים בו תמיד את כל יתר השיקולים האחרים.
396 Sha’arei Dura: אמר המחבר הנה הפצירוני חבירי לכתוב להם אסור והתר ואפרש להם בקוצר ואתחיל בדין
 מליחה והדחה בעשר שערים
397 For instance, Rabbi Yiẓḥak Troshin, a student of the tosafist Rabbenu Pereẓ and a 
contemporary of Rabbi Yiẓḥak; see Sha’arei Dura, edited by David Dvileiẓky (Bnei-Brak: Elon, 2016), 
4n32. 
398 He also wrote Lamed-vav she’arim (36 Gates), his own work on isur ve-ḥeter. Some 
manuscripts refer to it as 32 gates or other numbers; the exact chronology and relationship between the 
glosses and this work is unknown. 




teachings from his rabbi, additional sources, and glosses. Many of these eventually 
became part of the body of the work for the students who copied their texts together 
with the glosses. 
In true likut fashion, Sha’arei Dura contains, in addition to an eclectic variety 
of authors and opinions, an assortment of genres and types of halakhic text. Throughout 
the glosses, we find responsa, testimonies, explications of actual occurrences, and 
sections that straddle the border between halakhic adjudication (psikah) and custom 
(minhag), such as Rabbi Israel Isserlein’s frequent statement, “this is our custom” 
(hakhi nahug), which designates his halakhic endorsement. The mode of organizing 
halakhic knowledge that can be found in Sha’arei Dura is typical of Ashkenaz in the 
post-tosafist period. Sha’arei Dura was one of the most popular and oft-copied halakhic 
writings in Ashkenaz, as the countless later interpretations and glosses based on it attest. 
Ta-Shma mentions the existence of more than fifty surviving copies of the manuscript 
dating back to the period before it was printed – additional proof of its popularity.399 
He also states the importance of Sha’arei Dura as a “literary model for the continuation 
of works in the field of halakhic ruling in Ashkenaz.” It was a model, he explained, in 
several ways, “in its spirit, its style, its authoritative sources....”400 The work became 
representative of the most common form of ashkenazic halakhic writing until the 
sixteenth century and its characteristics are typical of the ashkenazic scholarly culture 
and its practices as a whole; multiple layers, unstable, flexible contents, personal 
transmission, and eclectic sources. It also represents a specific paradigm of textual 
                                                     
399 See ibid., 34. 
400 See Ta-Shma, “Kavim le-ofyah,” 35, השפיע רבות גם כדוגמה ספרותית להמשך היצירה בתחום הפסיקה
בעידוד היצירה המקצועית  -בכמה וכמה מובנים: ברוחו, בסגנונו, במקורותיו הסמכותיים ובראש ובראשונה  -באשכנז. וזאת 
 ....בתחום הפסיקה




organization; in contrast to codes, which organized texts in a complete, comprehensive, 
stable and streamlined structure, Sha’arei Dura was compiled in an incomplete, partial, 
erratic, and uneven manner.  
A comparison of the Sha’arei Dura to a similar section in the much more 
codified Arba Turim, composed by Rabbi Yacov ben Asher in fourteenth-century 
Spain, highlights the difference between the organizations of halakhic knowledge in 
codes versus personal compilations. The laws of salting, which occupy the first part of 
Sha’arei Dura can be found in Arba Turim, volume (or tur) Yoreh de’ah (Teaches 
knowledge).401 Arba Turim begins with a discussion of the principle – the general 
prohibition of blood, followed by “the order of salting,” which enumerates the steps of 
salting in the correct order (what to do before salting, what kind of salt to use, etc.), 
then proceeds to the first rinsing, the salting, the second rinsing.402 Only after listing 
the steps does it discuss possible mistakes, such as what happens if you forget the first 
rinsing. Compare this to Sha’arei Dura, where, instead of starting with the first step of 
salting meat, i.e., rinsing it prior to salting it, the work opens with a case in which 
someone forgot the second rinsing of the meat.403 Other instances also exemplify the 
rather haphazard order of the laws. Whereas Arba Turim provides a complete, 
comprehensive, and structured rendition of the laws with a conclusion, Sha’arei Dura’s 
discussion is partial and piecemeal, mentioning aspects of one subject in multiple 
places, and providing different opinions without reaching a conclusion. The division 
                                                     
401 Around §69. 
402 See appended table for a graphic representation of this. 
403 The attempts of subsequent generations of scholars to interpret and explain this strange order 
sometimes even led to practical halakhic repercussions. See Dvileiẓky “Introduction,” in Düren, Sha’arei 
Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky, 2n14, showing that Rabbi Yosef Kremniẓ, in his Biur (Commentary) on Sha’arei 
Dura (§ 2-3), based a halakhic decision on the order of some of the sections. For instance, Rabbi Kremniẓ 
bases a halakhic conclusion on the fact that Sha’arei Dura dealt first with soaked meat and only 
subsequently with meat that was not soaked. 




into sections itself is erratic and inconsistent. Discarding the initial structural division 
of ten “gates,” the remainder of the work consists of a succession of sections with no 
overarching structure. The work contains many lacunae; it cannot be considered 
complete in the sense of covering every relevant aspect of the subject at hand. Its main 
form of copying is a collage of quotations and paraphrases, as opposed to the 
streamlined summaries of the codes. Often, the final halakhic conclusion is neither 
stated outright nor clearly summarized nor differentiated from the various compiled 
opinions. 
These features grew exponentially as the work was copied and recopied. 
Ashkenazic scholars did not attach importance to faithfully retaining a semblance to the 
hypothetical “original” form of organization, and there are almost as many ways of 
dividing the work as there are manuscripts. Rabbi David Dvileiẓky, who recently 
published an important edition of Sha’arei Dura, has counted variations of between 
zero and forty subsections in different copies of the work.404 The different layers of 
glosses on the work are similarly jumbled, with no clear division between the body of 
the text and its glosses. It is difficult to arrange the glosses by author or to distinguish 
them chronologically. This disorder also makes it harder to determine the ultimate 
halakhic outcome among the layers and fragments of occasionally conflicting sources. 
The Arba Turim circulated in relatively stable manuscript form well before its 
printing, and later print transmission resembled its earlier manuscript transmission.405 
The Sha’arei Dura, on the other hand, displayed lack of stability, structure, and unity 
                                                     
404 See Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky, 3; see all the footnotes on that page for examples. 
405 See Yehuda Galitsky, “Arba Turim ve-ha sifrut ha-hilkhatit be-Sfarad ba-me’ah ha-14” (The 
Four Columns and the halakhic literature in Sfarad in the 14th century) (Ph.D. Diss, Bar Ilan University, 
1999). 




even in its printed life. Ashkenazic scholarly culture continued to treat the printed 
Sha’arei Dura as it had related to the work in manuscript form. Rather than becoming 
more stable in printed form, the structure and method of transmission of the first printed 
editions of Sha’arei Dura reflect everything that is typical of ashkenazic halakhic 
scholarly culture. First, the multiplicity of manuscript editions meant that there was no 
single authoritative manuscript of the “real” Sha’arei Dura from which to print the 
work; indeed, most of the manuscript versions never made it into print.406 In fact, 
Dvileiẓky considers the first seven printings of Sha’arei Dura in the sixteenth-century 
as seven first editions407 because their contents and structure were so varied. The 
glosses were not consistently parsed, and the ultimate halakhic conclusion was unclear.  
This comparison also shows that the influence of technologies on transmission is not 
absolute and that an entire scholarly culture and its practices do not change 
automatically as a result of new methods of reproduction. On the one hand, practices 
which were particularly suited to manuscript technology and manuscript culture 
continued to some extent even in print, and, on the other hand, other scholarly cultures 
created and reproduced codified texts in stable forms even without print. The bad fit of 
print technology with ashkenazic scholarly culture, however, led to problematic results, 
and the future of this traditional approach was tenuous.408 The scholarly practices of 
                                                     
406 See Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” in Düren, Sha’arei Dura, 8, where we have glosses from 
Isserlein’s 36 she’arim that quote Sha’arei Dura but cannot be located in the printed Sha’arei Dura 
because they are from glosses on Sha’arei Dura (or from compilations that added quotes from other 
works onto the copy of Sha’arei Dura that Isserlein had in his possession but are not in the “standard” 
version). 
407 See Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” in Düren, Sha’arei Dura, 17.  אבל בספרנו אינו כן, כנראה מפאת
ריבוי כתבי היד שהיו מצוים בכל עיר ועיר, השתמשו המדפיסים שאחרי הדפוס הראשון גם [או רק] בכתבי יד ולא השליכו את 
ים ראשוניםדפוס‘יהבם על אותו דפוס ראשון. ובזה זכינו לכמה  .’ 
408 Elhanan Reiner’s description of an episode in 1540 illustrates both sides of this argument. 
Plans were made to print the copy of the Arba Turim that had belonged to Rabbi Avraham ben Avigdor, 
a famed rabbi from Prague. In true ashkenazic fashion, this copy was buried in layers of glosses, some 
compiled by this rabbi from earlier sources, some written down from his teachers, and some his own 




halakhists still entailed mainly oral discussion, personal manuscript notes, and 
epistolary correspondence. The lacunae, the layers of glosses, the variety among the 
many versions, the multiple opinions, and the personal versions of different scholars, 
and incompleteness all reflect the way in which they studied halakha, transmitted it, 
and put it into writing. 
The profound incongruity between the new technology and the paradigms it 
favored and the traditional scholarly practices of this culture and its paradigms defined 
the scholarship developing in Ashkenaz during the age of print. Print heightened some 
of the differences between private and published, flexible and stable, unfinished and 
complete that were barely noticeable in ashkenazic pre-print textual culture. Different 
processes of production and distribution and profoundly distinct material circumstances 
and technological methods now determined the structure of the scholar’s manuscripts 
on the one hand and the books being published, on the other. Likewise, the chronology 
and process of printing were very different from that of manuscript copying. Whereas 
manuscript copies were created individually and could be copied in distinct ways at 
different points in time, printing a work resulted in multiple near-identical copies 
emerging from one source at one point in time. Whereas an author can insert changes 
                                                     
thoughts and insights. The Shaḥor printing press in Lublin (See Ḥayim Dov Friedberg, History of Hebrew 
Typography in Poland, 2nd ed. [Tel Aviv, 1950], 45-46) refused to include these layers of glosses in their 
printed version of the Arba Turim. Instead, they chose to use the basic text of the Arba Turim from this 
manuscript. Adding only two very simple additions, they printed the text in a “clean” manner, without 
any of the – in the publishers’ words – “superfluous” and “confusing glosses.” The letter of rejection, 
written to a relative of the rabbi who provided the full manuscript, was printed at the end of the printed 
volumes. An attempt, in the same year, to print Rabbi Avraham’s Arba Turim along with all its 
manuscript glosses faltered, and the press discontinued work on it after printing only one out of the four 
volumes. 
On the one hand, we see that Ashkenazic practices of writing personal layers of glosses were 
applied even to printed codified works. On the other hand, technically, it was possible to print a work 
organized according to the Ashkenazic style such as Rabbi Avraham’s glosses in the Arba Turim. In 
practice, however, it was not a natural fit, the results were unsatisfying, and the project failed. See Reiner, 
Al shtei hadpasot shel sefer ha-Turim be-shnat 300 be-Prag (On two printings of the Turim in Prague, 
1540) (unpublished: based on lectures at Princeton, 2016). 




and corrections into successive copies of a manuscript,409 introducing changes to a 
printed work requires printing a new edition. This drove a wedge between personal 
writing and standardized publication, making it difficult to continue earlier, more 
flexible and eclectic practices. 
Most importantly, print technology privileged more structured, complete, and 
stable paradigms for organizing texts. The proponents of the threatened forms of 
scholarship had to fight back, adapt, or fade into oblivion, as we can see in the case of 
Sha’arei Dura. Sha’arei Dura was printed seven times in the sixteenth century, which 
befits its central place in the world of ashkenazic halakha. After the sixteenth century, 
however, it was printed only once in the seventeenth century, once in the eighteenth, 
and once in the nineteenth century. The laws of isur ve-heter discussed in the work did 
not disappear; they were reordered according to other paradigms of knowledge. 
However, this transfer to a different organizational framework caused profound 
changes, both at the level of individual laws and at the level of the halakhic approach 
as a whole, because the paradigms of organization relate to the very foundations of the 
scholars’ approach to their texts. I shall describe and analyze this phenomenon in the 
subsequent sections, as I consider the printing, evolution, and the eventual 
disappearance of Sha’arei Dura and its organization model in the sixteenth century. 
The story of Sha’arei Dura is important not only in and of itself, but also because it 
exemplifies the process that took place when print technology and the forms of 
organization that it privileged came to dominate the world of halakhic scholarship in 
Ashkenaz.  
                                                     
409 See Israel Ta-Shma, “The ‘Open’ Book in Medieval Hebrew literature: the Problem of 
Authorized Editions,” in Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library 75.3 (1993) 17-24. 





3. RABBI SHLOMO LURIA’S ISUR VE-HETER : 
NEW METHODS, TRADITIONAL PRACTICES 
 
Rabbi Shlomo Luria represents a unique model for dealing with the challenge to 
ashkenazic knowledge-practices.410 Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles both considered 
themselves faithful descendants of the ashkenazic tradition and both traced their roots 
back to the giants of medieval Ashkenaz. However, they did so in significantly different 
ways. Sefer yuḥasin, a work written by Avraham Zacut, which dealt with astronomy, 
history, and genealogy, was printed in Cracow in 1579 with new glosses by Rabbi 
Isserles. In those glosses, he built upon the line of ashkenazic scholarship that already 
existed in the genealogy of the book’s earlier version. By adding his direct Polish 
predecessors, Rabbi Pollak and Rabbi Shalom Shakhna, to the traditional ashkenazic 
lineage, Rabbi Isserles effectively positioned his Polish predecessors and himself as the 
direct continuation of the medieval ashkenazic tradition. 411 This Polish élite, which had 
                                                     
410 Rabbi Shlomo Luria was born in first decade of the sixteenth century. The exact trajectory 
of Rabbi Luria’s travels and practice as a rabbi is unknown, but he spent some time in the area of 
Lithuania and then crossed the border westward into Poland (Ostrog). Later, he became the rabbi and 
head of the yeshiva in Lublin, where he died in 1574. The historian Meir Rafeld, in “Ha-MaharShaL ve 
Yam shel Shlomo” (Rabbi Shlomo Luria and the Sea of Shlomo) (Ph.D. diss., Bar Ilan University: Ramat 
Gan, 1991), describes Rabbi Luria as standing, “between two chapters in history: between the closing 
period of the Ashkenazic minhag-literature and its consequences – which shows clear signs of being 
sealed in the transition from the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries – on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the great revolution in the history of halakha that took place at the end of the sixteenth century: the 
composition of the Bet Yosef.” 
The period in question did, indeed, constitute an era of significant transition between two 
important chapters in the history of Jewish texts. As we have shown, these changes are not simply a 
matter of one halakhic genre declining in favor of another one on the rise, as the above quote would have 
it. Rather, the shifts entail deeper and broader metamorphoses in the field of technology, scholarly culture, 
and the organization of knowledge. The category of literature designated by Rafeld as “minhag literature” 
should be broadened to include not only works that deal with custom but also the plethora of halakhic 
textual material that was transmitted in manuscript likutim. This included custom but also responsa, 
psakim (rulings), professional literature, sdarim (manuals), takanot, (community decisions or decrees) 
testimonies, glosses, and so forth. The shift to the Bet Yosef, as Rafeld puts it, represents the more general 
transition from manuscript likutim to printed codes, most notably the Shulḥan Arukh. 
411 The “Seder dorot” (Order of generations) is a genealogical chain that is part of Sefer yuḥasin 
(Book of heritage) by Avraham Zacut, which deals mainly with astronomy. It is based on the 18th chapter 
of the late fourteenth-century work Yesod olam (Foundation of the world) written by a student of Rabbi 




its roots in medieval Ashkenaz, at the same time, represented a new, local iteration of 
that tradition. 
Rabbi Luria also affirmed a chain of transmission centered mainly on 
ashkenazic figures. In one of his works, he wrote that he relied on the opinion of 
“RaShY, the lineage of my father’s house.”412 By contrast, he did not continue the chain 
until his time. More importantly, his connection to RaShY did not pass via Rabbi Pollak 
and Rabbi Shakhna, 413 but via Rabbi Yiẓḥak Kloiber, his maternal grandfather, whom 
he identified as his primary teacher. 414 Rabbi Luria belonged to the same family as the 
Maharal of Prague, a clan that traced its roots back not to Poland but to the old 
ashkenazic communities of the Rhineland. Similarly to ashkenazic Jewry as a whole at 
the time, this internal Western élite was steadily moving eastward, first via places such 
                                                     
Asher ben Yeḥiel, which itself is based on Sefer ha-kabala (Book of tradition) by Rabbi David ibn Daud, 
a Spanish author from the 12th century. The first printed edition of Sefer yuḥasin (Constantinople, 1566), 
contained only the 18th chapter of Yesod olam, without glosses. On the study of this work among Polish 
rabbis, see Elhanan Reiner, “Yashan mipnei ḥadash” and David Fishman, “Rabbi Moshe Isserles and the 
Study of Science among Polish Jews” in Science in Context 10 (1997): 571-588. 
412 In Luria, Yam shel Shlomo tractate Yevamot, ch. 4 §33, he writes ועל רש”י יחוס בית אבי סמכתי... 
– and on [the opinion of] RaShY, the lineage of my father’s house, I relied….” In reality, he was related 
to RaShY via his mother, whose father, Rabbi Yitzchak Kloiber, was an important rabbi in Posen and 
descended from Rashi. ‘My father’s house’ is an idiom (it need not mean father necessarily). 
413 See ShUT MaharShaL, §29, where he provides a long chain of transmission with several 
back tracks and parallel chains that, he explains, he is copying from a list that he found. (It is not 
completely linear; Rabbi Luria himself is copying and compiling from a number of genealogical lists or 
the list from which Rabbi Luria is copying was itself a composite.) Yakov Mayer pointed out to me that 
this chain of transmission has clear predecessors, for instance, in Oxford MS847; Rabbi Luria t thus did 
not compose it from scratch. The introduction to his answer to the following responsum supports this 
view: “Question. Can our teacher show us the order of the genealogy of the geonim who composed 
works? Response. The order of the genealogy, I do not have a definite transmission regarding this, but 
every person reading from the books of the adjudicators, by their habitual statements and disagreements 
and actions can distinguish a little bit regarding the order of their generations. I will copy for you what I 
found copied....” ן לי קבלה מוחלטת אלא שאלה יורינו מורינו סדר היחס בין הגאונים המחברים ספרים. תשובה סדר היחס אי
י מעשים יכיר קצת סדר תולדותם אכן אעתיק לך מה ”כל אדם הקורא בספרי הפוסקים מתוך ההרגל של דבריהם ומחלוקותם ע
 ...שמצאתי הועתק
See also the genealogy of MaharShaL’s family added to the second edition of ShUT Maharshal (Fjorda, 
1768). 
414 See Meir Rafeld, “R Yiẓḥak Kloiber: hanhagotav, morashto, umesaviv lahen,” (Rabbi Yiẓḥak Kloiber: 
customs, legacy, and surroundings) in Netiv Meir (2013), 259-281; and Simḥa Assaf, “Mashehu le-toldot 
MaharShaL” (Something on the history of Rabbi Shlomo Luria) in Festschrift for Levi Ginsburg’s 70th 
Birthday (NY: The American Academy of Jewish Studies, 1946), 45-63. See also Rafeld, “Ha-
MaharShaL,” 25, 28, 32 n 25. 




as Prague and Posen, and, ultimately, further east to Cracow and Lublin, where they 
were, in a sense, newcomers. Their self-image, however, was that of an ashkenazic élite 
with an older pedigree than that of the relatively new “homegrown” Polish rabbis.415 
Members of these two élites studied together, married one another, and continued 
creating a shared ashkenazic culture. At the same time, they were acutely aware of the 
internal rivalries and distinctions separating them, especially with regard to the 
practices and traditions of studying and determining halakha.416 
Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles thus lived in the same region, worked in the 
same sphere, and were related by marriage. Whereas Rabbi Isserles identified with the 
new élite of local Polish origin, Rabbi Luria regarded himself as part of an older 
ashkenazic élite, as can also be seen in his practices of knowledge transmission. Rabbi 
Luria mentioned Rabbi Kloiber’s responsa in the following words: “see in the 
responsum of my master, my grandfather, the gaon, our teacher the rabbi Yiẓḥak… 
they are in the hands of my uncle ... in manuscript, and mine burned, due to our many 
                                                     
415 For a study of the connection between Rabbi Luria and the family of the Maharal of Prague, 
and an inquiry into the significance of this older élite and their claim to supremacy in the Ashkenazic 
sphere based on their pure, ancient lineage, see Reiner, “Yiḥus ve-hoẓa’at shem ra: MaharaL, Mishpaḥat 
Beẓalel ve-parashat ha-Nadler,” (Heritage and slander: Rabbi Loew, the Beẓalel family, and the “Nadler” 
episode) in MaharaL: Akdamot (Rabbi Loew ben Beẓalel: Prologomena), ed. Elhanan Reiner (Jerusalem: 
Zalman Shazar, 2015). 
416 Several studies relate this above-mentioned claim of supremacy to some of the new 
developments in halakhic study and decision-making in the 16th and 17th centuries, including the 
printing of Rabbi Isserles’ Torat ḥatat and the critique thereof by Rabbi Ḥayim of Friedberg in Vikuaḥ 
mayim Ḥayim. See Reiner in “Aliyat ha-kehila,” where Reiner makes this connection, and his “The 
Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of the Modern Era: Manuscript vs printed Book,” in Polin 10 (1997): 
85-98. See also Eric Zimmer in Gakhalatan shel hakhamim (The fiery embers of the scholars.) Jerusalem: 
Bialik, 1999) and, for example, in idem, “The 16th Century Rabbis of Germany and their Attitudes 
towards Contemporaries beyond their Borders,” in Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 
(1985) 129, on the rivalry between German-ashkenazic rabbis and Polish-ashkenazic rabbis. Although 
the former group often learned from the latter, they defended their primacy when it came to halakhic 
decision-making and customs, “a right that was transmitted from the beginning of the settlement [of 
Jews] in the Rhineland” (133). Zimmer quotes Rabbi Ḥayim of Friedberg as a representative of the older 
Ashkenazic élite. He opposed Rabbi Isserles’ privileging of Polish rulings and customs in some of his 
halakhic decisions and customs, saying “If the rabbi [Isserles] did not want to give up his custom in favor 
of the custom of the Holy Land, then, a fortiori, the sons of Ashkenaz should not give up their customs 
in favor of the custom of Poland” (ibid.). 




sins....”417 We thus know that Rabbi Kloiber wrote responsa and that his close relatives 
and students copied them (hence the fact that both Rabbi Luria and his uncle own a 
collection). Rabbi Luria’s remarks provide the only source of our knowledge about the 
existence of these responsa, which were never widely circulated or printed. We note the 
pattern of personal transmission of manuscripts by means of copying, from rabbi to 
student, (grand)father to son. 
Rabbi Luria also emphasized, via Rabbi Kloiber, his connection to the great 
ashkenazic figures from the previous century: “My great father-in-law, our teacher, the 
rabbi Rabbi Klonimus … who received from … Rabbi Daniel, who was a brilliant 
student and served our teacher, the rabbi Rabbi Isserl’, the author of Trumat ha-deshen, 
and saw his conduct.”418 Rabbi Luria mentions the personal transmission of knowledge 
from Rabbi Isserlein and Rabbi Daniel’s opportunity to witness the rabbi’s actions. 
Sometimes, Rabbi Luria himself also refers to practices he witnessed in his father-in-
law’s presence as a basis for his own decisions; his father-in-law’s connection to Rabbi 
Isserlein played a crucial role in this process.419 Textual study of manuscripts alongside 
oral transmission and experienced behavior were part of Rabbi Luria’s scholarly 
culture.420 
                                                     
417 See Luria, Yam shel Shlomo on Tractate Yevamot ch. 12.18 ועיין בתשובת אא”ז הגאון מוהר”ר יצחק
ה”ו בכתיבת יד ואצלי נשרף בעו”ר יצחק נר”ל בסימן סה, המה תחת יד דודי התורני מוהר”זצ ... 
418 ShUT MaharShaL (§98) חמי הגדול מוהר”ר קלונימוס ז”ל שקיבל מהחסיד הגדול - שו”ת מהרש”ל סי’ צ”ח
ר איסרל בעל תרומות הדשן וראה הנהגתו”ר דניאל שהיה תלמיד מובהק ושימש מהר”מהר . 
419 See Rafeld, “Ha-MaharShaL,” 30, also on p. 30-31, regarding the identity of R. Klonimus. 
420 See also Gliksberg and Kassirer, “Halakha.” They also discuss the differences in halakhic 
approach and they attempt to tie them to “meta-halakhic” differences between the schools (they consider 
Rabbi Ḥayim to subscribe to the same “meta-halakhic” – that is, philosophical/theological ideas about 
halakha – convictions as his brother, the Maharal). They also minimize the difference between the two 
groups, to some extent; see p. 168, the claim that Rema is, in fact, not so different from Rabbi Ḥayim, 
and that Rabbi Isserles’ point was precisely to allow more freedom to future poskim. 
In fact, they are equating leniency with freedom and flexibility. But leniency and universalization are 
separate issues; if Rabbi Isserles universalizes the lenient approach, it does not reinforce the earlier 
(stringent) customs, but, rather, eliminates them, which reduces flexibility to some degree. If later poskim 
want to be more stringent, they may do so according to Rabbi Isserles, but it will not be le-halakha 




Rabbi Luria was acutely aware of the consequences of print, and he sought 
innovative ways to respond to the new situation. He wrote about the danger of the Torah 
“becoming not like two Torahs, but rather like 613 Torahs421 because of the 
proliferation of books, and he saw the need for greater unification and universalization. 
On the other hand, he was wary of losing the individualized and personal nature of 
halakha as transmitted in pre-print Ashkenaz.422 Rabbi Luria saw danger in putting too 
great trust in written books, complaining that his contemporaries “prefer learning from 
books to learning from people,” a preference that he considered misguided: “and such 
is the bad thing that is before them, whatever is written in a book they believe, and if a 
living person is shouting that this is not the law…they will not pay heed to his 
words.”423 
Rabbi Luria was very concerned with correcting and emending texts and highly 
conscious of the faulty state of printed works. Although he also corrected manuscripts, 
he understood that mistakes in printed works were more dangerous because they were 
                                                     
(required by halakha), and thus not enjoy the legal force of halakha. Thus, separating minhag from 
halakha does not necessarily give the Ashkenazic custom more freedom but, rather, reduces it to 
something additional, not inherent to halakha. 
421 There are two versions of Rabbi Luria’s introduction to Yam shel Shlomo, which include his 
fascinating analysis of the change in the world of halakhic learning-practices in sixteenth-century Eastern 
Europe. One of these versions was printed with tractate Ḥulin and the other with tractate Bava Kama. 
The introductions deal with the Talmud’s discussion of the results of the disputes between Hillel and 
Shamai’s students. The introduction to Ḥulin is the only one that includes references to Rabbi Karo’s 
introduction to Bet Yosef. See Luria, Yam shel Shlomo on tractate Ḥulin, introduction:  והתור' לא נעשית
 ,for more on the different introductions, see Edward Fram ;כשתי תורות אלא כתרי"ג תורות מרוב ריבוי החלוקות
“Chapter Two: A Difficult Beginning” in his forthcoming book [no title yet]. 
422 See also in Rafeld, “Ha-MaharShaL,” 138, where he quotes Rabbi Luria’s approach to 
halakha, emphasizing the more individualized conception rather than the idea of a universalized halakha, 
Rabbi Luria’s explanation that, at Mount Sinai, every person received the Torah through “his own 
channel.” This is akin to Rabbi Ḥayim’s approach in the introduction to Vikuaḥ, where he compares the 
multitude of every person’s halakhic traditions to the differences in personal taste in food and the 
uniqueness of each person’s facial features. Rabbi Luria also considers the plurality of traditions to be 
essential to halakha. 
423 See Luria, Yam shel Shlomo on tractate Ḥulin,. 'והנה שגו בזה מאחר שראו שכ"כ בספרו שכך הלכ
אמינו, אם יעמוד א' חי וצוח ככרוכיא שאין הדין כן אמרו כ"כ הקאר"ו להדיא, כי כך העניין הרע אשר לפניהם, מה שכ' בספר י
בראיות גמורות או אפי' בקבלה, לא יחושו לדבריו כאשר כתבתי בהקדמ' ראשונה, ובפרט האידנא שבעו"ה הנסמכים מרובים 
 והלומדים מועטים...




disseminated faster and more broadly and because readers tended to trust printed works 
more than manuscripts. He collected and consulted printed and manuscript copies of 
texts, often juxtaposing and comparing several copies. In many ways, he treated the 
printed text as another (often inferior and suspect) version among the manuscript 
variants, rather than considering printed books as an ultimate text that replaced the 
others. Rabbi Luria criticized scholars who placed excessive trust in printed books and 
failed to correct them. He chastised Rabbi Karo, the author of the Shulḥan Arukh, who 
“did not have before him books with glosses [edited books] and copied them in their 
incorrect form as found in print, and sometimes he built a big foundation on this 
mistake.”424 Elsewhere he wrote: “... Karo gave a forced interpretation to reconcile it, 
because he did not know that it is a talmudic source, as it is found in [properly] corrected 
books.”425 Similarly, in his glosses on Sha’arei Dura, Rabbi Luria dismissed an idea 
suggested by Rabbi Isserles, which the latter had based on a gloss in a new edition of a 
book.426 Rabbi Luria explained that his younger colleague found the source, “and said 
‘everything I find, I believe,’ without examining the source carefully.” 427 Elsewhere, 
he complains, “I had to explain this at length for my students because they already 
found the words of Rabbi Isaac Stein in a book with an iron pen [i. e., a printed work], 
and it is hard for them to separate from this.”428 Rabbi Luria was thus very conscious 
                                                     
424 Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, Ḥulin, 2nd introduction 
425 Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, Gitin, ch. 4 §65  והקארו דחק ליישב בכדי ולא ידע דש”ס הוא, כאשר נמצא
 בספרים מדוייקים
426 He called this “a new Isur ve-heter ha-arokh” and “the new gloss,” which, in my opinion, 
refers to the fact that this he saw this gloss in print. More on this new Isur ve-heter ha-arokh in the case 
study. 
427 See Ateret Shlomo (Crown of Shlomo)on Sha’arei Dura. ואל תשגיח בדברי מהר”ם בספר תורת
משום ’ ח שהיה בעל הורא”ח. חוץ לכבודו בא להקל על מהרי”חטאת שכתב שאין לחלק בין כלי מתכות לכלי חרס ודלא כמהרי
ל”כ אין לסמוך עליו כלל להקל ש”שמצא אני מאמין ולא ירד לדקדק לעומק בעניין עו הארוך, ואמר על כל מה ”שמצא כן בא : 
428 Luria, Amudei Shlomo, (Pillars of Shlomo) Esseh (Positive Commandment) 50 §3.  




of the pitfalls of print and the false confidence that printed works inspire in their 
readership. 
Notwithstanding these suspicions, Rabbi Luria was clearly preparing his own 
works for eventual printing. He was not principally opposed to print publication and 
viewed print technology as merely another means for reproducing texts that had the 
unfortunate effect of producing false expectations among lesser scholars. Unlike those 
he accused of believing anything they encountered in print, he considered the correcting 
of texts as part of his scholarly role.429 While acknowledging that print technology 
presented new challenges and dangers, he nevertheless expected scholarly practices to 
continue as before. Although cognizant of a new technology for copying and 
disseminating knowledge, he did not believe that it required a reconceptualization of 
the scholarly practices of his entire culture.  
The publication history of Rabbi Luria’s works shows that, in many ways, he 
did not adapt his scholarly practices to the changes, leading to unfortunate results.430 
                                                     
Rabbi Yiẓḥak Isaac Stein (ca. Nürnberg 1430- Regensburg1495). His Bi’urim (Commentaries) on Rabbi 
Moshe of Coucy’s 13th-c Sefer Miẓvot Katan (Small Book of Commandments) were printed together with 
that work in Venice in 1547 by Bomberg. 
ר איזיק שטיין כבר בעט של עופרת בספר וקשה להם לפרוש מאתו”הוצרכתי להאריך בעבור התלמידים לפי שמצאו דברי מהר  
429 Concerning a responsum from Ravia: “ תשובות אלו העתקתי מס’ ראבי”ה והתשובות היו בלתי מתוקנות
ל יגעתי ומצאתי לתקנם על מכונם לפי הירושלמי שהיה לפניהם-לרוב טעויות, לפי שבאו מסופר אל סופר, ובעזרת הא ...” see 
Assaf, “Mashehu,” 57. Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (Large Book of Commandments), Talmud, Maimonides, 
Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel and other rishonim, Rabbi Luria mentions having different versions, printed 
ones and manuscript ones. 
430 None of Rabbi Luria’s works were printed during his lifetime, although many of his writings 
were preserved, including his responsa, the writings of Yam shel Shlomo, a prayer book he composed 
with emendations and notations about his customs regarding the liturgy, his glosses on Sha’arei Dura, 
and many other works. Some of his students used and copied parts of their rabbi’s work on the Bible into 
their own writings, which appeared in print before the first printing of Rabbi Luria’s own work on the 
subject. For example, Rabbi Yitzchak Kohen’s Kiẓur ha-mizraḥi, (Abridgement of the Mizraḥi) was 
printed in 1604, before the printing of Rabbi Luria’s own work (named Yeriyot Shlomo, 1609) (Curtains 
of Solomon, after Song of Songs 1:5). The latter work contained only some of the glosses – those not 
printed in the student’s work (see Assaf, “Mashehu,” 62-63). Although Rabbi Luria referred to Yam shel 
Shlomo in terms that suggest a finished work (“ḥiburi ha-gadol...”), at his death, both Yam shel Shlomo 
and even his responsa remained, to some extent, unfinished. Their publication history reflects this: Yam 
shel Shlomo ended up being printed in various volumes and editions, with several different introductions, 
and ultimately, many of the tractates were lost. Rabbi Luria’s responsa were, similarly, a work in progress 




Instead of definitively completing and then publishing specific works, he continued to 
write and accumulate writings and glosses in his archive throughout his life. This did 
not preclude publication in the traditional way, as he expected that the relevant scholars 
and students in his circles would copy from his manuscript archives as necessary. In 
one instance, Rabbi Luria expresses shock at the fact that Rabbi Isserles criticized him 
without having consulted his writings on an issue, although none of the relevant 
writings had been printed at the time.431 Rabbi Luria expected his colleagues to consult 
unpublished personal manuscripts. Indeed, in one responsum, Rabbi Isserles seems to 
mention keeping, and periodically adding to, all the manuscript copies of Rabbi Luria’s 
writings.432 In a similar vein, Rabbi Luria’s own archive appears to have been accessible 
to scholars who wished to copy from his writings, even after his death, as Rabbi Shmuel 
of Böhm, who published Rabbi Luria’s Ḥokhmat Shlomo (Wisdom of Shlomo) 
mentions in the introduction.433 Rabbi Luria’s practices of writing and transmitting 
                                                     
until almost up to his death. Partly, this is because he continued to receive new questions throughout his 
life; the last responsum in Rabbi Luria’s ShUT is the one with the latest date, 1572, two years before his 
death. Rabbi Luria clearly thought about publishing the work as a whole but did not succeed in doing so. 
It was printed by Klonimus, son of Mordekhai Yaffe, and his sons Yosef and Ḥayim in Lublin. The work 
of printing begun on the 19th of the month of Av 1574, less than a year after his death, and was completed 
in 1575. My chapter on likutim mentions the close connection between the “publishing moment” that 
separates a private work from a published one and the question of when and whether a work is complete. 
In the tradition of manuscript compilation, however, both the boundary between private and published 
and the point at which a work becomes “complete” is blurred. Rabbi Luria himself never conclusively 
crossed the boundary between private and published, between archive and completed work. 
431 MaharaShaL, Yam shel Shlomo, tractate Ḥulin, Ch. 1 §29. 
ק דחולין ”ה שלי גם לא ראית בספרי הגדול בפ”ושאלתי את פיו איך עלה על דעתך להשיג עלי ולא עיינת בהגהתי באו 
 ולא ידעת שורש דברי
See also MaharShaL on Sha’arei Dura, gate 4§8. 
וכתב להוציא ’ דגבים להשיב עלי בספר תורת חטאת שלו לאסור לא נמלח גבי מולייתא ”שוב ראיתי במה שרצה מהר 
ק ”ולא ראה יה והארכתי בספרי בפרק פ’ חוץ לכבודו לא עיין בהגהתי ולא בספרי אלא שהציץ מן החרכי’ מלבו של חכם כו
 .דחולין ושם הראיתי לך טעותיו עיין שם
Yam shel Shlomo on tractate Ḥulin was first printed in Cracow, 1733-5. 
432 Isserles, ShUT Rema §132.10. In ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 515n34 – Siev suggests that this is 
the source of the major dispute between the two rabbis. 
433 Rabbi Shmuel of Böhm, Ḥokhmat Shlomo, first ed. 
העניין יוכל לשלוח על ידי איש  אם המעיין מתקשה באיזה עניין בדבר הלכה שלא יוכל לירד לעומקו הן מחמת שגיאה או חומר
ל אשר הם ”מוקדם או הוא בעצמו כאשר הוא מורגל ותדיר שנוסעים ליריד לובלין, ושמה יוכל לראות בגוף הגמרות של הגאון ז
ו, או יכתוב לבנו דבר הקשה והוא ישיב לו תשובה”ר יחיאל יצ”ביד בנו האלוף הר ... 




scholarship represent the continuity of ashkenazic practices,  and they were deeply tied 
to the tradition of likutim. 
Lest Rabbi Luria come across as a staunch traditionalist, it should be stated that 
he was innovative and daring in many ways: The scholarship and scope of Rabbi 
Luria’s magnum opus, a work of interpretation, commentary, and halakhic decision-
making based on the Talmud, 434 titled Yam shel Shlomo, was most revolutionary.435 
This work is filled with innovative insights and interpretations that follow the order of 
the talmudic tractates and sugyot. It relied on the halakhic authority of the talmudic 
sources rather than on the compilations of his more immediate predecessors. His 
methods of textual interpretation were inspired by the distant tosafists, who focused on 
evaluating the talmudic discussions directly. This approach enabled him to be far more 
liberal with the tradition of halakhic texts that had accumulated between the Talmudic 
period and the time that he expressed his opinion. Such an approach was highly 
innovative for his age, as was the decision to create a work that covered the entire 
Talmud. This project can be considered Rabbi Luria’s own attempt at rescuing 
ashkenazic halakhic tradition. His decision to return to the Talmud was atypical, and 
his insistence on correct halakhic analytic reasoning over mere transmission as the true 
source of halakhic authority was innovative. Similarly, his preoccupation with 
correcting and emending texts is an attempt at preserving older traditions,436 which is, 
                                                     
For full discussion and translation of these quotes, see chapter 6 in this dissertation. 
434 See the discussion in the first chapter (The Inherited Tradition) regarding the Talmud as 
organized more like a compilation and less like a code. Significantly, Yam shel Shlomo was organized 
according to the Talmud rather than any of the codes. 
435 See Meir Rafeld’s dissertation, which studies the work at length. Rafeld, “Ha-MaharShaL.” 
436 Rabbi Luria possessed an impressive manuscript collection, especially of Ashkenazic 
manuscripts. See Assaf, “Mashehu,”60. ד ”וכן היה בידו שפע של מקורות מהוראותיהם של חכמי אשכנז במאה הי
הלכות בדיקות , הלכות שחיטות אשכנזים, בצורת ילקוטים שונים, שכמה מהם לא הגיעו אלינו דרך צנורות אחרים, ו”והט
י תשובות מראשוני חכמי היו בידו כמה קובצ. וכן ספרי מנהגים מרובים, תיקוני גיטין לרוב, הלכות בדיקות ישנות, אשכנזים
או ספרי לקוטים שהובאו בהם דברי הראשונים ותשובותיהם, צרפת ואשכנז . 




at the same time, exceptional and original. 
Whereas Yam shel Shlomo displays most solidly the originality of Rabbi Luria’s 
scholarship, his treatment of Sha’arei Dura provides a clear example of his perpetuation 
of traditional organizational paradigms and scholarly practices. Rabbi Luria’s work on 
Sha’arei Dura, in comparison to that of Rabbi Isserles, demonstrates continuity versus 
change in learned practices. Unlike Rabbi Isserles, who wrote Torat hatat, a stand-alone 
work on the basis of Sha’arei Dura, Rabbi Luria created a typically ashkenazic product 
– a personal compilation of paraphrases and summaries from the work. Rabbi Luria 
used the basic text of the printed Sha’arei Dura (Cracow, 1534), while editing, 
selecting, correcting, and adding text and glosses – both older ones and his own insights 
– on the basis of other editions, manuscript copies, and additional textual sources.437 He 
did not even give the work a title, and it was referred to in typical ashkenazic fashion 
as “The Sha’arei Dura of Rabbi Luria,” or “Rabbi Luria’s Isur ve-heter,” long before 
being printed under titles invented by its publishers. 438 Numerous rabbinic references 
to it indicate that it was known, consulted, and quoted long before being printed.439 
                                                     
Rabbi Luria recommended examining different variants of texts. He was conscious of the 
failings of printed works and continued to emend them. He did so not only by means of comparison and 
bibliographical tools, but also by using his scholarly prowess to determine the correct version of a text. 
Rabbi Shmuel of Böhm, the editor and publisher of some of Rabbi Luria’s works, mentioned in the 
introduction to Ḥokhmat Shlomo that Rabbi Luria “…did not avoid emending copies/made every effort 
to attain [lehassig] copies of the Talmud with RaShY and Tosafot from old parchment, and according to 
them and the poskim Alfasi, Maimonides, Sefer miẓvot gadol and Sefer miẓvot katan and the Arba Turim 
and the Arukh and the responsa of earlier and latter authorities, in their paths did he step and emend, and 
every mistake he corrected” ( In Rabbi Shmuel of Böhm, intro Ḥokhmat Shlomo first ed.). 
ועל פיהם ועל פי הפוסקים רב , י ותוספות של קלף ישנים”לא הניח מלהשיג גמרות רש, זה מעשהו הגדול אשר עשה 
”ק ובעל הטורים ובעל הערוך ותשובות ראשונים ואחרונים בעקבותיהם דרך והגיה וכל מעוות התקין”ג וסמ”ם סמ”אלפס ורמב  
437See Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky, 2:7. Based on the quotes, he shows that Cracow, 1534 was 
the printed edition used by Rabbi Luria as his basis. However, Rabbi Luria also had several manuscripts 
and he copied texts into the glosses, some of which are unknown to us from any other source, for example 
a responsum from Rabbi Isserlein that cannot be found in any of the latter’s collections of responsa. 
438 One of his students, Rabbi Eliyahu Loenz, printed the work in Basel in 1599 under the title 
Mekhonot Shlomo (Bases of Shlomo, after II Kings 27:16). It was printed in the same year in Lublin by 
Rabbi Yossi ben Rabbi Yehuda under the title Ateret Shlomo (Crown of Shlomo). 
439 See Dvileiẓky, ed. Sha’arei Dura, 2:7. 




Rabbi Luria thus continued to work in his habitual manner, disregarding the 
limitations of these practices in the face of the new technology and the order it 
privileged and expecting scholars to continue relating to his writings in the traditional 
way. Print technology, in his eyes, signified only a technical novelty rather than the 
initial upheaval of his scholarly culture. Although his innovations in content and 
approach may have been an attempt at defending traditional ashkenazic practices, it did 
not include an adaptation of the forms and order of his writings to the deeper changes 
that were looming. This omission would prove fatal, because it disregarded the 
replacement of traditional paradigms of organizing knowledge with foreign ones. 
Whereas new technologies could be disregarded as superficial, the shift in 
organizational paradigm that it inaugurated was much harder to ignore. Rabbi Moshe 
Isserles’ work Torat ḥatat (Cracow: Prostiẓ, 1570) is the first step towards the 
reorganization of Sha’arei Dura’s halakhic texts in this changed culture. His 
approaches, and the reactions it evoked, are a microcosm of both the potential and the 
threat inherent in this shift and the attempts to deal with it. 
 
4. BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE: RABBI ISSERLES AND TORAT ḤATAT  
In 1570, Rabbi Moshe Isserles,440 by then a significant rabbi in Cracow,441 published a 
work entitled Torat ḥatat.442 The work relates directly to Sha’arei Dura and attempts 
                                                     
440 On Rabbi Isserles, see Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim; Yona Ben Sasson, Mishnato ha-
iyyunit shel ha-Rema (The Philosophical System of Rabbi Moshe Isserles) (Jerusalem, 1984); Elhanan 
Reiner, “The Ashkenazi Élite at the Beginning of the Modern Era: Manuscript versus Printed Book,” 
Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 10 (1997): 85-98; Asher Siev, Rema (NY, 1972). 
441 See Siev, Rema, 20 n53 there regarding Rabbi Isserles’ tenure as Rabbi of Cracow. 
442 Rabbi Isserles mentions the Shulḥan Arukh in his work on the sections corresponding with 
the laws discussed in Torat ḥatat. This means that it must have been finished after 1565, when the latter 
work was printed. Rabbi Eliezer Galinsky, who edited the most recent edition, thinks that the work must 
have been ready for print in 1567-8 at the latest (see Isserles, Torat ḥatat, ed. Eliezer Galinsky 
[Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Rav Kook, 2015], Introduction, 24-25). 




to present the laws discussed in the former work in a clearer manner. The novelty of 
Torat ḥatat, Elhanan Reiner has explained, was its appearance in print, because it 
encouraged a transition from orality to textuality.443 Reiner emphasized the newfound 
accessibility of this work to a less élite audience, and the shift from local customs of 
small “holy communities” to large Jewish communities, which fed into more lenient 
interpretations of local custom. Printed texts, accessible to all and detached from 
rabbinic authority, fundamentally uprooted traditional ashkenazic halakha. Building 
upon these insights, I will focus on the transition from manuscripts to printed text more 
specifically (rather than on orality to textuality in the broader sense), while framing the 
polemic that Torat ḥatat evoked as a clash of paradigms of knowledge organization and 
the meanings that these paradigms held. 
In addition to the novelty of appearing in print, one of Torat ḥatat’s main 
innovations was its organization. The book, which was printed separately rather than as 
a gloss, transformed Sha’arei Dura into a more streamlined and complete work. In the 
introduction to Torat ḥatat, organization is mentioned several times. Rabbi Isserles 
explains that he intended to organize and create a “seder,”444 literally meaning both 
“order” and step-by-step manual, of the laws of isur ve-heter. Both meanings of seder 
connote the addition of greater structure to the entity. This ordering was necessary, he 
explained, because the accumulated glosses, the lack of clear conclusions, and the habit 
of generations of glossators to select, copy and comment upon what they personally 
found relevant, rather than to provide a complete and comprehensive work for an 
                                                     
443 Reiner, “The Ashkenazi Élite,”; See also Gliksberg and Kassirer, “Halakha and Meta-
Halakha,” 157-191. 
444 See Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction, for mentions of “seder” אברך את ה’...לסדר סדר איסור 
 והיתר על הדינים המבוארים בשערי דורא




anonymous reader, rendered the work unsystematic and confusing, and thus 
inaccessible, or “sealed and hidden,” in Rabbi Isserles’ words. Subsequent glosses only 
complicated matters by adding layers that were not clearly identified or differentiated 
from one-another, often resulting in seemingly contradictory claims: “This one says one 
thing, and that one says the opposite.”445 Instead of writing yet another gloss, Rabbi 
Isserles thus created a new work based on the older one, which was more organized 
than its predecessors. 
Torat ḥatat’s introduction shows clearly that Rabbi Isserles, as Rabbi Luria, was 
highly conscious of the dangers of printing a halakhic work rather than copying it in 
manuscript. One reason that he proposed for the need to write Torat ḥatat was the fact 
that Sha’arei Dura “can be found in everyone’s hand.”446 He emphasized that the 
problems with Sha’arei Dura caused confusion, “all the more so now in this most recent 
generation, when this book has been copied and printed several times, because every 
man wants it....”447 As a result of print dissemination, “... the books fell into the hands 
of many great people and little men.” This ever-growing audience then created their 
own glosses of the work, “and they made for them interpretations448 ... and additions ... 
they hang empty things onto the book, every man does what seems right in his own 
eyes in his own book, and who will contradict him?!”449 Without the individual contacts 
                                                     
445 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction:  באשר הגאון בעל שערי דורא תקנו לדורו שהיו גדולים וחכמים והיו
קיצר דבריו מספיק להם ולא כתב על ספרו רק דברים שהיו מחודשים בעיניו או דברים הצריכין בדורו ולכן כתב רק מקצת דיני 
ים דבריו סתומים וחתומים היו כלא היו עד שבשביל איסור והיתר וקצת טריפות בקצתו תראה, והנה בעונות בדורות האלו האחרונ
ל וסדרו עליו דברים בהגהותיהם כדי להורות לדורות כיצד ינהגו אך שעל ידי ”י ז”ל ובראשם הגאון מהרא”זה קמו האחרונים ז
  זה חזרו דבריהם כמתנגדים זה לזה. זה אמר בכה וזה אמר בכה
446 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction : באשר כי הוא מורגל ונמצא ביד כל אדם 
447 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction: כ”ש עכשיו בדור האחרון הזה אשר נעתק ונדפס הספר הזה כמה פעמים
 כי כל אדם חושק בו
448 Jeremiah 7:13 - note the reference to idol worship. 
 449 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction: ועי”ז נפלו הספרים ההם ביד רבים קטנים וגדולים עשו להם כוונים
וביאורים שונים הזמן כלה ודבריהם אינם כלים באשר עשו לספר הנזכר פירושים ותוספות גם קפצו התלמידים רבים ותלו בו 
 בוקי סריקו איש הישר בעיניו יעשה בספרו ומי ימחה בידו




between scholars that were inherent in personal manuscript copies, anyone could write 
mistaken interpretations justifying his own faulty opinions. Just as Rabbi Luria, Rabbi 
Isserles feared the faulty interpretations that would result from this broad and 
unsupervised dissemination of texts. The likelihood that these new, misguided 
interpretations, in turn, might be printed only amplified the risk, as the errors would 
also be disseminated. Moreover, their words would be taken seriously once printed; “... 
afterwards, these books and those words are printed, and he who sees them says that 
they were all given at Mount Sinai and he rules according to them, and they prohibit 
and permit against the Torah and the halakha.”450 
Unlike his colleague, however, Rabbi Isserles’ emphasized not the danger of 
learning from books rather than people but the risk that every reader would write his 
own ideas and glosses in his own copy, and “in his own book, who will contradict 
him?!”451 Rabbi Isserles contended, however, that traditional efforts to clarify the text 
by adding to the layers of glosses were ultimately unsuccessful and -- in the age of print 
– even served to heighten the confusion, “and thus the rulings of the sages who meant 
to help ended up only harming.”452 Rabbi Isserles advocated a new approach that would 
provide a printed, authoritative, and universalized form of this body of texts. In Torat 
ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles streamlined, unified, and summarized Sha’arei Dura. Realizing 
that most people now had the printed edition of Sha’arei Dura and would continue to 
utilize it, in his own work, Rabbi Isserles therefore followed the order and division of 
sections as found in the printed Sha’arei Dura, starting with the Venice edition of the 
                                                     
450 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction:  ואח”כ הספרים והדברים ההם נדפסים והרואה אותם אומר שכולם 
 מסיני נאמרו
451 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction: איש הישר בעיניו יעשה בספרו ומי ימחה בידו   
452 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, introduction ואח”כ הספרים והדברים ההם נדפסים והרואה אותם אומר שכולם 
 מסיני נאמרו ופוסק אחריהם נמצא אוסר ומתיר שלא כתורה וכהלכה ותקנת החכמים שכוונו להועיל לקצר ולברר הם קלקלהו




work453 “I saw that it was good to arrange a good order in all the laws of isur ve-heter 
that are found in Sha’arei Dura and to write them according to the order of its 
sections....”454 
Although Rabbi Isserles kept the same order as the Sha’arei Dura, his approach 
diverged from the classical glosses on Sha’arei Dura in fundamental ways: Instead of 
copying or paraphrasing the text and then glossing and adding to it, he created a new 
text, streamlining the contradictions, simplifying the many opinions, clarifying, and 
providing conclusions. In the introduction, he explained that he would present his work 
“in a succinct manner ... so that it will be easy to understand for every man, small and 
great.” Moreover, he added clear conclusions to all the laws “according to the latest 
authorities of blessed memory, whom we have the custom to follow.”455 
The main inspiration behind Rabbi Isserles’ Torat ḥatat was clearly Rabbi 
Yosef Karo’s Shulḥan Arukh, which was becoming increasingly popular. Rabbi Karo, 
“whose books already spread throughout the whole House of Israel,”456 was based in 
Safed and, belonging to the sfardic diaspora, did not follow the ashkenazic tradition. 
Considering it important to reinforce knowledge of the ashkenazic tradition among the 
non-elite scholarly population, Rabbi Isserles therefore offered his own streamlined, 
                                                     
453 The manuscripts of Sha’arei Dura are divided into from about 30 to 40 sections; the second 
printed edition (Venice, 1547-8) is the first to use sections that start with the first “gate” and run straight 
through to the end (not beginning a new count after the end of the ten “gates”), 96 sections altogether 
(plus 32 on niddah). Rema used this division of the printed edition, consciously made to complement the 
printed Sha’arei Dura. We also know from several remarks that Venice 1548 was indeed the edition he 
used (see Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” Düren, Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky 22n124, for the page-number 
of a section that corresponds to this). 
454 Isserles, Torat ḥatat, intro: וראיתי כי טוב הוא לסדר סדור נכון בכל דיני איסור והיתר הנמצאים בשערי
 דורא ולכתוב אותן על פי סדר סימניו שבשערי דורא
455 Ibid. בדרך קצר ולא בפלפול ארוך ...כדי שיהא נקל להבין לכל אדם קטן וגדול שם הוא ולכתוב שם כל חילוקי
פ דעת האחרונים ”ד: גם לכתוב הסכמת ההלכה בכל דין ודין ע”הדינים הנמצאים בשאר פוסקים השייכים לדין ודין שנמצאו בש
ל אשר אנו נוהגים אחריהם”ז . 
456 IIbid. הרב הגדול מו’ יוסף קארו זצ”ל אשר כבר נתפשטו ספריו בכל ישראל ואם יפסוק אדם אחר דבריו בפרט בדיני איסור
שנוהגים בהם במדינות אלו’ והיתר אשר יסד בשלחן ערוך שלו יסתור כל מנהגי  




clear alternative to the newly popular, accessible Shulḥan Arukh. Rabbi Isserles was 
preserving and conserving ashkenazic law by adapting it to some extent to the dominant 
organizational paradigms of his age. His reworking of the organization of the laws to 
fit the new paradigms led to more unification and universalization of halakha for the 
ashkenazic realm, eliminating the localized personal mode of teaching for the sake of a 
clearer, more unified, and more accessible halakhic corpus.457 The resistance that Torat 
ḥatat encountered reveals the extent of the change. 
 
5. RESISTANCE: RABBI ḤAYIM BEN BEẒALEL AND VIKUAḤ MAYIM ḤAYIM 
Torat ḥatat evoked significant controversy. Rabbi Ḥayim ben Beẓalel of Friedberg 
(Posen ca. 1520 - Friedberg 1588), wrote Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim (Dispute of the living 
waters), a polemical work opposing Torat ḥatat.458 Countless glosses, summaries, and 
other kinds of works had been written on Sha’arei Dura. What was it about Torat ḥatat 
that upset him? Rabbi Ḥayim’s polemical publication was aimed precisely against 
Rabbi Isserles’ concessions to this foreign organizational paradigm and the threat that 
it posed to traditional ashkenazic organization. Reiner discusses the threats that print 
technology proper posed by making halakhic writings available to a much wider 
audience. I will focus on Ḥayim ben Beẓalel’s reaction to organizational elements: 
flexibility versus structure, complete versus open works, modular versus holistic 
                                                     
457 He adds a caveat, that –of course – this was meant only for the masses who were tempted by 
the ease of the Shulḥan Arukh, and that learned people were invited to use his work merely as a 
springboard for discussing their own opinions (ibid.). והנה לא אומר לאחרים קבלו שהם רשאים ולא אני כל שכן
לגדולים מערכי באשר יש בידם מאזני השכל יודעים להכריע בכל דבר ולא  ס ד ר ת י   ה ס ד ו ר  הזה רק לקטנים ממני ולהעיר 
ים שידעו להזהר ובכל דבר כתבתי טעמי ונימוקי עמי והוריתי מקום אשר מתוכו הוצאתי הדין ההוא והרוצה לסמוך לב המעיינ
והנה כללתי .עלי יבא ויסמוך והרוצה לחלוק מי ימחה בידו ואחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכון לבו לשמים ויהיה מתון בדין
ל”כ ויברר לנפשו אחת מן הדרכים הנ”ים לאו דאורייתא יראה אחהדינים בקצרה בסוף דרך סימנים ומאן דאמר סימנ  
458 It was published in reaction to the printing of Torat ḥatat in 1559 but not printed until 1712 
in Amsterdam. Rabbi Ḥayim himself refers to his writing as “this letter” וראיתי לקרות שם האגרת הלז מים 
 .(intro., part 3) חיים כי זאת תורת חטאת להיות עץ ארז ואזוב יחד באגודה אחת




arrangements, and personal versus universal writings. This will show that the traditional 
ashkenazic way of organizing texts reflected an ideology of knowledge and a particular 
religious-intellectual approach. 
Rabbi Ḥayim’s issues with Torat ḥatat relate to questions of organization and 
traditional knowledge practices. After stating that his own rabbi, Rabbi Shakhna, never 
wrote down his teachings, Rabbi Ḥayim presented his own manuscripts as an example 
of permissible writing practices: “And see, there is another straight path before each 
man, and that is that everyone is permitted to compile and compose together every novel 
thing that he finds in the words of the older halakhic decision-makers (poskim) and to 
write them in a good order so that it may be there for him in case of forgetfulness, so 
common now because of the preoccupations of our times.”459 
Rabbi Ḥayim explicitly legitimized the practice of creating compilations by 
handcopying and collecting older texts. This was harmless, comparable to taking old 
coins and placing them together in a way of one’s choice – for example, putting all the 
similar coins in one pile.460 However, a person who writes down halakha in a new way 
is like someone who has lost access to the source of precious metals and shaves off and 
melts down old coins in order to create new, inferior ones.461 Copying fragments and 
noting them down in a one’s own compilation was acceptable, but synthesizing, 
streamlining and creating new entities from the earlier text was a practice which, to 
Rabbi Ḥayim, was “not a constructive labor at all, merely the destruction of the old, 
                                                     
459 See Vikuaḥ, 4a (Amsterdam, 1712)  והנה יש עוד דרך הישר לפני כל איש והוא שהרשות נתונה ביד כל
שיעמוד לו כנגד השכחה ולכתבם בסדר נכון כדי ’ הקדמוני’ אדם שיראה ללקט ולחבר יחד כל דבר חידוש שימצא בדברי הפוסקי
 .המצויה עכשיו מפני טרדת הזמן
460 Ibid.  ואין בזה שום קפידא לפי שאינו אלא כמי שטורח לאסוף לו מטבעות ישנות הרבה ומסדר אותם ומניח כל
 המטבע אל המטבע הדומה לה ואוצר אותם אליו להיות לו סגולה. כך אדם זה מאסף אליו דברי חכמים הקדמונים אשר לא יערכם
 כל כסף וזהב
461 Ibid. 




good coins.”462 Rabbi Ḥayim related his preference for personal manuscript 
compilations to a refusal to circulate halakhic writings, highlighting the personal nature 
of halakhic texts of this sort. Sha’arei Dura itself, indeed, any ashkenazic work of isur 
ve-heter, Rabbi Ḥayim insisted, was written with the same intention of showing it only 
to a small circle of colleagues and friends:  
I, too, some sixteen years ago, decided to collect all the laws of isur ve-heter 
from the books of the poskim ... it was hidden with me, sealed in my treasure chest. And 
the students who were in my house at the time stole it from me and copied it secretly. 
And when I was made aware of this, I took that copy from their hands, with fury and 
anger, because I composed it only for me and for myself, to be a support to me and aid 
against forgetfulness, but not for someone else to rely upon.463 
 
Moreover, Rabbi Ḥayim argued that the personal nature of the work was the 
reason for its many lacunae, inconsistencies, and ostensibly random progression, which 
were deliberately vague, since “… he [Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Düren] wished merely to 
uncover one hands-breath and then to cover two.”464 The work was written in an 
inaccessible manner by design, Rabbi Ḥayim claimed, in order to prevent the 
uninitiated from using it.465 For that very reason, Rabbi Ḥayim continued, the glosses 
                                                     
462 Ibid. והנה מחברי הספרים דומי’ אל האומנים עושי מטבעות שאינם יכולין לעשות מלאכתם אא”כ יש להם קרקע
אשר משם מוצא הכסף. אבל אם תם מוצא הכסף ההוא, צריכים הם ליקח המטבעות הישנות ולעשות במקומם מטבעות חדשות 
רק איבוד מטבעות הישנות הטובות. וכל עוד שיגרעו ויפחתו החדשות ישובחו הישנות. גרועות ורעועות. שאין זה מלאכת מחשבת 
כך הגאונים מחברי הספרים הראשונים היו יושבים על מעיינות חכמה מרחבי ים התלמוד...בזמנינו זה כבר נסתמו מעיינות החכמה 
’ כלום רק מקצרים דברי הראשונים ואוספי’ שיי הספרים שחברו. עד שלפעמים אינם מחד”פכ רוצים להודיע טבעם בעולם ע”ואע
  .יחד במקום אחד כל דעות הקדמונים ומסדרים אותו בסדר הנכון בעיניהם
463 Ibid. וזה לי ג”כ כמו ט”ז שנים שנתתי אל לבי גם אני ללקט כל דיני או”ה מספרי הפוסקים א’ הנה וא’ הנה 
. הלא הוא כמוס עמדי חתום באוצרותי. והבחורים שהיו אז בביתי ’וסדרתי אותם בסדר נכון והיו לאחדים בידי בתכלית הקצו
גנבו אותו ממני ועמדו והעתיקו אותו בסתר. וכאשר נודע לי לקחתי מידם אותו ההעתק באף ובחימה. כי לא חברתיו רק לי לעצמי 
 Rabbi Ḥayim tells a very similar story about Rabbi להיות לי לעזר ולהועיל נגד השכחה ולא שיסמוך עליו אדם אחר
Shalom Shakhna, where the students begged him for his writings, but he refused to let them compose a 
book from them, as mentioned at the start of this chapter. 
464 Ibid. גם השערים שכתב ר”י מדורא לא כתבם רק לתלמידיו כמו שכתב בתחילת דבריו ומה שהיה מקצר בהם אין
ל לפי שלא כתב רק הדברים שהיו מחודשים בעיניו או הדברים שהיו צריכים לבני דורו שהרי מבואר ”הטעם כמו שכתב הרב ז
נגלה שאינו כדבריו רק הטעם שלא רצה לגלות רק טפח ולכסות טפחיים ולהודיע כי לא על ספרו לבדו יחיה האדם כי אף על כל 
ם יחיה האדםמוצא פי שאר הספרי . 
465 Moreover, his explanation that the confusing and incomplete nature of Sha’arei Dura stems 
from the author’s desire to address only a limited audience of insiders returns to the theme of personal 
connections and inner circles. The use of the expression “to uncover one hands-breath and cover two” 
has associations to intimacy, emphasizing the private nature of halakhic writings (Babylonian Talmud, 
Tractate Nedarim 20b - to uncover a hands-breadth and cover it, etc.). 




were so difficult to translate into practical halakhic conclusions. The glossators did not 
intend to solve the inconsistencies, to streamline or clarify the work; they intentionally 
perpetuated the same logic of transmission as the Sha’arei Dura itself.  
Beyond favoring the ashkenazic practice of writing personal compilations over 
publishing codified works; Rabbi Ḥayim emphasized the religious view of knowledge 
and transmission that went along with it, revealing strong ideas about the personal, 
individual, and local nature of halakha. In the introduction, he commented that, just as 
human beings have different facial features, countenances, and different personal tastes, 
the halakhic decisions of different traditions will vary, and it would be morally wrong 
to expect everyone to conform to the same halakha. Permitting something that was 
prohibited in another scholar’s individual tradition is compared to forcing a person to 
eat something that he personally cannot stomach, “which will damage him as though it 
were poisonous.”466 
Rabbi Ḥayim insisted that not only did halakha not have to be uniform for all 
people but also a scholar did not have to hold consistent opinions over a period of time. 
“Also, the opinion of one person is not always the same, and perhaps his mind is tending 
not to rule in a case as he ruled yesterday, and there is nothing wrong or lacking with 
this, to say that this makes the Torah into two Torahs, God forbid. On the contrary, this 
is the way of the Torah and these and those are the words of the living God.”467 It is 
common knowledge, Rabbi Ḥayim wrote, that a person likes only food he prepares for 
himself and is uninterested in eating at the “set table” (lit. shulḥan arukh) of others.468 
                                                     
466 See Vikuaḥ, 1b כדרך שאנו רואים ג”כ לפעמים שנפשו של אדם קצה בשום מאכל שאפילו הוא מתוקן ומקובל 
.טוב אם יאכלנו בעל כרחו יזיק לו כאלו היה דבר ארסיי  
467 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Eruvin 13b. 
468 See Vikuaḥ, 1b. כך הדבר בהוראת איסור והיתר....כמו שלא יערב לו לאדם רק המאכל שיתקן לו הוא עצמו 
כ יסכים דעתו ”כפי אשר תאוה נפשו לאכול ואינו רוצה כלל להיות מצפה על שלחן חבירו, כך לא יערב לו הוראות זולתו אא




This is a clear reference to the Shulḥan Arukh, which, as a universal codification, 
represents the antithesis of Rabbi Ḥayim’s idea of halakha.  
Rabbi Ḥayim was willing to overlook Rabbi Karo’s approach in the Shulḥan 
Arukh. Considering his non-ashkenazic origins, the work could simply be attributed to 
a separate culture of organizing halakhic texts. Rabbi Ḥayim expressed incredulity, 
however, at the fact that Rabbi Isserles, a scion of the ashkenazic tradition, who learned 
from Rabbi Shakhna together with him and no doubt remembered their rabbi’s refusal 
to write such a work for his students, could create a halakhic book based on the 
outrageous assumption that halakha is universal: “It is a riddle and mystery to me how 
the great rabbi in his generation … Rabbi Moshe Isserles, wrote a specific book on the 
laws of isur ve-heter and called it Torat ḥatat, without heeding any of the things I wrote 
here.” 469 
The streamlining of Sha’arei Dura into a unified work of halakha and the 
attempt to simplify its multiplicity and arrive at universal conclusions is thus closely 
related to broader approaches and beliefs. In another patent reference to Rabbi Karo, 
Rabbi Ḥayim objected to a statement from the introduction to Bet Yosef, where the 
author complained that, due to the proliferation of halakhic texts, the Torah was 
                                                     
ש שאינו רוצה להיות מצפה על ספרי המחברים האחרונים שאין דעתו סומך עליהם ולהיות מצפה על שלחן ערוך שלהם. ”עליו. וכ
ה לקבוע המנהג והלכה לרבים”על דיני או ולזה מנעו הראשונים מלחבר שום ספר מיוחד  
469 See Vikuaḥ, 2 §2: “And for this reason the earlier authorities avoided composing any specific 
book on the laws of isur ve-heter (forbidden food) to set fast the halakha for the many. Because of all 
this, it is surprising and shocking that the great rabbi in his generation, the pious gaon, our master the 
rabbi Rabbi Moshe Isserles, who composed a specific book concerning the laws of isur ve-heter and 
called it Torat ḥatat….When we studied together in the yeshiva of the great gaon, our master the rabbi, 
Rabbi Shalom Shakhna of blessed memory, and heard from his mouth the Sha’arim of Dura, we, his 
students, begged him repeatedly to compose and compile together all the laws of isur ve-heter in a correct 
order, and he refused our request, no doubt for the reason I’ve mentioned” (note the orality implied in 
“when we heard from his mouth the Sha’arim of Dura”).  
see Vikuaḥ, introduction ל אשר חיבר ”רלש ז”ר משה איס”זה התימה ופלא מן הרב המופלא בדורו החסיד הגאון מהר מכל
 והיתר וקראו תורת חטאת ולא שת לבו לכל הדברים האלה ,ספר מיוחד על דיני איסור 




beginning to seem not like two Torahs,470 but – worse – like a multitude of Torahs. This 
was, in Rabbi Karo’s opinion, the reason why his code was so desperately needed. 
Rabbi Ḥayim, in contrast, did not see any problem with such multiplicity; to use 
parlance from digital technology, it was not a bug, but a feature of the system, not 
something to be overcome, but a dynamic to be perpetuated. 
This mode of organizing was thus far from a default; Rabbi Ḥayim presented it 
as a deeply entrenched scholarly practice with profound ideological meaning. Sha’arei 
Dura was incomplete because it was but one part of a larger world of study, it was 
eclectic and inconsistent because it was not meant to be published independently, but 
used personally. The entire enterprise of Torat hatat was therefore wrongheaded: “I 
have no doubt,” Rabbi Ḥayim wrote: “…that the earlier authorities also had the capacity 
to compile specific books that include all the laws of Isur ve-heter and to remove the 
stumbling block, as this rabbi [Isserles] did, and even more than he did.” Rabbi Isserles 
should not think that he is the first authority capable of creating a clearer Sha’arei Dura. 
His predecessors, however, “… did not consider this a removal of the stumbling blocks 
but, on the contrary, the source of much stumbling, as I have explained ... therefore, 
they relied on the glosses....” It was preferable to retain the halakhic text with its 
contradictions that arose as a result of the many layers of different glosses than to 
synthesize or introduce organizational interventions.471 
                                                     
470 See introduction to Bet Yosef; Rabbi Karo wrote that, because of the long duration of the 
diaspora, the halakha has been “emptied from vessel to vessel”  רוקנו מכלי אל כלי so often as to result in a 
situation where “the Torah is not only turned into two Torahs, but into a multitude of Torahs because of 
the many books in existence that explain its laws and rules.” כי לא נעשית התורה כב' תורות אלא כתורות אין  
 The origins of this phrase are in the Babylonian .מספר, לסבת רוב הספרים הנמצאים בביאור משפטיה ודיניה
Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 88: “Ever since the students of Hillel and Shamai multiplied, who did not 
do their full service as students, the disagreements have multiplied in Israel and the Torah has become 
like two Torahs.” 
471 See Vikuaḥ, 1b.  ואין ספק אצלי שגם לראשונים היה לב לחבר ספרים מיוחדים הכוללים כל דיני או”ה ולהסיר
ל לא חשבו זה להסרת המכשול רק לגורם מכשול כאשר בארתי....לכך היו סומכים ל ויותר ממנו. אב”המכשלה כמו שעשה רב ז




Rabbi Ḥayim viewed Rabbi Isserles’ work in unifying the disparate, personal 
patchwork of transmissions in the spirit of the Shulḥan Arukh, instead of simply adding 
glosses as ashkenazic scholars had done for centuries, as not merely writing a different 
kind of book, but as betraying the entire ashkenazic approach to halakha. Moreover, 
printing Torat hatat instead of copying it in manuscript rendered the work inexcusably 
public and accessible. “And therefore, it appears that the Rabbi [Isserles] has not done 
well by placing in his book all the issues of the teachings of isur ve-heter in the open 
and public for any reader, and even worse, that he has added short signs to them and 
printed them...”472 The betrayal targeted the entire scholarly culture in the transition 
from personal manuscript compilations to something more akin to a code – a complete, 
unified, conclusive, and public work aimed at an impersonal, universal audience. This, 
however, was only the first step. More radical reorganizations were yet to come. 
 
6. ORDER AND REASONING:  
CUSTOM AND COMPILATIONS vs CALCULUS AND CODES 
The more drastic change took place when Rabbi Isserles moved the locus of his 
scholarship on isur ve-heter away from the framework of Sha’arei Dura entirely and 
arranged his writings according to the Shulḥan Arukh. He did this in stages, first by his 
glosses Darkhei Moshe (Ways of Moshe), which were originally created for the Arba 
Turim. The Arba Turim, which presented a comprehensive code of all areas of Jewish 
                                                     
פ הלכה. זה היה יותר טוב ”זה לזה ואי אפשר שיהיו שניהם ע’ דברים המתנגדי’ על ההגהות....ואם לפעמים יבואו בהגהות ב
יורו לו מן השמים. כי אליו נתנה התורה בעיניהם ממה שיכריעו...ולכך ראו להניח שני הדעות לפני הרב המורה והוא יבחר כאשר 
כמו שכתבתי לעיל’ ה אינו כשאר איסורי”רשות להורות כי אין מכריחים את האדם לקבל דעתו כי דידני או . 
472 Ibid. 
גם דעתו של אדם אינו שוה עליו בכל עת ובאולי לא היה דעתו נוטה להורות בה כמו שהורה בה אתמול ואין בזה שום השתנות 
ולפי זה  תורה ואלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים.אלא אדרבה, כך דרכה של  -תורות חלילה’ י כב”לומר שנעשית התורה ע או חסרון
ה גלוי ומפורסם לכל קורא בספר ויותר מזה מה שהוסיף ”ל מה שנתן בספר כל ענייני הוראת או”נמצא כי לא יפה כיון הרב ז
 ....לתת בהם עוד סימנים קצרים ונתנם בדפוס




law, was divided into four volumes. In the process of working on Darkei Moshe, Rabbi 
Isserles was confronted with Rabbi Karo’s Bet Yosef, which was likewise a gloss on the 
Arba Turim and very similar to Rabbi Isserles’ work. Rabbi Karo used Arba Turim as 
the basis for his code, which he divided into corresponding volumes by the same name. 
Yoreh de’ah, the volume on isur ve-heter, was printed in 1550-1551. Since Bet Yosef 
had already begun to be printed before Rabbi Isserles finished his gloss, he turned his 
own work into glosses on Rabbi Karo’s gloss. 473  The following stage were his glosses 
on Shulḥan Arukh, which Rabbi Isserles called the Mapah, the proverbial tablecloth for 
Rabbi Karo’s “set table.”474 The division and organization of all the above works thus 
basically follows the same structure, since they are all either glosses of the Arba Turim, 
summaries thereof, or glosses of those summaries.  
Any given section of the Shulḥan Arukh breaks down a larger legal topic into 
its constituent subsections. On every such subsection, Rabbi Karo combines the 
opinions of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel from his son’s Arba Turim, Maimonides’ 
codification of Jewish law, Mishne Torah, and Rabbi Yizhak Alfasi’s summary of the 
laws in the Talmud, often adding other material. Rabbi Karo then determines the law 
based on these. Rabbi Isserles added his glosses where he considered it necessary. 
                                                     
473 Rabbi Isserles wrote that he had started writing his gloss directly on the Arba Turim, but he 
changed it to a gloss on Bet Yosef once he was made aware of the latter work, as there was so much 
overlap. From his wordplay on the book of Esther in the introduction, it appears that he was made aware 
of Rabbi Karo’s volume with the laws of isur ve-heter just as he began to write his own volume on these 
laws:  וחיבר ספר בית ...בשמעי ,אחזני פלצות ולבשני חלחלה, והתחלתי הלחות חלה, ל איסור והיתר"ובהגיע טור אסתר ר
 ”,And when the turn of Esther came…” [Esther 2:15] is misspelled as “when the Tur of Esther“ ...יוסף
“the volume of Arba Turim dealing with isur ve-heter came. 
See introduction in Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-shalem, vol. Ḥoshen mishpat, ed. Ḥayim 
Shlomo Rozenthal (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1979), 36. 
First printed in Sulzbach, 1692 – only one volume, and an abridged version on Arba Turim in Berlin, 
1702 (many of Rabbi Isserles’ glosses from Darkhei Moshe were mentioned in the gloss of his student, 
Rabbi Yehoshua Falk, the author of the gloss Meirat einayim (Enlightening the eyes), first printed with 
Arba Turim and Bet Yosef (Lublin, 1635-38). 
474 The first volume was printed in Cracow, 1571. In Cracow, 1578-1580 all four volumes were 
printed. 




Sometimes the glosses affirm the law; at other times, they note distinctions between the 
law and ashkenazic opinions, and then provide a legal conclusion. Rabbi Karo included 
many sources from Sha’arei Dura in his Bet Yosef.475 Rabbi Isserles’ Darkhei Moshe 
inserted much additional material from Sha’arei Dura and other related ashkenazic 
works. As a result, Sha’arei Dura was, in fact, represented quite seriously in Shulḥan 
Arukh. Although these writings used sources from Sha’arei Dura, their organizational 
scheme followed the order of the Arba Turim. Whereas in Torat ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles 
followed the order of the sections in Sha’arei Dura, thus preserving the connection to 
the older work, his glosses in Darkhei Moshe and Mapah completely followed the order 
of the Arba Turim and Shulḥan Arukh. 
Rather than adding all the sections of Sha’arei Dura into the other code as one 
big cluster, Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles took Sha’arei Dura apart and integrated its 
parts into the Arba Turim. Moreover, the individual sections as they appear in Sha'arei 
Dura were not kept intact. Instead, components from the sections were separated and 
placed in their relevant places in the code. The entire volume Yoreh de’ah of Bet Yosef 
contains almost seventy entries from Sha’arei Dura, a relatively large amount to import 
from one source. They are, however, spread out over twenty-four different sections of 
Yoreh de’ah, adopting the order of the code. Even within individual sections of Bet 
Yosef that featured many entries from Sha’arei Dura, the parts were all woven into 
different places of that section, thus losing their original form. Section 69, the part that 
deals with salting meat, for instance, includes more than seventeen entries that have 
                                                     
475 See also Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” Düren, Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky, 18n107, which 
shows that both Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles had ms. copies of Sha’arei Dura when writing, but Rabbi 
Karo probably did not have the laws of niddah because he does not mention them in Bet Yosef; Rabbi 
Isserles, however, did, and he mentions it repeatedly. The first printing of the laws of niddah was in 
Venice, 1548; by then Rabbi Karo had finished with Bet Yosef on niddah. 




their source in Sha’arei Dura, but they appear in ten different subsections of §69, based 
on their place according to the Arba Turim, not their original order. Rabbi Isserles added 
more than 160 entries from Sha’arei Dura, but because the gloss was following a 
codified work, these entries were separated and rearranged according the order of the 
code.476 
This kind of reorganization ultimately destroyed Sha’arei Dura. With Torat 
ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles had already taken the Sha’arei Dura one step away from being a 
compilation by homogenizing and summarizing it and resolving internal contradictions, 
thus creating a more stable and universally applicable work. When Torat ḥatat’s 
contents were adapted to the Shulḥan Arukh, which was published with Mapah toward 
the end of the sixteenth century, the traditional corpus was effectively transformed into 
a codification. Placing these glosses in the order of a code rather than a compilation 
challenged the ashkenazic halakhic culture, jolting approaches to authority, law, and 
tradition, and opening new possibilities of reasoning with halakhic texts.  
The differences between the organization of the laws of isur ve-heter in Sha’arei 
Dura as opposed to Arba Turim are a result of the quintessentially different paradigms 
of compilations versus codifications. Whereas compilations are eclectic and personal, 
codes are structured and universal. The sections in Arba Turim that deal with isur ve-
heter are comprehensive, complete, and ordered according to a rational and continuous 
scheme. Every law is located only in the appropriate place. Similarly, Shulḥan Arukh’s 
                                                     
476 Rabbi Isserles mentioned in his introduction to Darkhei Moshe that he was working on the 
section of Isur ve-heter of Darkhei Moshe that was meant to be a gloss on the Arba Turim, when he heard 
about the existence of the Bet Yosef and decided to transform his work into a gloss on the latter work. 
Presumably, prior to this decision, his glosses followed the order of the Arba Turim and thus were already 
ordered according to a code; the Isur ve-heter sections were the first ones that he started writing directly 
as a gloss on the Bet Yosef. 




organizational scheme was highly structured, with a comprehensive ordering of all the 
parts of the laws within a rational overarching order. Sha’arei Dura, conversely, 
contained an eclectic combination of sources presented in layered, complex sections 
that followed one another haphazardly; it included lacunae and sometimes reiterations 
and overlaps, and neglected to present any final conclusions. On the one hand, the 
Shulḥan Arukh sought to define the main legal conclusion universally by combining 
and weighing all the opinions and subsequently assigning an appropriate place to any 
deviations, such as local variations, added stringencies, or reasons for leniency. The 
Sha’arei Dura, on the other hand, which did not aspire to present the law universally, 
transmitted specific traditions. 
The transition entailed reorganizing and subdividing contents of sections from 
the unstructured Sha’arei Dura and placing them in new locations alongside the 
relevant parts of parallel traditions in Shulḥan Arukh. An analysis and comparison of 
parallel opinions in each section led to the determination of the basic law; at the same 
time, local deviations or specific stringencies were pointed out. No longer was Rabbi 
Isserles merely summarizing the conclusions internally, as they emerged from the 
various sources of Sha’arei Dura; he was also integrating these conclusions with those 
of other traditions and subjecting them to a new organizational paradigm.  
Clearly, these distinctions between compilations and codifications are not 
merely technical varieties of organizing halakhic texts. Organizational practices 
developed as intimate components embedded in the practices of scholarly cultures in 
general, and thus they came to represent paradigms of knowledge that reflected deep-
seated conceptions of the nature of religious law and the legitimate forms of applying 
reason to these texts. The undetermined, varied, and personal structure of ashkenazic 




manuscript compilations were part and parcel of their mode of studying and 
determining halakha. The culture of compilations typically follows a reasoning of 
custom. This approach is flexible in allowing for a multiplicity of localized traditions 
and ever-shifting texts, but it is more limited, as it lacks the idea of a universal backdrop 
for halakha where opinions can be weighed against one another and combined. 
Compilations assess a certain action by whether or not it is backed by a relevant 
tradition, and it is futile to attempt to overturn or oppose a tradition based on sources 
and reasoning from outside that particular chain of transmission. Codifications, on the 
other hand, with their more unified, standardized, and structured mode of organization, 
reinforced a conception of halakha in which every part of a law has a place relative to 
the law as a whole and relative to any parallel traditions, from which the conclusion can 
be drawn. The resulting standard law, applied to all the users of the code, and any 
additions, deviations, or other opinions were presented as addenda, which were not part 
of the central body of the code. We can term this the reasoning of codifications, which 
allows for a kind of halakhic calculus. 
This halakhic calculus was precisely the mode of reasoning that Rabbi Isserles 
famously introduced into the ashkenazic environment. He would determine the basic 
law apart from the ashkenazic tradition and then conclude how much of the additional 
traditions were obligatory, permitted, or prohibited, based on a range of considerations. 
He would weigh such factors as whether the source of a halakha was talmudic or merely 
a later authority, whether the prohibition was unanimous or if some authorities 
permitted it, whether it was the minimal requirement or an additional stringency, or 
whether the situation entailed great monetary loss or was urgent for some other reason. 
This form of reasoning could be applied to halakhic sources no matter how they are 




organized, but it was more easily defensible in the context of a code, which breaks down 
individual halakhic traditions into modular units, separating and arranging data 
according to an overall organizational scheme. Smaller excerpts from various traditions 
thus appear next to one another rather than in their original context, facilitating halakhic 
reasoning that compares and combines these traditions. 
Rabbi Ḥayim’s polemic illustrates how alien this mode of reasoning was to 
ashkenazic halakhic scholarship. He repeatedly criticizes Rabbi Isserles’ attempts to 
permit things that were customarily prohibited,477 concluding: “Even there where we 
accept the words of the Rabbi [Isserles], we accept it only in the realm of halakha but 
not in the realm of custom.”478 Although some of Rabbi Isserles’ arguments were 
acceptable as pure halakhic reasoning, Rabbi Ḥayim drew the line at accepting such 
ideas where they touched upon custom. This was not an argument for the separation of 
custom from halakha. On the contrary, it was an argument for the inextricable place of 
custom as part of halakha. The reasoning of compilations involved a notion of legal 
authority that viewed law and custom as interconnected. As was noted in the 
introduction, the ever recurring “and this is the custom,” in Sha’arei Dura’s many 
glosses, in fact, sealed the law for its successors. The statement that something is “the 
                                                     
477 The work circulated in manuscript close to the publication of Torat ḥatat, but it was not 
printed until 1712. The author called it an “epistle” אגרת and gave it its title. The question of how 
representative this mode of halakhic (un)reasoning is, is not entirely clear. This is the only programmatic 
statement of this kind. By definition, the more ad-hoc, personal mode of halakhic decision making will 
leave less textual traces because it is not an a-textual mode. Moshe-Duvid Chechik is preparing an article 
in which three 16th-century halakhic disagreements between Rabbi Yosef Katz and Rabbi Eliezer of 
Egypt illustrate these opposing traditions. The former figure, a relative of Rabbis Isserles and Luria, 
represents the traditional ashkenazic ad-hoc tradition described by Rabbi Ḥayim. It is mainly expressed 
by a reluctance to engage in all but the simplest halakhic reasoning; Rabbi Katz only checks whether 
there is a tradition or not and will not dare decide anything if such a tradition cannot be found. I thank 
Moshe-Duvid for sharing his draft with me.  
478 Vikuaḥ, Intro., §10,  על כן אני אומר כי אפילו במקום שנקבל דברי הרב לא נקבלם רק בתורת הלכה לא
. בתורת המנהג  




custom,” far from implying that it was an extra-halakhic customary addition, meant 
precisely that there was no room for negotiation. 
Rabbi Isserles, in contrast, explained that he would be lenient where “it is 
completely permissible according to halakha, except that the later authorities were 
stringent,”479 clearly designating halakha as one thing and decisions of later authorities 
as something entirely different and not universally binding. Rabbi Isserles did not 
invent his form of reasoning; similar ones appear throughout the halakhic tradition.480 
When he apologized for sometimes loosening stringencies, he pointed to both “later 
authorities and earlier ones who acted thus.”481Although aware that this approach had 
precedents, Rabbi Ḥayim considered it unacceptable within the ashkenazic scholarly 
tradition in his day and age. In Rabbi Ḥayim’s opinion, rabbinical decisions concerning 
stringency or leniency rested entirely on the custom received from predecessors:  
That which he [Rabbi Isserles] wrote, that this we find also among earlier and 
later authorities that they were lenient when necessary, this does not mean that one can 
be lenient in every instance because the rabbi did not write a blanket statement that this 
is a principle.... In that case, we cannot learn [that one may be lenient] from the earlier 
authorities; for perhaps they only said it there where they said it, but there where they 
did not say it, they did not say it.482 
 
                                                     
479 Torat ḥatat, intro (emphasis added). והנה אתנצל עצמי בדבר אחד שלא יחשדני...לפעמים כתבתי להקל
ל כי היתר גמור   א ל י ב א  ד ה ל כ ת א    ר ק   ש ה א ח ר ו נ י ם  ה ”והוא מטעם כי באותן המקומות היה נ...בהפסד מרובה
 ח מ י ר ו
480 Numerous examples of such “halakhic calculus” can be found, starting in the Talmud: for 
instance, tractate Brachot 9a, which presents a more stringent and a less stringent opinion, followed by 
the statement that one may rely on the more lenient opinion in case of emergency, or the one mentioned 
in Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim in tractate Niddah 7b, where the more lenient opinion (of Rabbi Eliezer) is 
proclaimed: “Rabbi Eliezer is good enough to be relied upon in a time of need.” Other principles abound, 
for example שבות דשבות במקום מצוה או כבוד שבת או צער..., the principle that something will be permitted on 
the Sabbath if it contains the combination of two elements that are prohibited only rabbinically – as 
opposed to scripturally – provided that it is an emergency, crucial for the honor of the Sabbath, or 
necessary for performing a mitzvah, etc. 
481 See Torat ḥatat, intro,  והנה אתנצל עצמי בדבר אחד שלא יחשדני המעיין והוא כי לפעמים כתבתי להקל
וכן מצינו בקמאי ובתראי דעבדי הכי...בהפסד מרובה או לעני בדבר חשוב או לכבוד שבת  . 
482 Vikuaḥ, introduction, §11:  ומה שכתב שכן מצינו ג”כ בקדמאי ובתראי שהקילו מפני הצורך, לא מפני זה
’. כלל הדבר כל מקום שהחמירו בו האחרונים ולא הראשונים יש להקל‘שהרי לא כתב הרב בסתם . נאמר שיש להקל בכל מקום
לא איתמר, והיכא דלא איתמר, דשמא היהי דאיתמר איתמר, גם מדברי הראשונים אין ללמוד, אם כן . 




Rabbi Ḥayim’s view created a situation in which it was almost impossible to 
overturn halakha determined by custom. He claimed that, even if a stringent approach 
was instituted knowingly and explicitly because of a temporary lack of practical 
information, the decision would remain in place forever, even after the lack of 
information was remedied.483 He also insisted that exceptions to a stringent tradition, 
for instance in the case of great monetary loss, could only be instated by the exact same 
person who instituted the stringency, because only “the mouth who prohibits is the 
mouth who permits.”484 Similarly, he rejected Rabbi Isserles’ argument that one could 
rely on earlier alternative opinions to be lenient in cases of great monetary loss, 
contending that those cases did not constitute sufficient precedent for Rabbi Isserles to 
rule similarly:485 Their predecessors’ decisions applied in their time and place, to the 
specified degree of monetary loss. As the earlier generations, being pious and much 
less pampered, probably had higher standards of what constituted “great monetary 
loss,”486 Rabbi Ḥayim concluded, they would not have considered Rabbi Isserles’ idea 
of loss sufficiently serious to warrant leniency. Rabbi Ḥayim opposed the possibility of 
distinguishing halakha from custom; custom was not a separate category; it was the 
tradition of how scholars were expected to work with halakha, and it left very little 
room for creating new structures. This is directly opposed to Rabbi Isserles’ method of 
halakhic reasoning, evaluating the halakha separately to determine a “base-line,” and 
                                                     
483 Vikuaḥ, introduction, §12.... מה שמנעו עצמם מכי שלא ידעו הלכה חשיב מנהג. אם כן ה”נ הואיל ומודה
שנהגו בו איסור עד היום הזה יש לחוש שחכם אחד קדמון הנהגי להם איסור בדבר ולפחות נהגו בו איסור משום שלא נתברר 
’להם הלכה וזה חשיב מנהג  
484See Vikuaḥ, introduction, §11. וכתבו גם כן שיש להקל במקום הדחק כי הפה שאסור הוא הפה שהתיר. וכן
כל מה שהחמיר הרב המחבר או שאר חכמי דורינו אין בידינו לבטל או אפילו להטיל תנאי בסברתם ולהקל במקום שאמרו 
אפילו בדבר שהיה היתר גמור לבני דורות הראשונים כבר נתחזק הדבר אצלם בוודאי איסור כמו שאבאר, האחרונים להחמיר . 
485 See also Gliksberg and Cassirer, “Halakha and Meta-Halakha,” 163-168 on this issue. 
486 Vikuaḥ, introduction, §11.  ואפשר ג”כ דטעם הפסד מרובה לא היה שייך רק לדורות הראשונים. לפי שהיו
ר משום הפסד אבל עכשיו יש לחוש שאם נתי. יראי חטא ולא היה חסים על ממונם במקום חשש איסור אם לא בהפסד מרובה מאד
 מרובה יבואו להקל אף בהפסד מועט וחששה כזו מצינו הרבה בספר הזה




thus designating the custom as separate from the basic halakha. 
In the introduction to Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim, Rabbi Ḥayim warned: “There are 
teachers who are presumptuous and want to introduce many steps in the laws of isur 
ve-heter.” Those who want to divide the law into many little steps: “… say that 
everything is according to how that rule or reason is mentioned ... and it seems that this 
is also the opinion of the Rabbi [Isserles] ... and I have already explained that we do not 
have the right to distinguish between the different halakhic authorities based on our 
personal reasoning.”487 Rabbi Isserles’ method of reasoning is, in essence, modular. 
Instead of upholding every traditional transmission wholesale, he separates them into 
their parts, comparing all the corresponding modules from parallel traditions to 
determine the halakha, dividing preferred from required, stringency from basic law. He 
assigns places to the parts that do not fit into the basic halakha by designating different 
gradations; certain stringencies should be followed unless it is an emergency, while 
other stringencies are entirely optional, and so on. In addition to being modular, this 
mode of reasoning is also universal in its aspirations, attempting to combine all the parts 
of all the different traditions into one larger scheme and defining their relations to one 
another. The idea of halakha as universal and the modular approach of reasoning was 
anathema to Rabbi Ḥayim’s view. One received certain traditions as a holistic unit, and 
that was how they remained. The combination of terms “merely” and “a custom,” as 
Rabbi Isserles formulated it,488 was oxymoronic to him. The fragmentation of the 
                                                     
487 Vikuaḥ, introduction, §12. .ויש מורים זחוחי דעת שרוצים לעשות מדרגות מדרגות בדיני איסור והיתר
הפוסקים אחרונים כך ואומרים שהכל לפי מה שמוזכר הדין או סברא ההיא אם בגמרא אם בדברי הפוסקים הקדמונים אם בדברי 
וכבר כתבתי שאין בידינו לעשות הפרש בין דברי הפוסקים מסברת ...ולכאורה נראה שגם דעת הרב כן. יש להקל או להחמיר
 נפשינו
488 See, for instance: Isserles, Torat ḥatat, §3.1, Galinsky, ed. 11: “and there, too, it is merely a 
custom.…” א מנהגוגם שם אינו אל  




general halakhic tradition, followed by the reorganization of the fragments alongside 
their equivalents from other traditions within a complete and comprehensive scheme 
allowed Rabbi Isserles to engage in the type of “halakhic calculus” that Rabbi Ḥayim 
so vehemently opposed.  
The traditional ashkenazic approach was facing a challenge not simply from an 
external work that represented a different stream of halakha, but, rather, from a radically 
different organizational paradigm and the reasoning method that it invited. With Rabbi 
Isserles’ gloss, this paradigm was no longer an external challenge; it invaded the 
ashkenazic milieu. Technology reinforced these changes: Printing a code further 
stabilizes its text, and the need to plan and complete a work before being able 
successfully to print it as a whole precludes flexibility and encourages systematization. 
It also served further to universalize halakha by expanding the code’s potential 
audience,489 the clear organizational structure making it more accessible to audiences 
who did not receive these laws via personal instruction.  
It is clear which form of organization was victorious. As mentioned earlier, 
Sha’arei Dura went from being printed seven times in the sixteenth century490 to being 
                                                     
489 See Davis, “The Reception.” 
490 In the16th c: 1) Cracow, 1534 (Helitz); 2) Venice, 1547-8 (Franzoni): title page:  אמר
מקלף ישן נושן ועבר בתוכו אחד מהחשובים הקדמונים תקנו בכל מיני נוי ’ אח. למיניהם שנים’ לפני טופסי’ הקרה ה...המגיה
ואולם ....וגם הוספתי הגהות...הוגה בכתב ידו] ר יוסף מלובלין”ב[שכנא ] שלום’[ר...ביד אחד מתלמידי והאחר מצאתי’ ותיקוני
אחר כל ...ועוד חיפשתי] ...לשנות[ל לא שלחתי ידי ”איסרלן ז’ ר ישראל אשכנזי הנקרא ר”באותן שנתייחסו אל הגאון מהר
כונת השער כולו...נכלל בהם’ דפסנו בסוף הספר כללי קצרי ועוד. מקבלת רבותיו’...מקומו בתלמוד או בשאר פוסקי...דין   
3)Constantinople, 1553-4 (Heliẓ), NLI Bibl. index remarks that this is a printed form of another ms. and 
very different from  the Venice version (1547-8); it was printed by one of the Heliẓ brothers; see 
Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” Düren, Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky, ed. 13-14 on the different nature of this 
edition.; 4) Venice, 1563-4 (Eliano) includes some glosses of Rabbi Luria but partial and anonymous; 5) 
Lublin, 1574-5 (Klonimus b Mordekhai Jaffe) added R Natan Shpira, Mevo She’arim, (Entrance to the 
gates); 6) Basel, 1599 (Conrad Waldekilch), full glosses of Rabbi Luria, intro. by R Eliyahu Loenz; he 
calls these Mekhonot Shlomo); and 7) Lublin, 1599. 




printed only once in the seventeenth491 and once more in the eighteenth century.492 
Evidently, subsequent generations, even in Ashkenaz, continued to study the Sha’arei 
Dura’s laws of isur ve-heter; they did so, however, not in the context of personal 
manuscript copies of one of the many versions of the Sha’arei Dura nor on the margins 
of one of the several printed editions of that book. Instead, they studied these laws on 
the margins of the Shulḥan Arukh. 
 To name several important examples: Rabbi Yehoshua Falk (1555-1614), a 
student of Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Luria, published his glosses on both Tur and Bet 
Yosef (titled Drisha and Prisha, Interpretation and commentary), and on Shulḥan Arukh 
(Sefer meirat einayim, book that enlightens the eyes). Many of Rabbi Isserles’ glosses 
from Darkhei Moshe were first published via Rabbi Falk’s gloss, which was printed 
before Darkhei Moshe. The gloss of Rabbi Yoel Sirkis (1561-1640), known as the Bayit 
ḥadash (New home), includes considerable discussion of the laws of isur ve-heter, but 
it was written and printed as a gloss on the Arba Turim, and not on Sha’arei Dura. His 
son-in-law, Rabbi David Ha-Levi (1586-1667), wrote his gloss, named Turei zahav 
(Golden pillars), on the Shulḥan Arukh (tractate Yoreh de’ah, which was published in 
1646; the rest followed considerably after his death.)493 Rabbi Shabtai ben Meir ha-
Kohen (1621-1662), married to a great-granddaughter of Rabbi Isserles, wrote his 
gloss, Siftei Kohen (Lips of the priest), on the volume Yoreh de’ah of the Shulḥan Arukh 
                                                     
491 Prague, 1609, Biur al sefer Sha’arei Dura (Commentary on the book Sha’arei Dura Yosef 
son of Moshe of Kremnitz). 
492 Jessnitz, 1724 (glosses attributed to Rabbi Mordekhai Yaffe) – two different title pages, see 
Magda Bendowska, “The 480th Anniversary of Printing the First Jewish Book in Poland” (May 2014, on 
the website of the Jewish Historical Institute, http://www.jhi.pl/en/blog/2014-05-05-the-480th-
anniversary-of-printing-the-first-jewish-book-in-poland). In the 19th c, Zaslaw, 1806; and in the 20th, 
Varnow, 1940-1 (with R, Freilich’s Sha’arei bina, Gates of wisdom). 
493 His glosses on Oraḥ ḥayim (Way of life) were first printed in Shulḥan Arukh (Amsterdam, 
1692) printed by Shabbetai Bas. 




(it was printed in Cracow, 1646), not on Sha’arei Dura. Rabbi Mordekhai Yaffe 
(c.1530-1612), who studied with Rabbi Isserles, wrote his magnum opus, Levush 
(Garment), on the Shulḥan Arukh and Bet Yosef; although he did write glosses on 
Sha’arei Dura, he is known for the former work, not the glosses.494 
What is the significance of the disappearance of Sha’arei Dura? Rabbi Isserles’ 
decision to deviate from the tradition of Sha’arei Dura by writing Torat ḥatat, and, to 
a much greater degree, his eventual integration of the contents of Sha’arei Dura into a 
codified work, introduced a form of reasoning alien to the typical ashkenazic mode that 
prevailed in the centuries preceding the Mapah. His approach implied the existence of 
a larger order of halakha within which all the variations have their designated place 
alongside others and can be calculated as components of a whole. Conclusions that were 
harder to defend within the old ashkenazic system appeared far more obvious and 
defensible in the new scheme of things. The contents of Sha'arei Dura remained, albeit 
deeply embedded in hundreds of entries within the structure of the codes. Although the 
contents survived, the organizational tradition and transmission practices attached to 
the work did not. An entire culture of study and its specific practices, from its practices 
of writing and copying to its approaches to religious law and legitimate modes of 
interpretation, receded. The following case study will trace this transformation in legal 
reasoning from the organizational paradigm of the compilation to a new organizational 
pattern. 
                                                     
494 Rabbi Yaffe did write a gloss on Sha’arei Dura, the source of the glosses that were added to 
the only 17th-century printing of Sha’arei Dura. Not surprisingly, he was a student of Rabbi Luria and, 
like his teacher, identified with the traditional Ashkenazic camp against the Polish newcomers regarding 
some of the other battles that raged in his time over the correct practices of study, notably the controversy 
surrounding the casuistic method called pilpul. See Elhanan Reiner, “Tmurot be-yeshivot Polin,” 60-66. 
See Lawrence Kaplan, “Rabbi Mordekhai Jaffe and the Evolution of Jewish Culture in Poland in the 
Sixteenth Century” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Bernard Cooperman (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 282-266. 





7. CASE STUDY: COOKING vs PRESERVING AND NULLIFICATION IN SIXTY 
This case study will consider a set of laws on prohibited meat and its interpretation in 
Sha’arei Dura, and then compare the very same laws in their codified form, as they 
appear in the Shulḥan Arukh. It will show how Rabbi Isserles’ attempt at arriving at a 
more lenient decision regarding meat in certain circumstances evoked considerable 
opposition from Rabbi Luria – and required serious justification –whereas the next 
generation of Ashkenazic scholars, even as they were conscious of the contested nature 
of his decision, accepted Rabbi Isserles’ decision in the framework of the code. This 
illustrates the profound and revolutionary significance of introducing new 
organizational paradigms into an established scholarly culture and delineates the 
transition from the medieval ashkenazic world of halakha to the early modern one. 
Jewish law prohibits the consumption of blood. Therefore, meat must be rinsed, 
salted, and then rinsed again before consumption, in order to draw out the blood. 495 If 
meat is accidentally cooked without salting, opinions differ as to what may be done 
with it. If the ratio of the prohibited substance (blood) to the permissible substance 
(whatever it was cooking in) is 1:60, the prohibited substance can be nullified in relation 
to the permitted one. This is called bitul be-shishim or “nullification in sixty.” If the 
quantity of blood is unknown, as in this case, when the blood was still absorbed in the 
meat before cooking, some authorities will assume that the entire volume of the piece 
of meat was filled with prohibited blood. Thus, a permissible substance sixty times the 
volume of the entire piece of meat is required in order to nullify the prohibition. If these 
                                                     
495 This is based on the verse in Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 3:17, 7:26-27, and 17:10-12. The blood 
that remains within the meat called dam ha-evarim (blood of the limbs) is not prohibited, only blood that 
will eventually be drawn out by heating, preserving, salting, roasting, etc. 




proportions are present, several authorities, including the Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel (or 
ROSh, the father of the fourteenth-century author of Arba Turim and the main authority 
behind the work), permit the entire contents of the dish, including the problematic piece 
of meat. Others will permit the rest of the contents, but prohibit the problematic piece 
of meat, “because it has cooked with its blood,” and is prohibited for consumption even 
after “nullification in sixty.” In Sha’arei Dura, gate two, section two, this is 
summarized as follows: “...if there is sixty [times the amount], the stew is permitted, 
however the piece in question is prohibited, as it is cooked in its blood. And there were 
those who (would have) wanted to permit the piece in question itself.... However, we 
have the custom to prohibit the piece in question even when there is sixty [times the 
amount] to nullify it.496” Thus, while some traditions permitted the piece of meat, 
Sha’arei Dura concludes that “we have the custom to prohibit.” 
Generally, prohibited substances “travel” from one body to another by means 
of heat. Therefore, for instance, if something prohibited is cooked in a pot, the 
prohibited substance transfers into that pot, which itself becomes unfit for use. 
Although high temperature is the main form of this transfer, other methods (such as 
high pressure or acidic substances) may have the same effect. In one case in the 
Talmud,497 preserving, too, is compared to cooking, even though no heat is involved. 
Therefore, one opinion equated preserving with cooking for its (li)ability to transfer 
prohibited substances from one body to another. 
The section of Sha’arei Dura adjacent to the one about unsalted meat that was 
cooked discusses a related question: the law concerning an unsalted piece of meat that 
                                                     
496 Sha’arei Dura, gate 2 §2. 
497 The Babylonian Talmud tractate Avodah Zarah, 33a discusses the use of wine carafes 
previously used by idolaters. 




was left soaking in liquid for more than a period called “me-et-le-et” (literally, “from 
one point in time to the same point in time” [the following day]; twenty-four hours).498 
This soaking renders it “preserved,” leading to the following issue: If a piece of meat 
that was not yet salted, and is thus still filled with prohibited blood, was left to soak for 
twenty-four hours, the sufficient time to consider it “preserved,” is it as though it was 
cooked in its own blood, and thus prohibited? Moreover, will the principles of 
“nullifying in sixty” be identical to those for cooked prohibitions, meaning that even if 
the proportions of prohibited (meat) to permissible substance (soaking water) were 
favorable,499 the piece of meat itself would remain prohibited? Following the above 
conclusion in Sha’arei Dura that, “we have the custom to prohibit the piece in question 
even when there is sixty to annul it,” this is indeed the law, and Sha’arei Dura prohibits 
unsalted meat that was left to soak, no matter the proportions.500 
Surprisingly, Rabbi Isserles, in Torat ḥatat, does not arrive at this conclusion.501 
He permits the piece of soaked meat by means of nullification in sixty without any 
caveats or reservations: “And in any event it seems that the piece itself is also permitted 
when there is sixty ... and he who is lenient does not transgress [lit. “lose out”].”502 An 
inquiry into the reasons for Rabbi Isserles’ conclusion leads us back to the previous 
section, where the bloody meat was cooked, rather than soaked. Sha’arei Dura 
mentioned that some scholars, including ROSh, wished to permit the meat by 
                                                     
498 There is an opinion that for cold, bland foods this should be three days, not twenty-four hours. 
See Mordekhai ben Hillel, Mordekhai tractate Beiẓah ch. 2 (Yom Tov) §674, but not the Ashkenazic 
tradition via Rabbi Meir Rothenburg. 
499 If the soaking liquid plus any other permissible pieces in the liquid are 60:1 to the volume of 
the piece. 
500 Sha’arei Dura §3.3, Dvileiẓky, ed. 14-15, “Meat that was soaking in water and remained in 
the water for a full day, our rabbis prohibit it…” רו במים ונשתהה במים מעת לעת, רבותינו אוסרין...בשר שש  
501 Torat ḥatat §3.1 ומ"מ נראה דאותה חתיכה ג"כ שרי...כשיש ס' וכדברי מהר"ם 
502 “Does not lose out,” in the sense that it is not considered a transgression or a sin (Sha’arei 
Dura §3.3, Dvileiẓky, ed. pp.14-15) נראה דאותה חתיכה גם כן שרי כשיש שישים ומ"מ  




nullification, but the work unequivocally concluded that “we have the custom to 
prohibit” the piece of meat itself, no matter the proportions. The corresponding passage 
in Torat ḥatat, however, contains an unexpected addition: First, Rabbi Isserles 
summarized the accepted law as reflected in Sha’arei Dura and the dominant 
ashkenazic tradition: “...and if there is [a 60:1 ratio of other substances to meat], the 
stew is permitted, but the piece in question is prohibited, as it cooked in its blood, and 
this is the custom.”503 Then Rabbi Isserles adds: “However, the Bet Yosef wrote … that 
if it is on the eve of the Sabbath, one should be lenient concerning this, and … 
adjudicated plainly that also the piece in question is permitted provided there is 
sixty.”504 Rabbi Isserles cites Bet Yosef, a gloss on a codification by a contemporary 
rabbi from Safed, and an exotic source in the cultural context of Sha’arei Dura, for 
which the main sources were medieval and ashkenazic.505 Furthermore, Rabbi Isserles 
did not merely mention this alternative source; he took the opinions into account in his 
adjudication: “Therefore, it seems that if it is a time of emergency (sha’at ha-d’ḥak), or 
if there is risk of a great loss, and provided there is [a ratio of] sixty in the stew in 
relation to the piece, one should be lenient, seeing as ROSh506 agreed with the words of 
those who permitted even the piece in question, he is worthy of relying on in the time 
                                                     
503 Isserles, Torat ḥatat §2.1  כתב ש"ד בשר שהודח ולא נמלח ושמוהו בקדירה צריך ששים כנגד כל החתיכה...ואם יש
ששים התבשיל מותר אבל אותה חתיכה אסורה שנתבשלה בדמה, והכי נהוג וכמ"ש מהרא"י בהג"ה ש"ד וכ"כ או"ה וכן פסק 
מיימון בשם סמ"ק.בהגה"ת   
504 Isserles, Torat ḥatat § 2.1  מיהו, כתב ב"י בשם א"ח דאם הוא בע"ש יש לההקל בדבר ובש"ע פסק סתם 
דגם אותה חתיכה מותר בדאיכא ס', לכן נראה אם הי' שעת הדחק או במקום הפסד מרובה ויש ששים בתבשיל נגד החתיכה יש 
אותה חתיכה, כדאי הוא לסמוך עליו בשעת הדחק או במקום הפסד מרובה. להקל מאחר שהרא"ש הסכים לדברי המתירים אף  
505 Orḥat Ḥayim, a Provençal 13th-c likut, can be considered “traditional” and thus Ashkenazic 
and tosafist in origins (although it is less prominent in the German tradition represented in Sha’arei 
Dura), but Rabbi Isserles cited it by way of Bet Yosef. It does not come up in Sha’arei Dura’s glosses. 
506 Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel in Piskei ha-ROSh (Laws of Rabbi Asher) in Ḥulin and as 
paraphrased in the Arba Turim by his son. 




of emergency or if there is risk of a great loss.”507 
Rabbi Isserles permits the piece of meat that was cooked with its own blood, 
something that Sha’arei Dura unequivocally prohibited, attenuating the transgression 
somewhat by adding that this should only be done in the case of an emergency. In the 
subsequent section, however, regarding meat that was soaking in its own blood for a 
long period of time, Rabbi Isserles goes a step further and permits the nullification in 
sixty of the piece of meat without any caveats or reservations: “…the piece itself is also 
permitted when there is sixty ... and he who is lenient does not transgress.”508 
As we can see, Rabbi Isserles was of the opinion that there was enough halakhic 
justification to permit even the piece of meat that was cooked. As he could not oppose 
the decision of Sha’arei Dura, however, he permitted it only in cases of emergency. He 
went a step further regarding meat that was soaked, concluding that nullification 
permitted the piece unequivocally. The inconsistency between his above-mentioned 
stance on cooked meat and his opinion on soaked meat was glaringly apparent. Aware 
of the need to explain himself, Rabbi Isserles did so immediately after concluding that 
the soaked meat should be allowed:  
And although preserving is equated to cooking, and in the case of cooking we 
are stringent to prohibit the piece itself, as we saw above, in any case it does not seem 
to me that he who is lenient here [for preserving] transgresses, because we do not say 
that preserving is considered cooking for absolutely everything ... and even there [for 
cooking], it is merely a custom to prohibit the piece in question, and thus one should 
not be stringent in cases like this....509 
 
Rabbi Isserles’ approach is double-pronged: First, he argues that soaking and 
                                                     
507 Isserles, Torat Ḥatat §2.1  כתב ש"ד בשר שהודח ולא נמלח ושמוהו בקדירה צריך ששים כנגד כל החתיכה...ואם יש
 ששים התבשיל מותר ואבל אותה חתיכה אסורה...והכי נהוג...מיהו כתב ב"י בשם א"ח דאם הוא בע"ש יש להקל בדבר 
508 Sha’arei Dura §3.3, Dvileiẓky, ed. pp.14-15. ומ"מ נראה דאותב חתיכה גם כן שרי כשיש שישים 
 509 Isserles, Torat ḥatat §3.1 ואע"ג דכבוש כמבושל ובמבושל מחמירינן לאסור אותה חתיכה כדלעיל מ"מ נראה 
דהמיקל בכאן לא הפסיד דלא אמרינן כבוש כמבושל לכל דבר רק שבולע ומפליט אבל אינו מבלבל טעם החתיכה כמו ברוטב וגם 
ן אין להחמיר בכה״ג וכן הוא בהג"ה ש"ד וכן נ"ל.שם אינו מנהג לאסור אותה חתיכה ולכ  




cooking are not completely similar, and therefore not everything that applies to cooking 
will automatically apply to soaking. He combines this with a second argument, which 
is a foundation for the first, namely, that even the prohibition on the cooked meat is not 
absolute, “it is merely a custom to prohibit the piece in question.” Combining the two 
prongs, he concludes that one could permit the piece of meat in the case of soaking 
although, barring an emergency, it remains prohibited if cooked. 
Rabbi Isserles’ first step, – the distinction between cooking and soaking – was 
achieved by means of two supports: an argument about the nature of cooking versus 
soaking, and an authoritative source. He argued that cooking and soaking are dissimilar 
in the degree to which these methods cause blood to circulate and be absorbed 
throughout the meat, because cooking causes the blood to be absorbed much more 
intensely than soaking. Therefore, one should be less strict about meat that was soaked 
with blood than about meat that was cooked with blood. This argument was not 
waterproof. Beyond this analysis, he also presents a source quoted in Isur ve-heter ha-
arokh, another traditional Ashkenazic compilation of the laws of kosher foods. The 
source implied that a medieval Ashkenazic authority, Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, was 
more lenient with soaking than with cooking.510 His second step was to claim that the 
entire basis for stringency, even for cooking, was but a custom, and therefore leniency 
is warranted. Based on his distinction between cooking and soaking, he applies the 
                                                     
510 In some places, this is attributed to other (older) medieval Ashkenazic figures. The rationale 
was that, as the blood that was drawn out was annulled in the water, it could do no further harm if it 
returned and was absorbed into the meat. Any blood that remained in the meat would be removed by 
subsequent salting. 
 Torat Hatat § 3.1  וכתב עוד באסור והיתר הארוך (כלל ב דין ה) "הא דאסרינן בשר ששהה מע"ל במים השיב
ששים במים ובבשר לבטל הדם עכ"ל מוהר"ם...ומכל מקום נראה מוהר"ם דהיינו דווקא כשיש שם מעט מים והרבה בשר דאין 
.ם כן שרי כשיש ששים וכדברי מהר"םדאותה חתיכה ג   
A similar gloss is also found in the glosses on Sha’arei Dura in this section (§3), in Dvileizky 
ed., 15  דוקא בבשר הרבה שאין במים ששים כנגד כל החתיכות, הר"ם אומר מה שאוסרים רבותינו הבשר ששהה במים היינו
 אבל אם יש ששים במים כנגד כל החתיכות אז...ולא דמי לחתיכה דלעיל בשער ב' דאסור...




leniency unevenly; he suggests leniency for cooking only in cases of emergency, 
whereas for soaking, the less extreme method, one could always be lenient. 
Unlike Rabbi Ḥayim ben Beẓalel, Rabbi Luria did not write a polemical work 
against Torat ḥatat. Among his own glosses on Sha’arei Dura, which remained in 
manuscript until 1599, there are, however, a handful of critical remarks regarding some 
of Rabbi Isserles’ halakhic conclusions in Torat ḥatat. The remarks are quite harsh and 
often dismissive: “Do not pay heed to...,”511 is a recurring expression when Rabbi Luria 
introduces the opinions of his younger colleague, Rabbi Isserles.  Rabbi Luria sharply 
disagreed with Rabbi Isserles’ interpretation of nullification of soaked blood: “Rabbi 
Moshe wrote … that ‘he who is lenient does not transgress,’… Do not rely on him to 
permit a prohibition!”512 
Rabbi Luria would have none of Rabbi Isserles’ argument, on all counts. He 
expressed his disagreement in his glosses on Sha’arei Dura.513 Rabbi Luria copied 
                                                     
 ;(see Rabbi Luria’s glosses in Sha’arei Dura Mekhonot Shlomo (Basel, 1599 אל תשגיח ב...   511
all examples here are excerpts in which he addresses Rabbi Isserles – these are relatively minor remarks 
alongside broader discussions. 
ם ”ח שכתב מהר”כ הניחו אותו לבשל בלא הדחה. ואל תשגיח בת”שער ראשון א. בשר שנמלח וכבר הודח...ואח 
ה..”ה ע”רי פכח שלו לאסור מיד, עיין בספ”ם בת”.... .. שער רביעי ו. במה שכתב מהר ... ח שכתב ”תואל תשגיח כלל ב
ל...”ב שעות והכל הבל ורעיון רוח. ש”להתיר עד י’ ודעתו נוטשהה שיעור מליחה ’ שאפי ... 
פעמים כי עם [!] פעם אחת ’ פעמים הדחה מן הדם בצלייה כמו במליחה אך אין המנהג כן להדיח ג’ ה בעי ג”ט. אפ 
ל”ח שלו כי כתב מנהגים מעצמו בכמה מקומות אשר לא ישרו ש”ם בת”מהרבמה שכתב ’ לבקרי’ ואל תשגיח בחדשי . 
 ... ם ורצה לתרץ...”שער שביעי יא. ומה שטעה מר 
ח להקל כדברי המרדכי בלי טעם וראייה ואם היה אומר קבלה היא בידו החרשתי ”ם כתב בת”דיני ביצים: ומהר 
  .אלא...ש"ל
ולא דבר נכונה כי ’ ל”ל... עכ”י] וז”ז ומהרא”ח שלו שחולק על שניהן[א”ם בת”רוב גוברים דמהר: ו דיני ביטול בשר בחלב
ל”לא נהגו לחוש אלא .... ש  
512 Ibid.,. [שוב מצאתי שמהר"ם ז"ל כתב בתורת חטאת שלו שהמיקל לא הפסיד וסמך על הג"ה זו ורצה [רמ"א      
ה אל תסמוך עליו להתיר איסור.לחלק בין שרייה לבישול בסברת הכרס דלא ממש כבישול דמי בלא ראיי  
513 Only those with access to his manuscripts would have known initially about Rabbi Luria’s 
comments in tractate Ḥulin of Yam shel Shlomo that address Rabbi Isserles, as those, like his glosses on 
Sha’arei Dura, were printed much later. As we have shown in the section on his scholarly practices, 
however, the people with access to his manuscript were not a negligible group. See Yam shel Shlomo, 
Ḥulin, ch. 8, §90 – his remark concerning Rabbi Isserles here is similar but not identical to those in his 
Sha’arei Dura glosses. The additional reasoning here includes some added sources (some of which work 
against Rabbi Luria’s argument, but he dismisses them). The general argument is the same: 1. cooking 
in blood is prohibited; 2. when the proportions are favorable, our custom is to permit the liquid but 




Sha’arei Dura’s basic text, but the glosses were his personal selection from older 
manuscripts, together with his remarks, usually signed with his initials “Sh. L.” In the 
section on meat with blood that was left to soak, Rabbi Luria chooses to copy the source 
used by Rabbi Isserles in the name of Rabbi Rothenburg to support distinguishing 
soaking from cooking. Rabbi Luria introduces the quotation as something he “found in 
a new Isur ve-heter,”514 and he ends the quotation, adding “till here the words of the 
                                                     
continue to prohibit the piece itself; 3. preserving is equivalent to cooking-> so all the same customs and 
stringencies should apply. 
 
ד שעות אינו נאסר”לצלייה בפחות מכ’ ור אפיד שעות, חשוב כנתבשל בדמו ואס”צ. דין בשר ששרוי במים כ  
ד אם שכח בשר בשריית מים כל הלילה יש מפטפטין לאוסרו,...אך לא שמעתי מרבותינו שהיו ”פסק, כתב במקצת ש 
כ במקצת שערי דורא (סימן ”אוסרים וגם אני אין נוהג בה איסור בדיעבד, אפילו אם שהה כל הלילה וגם מעת לעת איני אוסרו ע
א גבי בשר ”ל רבותינו אוסרים אותו...דלא שייך חידוש כ”ל בשר ששרה במים, ונשתהא מע”מצאתי בנוסחא אחרת, וז’). ג
כלומר שבכל  -ד: שם מדובר בזה ששרוי בבשר וחלב חידוש שמותר ”[פסחים מ’ בחלב, דאי תרו ליה כולא יומא בחלבא שרי וכו
כ גבי ”משום דדרך בישול אסרה תורה אבל מדרבנן אסור לכולי עלמא, וא חומר אחר אסור] אבל גבי דם לא...היינו מדאורייתא,
’) אות ה’ ג’ שד סי”מדאורייתא, דכבוש הרי הוא כמבושל ומשום הכי אין להתיר בצלייה, ואף שנמצא כתוב (הג’ דם אסור אפי
ם (מרוטנבורג) ”בשם מהר’) ה חדשה (שם אות ג”כ בהג”שלו...עוד מ’ י בשערי”כ מהרא”ם (מרוטנבורג) התיר...וכ”שמהר
במים נגד כל החתיכות אז הדם שיצא בטל במים כבר ואם חוזר ונבלע בבשר אינו מזיק...ואומר אני שאל ’ ל...אבל אם יש ס”ז
כ הוה כנתבשלה בדמה ואין חילוק בין זה לחתיכה שנתבשלה בלא מליחה”תשגיח בזה, מאחר דשרייתה הוא כבישול, א  
ה זו, ורצה ”שהמקיל לא הפסיד, וסמך על הג’) דין א’ ל כתב בתורת חטאת שלו (כלל ג”ר משה ז”שוב מצאתי שמהר 
ם כתב להתיר, לא משגחינן ”לחלק בין שרייה לבישול דלא ממש כבישול דמי, בלי ראייה, אל תסמוך עליו להתיר, אף שמהר
אף בבשר שנתבשל בלי מליחה החתיכה ה של איסור והיתר הארוך החדש) היה סובר ”ם (מרוטנבורג, בהגה”ביה, כי אפשר מהר
ה הכא בשרייה, ”ה), ובודאי ממנו קבל, אבל אנו דקיימא לן דאסור בבישול ה”ש תלמידו (סימן מ”עצמה מותרת, כמו שכתב הרא
ל: דכבוש כמבושל, וחמור יותר מרותח דצלי, כי הטעם מתפשט בכולו כבישול, אלמא ”ז) וז”תש’ ובפרט שכתב המרדכי (סי
בהם שאין לחלק . 
514 It is not entirely clear what Rabbi Luria means by this “new Isur ve-heter.” The term “Isur 
ve-heter” could be the title of a specific work, such as Isur ve-heter ha-arokh, but it was also a generic 
way of referring to all works on the laws of slaughter and salting, including Sha’arei Dura. The “new 
gloss” in question already existed in the earliest printed Sha’arei Dura (it opens with the words  הר"ם
 as well as in the earliest printed Isur ve-heter ha-arokh (Ferrara, 1555). In Sha’arei (הר"י אומר or אומר
Dura (Venice, 1547-8), which Rabbi Isserles used as his base-text for Torat ḥatat, the line in question 
exists, but it is said in the name of Rabbi ‘I’ instead of Rabbi ‘M,’ for Meir Rothenburg. This may refer 
to Rabbi Israel Isserlein, the 15th-century compiler of most of the glosses on Sha’arei Dura featured in 
the printed editions. In any case, Rabbi Isserles was consulting not only the printed edition and some of 
the manuscripts must have said “Rabbi M,” because this is the version in other printed editions. 
There is a strong case to make that the “new gloss” in question came from the glosses on 
Sha’arei Dura and not the Isur ve-heter ha-arokh because, although all instances preserve the gist of 
Rabbi Isserles’ point, the gloss in Sha’arei Dura includes the line ולא דמי לחתיכה דלעיל בשער ב' דאסור (and 
this is distinct from the piece of meat above which is prohibited), which expresses the point Rabbi Isserles 
was trying to make more precisely. 
This line cannot be found in Isur ve-heter ha-arokh (Ferrara, 1555), which was the printed Isur 
ve-heter used by Rabbi Isserles (in a responsum [§132] he writes that he did not yet have a printed Isur 
ve-heter ha-arokh when he was assembling his own glosses on Isur ve-heter. When he was assembling 
his own glosses, he was using only manuscript copies. He may still have consulted the book prior to 
printing Torat ḥatat in 1570). 
Rabbi Israel Isserlein’s Lamed-Vav she’arim (36 gates), in which this 15th-century Rabbi 
summarizes similar laws, does not contain this gloss. As Dvileiẓky has shown, Lamed-Vav she’arim was 




new gloss.”515 This designation of the source as “new” perhaps implies that he 
encountered it in printed books rather than in his old manuscripts, thus already 
rendering it suspect. He then remarks that Rabbi Isserles used this source as support: 
“…I found that our master, the Rabbi Moshe wrote in his Torat ḥatat that ‘he who is 
lenient does not transgress,’ and for this he relied on this gloss... Do not rely on him to 
permit a prohibition!”516 Thus, the source is discredited and Rabbi Isserles’ opinion is 
somewhat weakened. 
He then attacks Rabbi Isserles’ analytical attempt to distinguish between 
cooking and soaking, writing: “And again, I found that our master, the Rabbi Moshe … 
wanted to distinguish between soaking and cooking with a ‘gut-analysis,’ saying that it 
is not truly akin to cooking, without any proof. Do not rely on him to permit a 
prohibition!”517 Rabbi Luria dismissed Rabbi Isserles’ explanation, terming it a svarat 
keres, literally, an analysis “from his stomach,” an expression denoting a baseless and 
sloppy piece of inquiry.518 The first prong of Rabbi Isserles’ argument, his attempt to 
present cooking and soaking as fundamentally different, is hanging by a thread.  
                                                     
a compilation where Rabbi Isserlein barely added any of his own opinions (this he did in his glosses of 
Sha’arei Dura which, as mentioned, became part of the standard printed glosses of this work) and only 
copied from older sources. A source resembling this one can be found there, meaning that it dates back 
to before Rabbi Isserlein’s time and that he regarded it as authentic. However, that source does not 
contain the quote that Rabbi Luria designates as “new” here, lending credence to my claim that by “new” 
he might mean “printed.” 
The “new gloss” may have been from somewhere else as well. Bet Yosef cites it via Mordekhai 
in the name of other medieval Ashkenazic authorities. 
515 See Luria, Sha’arei Dura §3, or Isur ve-heter shel MaharShaL in Sha’arei Dura, Dvileiẓky, 
ed. 2: 8 (emphasis added). ויש מתירין כו'. ואנן לא נהיגינן כך דהא כתב מהרא"י דחשוב כמבושל וק"ל. ובאיסור והיתר
הג"ה וז"ל...עכ"ל ההגה החדשהחדש מצאתי    
516 Ibid. [שוב מצאתי שמהר"ם ז"ל כתב בתורת חטאת שלו שהמיקל לא הפסיד וסמך על הג"ה זו ורצה [רמ"א      
 לחלק בין שרייה לבישול בסברת הכרס דלא ממש כבישול דמי בלא ראייה אל תסמוך עליו להתיר איסור.
517 Ibid. 
518 Rabbi Isserles claimed that cooking caused the prohibited substance to be absorbed 
throughout the whole piece, whereas soaking did not. See Torat ḥatat§ 3.1  דלא אמרינן כבוש כמבושל ולכל
 Rabbi Luria refers to this argument in his דבר רק שבולע ומפליט אבל אינו מבלבל טעם החתיכה כמו ברוטב...  
glosses Sha’arei Dura (Mekhonot Shlomo, Basel ed., 1599, 5b)  ורצה לחלק בין שרייה לבישול בסברת הכרס דלא
 ממש כבישול דמי בלא ראייה




As a fatal blow, Rabbi Luria zeroed in on the inconsistency in Rabbi Isserles’ 
application of leniency. In the case of cooking, Rabbi Isserles permitted the piece only 
in extenuating circumstances, whereas for soaking, he allowed the piece unequivocally. 
Rabbi Luria wrote: “And I say, do not pay heed to this, because it permits a prohibition 
to the people of Israel, because there is no distinction between soaking and cooking in 
any way, and since the piece of meat was prohibited above, because it cooked in its 
blood, this is the law here, too, and so it is. Sh.L.”519 
Rabbi Luria could see no good reason to distinguish between cooking and 
soaking, and considered Rabbi Isserles’ two-part conclusion, being lenient in once case 
and less so in the other, faulty. This inconsistency led to the next question; where did 
Rabbi Isserles derive his permission to be lenient at all? The second prong of Rabbi 
Isserles’ argument was that even the more serious prohibition of refusing to nullify meat 
that was cooked with blood was “merely a custom,” thus warranting leniency. In saying, 
“and even there [for cooking], it is merely a custom,” Rabbi Isserles meant that he saw 
no strong halakhic basis to prohibit the meat given the necessary ratio, even when it 
was cooked in its own blood, as this was in accordance with the opinion of many other 
traditions, including Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel. Given the existence of a strong basis to 
permit it, the Sha’arei Dura’s decision to prohibit the meat struck him as a stringency 
that exceeded basic halakha, and thus was “merely a custom.” Rabbi Isserles wrote 
                                                     
In his glosses on Sha’arei Dura (Mekhonot Shlomo), 5b, Rabbi Luria adduced proof from elsewhere 
(Mordekhai) that soaking is considered more intense than cooking. He brings this as proof against Rabbi 
Isserles’ attempt to distinguish the two and classify soaking or preserving as less severe. ובפרט שכתב  
שט בכולו כמבושל אלמא שאין לחלק ביניהם שלמה לוריא: המרדכ"י כבוש כמבושל וחמור מרותח דצלי כי הטעם מתפ  
519 Sha’arei Dura (Mekhonot Shlomo) §2:3, 5b(emphasis added): ואומר אני אל תשגיח בה כי היא 
מתרת איסור לישראל שאין חילוק בין שרייה לבישול בשום אופן ומאחר דאסרינן לעיל החתיכה לפי שנתבשלה בדמה ה"ה הכא 
  וק"ל ש"ל.




specifically that, if necessary, “ROSh is worthy of relying on” 520 to permit the piece of 
meat cooked in its blood. 
Rabbi Luria’s vehement rejection of this part of the argument is closely linked 
with his approach to halakhic texts and their transmission. He knew, of course, that 
Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel held this opinion; it is stated very clearly both in Rabbi Asher’s 
own Piskei ha-ROSh, and in his name in his son’s Arba Turim. Rabbi Luria, however, 
dismisses these authorities by a counterintuitive move: he reads the lenient opinion of 
ROSh together with the lenient passage from the “new” Isur ve-heter ha-arokh 
regarding soaked meat and turns ROSh’s opinion into a more lenient approach than 
even Rabbi Isserles wished to claim: Rabbi Luria suggests that, for all we know, Rabbi 
Meir of Rothenburg (cited in the “new” Isur ve-heter ha-arokh)  may have been lenient 
about the cooked meat. This makes perfect sense, he explains, as ROSh, who was 
explicitly lenient about cooked meat, was a student of Rabbi Rothenburg. He thus adds 
a second important thirteenth-century rabbi on the side of leniency. If anything, this 
appears like an argument in Rabbi Isserles favor! For Rabbi Luria, however, this was 
the perfect way of silencing Rabbi Isserles’ claim. He could do so because of their 
opposing approaches to halakhic reasoning, especially where custom is invoked. 
For Rabbi Isserles, the existence of more lenient opinions outside of Sha’arei 
Dura invited him to combine those external lenient opinions with other factors in order 
to permit leniency even within his own, more stringent tradition. As he wrote, “Even 
there [in the case of cooking], it is merely a custom to prohibit the piece in question, 
and therefore one should not be stringent in cases such as this one [soaking].”521 Thus, 
                                                     
520 Torat ḥatat §2.1 יש להקל מאחר שהרא"ש הסכים לדברי המתירין אף אותה חתיכה כדאי הוא לסמוך עליו
   בשעת הדחק או במקום הפסד מרובה.
521 Torat ḥatat,§ 3.1, וגם שם אינו אלא מנהג    




even if he would not go so far as to oppose Sha’arei Dura’s prohibition head-on, he felt 
free to permit it in a slightly different permutation, in a case of emergency or in a section 
slightly further removed. His approach was modular, separating the various elements 
of halakhic traditions that had been transmitted as homogenous compounds, and 
combining pieces from different traditions, together with circumstantial factors, to 
reach a new conclusion. Rabbi Isserles justifies this approach: “...because in those cases 
it seemed to me that it is entirely permissible according to halakha, except that the later 
authorities were stringent.”522 
Rabbi Luria, for his part, rejected this calculus of adjudication, regarding the 
combining of opinions across different traditions as a fallacy. If the tradition dictated 
stringency regarding cooked meat, and the talmudic principle claimed that “preserved 
is equated to cooked,” there should be no distinctions between anything that was cooked 
and any equivalent to it. Despite the distinguished pedigree of the lenient source, Rabbi 
Luria considered it irrelevant to his own (and Rabbi Isserles’) tradition, which derived 
from Sha’arei Dura. If Sha’arei Dura was stringent regarding the piece of meat when 
it was cooked with its blood, he wrote, one ought to be equally stringent when it came 
to soaking meat in its blood, as soaking was equated to cooking. What Isserles meant 
by “merely a custom” was that the base-line law was to be lenient, as the many other 
traditions prove. For Rabbi Luria, this knowledge meant nothing. Sha’arei Dura’s 
conclusion that “we have the custom to prohibit it”523 was final. 
Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim opposed the position that halakha and custom could be 
                                                     
522 Torat ḥatat, introduction (emphasis added). והנה אתנצל עצמי בדבר אחד שלא יחשדני...לפעמים כתבתי
ל כי היתר גמור   א ל י ב א  ד ה ל כ ת א    ר ק   ש ה א ח ר ו נ י ”להקל בהפסד מרובה...והוא מטעם כי באותן המקומות היה נ
 ם  ה ח מ י ר ו
523 Sha’arei Dura, §2, in Dvileiẓky, ed.,12 אמנם אנו נוהגים לאסור 




“divided into steps” and gradations by disentangling and separating its components. 
The fragmentation of the general halakhic tradition, followed by the organization of the 
fragments alongside their equivalents from other traditions allowed Rabbi Isserles to 
engage in the type of “halakhic calculus” that Rabbi Ḥayim so vehemently opposed. In 
the argument about soaking versus cooking, Rabbi Isserles considered that finding 
alternative traditions that permitted nullifying the blood in cooked meat was one step 
in his favor. For Rabbi Luria, the fact that this was a lenient, but separate, tradition, 
meant that it was irrelevant. 
Ultimately, Rabbi Isserles’ approach prevailed, but, as both Torat ḥatat and 
Rabbi Luria’s gloss show, this victory was not yet obvious in the 1570s. Rabbi Isserles 
had to argue and fight to defend his position. The way in which Rabbi Isserles’ view 
gained the upper hand becomes clear through a comparison of his intense defense of 
his view in Torat ḥatat, which we discussed here, to his argument once these laws were 
transferred to the Shulḥan Arukh. This victory was achieved as part of the broader 
transition of the scholarly culture to a new organizational field, namely, the Shulḥan 
Arukh. By the end of the sixteenth century, the laws of Sha’arei Dura were already 
embedded in the Shulḥan Arukh, according to the order of the latter. Once Shulḥan 
Arukh had replaced the Sha’arei Dura as the textual locus for the discussion of these 
laws, Rabbi Isserles’ approach appeared more reasonable than those of Rabbi Luria and 
Rabbi Ḥayim. To show the mechanics of how the problem disappears, let us return to 
the most problematic point of Rabbi Isserles’ argument: the uneven application of 
leniency in the case of soaking, but not in the case of cooking. 
The structure of a code favors precisely the kind of reasoning used by Rabbi 
Isserles to permit the soaked meat, but dismissed by Rabbi Luria because the lenient 




source belonged to a separate transmission. In this particular case, the separate 
transmission was even an ashkenazic one, rooted as it was in Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel 
and Rabbi Rothenburg’s opinions, but Rabbi Luria still opposed mixing this with their 
own transmission, sealed as it was with “and this is the custom.” Rabbi Isserles did not 
abandon the idea of an ashkenazic tradition or oppose it head on, accepting the 
ashkenazic stringency on forbidding the piece of meat if it was cooked. Although he 
argued for permitting the piece even in that case, he did not consider himself at liberty 
to permit it. In his view, however, this limitation applied only to the specific case in 
which the custom was mentioned, but it did not prevent him from permitting the meat 
in other permutations. The new category of soaking provided the opportunity for him 
to explain why one should be lenient.  
In Torat ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles had to invest considerable effort in justifying his 
modular approach to custom, which is precisely the very point where Rabbi Luria 
confronted him. Rabbi Luria demolished Rabbi Isserles’ argument, writing that it was 
completely faulty to separate these two cases, which were part of the same amalgam, 
“…since the piece is prohibited above ... this, too, is the law here ....”524 How could 
Rabbi Isserles claim one thing in one section and another thing in the very next section?! 
The Sha’arei Dura, representing one holistic tradition, made the two sub-laws almost 
undistinguishable, and Rabbi Luria easily dismissed Rabbi Isserles’ less than strong 
attempt to claim that soaking and cooking were somehow different in nature, deeming 
it a “svarat-keres.” However, this contention carried a lot less weight in a different 
format.  
                                                     
524 Sha’arei Dura, (Mekhonot Shlomo) §2:3, 5b  .אבל אנו דק"ל לאיסור התם – הכא נמי, גבי שרייה 




The laws of cooking and soaking meat in its own blood were discussed in 
successive paragraphs of a larger discussion in Sha’arei Dura, making them harder to 
separate; Rabbi Luria’s rhetoric highlights this (“above ... here”). In the Shulḥan Arukh, 
the law about cooking unsalted meat appears ten subsections away from the discussion 
of unsalted meat that was soaked, with a host of other topics discussed in between.525 
The Shulḥan Arukh deals with soaking many sections and pages later, in §105 on 
forbidden admixtures, where the case of meat soaking in its own blood is not even 
mentioned explicitly [see table]. Moreover, the authority of Sha’arei Dura diminishes 
once it is embedded within a much wider range of sources. The traditions of Sha’arei 
Dura transmitted by Rabbi Isserles literally and figuratively shrank in proportion to the 
main text of the Shulḥan Arukh, as his glosses were rendered in smaller type and 
surrounded by alternative opinions [see table]. What had been the major authority for 
the ashkenazic halakhic tradition of these laws, in the form of Rabbi Isserles’ gloss on 
Shulḥan Arukh, suddenly became one small opinion in a sea of authorities permitting 
the piece of meat. The organizational act of fragmenting and embedding the laws of 
Sha’arei Dura within a new code thus weakened its hold. 
 In addition, Rabbi Isserles inserted the ashkenazic traditions into the Shulḥan 
Arukh not by copying and compiling fragments, but by summarizing and concluding. 
This act of turning heterogeneous opinions into a homogeneous whole was similar to 
what he had done in Torat ḥatat, but to a much higher degree, because it incorporated 
alternative halakhic traditions. Constricted in Torat ḥatat by having to follow Sha’arei 
Dura’s order and its explicit wording, Rabbi Isserles had to present the possibility for 
                                                     
525 The laws about cooking unsalted meat are discussed in §69:11, whereas the law about 
unsalted meat that was soaked for twenty-four hours is mentioned only briefly in Rabbi Isserles’ glosses 
on §69:1. 




leniency in the case of unsalted meat as his own opinion: “we have the custom to 
prohibit…526 However … it seems to me that if it was a time of dire need or great 
monetary loss ... one should be lenient”527 [see table]. Moreover, he faced heavy 
criticism for suggesting it.  
In Shulḥan Arukh, on the other hand, Rabbi Isserles summarized the law, 
streamlining it with the other opinions of that code, which made his interventions 
almost invisible.528 In Shulḥan Arukh, this very same law is introduced not in Sha’arei 
Dura’s terms, but, instead, with the words of Rabbi Karo: “Meat that was cooked 
without having been salted, it is necessary for the stew to have sixty times the volume 
of the meat, and then everything is permitted.”529 As mentioned, this was ROSh’s 
opinion, and it appears as the main opinion in the Shulḥan Arukh, which relied to a large 
extent on the Arba Turim, written by Rabbi Asher’s son. The gloss of Rabbi Isserles 
follows in much smaller type, presenting the more stringent ashkenazic tradition of 
Sha’arei Dura: “…there are those who prohibit... and this is the custom where it is not 
very urgent, for example for Sabbath or in honor of guests, in which cases one should 
rely on those who are lenient.”530 Instead of presenting the Sha’arei Dura first as the 
main authority, and then proposing his own suggestion for leniency separately, as he 
had done in Torat ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles merged his own view on the issue with the 
general summary and concluded, “this is the custom where it is not very urgent” [see 
                                                     
526 Sha’arei Dura, §2.  
527 Torat ḥatat, §2:1 ...בשר ששהה במי שריי'...רבותי אוסרי' והכי נהוג. ...מ"מ נראה דהמיקל בכאן לא הפסיד 
528 Rabbi Isserles similarly summarized according to the Arba Turim and Bet Yosef rather than 
according to the Sha’arei Dura in his glosses on those works. Nonetheless, the Shulḥan Arukh is the 
strongest example of streamlining and summarizing rather than paraphrasing and copying. 
529 Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah, §69:11,  בשר שנתבשל בלא מליחה צריך שיהיה בתבשיל ששים כנגד אותו
הכל מותר בשר ואז  
530 Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah Mapah, §69:11 (emphasis added),  ויש אוסרים אותה חתיכה אפילו
דאז יש לסמוך אדברי המקיליןכגון לכבוד שבת או לכבוד אורחים  ...והכי נהוג אם לא לצורךנגד החתיכה’ בדאיכא ס  





The same dynamic plays out even more strongly in the discussion of unsalted 
meat that was left to soak. In Torat ḥatat, when Rabbi Isserles was still working within 
the confines of Sha’arei Dura, he ventured merely: “... and even though preserved is 
like cooked and in the case of cooked one is stringent to prohibit the piece in question 
as mentioned above, in any case, it seems that whoever is lenient does not lose out.”531 
In the Shulḥan Arukh, he did not need first to present Sha’arei Dura and then phrase 
his suggestion so hesitantly. The only place where the Shulḥan Arukh specifically 
touches upon this issue is in §69:15, “Meat that is dirty with blood and was soaked in 
water ... there are those who prohibit it ... unless there is sixty in the liquid versus it [the 
piece].”532 In the Shulḥan Arukh, there was no opinion at all prohibiting the piece itself. 
In his glosses, Rabbi Isserles simply did not mention the prohibiting tradition of 
Sha’arei Dura, thus circumventing the need for him to explain his argument in favor of 
leniency. By not bringing up the issue that evoked Rabbi Luria’s censure, the entire 
issue was effaced from the Shulḥan Arukh [see table]. 
This omission, or rather, this act of “glossing over,” was noticed by one of the 
Ashkenazic scholars of the next generation, Rabbi David Ha-Levi, author of the Turei 
zahav. He reintroduces it into the discussion in his gloss on the Shulḥan Arukh, writing: 
“This implies that [nullification in] sixty does function here; previously, in subsection 
§69.11, Rabbi Isserles concluded that there are those who prohibit the piece itself – and 
shouldn’t it be the case that here, since it is preserved [by soaking], then it is as though 
                                                     
531 Torat ḥatat §3:1. 
532 Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah §69:15, בשר המלוכלך בדמים שנשרה במים מע”ל יש אוסרים לאכלו כי אם
כנגדו (רמא: עיין ס"ק נ"ו) ויש אוסרים אפילו לצלי והכי נהוג’ כ יש במים ס”צלי אא  




it were cooked...?!”533 Rabbi Ha-Levi then provided the necessary background 
information, explaining that Rabbi Isserles addressed this issue in Torat ḥatat, where 
he claimed that cooking and soaking were profoundly distinct. The Turei zahav also 
mentioned Rabbi Luria’s rejection of Rabbi Isserles without providing any convincing 
defense of Rabbi Isserles. Although it would seem that Rabbi Isserles’ opinion was not 
accepted even in the new configuration, the conclusion in Turei zahav sides with Rabbi 
Isserles: “And it seems that we should rely on the ruling of Rabbi Isserles to be lenient 
in this.”534 The paradigm had fully shifted and Rabbi Isserles won the day. 
Rabbi Isserles’ Mapah was his attempt at preserving the traditional ashkenazic 
halakhic rulings, previously transmitted by means of personal manuscript compilations 
or likutim. The religious beliefs, learned practices, and the overarching halakhic 
approach that these compilations reflected, however, are obliterated when inserted into 
the code. Rabbi Luria, perhaps underestimating the immense advantage that print 
technology gave to codification, continued to work on his own project to rescue 
ashkenazic halakha, while his scholarly practices remained unchanged. His opposition 
to Rabbi Isserles was registered in his glosses, the so-called “Isur ve-heter of Rabbi 
Luria,” a typical personal compilation copied among students and colleagues. Rabbi 
                                                     
533 Rabbi David ha-Levi’s glosses on the Yoreh de’ah were the only ones printed during the 
author’s lifetime (Lublin, 1646); they are considered “the part of the TaZ [Turei zahav] that is most 
important and popular with scholars,” and it is with this part that “he achieved eternal fame in the field 
of halakhic literature and teaching” (Rabbi Y.L. Ha-Kohen Maimon, “Ha-Shulḥan Arukh ve-nose’i 
keilav” (The Shulḥan Arukh and its glosses) in Rabbi Yosef Karo: Koveẓ (Rabbi Yosef Karo: 
Compilation), ed. Yiẓhak Refael [Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1969], 55). Concerning the printing 
of Rabbi David ha-Levi’s glosses, see Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim, 3:138-158, as well as Elon, 
Mishpat Ivri (Jewish Law) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1978), 2: 1187 and articles by Rabbi Maimon and Rabbi 
Reuven Margaliot in Rabbi Yosef Karo: Koveẓ, 42-63 ; 89-100.  
Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah §69:15 Taz,  
א דיש אוסרין אותה חתיכה, והלא כאן ”א מסיק רמ”ולעיל סעיף י’ כנגדו. הא דמהני כאן ס’ כ יש במים ס”ה: אא”ד 
ז”ל חולק ע”מ לא הוי ממש שרייה כבישול ורש”ח דמ”א בת”דהוא כבוש הרי הוא כמבושל דלעיל חילק רמ .. 
534 Shulḥan Arukh Yoreh de’ah, §69:15 Taz,  
א בזה”ז...ונראה דיש לסמוך להקל כפסק רמ”ל חולק ע”מ לא הוי ממש שרייה כבישול ורש”ח דמ”א בת”דלעיל חילק רמ  




Ḥayim ben Beẓalel provides the most explicit expression of this fear of the threat of 
codification. The target of Vikuaḥ mayim Ḥayim was not just Torat ḥatat but the 
organizational threat inherent in a printed code, which privileged a different kind of 
halakhic logic. 
 
8. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SHA’AREI DURA:  
THE NEW ORDER OF HALAKHIC BOOKS  
 
Rabbi Isserles’ many leniencies were noted by Chayim Tchernowitz,535 the first 
historian to devote considerable attention to the Shulḥan Arukh as a chapter in Jewish 
intellectual history. Tchernowitz, however, limited the issue of Rabbi Isserles’ halakhic 
leniency to musings about his personality, reiterating time and again that, for Rabbi 
Isserles, “the force of leniency was preferable,”536 and that he was very considerate of 
“life” and of “changes in life,”537 in contrast to the difficult and unpopular Rabbi 
Luria.538 Yona Ben-Sasson made an attempt to reconstruct Rabbi Isserles’ worldview, 
mainly on the basis of the latter’s mystical work Torat ha-olah (Law of the offering). 
He links Rabbi Isserles’ understanding of concepts such as the universe and the 
commandments to his practical halakhic decisions, 539 wondering, “What impression 
does the thought of Rema [Rabbi Isserles] make on the foundations of his halakhic 
                                                     
535 He expressed surprise at the traditional image of Rabbi Isserles as a stringent figure: “This 
is wondrous, why was Rema considered stringent among us, while, in reality, it is only thanks to him 
that we arrived at great leniencies…!?” (Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim, 3: 67). 
 .A talmudic expression that appears, for instance. in Tractate Brachot 60a כוחא דהיתרא עדיף 536
537 See, for instance, Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim, 3: 67, where he notes:  ועוד הרבה היתרים
הניח לנו הרמ"א בהלכות שבת ובשארי הלכות, שערכן רב ביחס אל החייים....ובכלל היה הרמ"א משים לב הרבה להשתנות 
 החיים, לשנות בשביל זה את ההלכה.
538 Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim, 3:87  תקיפות דעתו...לא היה מקובל ומרוצה על בני דורו...גם תלמידיו
 .etcמרדו בו...
539 He recognizes that synthesizing a rabbi’s philosophical ideas with his halakhic decisions is 
problematic and that it can be understood only by means of “analysis and induction” (Ben-Sasson, 
Mishnato, 252-4). 




system?”540 He concludes that the principle of leniency “… teaches us about the 
attention to the ethical element of caring about the unfortunate one who is suffering.”541 
In his foundational article on the urban community in Poland, Elhanan Reiner considers 
Rabbi Isserles’ decision-making a reflection of communal change – the new Jewish 
community’s immense growth and its transition from a monolithic economy to a multi-
tiered one required new legal tools. Rabbi Isserles carefully used concepts such as ‘great 
loss’ to adapt the halakha to the changed situation without defying or changing the 
halakhic canon outright. The change in question was not merely socio-economic. As 
the size, occupational makeup, and legal status of the communities changed, “…the 
community lost its sacral status. … it was, instead, understood as, first and foremost, a 
social and economic entity. As a result, the ashkenazic zealotry for custom and tradition 
consistently disintegrated in the sixteenth century....”542 Reiner attributes Rabbi 
Isserles’ revolutionary decisions to this shift; he was the first influential rabbi to 
subscribe to this new understanding of a community and adjust his halakhic thought 
accordingly, and “… behind his decisions there is also a new approach to the notion of 
‘community’ and of the ashkenazic-Polish environment in which he functioned.”543 
Tchernowitz’s characterization of Rabbi Isserles as someone who preferred 
“life” and the power of leniency, and Reiner’s insight that the social and economic 
                                                     
540 He writes as follows: “‘great loss’ – a principle of leniency. In many of the decisions of the 
Rema, the tendency to be lenient can clearly be distinguished, especially in consideration of the privations 
of man and his needs …. As a philosophical source for this principle of adjudication – and other instances 
of leniency – we can use the consideration Rema took for the fate of man in his philosophy of ethics” 
(ibid, 252). 
541 Ibid, 272-3  ניתן להביא להם אסמכתאות מתחום העיון: ...ואילו ההתחשבות ב'הפסד מרובה' מלמדת על החשבה
 הסובל של האלמנט המוסרי של דאגה לנפסד
542 Elhanan Reiner, “Aliyat ha-kehila ha-gedola: Al shorshe ha-kehila hayehudit ha-ironit be-
Polin ba-et ha-ḥadasha ha-mukdemet” (The rise of the big community: On the roots of the Jewish 
community in Poland in the early modern period”), Gal-ed 20 (2006), 30. 
543 Ibid, 30-1. 




reality on the ground may have influenced the conceptions behind his decision-making 
are both important points. Even Ben-Sasson’s attempt to connect this to ethics may be 
defensible. These explanations go a long way in explaining why Rabbi Isserles may 
have wanted to be lenient. However, we need to consider an element beyond his 
philosophy or personality in order to gain an understanding of why and how he 
succeeded in boldly carrying out his vision and why his opinion was accepted – that is, 
the organization of knowledge, the changing paradigms of organizing halakhic texts, 
and, as a result, the field of interpretational possibilities within which the halakhist 
operated. He was not the first to consider monetary damage, but he was the first in his 
tradition operating in a new halakhic playing field with a new culture of knowledge that 
he helped create. This new organizational field allowed him to be lenient where 
predecessors would be hard-pressed to do the same – indeed where he, himself, faced 
forceful opposition. 
Some technologies are a better fit for certain organizational models and thereby 
privilege certain cultures of knowledge, whereas others better fit a different model. 
These variations are not immutable, and they are often minor; a scholarly culture can 
often adapt to changes without any profound impact on its intellectual practices and 
conceptual world. In some cases, however, a technology is so antithetical to the entire 
scholarly culture and its practices of transmission and organization that transmission 
according to these practices becomes almost untenable, and change becomes inevitable. 
Ashkenaz in the early modern period was such a case. Compilations embodied their 
study methods throughout the post-tosafist period – textually, materially, and in their 
form of reasoning. Rabbi Shlomo Luria continued to use compilatory practices 
throughout his life and, although his Yam shel Shlomo can be seen as his own attempt 




to rescue ashkenazic halakha by reorganization, in his glosses on Sha’arei Dura we see 
that, at the level of adjudication concerning isur ve-heter, his approach was traditional 
and his logic was holistic. Perhaps his failure to adapt to print-practices caused Yam 
shel Shlomo never to achieve the effect he hoped it would. Moreover, a much more 
print-appropriate alternative paradigm, the code, was already waiting in the wings and 
starting to take over. 
Print favored codification rather than compilation primarily because it 
facilitated textual stability and dissemination to an impersonal audience. Print also 
introduced the printed codes from other traditions into the ashkenazic realm. These two 
elements reinforced one another. By the end of the sixteenth century, the clash between 
the old and new methods of text production and the different paradigms of organization 
that each reflected, reached a point where the format that had characterized scholarly 
culture in Ashkenaz ever since the fourteenth century had, for the most part, become 
obsolete. As I have pointed out, Sha’arei Dura was printed often in the sixteenth 
century, but the challenges of printing such an individualized and flexible work are 
reflected in the state of the different editions. By the end of the century, when Rabbi 
Isserles had adopted and adapted the Shulḥan Arukh for Ashkenaz, printed codes 
dominated the ashkenazic landscape. At that point, printing of Sha’arei Dura basically 
ceased. While its laws were preserved in the glosses, they were sublimated into the 
Shulḥan Arukh and its codification. As a result, everything that Sha’arei Dura used to 
represent wound up disappearing, together with the work itself. 
Rabbi Yeshaya Horowitz,544 who was born in the mid-sixteenth century, 
                                                     
544 ca. 1555-1630, also known as the ShLA (the acronym for his Shnei Luhot hA-brit),. 




describes the conflict between Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles, and the latter’s victory, 
as caused by divine intervention: “every one of them composed and arranged an Isur 
ve-heter, and sometimes they disagree. And the nature of the gaon Rabbi Isserles of 
blessed memory has been broadcast, so that we follow his opinion, and certainly he 
merited this from heaven, just like the law was adjudicated according to Bet Hillel545 
even though Bet Shamai was more astute.”546  
Rabbi Horowitz emphasizes that not only was Rabbi Luria the superior intellect, 
but also he had the last word, thus according him the status of the “batra’i,” the later 
authority: “Thus was the story: students of …Rabbi Luria … copied his Isur ve-heter 
and brought it to Rabbi Isserles when he wrote his Torat ḥatat … and then Torat ḥatat 
came into the hands of Rabbi Luria, and he wrote what he wrote in his Isur ve-heter. It 
follows from here that Rabbi Luria is the batra’i….”547 Although Rabbi Luria had the 
last word in the realm of manuscript copies and glosses, Rabbi Horowitz concludes, “In 
any event, I already said that in the diasporas of Israel it already had been spread that 
outside the land of Israel, in the kingdom of Poland and Bohemia and Moravia and 
Germany, one adjudicates according to Rabbi Isserles.”548 Rabbi Horowitz’s implied 
                                                     
545 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yevamot 14a. Bet (the house of) Hillel and Beit (the house of) 
Shamai are two schools of interpretation in the talmudic tradition from the first century CE, each named 
after its leader, Hillel and Shamai. The former is usually characterized as a figure who is more tolerant 
and considerate of human needs, whereas the latter rabbi is seen as a harsher, more intellectual and 
religiously zealous figure who tends to be more stringent. The Talmudic decision was that one should 
follow Bet Hillel, although some maintained that in some messianic future, this will be reversed. 
546 Yeshaya Horowitz, Shnei Luḥot ha-brit (Two tablets of the covenant) (Amsterdam, 1698), 
(3rd ed.) 74b.  כל אחד מהם חיבר וסידר איסור והיתר וכמה פעמים הם מחולקים. וכבר יצא טבעו של הגאון מהרמ"א ז"ל
ובודאי מן השמים זכה לזה כמו שנפסק הלכתא כבית הלל אף על גב דבית שמאי הוי חריפי. לילך אחריו ולפסוק כמוהו  See 
introduction to Torat ha-olah, (Tel-Aviv: Yeshivat ḥidushei ha-Rim,1992). 
547 Horowitz, Shnei Luḥot ha-brit 74b   כי כן היה המעשה: תלמידים של הגאון מהרש"ל ז"ל העתיקו איסור
תר שלו והביאו אותו ליד מהרמ"א ז"ל כשחיבר התורת חטאת, על כן הביא כמה פעמים איסור והיתר של הגאון מהרש"ל ז"ל והי
ומשיב עליו ואחר כך בא התורת חטאת ליד הגאון מהרש"ל ז"ל וכתב מהרש"ל ז"ל באיסור והיתר שלו מה שכתב. נמצא שזה 
 הגאון מהרש"ל ז"ל הוא בתראי.
548 Horowitz, Shnei Luḥot ha-brit 74b אבל כבר אמרתי שכבר נתפשט בתפוצת ישראל שבחוצה לארץ 
 במלכות פולנייא ופיהם ומעהרין ואשכנז לפסוק כהגאון מהרמ"א ז"ל.




statement that Rabbi Isserles’ opinion was in fact inferior was obscured by his 
conclusion that this must have been decreed by God. However, Rabbi Horowitz still 
recommended that people adopt Rabbi Luria’s more stringent opinions, “… it is 
appropriate for every person to rule in his own home549 and sanctify himself and be 
stringent to prohibit for himself everything that either of them prohibits, even if he is 
lenient towards others in halakhic decision, he should be stringent for himself according 
to custom.”550 
Even while advocating for the stricter interpretation, he relegates these not to 
basic required halakha adjudicated for everyone, but to a supererogatory stringent field, 
which every individual is free to take or leave “according to custom.” Thus, even for 
those who maintained strong connections to the ashkenazic traditions and encouraged 
the adoption of its stringent opinions, the paradigm shift in which custom was separated 
from the legal realm had prevailed.  
Rabbi Horowitz resorts to a deus ex machina to justify Rabbi Isserles’ 
unwarranted victory, attributing it to divine intervention, “merited from heaven.” This 
revolution would never have come about if it were not for the combination of several 
cultural, social, and intellectual changes. These changes were the perfect accomplice to 
the paradigm of the code: Rabbi Horowitz uses the expression “yaẓa tiv’o,” ’meaning, 
“the nature of the gaon Rabbi Isserles of blessed memory has been broadcast.” The 
word tiv’o, (from teva, nature) means “his nature has come out,”551 but also connotes 
                                                     
549 Esther 1:22. 
550 Horowitz, Shnei Luḥot, 74b  אבל מ"מ ראוי להיות כל איש שורר בביתו להתקדש ולהחמיר לאסור לעצמו
מה שאוסר אף שמיקל לאחריני בהוראה לפי המנהג יחמיר לעצמו. הן מה שאוסר זה והן  
551 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Avodah Zarah 2b in the sense of being known and 52b in the 
sense of coins. Some also relate this reference to coins to the Hebrew expression “monitin,” which means 
a reputation, and to its relation to coins (from the Greek moneta). 




coins that are circulated widely (matbe’ah – tivo) and therefore accepted as 
standardized currency. Perhaps, via this mention of coining or embossing (tvi’yah) 
something that circulates broadly in a standardized manner, it is not a stretch to say that 
Rabbi Isserles’ battle was won by means of imprinting and disseminating his writings 

















9. APPENDIX: TABLE 
The appended table shows the implications of a shift in organizational paradigm from an eclectic, heterogeneous, personal, and idiosyncratically 
organized compilation of holistic units to a modular, complete, comprehensive, and streamlined organizational paradigm. The two successive 
sections (§2.1 and §3.1) dealing, respectively, with cooking and soaking, in Sha’arei Dura were the loci for Rabbi Isserles argument in Torat ḥatat 
and, as the order remained the same, it can also easily be identified as the locus for Rabbi Luria’s attack. Long explanations are necessary for 
Rabbi Isserles to distinguish the two sections and defend his point.  
In the order of the Arba Turim, which determined the sequence in Shulḥan Arukh, these sources appear only briefly, one of them not at all (§2 is 
in §69 and §3 only in the glosses). In the Shulḥan Arukh, the part that was Sha’arei Dura §2 appears in §69.1, and Sha’arei Dura §3 simply 
disappears (only the lenient opinion is mentioned in §69.15, the stringent opinion of Sha’arei Dura is nowhere to be found ). A later glossator (*) 
notices this, and adds a remark about the omission in the module where, logically, the opinion should have appeared (§69.15).  
Furthermore, comparing the corresponding sections in Sha’arei Dura, Torat ḥatat, and the Shulḥan Arukh, it becomes clear how the phraseology 
of summary rather than paraphrase allows Rabbi Isserles to present the Ashkenazic sources in a way that already embodies his own conclusions, 
thus “it is prohibited, but … it seems to me that in a case of emergency … one should be lenient” becomes simply:  “there are those who 



































§1 Laws of 
slaughter 
… 












§1 First Gate 
.(1) Meat that was 
rinsed and salted 




Glosses on  §1 
Torat ḥatat (Isserles) 
§1 Principle and section 1: 
 On the laws of meat that 
was salted and not rinsed 
after the salting, and it 
includes 7 sub-laws: 
§66 What kind 
of blood is 
prohibited 
… 
§67 What kind 










...   §66 Things that 
are prohibited due 
to blood… 
1. animal blood 







§2 Second Gate 
. (2) Meat not salted 
and cooked: we 
need 60:1 in 
proportion to the 
whole piece, for we 
do not know the 
amount of blood. If 
there is 60:1, the 
stew is permitted. 
The piece itself is 
prohibited, since it 
cooked in its own 
blood. Some 
wanted to permit 
the piece itself after 
it was annulled 
60:1, But we have 
the custom to 
prohibit.  




§2 Principle and section 2: 
On the law of meat that was 
rinsed and not salted, and it 
includes 5 sub-laws: 
.1 paraphrases Sha’arei 
Dura(piece itself is 
prohibited even with 60:1) 
However, Bet Yosef wrote… 
Orhot Hayim, if it is Erev 
Shabbat, one should be 
lenient, and Shulhan Arukh 
simply permits the piece 
when there is 60:1. 
Conclusion:  it seems to me 
that in a case of emergency 
or great loss when there is 
60:1, one should be lenient, 
seeing as ROSh agreed to the 
words of those who permit 
even the piece itself, and he 




§69 The Order 
of Salting 
What is the 
order of salting? 











§69 The laws of 
salting and 
rinsing: And in it 
are 21 subsections 
§69.1 One must 
rinse the meat 
before salting… 
Gloss and if he 
did not do this… 
 
. (3) Meat with its 
blood that soaked in 
water for 24 hours, 
our rabbis prohibit 
it. If it soaked only 
for less time, one 
does not prohibit. 
And there are those 
who permit to fire-
roast  it even if it 
soaked for 24 hours. 
 
3. “Meat that has 
soaked…”  
 
There are those 
who permit, but 
we do not have 
this custom, since 
[R’ Isserlein] 
wrote that it is 
considered like 
cooked. Mentions 
same  “new” Isur 
ve-heter (arokh) 
Concludes: do not 
pay heed to this! 
There is no 
distinction 
between soaking 
and cooking in any 
way and the piece 
itself is prohibited 
above, when 
cooked, so too is 
the law here. 
Critque of Torat 
ḥatat: he said that 
who is lenient 
does not lose out, 
and  relied on this 
gloss Isur 
§3 Principle and section 3: 
On the law of meat that 
remained in its soaking 
water for 24 hours and it 
includes 2 sub-laws: 
1. Meat with its blood that 
soaked in water for 24 hours, 
our rabbis prohibit it, and 
thus is the custom. 
So, too writes R’Isserlein in 
a gloss that the custom is to 
prohibit… 
…and he wrote there that if 
it remained for 24hours it is 
prohibited even if one fire-
roasts it.  
Quotes “new” Isur ve-heter 
ha-arokh: The case when 
one prohibits meat that 
soaked in water for 24 hours, 
R’ Meir [Rothenburg] says 
that that is only when there 
is a lot of meat and no 
proportion “in the water and 
the meat to annul the blood,” 
implying that one needs 60:1 
of water to blood, not 60:1 
against the whole piece 








and wanted to 
distinguish 
soaking and 
cooking with bad 
analysis without 
any proofs – do 




Meir’s opinion in  
new” Isur ve-heter 
ha-arokh : 
R’ Isserles remarks: This is 
wrong, since it soaked for 24 
hours and we prohibit it 
because “preserved is like 
cooked”, thus one needs 
60:1 for the entire piece. 
However, the piece will be 
permitted when there is 60:1 
like the words of R’ Meir.  
R’ Isserles explains: 
although “preserving is like 
cooking” and with cooking 
we are stringent to prohibit 
the piece, as we saw above, 
in any case, here one can be 
lenient, because: a) 
“Preserving is like cooking” 
is not absolute; it functions 
differently for soaking and 
for cooking. b) Moreover, 
for cooking, too, it is but a 
custom to prohibit the piece 
itself. Conclusion: one 
should not be so stringent, 
the soaked piece is permitted 






And if he forgot 









§69.2 If he salted 
and did not rinse 
before… 
Gloss: and so we 
have the custom 
even if… 
.(4) The Geonim 
wrote that all meat 




Meir may have 
permitted it  even 
in when cooked, 
like ROSh his 
student, 
… 
And he can use 
either fine salt 
or coarse…. 
“And he can use…” 
glosses… 
Glosses... §69.3 One should 
not use very fine 
salt or very coarse 
salt… 
 
§3 The third gate 
.(5) A piece of meat 
that was not rinsed 
first and then salted 
is prohibited…. 
However:  we, 
who hold as law 
that it is prohibited 
above, so, too, 




And it is not 
necessary to salt 





§69.4 One should 
spread salt all 
over… 
Gloss: And there 
are those who 
prohibit even… 
§69.5 After he has 
salted… 
§4 The fourth Gate 
.(6) A piece that 








§4 Principle and section 4: 
Regarding the laws of meat 
that remained for three 
days… it includes 9 sub-
laws. 
1. Meat that remained… 
9…. 
And the amount 
of time it must 
stay in the 
salt…  





§69.6 The amount 
of time that it 
must stay with 
salt… 
Gloss: and one 
can rely on this if 
it has already 
been done… 












amount of time, 
he should rinse 
it…and before 
he places it in a 
vessel, he 
should take off 
the salt… 
“And after…” glosses 
 
“And before…” glosses… 
Glosses… §69.7 Before he 
places the meat in 
a vessel… 
Gloss: and there 
are those who say 
that one must 
rinse… 
§5 Gate Five 
.(9) Meat that is 
being fire-roasted 
need not be salted at 
all… 




§5 Principle and section 5… 
 
However, 
whether he used 
coarse or fine 
salt, if he did 
not take it off… 
“However,…” glosses... Glosses… §69.8 If he did not 
take off… 
Gloss: and even if 
the water is a little 
bit… 
 
§7 Seventh Gate 
.(11) It is prohibited 
to salt meat in a 
vessel… 
.(12) And if… 













must be 60:1 in 
the pot in 
proportion to 
the salt… 
“And if the meat was 
cooked…” glosses 
And it says… 
And the Egor wrote… 
It says in the writings of… 





§69.9 Meat that 
was salted and 
cooked without 
rinsing it again, 
there must be 
60:1 to the salt 
present. 
Gloss: And the 
whole pot can be 
joined to the 60, 
and if there is as 
much in the stew 
as the size of the 
piece, then it is all 
allowed… 
§69.10 A non-
Jew who works in 
a Jewish home…  
Gloss: and even 
one…. 
.(14) And when one 










Meat that was 
cooked without 
salting, there 
must be 60:1 in 
the pot to annul 
all the meat, and 
then everything 
is permitted.  
There are those 
who say the 
stew is 
permitted but 
the piece of 
meat is 
prohibited and 
there are those 
who permit, and 
to this my father 
ROSh agreed.  
Meat that was cooked 
without salting… 
Paraphrases Tur: those who 
prohibit the piece, those 
who permit…and this 
makes sense. 
Presents added sources 
(some R’ Isserles then 
mentions in Torat ḥatat): 
Hagahot Maimon 
concluded that our custom 
is to prohibit.  
Orhot Ḥayim on Erev 
Shabbat they allowed for 
two 
reasons…Mordekhai…for 
meat it is permitted, but 
with chicken… 
Glosses… 
…60:1 must be 
in proportion 
to the whole 
piece… 
but, one can 




the custom to 
be stringent on 
other days of 




it is urgent, one 
should permit 
the piece and 
rely on those 
who permit… 
§69.11 Meat that 
has been cooked 
without salting, 
there must be 
60:1 in the stew in 
proportion to the 
piece of meat, and 
then it is all 
permitted. 
Gloss: And there 
are those who 
prohibit the piece 
of meat itself 
even when there 
is 60:1 in 
proportion to 
it…and so is the 
custom unless 
there is an urgent 
need for example 
to honor the 
Sabbath or guests, 
in which case one 
should rely on the 
words of those 
who are 
lenient…and if it 
was salted… 
§8 Eighth Gate 
.(15) One must first 
rinse the meat…. 
§9 Ninth Gate 
.(16) The world 
wonders, how come 
that people had the 
custom to salt 
several times in 
vessels… 
.(17) This is the 
source for the 
custom to be lenient 
with the presses of 
non-Jews… 
.(18) And the 
skewer on which 
one has roasted… 
.(19) And one 
should also refrain 
from stabbing the 
knife… 







wrote: meat that 
sat for 3 days… 
 The Geonim 
wrote…RibaSh 
wrote…Trumat ha-deshen 
…The Egor …It says in the 
writings…It says…The 
Egor wrote, meat that  has 
stayed in water a whole day 
… but less than a whole day 
is permitted... R’ Yeruḥam 
wrote: meat that is filthy 
with its blood and soaked 
for a whole day in water, I 
have a tradition that it is 
prohibited since it 
resembles cooking, as it 
says ‘preserving is like 
cooking’ ….And it says in 
Sha’arei Dura, meat that 
soaked, those prohibiting 
are more than those who 
permit … and so we have 
the custom…  
some permit to fire-roast 
it… in the glosses on the 
She’arim he wrote: R’Meir 
says our rabbis prohibited 
the meat  when there was a 
lot of meat and thus there 
was not 60:1 in the stew 
against it, but if there is 
Glosses, on 







thinks that here 
one does not 
need 60:1 
against the 






his words are 
not right, since 
it soaked for 




do need 60:1 
(water: meat) 
for the whole 
piece, just like 
a piece of meat 
§69.12 Meat that 
sat for three… 
§69.13 And if 
they soaked it in 
water in those 
three days… 
§69.14 Water that 
stayed for three 
days without 
salting… 
§69.15 Water that 
is filthy with its 
blood that soaked 
in water for 24 
hours, there are 
those who 
prohibit to eat it 
unless it is fire-
roasted, except if 
there is 60:1 of 
water in 
proportion to the 
piece of meat. 
Gloss: …and 
there are those 
who prohibit it 
even for fire 
roasted, and this 
is the custom.   
 
§10 Tenth Gate 
.(20) If he salted a 
prohibited 
carcass… 
.(21) And since our 
saltings are done… 
.(22) But raw 
meat… 
.(23) But it is warm 
since it was cooked 
or roasted… 
.(24) Abaye said… 
.(25) And if the 
liver is stuck… 

















* Turei Zahav: 
 
We only salt in 
a vessel with 
holes…. 




§69.15 One only 
salts in a vessel 
with holes… 
Gloss: and a  
sheet… 






..I found written 




End of §69 
... 
I found written 
glosses…And that which it 
says…glosses… 



















One salts many 
pieces on top of 
one another… 











COMMUNITY, CONTINUITY, TRADITION AND SCHOLARSHIP 
Reconstructing Tradition in Ashkenazic Halakha 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
COMMUNAL RUPTURE AND SCHOLARLY CULTURE IN ASHKENAZ 
 
The previous two chapters studied the effects of extra-textual elements in the history of 
knowledge – one technological, one organizational (print-reproduction and codification 
respectively) – on halakhic culture in Ashkenaz. The current chapter examines another 
extra-textual aspect: the scholarly culture of the rabbis who studied and interpreted these 
texts, and the relationship between this culture and the scholars’ religious community. The 
communal rupture and subsequent reconstruction of Ashkenaz in the sixteenth century 
enables us to consider the community’s function in the formation of knowledge. 
Ashkenaz is an overarching term for the communities located in the geographical 
area of the Rhineland.552 It can also be considered a term demarcating shared physical 
                                                     
552 See Hirsch Jacob Zimmels, Ashkenazim and Sephardim: Their Relations, Differences, and 
Problems as Reflected in the Rabbinical Responsa (NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1976). See Talya Fishman, 
“Framing Ashkenaz: Cultural Landmarks of Medieval Northern European Societies,” in Becoming the 
People of the Talmud: Oral Torah as a Written tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 91-120. 
On the origins of the name “Ashkenaz,” see Shmuel Krauss, “Ha-shemot Ashkenaz ve-Sfarad” (The 
names Ashkenaz and Sfarad), in Tarbiz no.3 vol.4 v (1932): 423-435.  
For a general and cultural description of medieval Ashkenaz, see Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei 
Ashkenaz ha-rishonim (The early sages of Ashkenaz) (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001), 
and Ḥakhmei Tsarfat ha-rishonim (The early sages of France) (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 
1995). 
See also Ephraim Kanarfogel, Peering Through the Lattices: Mystical, Magical and Pietist 
Dimensions in the Tosafist Period (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000). 
For a definition of Ashkenaz linked to its linguistic characteristics (Yiddish), see Max Weinreich, 
History of the Yiddish Language, vol. 1, ed. Paul Glasser, trans. Shlomo Noble (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2008), especially his distinction of Ashkenaz I (origins, German Ashkenaz) and 
Ashkenaz II (later migrations, Eastern Europe) in the first chapter, “Yiddish and Ashkenaz: The Object of 
Study and the Approach,” 1-45. Lucia Raspe’s more recent suggestion of Northern Italy as Ashkenaz I ½ (as 
it is positioned between Ashkenaz I and II, both on the geographical scale from west to east and 
chronologically) can be added to this (See Lucia Raspe, “The Migration of German Jews into Italyand its 
Impact upon the Legacy of Medieval Ashkenaz,” in European Jewry around 1400: Disruption, Crisis, and 
Resilience, ed. Lukas Clemens and Christoph Cluse [forthcoming]). 




origins, geographic and genetic, rather than current dwellings, thus functioning as a term 
that is local but also implies movement from place to place. Beyond shared geographic and 
genetic origins, “Ashkenaz” implies a community in the sense of a broad shared common 
culture, including a shared language, customs, foods, liturgy, beliefs, folklore, rites, and so 
forth. More specifically, it refers to a shared religious culture through which all the above 
elements find expression.553 This chapter will focus on one aspect of the religious culture 
of Ashkenaz, namely, its halakhic culture and its intersection with the scholarly culture of 
its halakhists. 
The general image of Ashkenaz in the twelfth, thirteenth, and first half of the 
fourteenth centuries conveys a (relative) sense of continuity despite the relocation of 
centers and the rise and fall of local communities.554 Between the end of the thirteenth 
century and the middle of the fourteenth, several waves of persecutions and expulsions 
drove Jews out of the German and French centers; by the end of the fifteenth century, there 
                                                     
See Ivan Marcus, Piety and Society: The Jewish Pietists of Medieval Germany (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 
for an anthropological approach to ashkenazi culture.  
The idea of Ashkenaz as a genetic community has introduced some attempts at DNA-based 
definitions of Ashkenaz, most notoriously those testing the so-called “Khazar hypothesis” of Ashkenazic 
Jews (See Shaul Stampfer, “Did the Khazars convert to Judaism?” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, 
Society 19, no. 3 (2013): 1-27, for a summary and critique). 
553 Or, to take Clifford Geertz’s broad-ranging and profound definition of culture and its 
significance: “Believeing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs.”; “The culture concept to which I adhere…denotes an 
historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge 
about and attitudes towards life.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 
1975), 5;89. This chapter will be looking, primarily, at ashkenazic scholarly culture, their knowledge about 
and attitudes towards religious law, and how these are expressed both in the legal texts they interpret and 
transmit, and in the communities for whom they interpret these laws. 
554 See, for instance, Simcha Emmanuel, on the fall of the Rhineland in the third decade of the 13th 
century, as its scholars moved eastward to Austria and Bohemia, and the subsequent revival of scholarship 
in the German Lands with Rabbi Meir Rothenburg. Simcha Emmanuel, Ḥakhmei Germania ba-meah ha-
shlosh-esre: Reẓef o mashber? (The sages of Germany in the 13th century: Continuity or crisis?) Tarbiẓ 82 
vol.4 (2014):549-567.  




were few Jewish communities left in Ashkenaz.555 By the sixteenth century, no ashkenazic 
communities remained in their original locations. This was a rupture, not merely another 
wave of suffering within a continuous community. In new locations, numerous ashkenazic 
Jewish communities came into being, first in Northern Italy, in Central Europe, and later 
in Poland-Lithuania.556 Thus, Ashkenaz, now unified by origins rather than location 
continued in these communities, which proclaimed themselves ashkenazic and regarded 
themselves as the loyal descendants of their Western predecessors. 
Significant differences in addition to their new location distinguished these 
ashkenazic communities: their legal status, their demographics and make-up, and their 
economic profile differed.557 Profound differences in religious culture, too, were 
noticeable.558 Changes occurred not only at the physical and practical level of the 
                                                     
555 For a mapping of these processes, see Michael Toch, “The Formation of a Diaspora: The 
Settlement of Jews in the Medieval German Reich” Ashkenas 7 (1997): 55-78. 
556 See Moshe Shulvass, “Ashkenazic Jewry in Italy,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 7 
(1952): 110–131. See the introductory chapter of Gershon D. Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the 
Eighteenth Century (LA: University of California Press, 2004): 1-21; see also the prologue by Mordechai 
Breuer,  “The Jewish Middle Ages,” in German-Jewish History in Modern Times: vol. 1, Tradition and 
Enlightenment 1600-1780, ed. by Michael A. Meyer, trans. William Templer, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 7-77. 
On Central Europe, see Hillel Kieval, “Bohemia and Moravia” in YIVO Encyclopedia of the Jews 
in Eastern Europe, ed. Gershon Hundert (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 204; Otto Muneles, ed. 
the Prague Ghetto in the Renaissance Period (Prague: State Jewish Museum, 1965); Abraham Stein, Die 
Geschichte der Juden in Böhmen (Brünn: H Rickl Verlag, 1904). 
557 On the university in Cracow and its centrality as a capital of learning, see Paul Knoll, A Pearl of 
Powerful Learning: the University of Cracow in the Fifteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2016). On Poland and 
its economic flourishing in this period, especially on Cracow see Francis W. Carter’s geographic-economic 
study, Trade and urban development in Poland: An economic geography of Cracow, from its origins to 1795 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On the outsize role of Jews in Cracow’s economy, see, 
for instance, the data on p.71, on the ethnic structure of Cracow (as early as the 14th century, Jews were the 
third largest population group after Poles and Germans). Pages 28-29 show a sampling from customs 
registers, in which Jewish traders and merchants are strongly represented.  
558 On differences between Ashkenaz in Eastern Europe as compared to its previous location, see 
many of the references cited in the previous chapter, including Ḥayim Hillel Ben Sasson, Hagut ve-hanhaga 
(Theory and Practice) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1959), esp. 55-75; Gershon David Hundert, "Some Basic 
Characteristics of the Jewish Experience in Poland," Polin 1 (1986): 28; Adam Teller, "Telling the 
Difference: Some Comparative Perspectives on the Jews’ Legal Status in the Polish-Lithuanian 




surroundings that affected ashkenazic religious life; religious culture was also affected in 
intellectual realms, including the scholarly culture. Scholarly culture includes a practical 
aspect, on the one hand, which involves the technical sides of scholarship, its material tools 
and trappings. On the other hand, scholarly culture has a more theoretical-intellectual 
aspect, that is, the accepted manner of dealing with knowledge and working with one’s 
intellectual sources. This latter aspect is a scholarly culture’s tradition, which encompasses 
ideas about methods, practices, and attitudes that govern a discipline; every scholarly 
discipline, whether religious, legal, scientific, or otherwise, has its own tradition. Such 
scholarly traditions cannot be reduced to specific rules or methods; they include more 
amorphous components such as attitudes, mores and ethics, hierarchies of authority and 
sources of knowledge, and other elements that cannot be pinpointed or distilled – 
sometimes barely even formulated – and emerge from the scholarly culture as a whole.559 
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The tradition of Jewish legal scholarship, I will argue, was determined not only by 
the scholarly community, but also by the Jewish community at large, which provided a 
unifying basis for adherence to a specific legal tradition. Communal continuity thus 
ensured the continuity of the scholarly traditions associated with this culture’s halakha. 
Text and textuality are the most salient methods and characteristics for transmitting 
knowledge across rupture. Because the legal tradition is an element of scholarly culture, 
however, it could not be readily transmitted solely by textual transmission. Because of the 
close interconnection between ashkenazic scholarly culture and the communal culture in 
which it was taught and practiced, a geographical and temporal communal rupture inhibited 
transmission of the scholarly tradition.  The rift of the late middle ages disrupted the 
continuity of this rather amorphous legal tradition even while preserving most of the 
content of halakhic knowledge. 
The tradition could reemerge, but, inevitably, in a different form, even when the 
scholarly tradition was reconstructed with the intention to restore Ashkenaz.  In the course 
of the communal rupture, this scholarly tradition, which could not be transmitted in the 
face of communal discontinuity, was thus lost. Scholarly culture was inextricably linked to 
the broad religious culture of the community, and the communal continuity of Ashkenaz 
was the foundation for transmission of scholarly traditions. Transmission of the texts alone 
resulted in a very different continuation of this legal tradition, even – as this chapter will 
show – when successors were, in fact, knowledgeable about the legal traditions of their 
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predecessors. My discussion will utilize theories on the dynamics of tradition and rupture 
from several fields that relate to my study of this community’s scholarly culture of religious 
law: history, jurisprudence, sociology, and anthropology. 
This chapter will explore the changes that evolved from the ashkenazic halakhic 
traditions in their earlier location to the same community’s approaches to knowledge in the 
Ashkenaz of Eastern Europe. This investigation will shed light on the ways in which 
community, scholarly culture, and tradition are intertwined, and how these elements affect 
knowledge. It also helps us resolve a crucial question: As the introductory chapter has 
discussed, Ashkenaz had a very strong scholarly tradition of halakha, represented by the 
manuscript compilation, which was radically different from halakha as it came to be 
organized in the printed codifications that dominated the sixteenth century. Considering 
the strength of the ashkenazic tradition, it is surprising that its approach to halakha changed 
so drastically in the sixteenth century, even in the face of technological and organizational 
upheaval. Why did ashkenazic halakha accept this new order, rather than retaining its 
earlier ways? The answer lies in the communal rupture that eliminated the possibility of a 
continuous adaptation to the emerging changes in technology and organization. Unable 
gradually to adapt to the changes it was facing because of the rupture, ashkenazic scholarly 
culture had to reconfigure itself in a new environment. On the one hand, this vacuum 
allowed for reinventions of scholarly culture without appearing as an outright break in 
tradition. Rupture created an opening that enabled innovative approaches to knowledge to 
be considered authentically ashkenazic. On the other hand, the rift also meant that even 




those who actively sought to continue ashkenazic approaches as they had existed before, 
could no longer truly do so.  
I will analyze the relationship between community and scholarly culture by 
focusing on the ashkenazic legal tradition that is located outside the halakhic text proper 
and dominates its scholars’ way of thinking. This evolution in the legal tradition will be 
illustrated by tracing a specific halakhic requirement, the obligation to give the bekhor 
behema tehora, the firstborn male of a kosher animal, to members of the priestly class, and 
the fate of this requirement in Ashkenaz from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. The 
illustration will reveal the legal traditions of a specific scholarly culture that relied for its 
survival not on textual transmission but on the continuity of a community; it will also 
describe how these laws take on a new life once the legal tradition is ruptured, even among 
a community’s strongest representatives and most faithful successors. 
 
2. NOTIONS OF TRADITION AND RUPTURE: LAW, HISTORY, SOCIETY 
Communities and their relation to tradition have often been studied by positing rupture as 
a central dividing line and subsequently assigning opposing binary features to the pre-
rupture and post-rupture “sides” of this border.  Several fields employ these modes of 
thinking; they all are relevant for a study of halakhic scholarly culture and communal 
change: the study of law, history, and sociology or anthropology. The focus in each of these 
fields is particular to its discipline and thus slightly different, but the concepts still map 
onto one another in largely compatible ways.  




Historical studies focus on the differences in traditional and modern societies’ 
conception of their past, and on how, following rupture, societies relate to tradition, 
whereas legal scholars delve into notions of the legal past and the difference between 
traditional customary law and notions of law that emerge after communal rupture. 
Sociology and anthropology take a different approach to these issues, placing the 
opposition between traditional society’s attitude toward the past and post-traditional 
societies’ notions of history in the context of phenomena such as writing, mimetic practice, 
and social structures. Some fields posit tradition and its rupture in spatial or social contexts 
rather than in chronological ones; they thus situate traditional societies in villages or among 
the common folk, on the same temporal plane as modern societies, which they locate in 
cities or among the élite. This section will examine the notion of communal rupture in these 
different fields and bring them into dialogue with one another in order to understand how 
communal continuity and rupture affected the world of religious law. 
a. Binaries 
 Historical studies often differentiate between history and memory. Memory is associated 
with the collective, as in Maurice Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory, whereas history 
is the realm of the historian.560 As such, memory is for insiders, whereas history is for 
outsiders; memory is subjective, unselfconscious, and hazy, whereas history is objective, 
critical and scientific. Memory is often tied to emotions, it is affective; whereas history is 
distant, intellectual, and reasonable. As Pierre Nora explained, memory is authentic in 
many ways that history is not; memory is unselfconscious in the sense that the subject 
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belongs in a seamless and continuous fashion to memory, whereas history is perceived 
from afar, once the subject is separated from the events and can consider them from a 
distance.561 As one historian put it, the two are, in a sense, mutually exclusive: “General 
history starts only when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up.”562 
There is no need to set down history in writing except in moments of disintegration. 
Memory is characterized as a living repository and safeguard of tradition whereas history 
is a detached record of past events and personages.  
Similar distinctions have been made in the fields of anthropology and sociology. 
Robert Redfield associated small rural societies with “little culture,” which was more 
personally enmeshed with its society, whereas learned, reflective culture was more 
objective and critical and associated with the élite few.563 Jack Goody and Ian Watt have 
attribute similar differences to orality versus writing; orality posits continuity with tradition 
and is transmitted by repetition, whereas written-ness permits distance and critical 
reflection. In that sense, textuality is seen as more progressive, more analytical, and more 
rational than orality.564 Tradition implies continuity that unites the past with the present 
and attaches importance to faithful repetition. Textuality in contrast, permits distance 
between the tradition being transmitted and the recipient of this transmission in the present, 
thus allowing comparison and critical analysis. 
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Scholars of law and legal history similarly distinguish between tradition, continuity, 
and lack of critical reflection, which is transmitted almost organically, either orally or by 
mimetic repetition, on the one hand, and law, which is more critical and rational and often 
transmitted textually, on the other. Often, the realm of custom was identified with the 
common people or the rural folk, while law was the field of the scholar;565 custom was 
transmitted orally, and law in texts.566 The process of legalizing custom thus entailed the 
transition from orality to textuality, with an accompanying shift to scholarship and legal 
science.567 Each of these modes have their own logic, their own way of authentication. The 
authority of law rests on textual logic founded on analysis, precedent, and analogy, whereas 
custom supports its claim to authority by proving the reliability of its transmission, whether 
by means of an uninterrupted chain, the quantity of testimony, or the stature of the figure 
transmitting the custom. The repositories for authoritative source material are thus also 
distinct: the scholar searches textual archives of the past for sources of authority, whereas 
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the common people’s source of authority was based on continuity, and they were, thus, the 
living archive, needing merely to bear witness to an existent custom in order to imbue it 
with validity. 
Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of invented traditions links unselfconscious continuity 
with customs, which are seen as authentic traditions, whereas a tradition actively 
attempting to overcome rupture is consciously engineered and thus invented.568 Hobsbawm 
distinguishes between invented traditions and traditional society, which is dominated by 
custom. As opposed to invented traditions, true custom: 
… does not preclude innovation and change up to a point. … What it does is to give 
any desired change (or resistance to innovation) the sanction of precedent, social continuity 
and natural law as expressed in history. … Custom cannot afford to be invariant, because 
even in traditional societies life is not so. Customary or common law still shows this 
combination of flexibility in substance and formal adherence to precedent. The difference 
between ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ in our sense is indeed well illustrated here. ‘Custom’ is 
what judges do; ‘tradition’ (in this instance, invented tradition) is the wig, robe, and other 
formal paraphernalia and ritualized practices surrounding their substantial action.569 
 
Thus, in Hobsbawm’s view, custom is a holistic legal form that can therefore handle 
change in a continuous fashion, whereas invented tradition, which is artificial and divorced 
from any real community, cannot afford to be flexible. 
b. Complications 
These distinctions between tradition and rupture have been criticized in all the fields where 
they were advanced. Historians pointed to the essential similarities between history and 
memory, both by affirming forms of historical consciousness among traditional societies 
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and by questioning the idea of critical distance and objectivity among historians. Scholars 
such as Michel de Certeau, for instance, pointed to the ways in which historical writing is 
not so different from other more traditional forms of remembering.570 The distinction 
between scientific history and emotional memory became especially weakened by the 
treatment of historians such as Haydn White, who  saw  little difference between history 
and other ways of constructing narratives and did not consider the latter  more critical or 
rational than other ways.571 However, even scholars holding intermediate views 
acknowledged the many similarities between pre-modern memory writing and ‘scientific’ 
historical writing.572 While recognizing that history is but one genre among many forms of 
historical consciousness, each of which has different purposes and relevance (and none of 
which are completely neutral), these critics still insisted on designating history, the only 
genre that bases its authority on written sources, as scientific because it creates a distance 
from the present, whereas “living tradition sees itself as part of the past.” Thus, only history 
was considered fully capable of being critical. 573 In sum, both more radical and less 
extreme approaches recognized that history and memory are not truly separable. 
The need for Hobsbawm’s distinction between genuine custom, which is 
transmitted continuously and adapts in authentic ways, versus invented tradition, which 
                                                     
570 Michel de Certeau, L'Écriture de l'histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
571 Haydn White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory,” History and 
Theory 23 no.1 (1984): 1-33. 
572 Frantisek Graus, “Funktionen der spätmittelalterlichen Geschictsschreibung” in 
Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewusstsein im Späten Mittelalter, ed., Hans Patze (Jan Thorbecke 
Verlag, 1987): 11-55.  
573 “Nur die Historiographie mach schliesslich die Vergangenheit in ‘Distanz’ als Geschichte 
bewusst, wogegen die lebendige Tradition sich selbst irgendwie als integrierter Bestandteil der vergangenheit 
fuhlt…Die Geschichtsschreibung kann …kritisch gegenuber etablierter und vermeintlich unbestrittenen 
Traditionen auftreten….” (Graus, “Funktionen,” 39). 




comes after rupture, was likewise called into question, for instance by Peter Burke, who 
wondered where the line between invention and adaptation or flexibility is drawn and 
whether it is even useful to draw such a line.574 The identification of textuality and writing 
with history and critical distance, as opposed to orality with memory and lack of 
reflectivity, has come under the attack of scholars such as Brian V. Street, for instance, 
who detected in the approach of scholars such as Goody an inherent value judgement that 
considered written culture superior and more rational than the oral cultures they studied.575 
Others have pointed out that textual transmission does not imply any essential 
approach to the text, thus severing notions of rationality from textuality. Studies of legal 
history have shown that the different approaches to the past among élite and common folk 
are, in fact, not essential elements of their social role or degree of literacy. Rather, the 
differences in the various actors’ position in society create divergent interests that lead to 
different strategic uses of the past. A cross-over from scholarly groups to traditional 
memory and from rural groups to textual history is thus possible.576 Rather than thinking 
of scholars on the one hand and peasants on the other as isolated in completely parallel 
spheres – one historical, the other continuous; one written, the other oral; one relating to 
law, the other to custom – overlaps have been emphasized, showing that scholars made use 
of oral statements and traditional groups interacted with the élites. Moreover, the scholarly 
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élite and the common populace themselves are not monoliths, requiring distinctions and 
nuances within these categories. 
Distinctions similar to those about history and memory, tradition and change, law 
and custom, have been made in the realm of Jewish history, with varying degrees of nuance. 
In many ways, Yosef Ḥayim Yerushalmi’s Zakhor was an interpretation of Jewish history 
and memory based on Halbwachs’ ideas; it considered the Jewish people’s approach to its 
past as religious, and thus non-historical.577 To some extent, ideas of the unselfconscious 
past as opposed to ruptured modernity capable of criticism are present in Jacob Katz’s 
Tradition and Crisis, in which traditional society is stable and religious, and the modern 
era is secular (or neutral), a consequence of crisis.578 These distinctions have, however, 
been similarly critiqued in Jewish studies. Amos Funkenstein mentioned that, even absent 
Jewish historiography, a well-developed historical consciousness existed elsewhere 
namely, in “halakhic interpretations and applications.”579 Ivan Marcus has worked with a 
much-attenuated notion of the distinction between history and memory, arguing that 
religious tellings of the past  display a certain historical consciousness and possess great 
value as historical sources,580 and Dean Phillip Bell regards community ledgers and 
minutes as containing something akin to historical accounts.581  
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More recently, Marina Rustow and Albert Baumgarten have critiqued Hobsbawm’s 
sharp distinction between genuine versus invented traditions and its linkage with 
premodern versus modern societies from the realm of Jewish studies,582 explaining that 
“even when one can clearly distinguish between the two types, that distinction does not 
always yield analytical dividends.”583 They explain that conflating rupture and modernity 
is a “…presumption that rests on a notion that we find difficult to accept in light of the 
evidence we have examined – as though prior to modernity, Jews were unflaggingly pious, 
heirs to a continuous, organic and unselfconscious tradition and entirely lacking the tools, 
the wherewithal, or the necessity to call upon arguments from the past with self-conscious 
intent.”584 Instead, they suggest distinguishing weak versus strong appeals to tradition, and 
they show how appeals to tradition are usually a reaction to change, something that can be 
observed both in premodern and in modern times. In line with these adjustments, they 
present shifts from oral to written transmission as one such instance of crisis, which 
prompts appeals to authority.585 
In the realm of Jewish law, Menachem Elon has pointed out that custom was a 
learned legal concept, not something belonging solely to popular culture.586 Brachyahu 
Lifschitz has suggested that, as early as in talmudic and amoraic sources, minhag or 
custom, was a form of law, and, in fact, often referred to rabbinic legal adjudication rather 
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than to popular custom. The degree of authority accorded to popular custom differed from 
one halakhic culture to another at various times and places.587 The study of minhagim books 
has both emphasized the textual appearances of custom and connected the process of 
textualization to rupture.588 Haym Soloveitchik took the non-textual mimetic tradition into 
consideration in his analysis of legal scholarship, considering its impact on and importance 
to halakhic study, interpretation, and change. He pointed to the rupture of the Holocaust 
and the move of Jewish communities to the United States as the reason for a shift from the 
mimetic to the textual. This resulted in the predominance of strictly textual legalism where 
once a more nuanced form of law (that relied on practice and custom as legitimate sources) 
used to reign.589 Talya Fishman has emphasized that halakha and minhag should not be 
considered at odds with one another, but rather complementary.590 Thus, history and 
memory, halakha and custom, mimetic transmission and textuality, community and 
scholarship are seen as influencing one another.  
In sum, rather than belonging to separate realms that are governed by different 
methods, dynamics or rules, history and memory, scholarship and community, law and 
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custom, textuality and orality, are, in fact, closely related, influence each other,  and have 
relevance for élites and the community at large. Such distinctions are, in fact, very useful, 
but the pairs are not binary opposites. Rupture can apply to traditional society and history 
is not objective; scholars utilize oral transmission, and custom often has legal weight. In 
order to address the question of communal tradition, continuity, rupture and law, we must, 
then, understand these concepts and dynamics as belonging to a common realm, often 
coexisting, interacting, and impinging on one another. This will enable us to form not only 
a more nuanced image of the relationship between communal tradition and legal 
scholarship but also it will correct certain blind spots, revealing phenomena and 
connections that were missed due to false assumptions of dichotomous realms.  
 
3. COMMUNAL CONTINUITY AND SCHOLARLY TRADITION:  
a. Communal Continuity and Scholarly Tradition in Halakha 
 
As mentioned above, when examining continuity and rupture in various realms we are not 
dealing with strictly binary oppositions nor entirely separate realms. Precisely when they 
are brought together, these concepts and dynamics can lead to a deeper understanding of 
the relations between community and scholarship, tradition and rupture, and the 
transmission of legal knowledge. In particular, analyzing changes in religious law as a 
result of communal rupture enables us to isolate what the culture of halakhic scholarship – 
the scholarly culture studied here – received from communal continuity, and the effect of 
communal discontinuity on the law. 
Most law forms receive their authority from the past. The legal practice is a 
discipline based on examining whether current behavior conforms to legal norms that were 




previously established and transmitted.591 As such, legal scholarship is concerned primarily 
with those legal norms that are preserved textually. In general, textuality is the only way to 
transmit knowledge across rupture. Whereas both texts and oral traditions can be 
transmitted, even across geographical and temporal rupture, the latter requires a continuous 
chain of oral transmission. If this chain is disrupted, it is necessary to record the oral 
tradition by means of a more permanent medium (until recently, text) in order for it to be 
mediated. Legal investigations are thus fundamentally textual enterprises. Textual logic 
facilitates critical analysis and reasoning, whereas the logic of custom requires repetition 
and continuous transmission from a source of authority. 
It is useful to counterpose a textual logic, based on analysis of precedent and 
interpretations of analogous cases, to a logic of custom, based simply on continuity. 
However, this, too, is not a clear-cut distinction: As opposed to mimetically transmitted 
practices, customs repeated verbatim, for instance, function similarly to a text even though 
they are oral. Texts can be transmitted orally, and practices can be analyzed textually. Even 
when legal authority derives from text, the precise manner of relating the authoritative text 
of the past to the current legal case is not a given. The connection may not necessarily 
depend on using the logic of textual analysis, analogy and precedent. Sometimes, a logic 
more similar to custom can be used, which considers the more continuous or reliable textual 
transmission to be the more authoritative. Orality and textuality can thus apply to custom 
or law, and vice versa, as can their forms of logic and interpretation. Moreover, the 
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communal basis for the scholarly culture is not limited to the scholarly community but 
involves the legal community as a whole, inasmuch as law as practiced in the community 
is part and parcel of the legal system. The community thus becomes a carrier not only of 
custom but also of law. The community is the law’s sphere of jurisdiction and, as such, it 
is an indispensable part of legal transmission. 
These insights go beyond mere crossovers from one realm to the other. The 
attributes of textuality and orality, law and custom, and their forms of thinking, in fact, 
interpenetrate. The textual transmission of law is not completely stable, as non-textual 
elements such as technology, organization and scholarly culture affect the nature of the 
legal material.592 Scholarly culture has both practical and theoretical sides: the first refers 
to the specific techniques and material particular to a scholarly group. The theoretical side 
includes the rules and methods of working with legal knowledge that are not found in the 
text but often depend on non-textual transmission, as it concerns passing on an entire legal 
tradition, which cannot, therefore, be formulated at the level of theoretical education. This 
legal tradition is transmitted in the amorphous ways of the scholarly culture, through the 
vague channels of identity, affect, and values that rely on communal continuity in order to 
be preserved. In this sense, not only custom is transmitted by means of repetitive practice 
and mimetic continuity. Law, too, is dependent on this type of continuity in order to 
transmit the legal traditions that text alone, without the communal basis, cannot fully 
transmit. 
                                                     
592 See Algazi, “Ein gelehrter Blick,” 329. 




One should not use the difference between invented and real traditions, or invented 
laws and true custom, to distinguish between inherent authenticity and untruth. The concept 
of an invented tradition is nevertheless significant because it expresses the difference 
between a law that is newly and consciously constructed or reconstructed, on the one hand, 
and something transmitted in a more continuous fashion, on the other. Perhaps, instead of 
genuine versus invented, we should call them traditions and reconstructed traditions and 
distinguish between tradition and traditionalism. In this way, such differences can fruitfully 
elucidate the nature and meanings of traditions and the differences in a community before 
and after a rift. The more that the logic of custom, non-textual transmission, and community 
play a part in a legal tradition, the more vulnerable this legal tradition will be to disruption 
and change. We can thus gain a better understanding of the scholarly culture of halakha in 
Ashkenaz and the nature of its upheavals by studying the juncture points of these 
distinctions and examining precisely what got lost in the transition to the sixteenth century. 
b. Communal Continuity and Scholarly Tradition in Ashkenaz  
Examining the two elements in conjunction rather than separately facilitates the creation 
of a theoretical model of the relationship between community and legal scholarship. 
Ashkenaz is a marker of common origins signifying a shared religious culture. This 
religious cultural meaning is embedded in its legal tradition, the community’s distinctive 
culture of halakha. One of the main distinctions between Ashkenaz and Sfarad – the two 
main halakhic communities – is their legal tradition. This tradition includes the legal 
sources particular to each culture, the ones that are separate from the shared basic canonic 
halakhic texts and related modes of interpretation. Whether oral or written, both legal texts 




and customs function as types of legal knowledge; some of them are shared by several 
religious cultures, others are particular to a specific culture.  
In an overarching sense, the scholarly tradition of how to work with this knowledge 
governs the legal sources. There is much overlap between the legal sources available to 
ashkenazic and sfardic scholars; it is their legal tradition regarding this common body of 
sources that differs. A legal tradition could be described as a body of methods and rules for 
a scholarly discipline, traditions regarding, for instance, which sources to privilege and 
when, or how to interpret and adjudicate. Such a legal tradition is not necessarily strictly 
methodical. Its manner of transmission is in accord with Nora’s insight that history is 
“objective remembering” while memory is “sacred remembering,” which was more hazy, 
symbolic and “affective”593 and thus inextricable from its social aspects. As we have 
emphasized, however, the latter type of remembering is a crucial component of the legal 
tradition and thus important for the textual scholarship of halakha, too. Thus, 
notwithstanding the differences between memory and the mostly textual legal realm, the 
legal tradition does not transmit well textually. 
While this dynamic often existed, it was especially significant in Ashkenaz because 
of the disproportionate reliance on extra-textual elements of transmission in this halakhic 
culture. In many ways, the nature of the relationship between a scholarly culture and its 
legal traditions and the community is in itself part of the legal tradition and thus varies 
from one scholarly culture to another. Ashkenazic legal tradition was heavily 
interdependent with Ashkenaz the community.  Jewish scholarly cultures can rarely rely 
                                                     
593 See Bell, Jewish Identity in Early Modern Germany, 3. 




on geographic continuity as a unifying factor, but the community as a non-geographical 
idea can likewise provide such a unifying factor. Marcus related different communities’ 
way of telling their history, especially their translatio studii and stories of religious 
transmission, to different structures of authority. He noted that ashkenazic narratives, 
which seem to emerge especially at times when communal status is in decline,594 
emphasized the life of their community. Whereas in Sfarad, chains of authoritative figures 
were the more frequent form, in Ashkenaz, the focus was not necessarily on powerful or 
learned “saintly Jews”; the canvas is society itself. Both ashkenazic and sfardic forms of 
establishing traditional authority in this example are not text-based; but, whereas one 
focused on specific figures, the other emphasized continuity at the more nebulous level of 
the communal entity. Thus, ashkenazic religious culture was especially tied to its 
community, and saw it as the basic unit of religious transmission, more so than other 
religious cultures. This, perhaps, relates to the ideas expressed by Soloveitchik that scholars 
in Ashkenaz viewed their community as sacred, often considering their behavior a source 
of prescriptive law even when it did not correspond to the textual law.595 As Marcus puts 
                                                     
594 “The occasion for writing down a narrative about the past is not idle curiosity or even family 
pride or a community self-respect but a perceived change or loss” (Marcus, “Story and Collective Memory,” 
381). 
595 See, for instance, Haym Soloveitchik, “Can Halakhic Texts Talk History?” in AJS Review 3 
(1978): 188. Soloveitchik posits the custom and even the vaguer “religious sensibilities” of the community 
as a force that scholars such as RaShY took seriously, even in the face of their scholarly intellectual certainty 
that these sensibilities were not supported by the legal text as such: “The idea of Gentiles treading Jewish 
wine awakened revulsion in the Ashkenazic psyche….The roots of this sentiment are difficult to uncover (it 
clearly antedates all literary remains of the community), but one suspects that this aversion played its part in 
Rashi’s stubborn efforts to sustain, or at least understand minhag avot. It was not simply a question of ancient 
custom. … But here he realized that his interpretation … and he asked himself in amazement whether it was 
possible that the religious sensibilities of the entire Ashkenazic community had gone astray. Could so deeply 
felt an injunction be a figment of the imagination…? It was, one suspects, questions like these and the 
conflicting pull of intellectual certainty that led Rashi into ambiguity.” 




it, ashkenazic narratives “…describe the Jewish people as a holy community of hasidim – 
pietists – and emphasize that the self-image of Ashkenaz is of a community of righteous 
saints … the phrase Kehila kedosha [holy community] is central.”596 
Another notable characteristic of ashkenazic religious culture is the central place 
accorded to custom in its world of religious law.597 “What distinguished Minhag 
Ashkenaz,” in the words of one historian, “was the elevation of custom to a level virtually 
equivalent to law.”598 The insight that there is no absolute distinction between custom and 
law, that they do not inhabit separate realms and are not governed by different kinds of 
logic is thus especially relevant to understanding Ashkenaz and its legal tradition. The 
strong link between ashkenazic law and custom went beyond mere respect for custom as a 
legal source and the view that the community’s actions were, to some extent, legally 
authoritative. In cases of an opposition between custom and communal practice, on one 
hand, and law and scholarly text, on the other, the legal tradition of Ashkenaz sometimes 
                                                     
596 Marcus, “Story and Collective Memory,” 380-381 (capitalization in original). 
597 Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-kadmon (The ancient ashkenazic custom) (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 1992), 16-22; idem, “Halakhah, minhag u-meẓiut be-Ashkenaz, 1000 – 1350” (Halakha, custom 
and reality in Ashkenaz, 1000-1350) in Kneset meḥkarim (Collected studies) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2005); Eric 
(Yiẓhak) Zimmer, “Olam ke-minhago noheg: Prakim be-toldot ha-minhagim, hilkhotehem ve-gilgulehem 
(‘Olam ke-Minhago Noheg: Studies in the History and the Metamorphoses of Jewish Customs.) (Jerusalem: 
Zalman Shazar, 1996). 
This tendency is sometimes tied to Ashkenaz’s roots in Palestinian Jewry and its conviction that 
authority can be sought outside the Babylonian Talmud. See Israel Ta-Shma, “Halakha minhag u-masoret 
be-yahadut Ashkenaz ba-me’ot ha 11-12” (Halakha custom and tradition in the Jewry of Ashkenaz in the 
11th-12th centuries) in Sidra 2 (1987); idem, Minhag Ashkenaz, 9-10, 16, 93-103. See Fishman’s critique of 
this link in Fishman, Becoming the People of the Book, 177-178. Other than questioning the genealogical 
connection to the Land of Israel, Fishman also considers problematic Ta-Shma’s interpretation of ma’aseh 
(action) as referring to custom, rather than its more straightforward interpretation as a precedent from an 
actual legal case, which makes the ma’aseh into a legal principle rather than a reference to custom. These 
differences become less pronounced if we consider custom and law not to belong to two separate categories, 
something that Fishman’s interpretation, it seems, would support. 
598 Jay Berkovitz, “Crisis and Authority in Early Modern Ashkenaz,” Jewish History 26 (2012): 
179–199, 181. 




yielded preference to the former. Israel Ta-Shma, emphasizes this, writing that, in the 
eleventh century in Ashkenaz: “Custom did not yet have a specific relation to halakha 
because it was the entire essence of halakha and its energizing force.” 599 The two were 
completely interpenetrated, and, in Ashkenaz, custom was particularly privileged. Thus, 
rather than opposing custom and law, halakha includes both law and custom, and 
ashkenazic halakha was especially responsive to the latter. 
This characteristic also relates to the earlier discussed feature of the essentially 
scribal nature of halakha in Ashkenaz. By scribal, I designated a culture that worked with 
texts, but in ways that relied considerably on non-textual elements. This form of 
interpretation was, as mentioned, fluid, personal, and heterogeneous. Moreover, not only 
individual adjudication, but also the legal tradition as a whole, was tied to such personal 
and fluid transmission. Consider Rabbi Moellin’s statement, mentioned in chapter one, that 
the rules for working with halakhic sources, for example, when one relies on texts and 
when on action, or which source one privileges and how “…is a teaching that has no 
measure because one cannot teach a rule about it … and they require a rabbi and a 
tradition.”600 Halakha in Ashkenaz, both individual laws and its legal tradition, was 
strongly determined by non-textual elements, upon which its transmission depended. This 
is one of the reasons why both print and codification were so fundamentally incompatible 
                                                     
599 Israel Ta-Shma, “Halakha, minhag u-masoret,” 145. He also writes, “In this early period [the 11th 
century], the principle of ‘custom-action’ was still known as the living principle of Jewish law, which mainly 
relied on the common action and the accepted precedent, and only in the second place on creative and abstract 
interpretation.” See Fishman, Becoming the People of the Book, 177, where she criticizes the “newly-
fabricated term, ‘minhag-ma’aseh principle.” 
600 See chapter 1 in this dissertation; Yacov Moellin, Responsa, §171:  מילתא דלית ליה קצבה דלא להודיע
 כלל על זה, ...וכל כה״ג צריכא רבה וקבלה.




with ashkenazic halakha. When ashkenazic halakhic culture was challenged by these 
phenomena, it experienced total disruption. Whereas its texts were transmitted in writing, 
the non-textual elements were lost in communal rupture. The lack of communal continuity 
precluded the possibility for ashkenazic halakhic culture to resist these incompatible new 
forms of knowledge. 
c. Communal Discontinuity and Reconstruction 
Ashkenaz had come to designate not just location but also origins, thus suggesting 
communal continuity despite new whereabouts. The important halakhic texts from 
Ashkenaz; likutim with responsa, glosses, and customs made their way to Ashkenaz in its 
new locations. Increasingly, these texts were printed, thus unifying and stabilizing their 
contents to some extent.601 We must, however, also consider the effect on the scholarly 
tradition when the communal continuity is ruptured and subsequently reconstructed by 
successors. The members of ashkenazic scholarly culture in sixteenth-century Poland 
considered themselves the successors of their Franco-German forbears. They portrayed 
themselves as direct descendants, subscribed to the same texts, and, in theory, to the same 
scholarly culture. A noticeable shift occurred, however with regard to legal traditions; 
where transmission had been previously governed by a mixture of orality and textuality, 
stable textuality came to reign supreme. The logic of custom was replaced by more 
analytical legal reasoning, the relative weight of authorities and importance of sources was 
subtly redistributed, and values were reassigned. The reconstruction of Ashkenaz across 
                                                     
601 On the printing of ashkenazic minhag books, see Mincer, “Liturgical Minhagim Books” and 
Raspe, “The Migration of German Jews to Italy.” 




the rift of the sixteenth century meant that some of its scholarly culture, especially the parts 
most vulnerable to communal rupture because they were most reliant on non-textual 
transmission, were inexorably lost. 
Moreover, the universalization of halakha – the idea that Jewish law should be 
identical for Jews independent of location – gained unprecedented strength in the sixteenth 
century, making geographical difference and local variation more difficult to uphold.602 
The oeuvre of Rabbi Yosef Karo (1488-1575) expresses this tendency most strongly. 
Combining halakhic opinions from a broad range of origins into his Bet Yosef, first printed 
in the 1550s, Karo stated his intention of unifying the law, which was beginning to 
resemble “an innumerable amount of Torahs because of the many books.”603 Rabbi Karo’s 
method, as a rule, took the three main halakhic codes and adjudicated according to the 
majority. He apparently assumed that Jews across the world would use the work similarly. 
Tirẓa Kelman and Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, among others, have shown that Rabbi Karo’s 
halakhic universalism is closely linked to the phenomenon of print and that the 
standardization and broad geographic range of print technology influenced Rabbi Karo’s 
halakhic approach.604 
                                                     
602 On Rabbi Karo’s vision of a universalized halakha, see the article by Tirẓa Kelman, “Ktuvot be-
ot barzel ve-oferet be-dfus: mahapekhat ha-dfus ve-yeẓirat ha-ḥibur Bet Yosef” (Written in metal and lead 
letters in print: The print revolution and the creation of the work Bet Yosef) in Peamim (148):9-27. See also 
Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “Ḥakika, meshiḥi’ut, ve-ẓenzura: Hadpasat ha-Shulḥan Arukh ke-reshit ha-
moderni’ut” (Adjudication, messianism and censorship: The printing of the Shulḥan Arukh as the beginning 
of modernity) in Tov elem: Zikaron, kehila u-migdar be-ḥevrot ha-yehudim bi-yemei ha-beinaim u-be reshit 
ha-et ha-ḥadasha: Maamarim li-khvodo shel Reuven Bonfil (Memory, community and gender in the Jewish 
communities in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period), ed. Elisheva Baumgarten, Roni Weinstein, 
Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2011): 335-306. 
603 Yosef Karo, Bet Yosef, introduction:  כי לא נעשית התורה כב׳ תורות אלא כתורות אין מספר לסבת רוב
ודיניה.הספרים הנמצאים בביאור משפטיה   
604 Kelman, “Ktuvot be-ot barzel,” 21. 




As Kelman points out, Rabbi Karo did not regard divergences among communities 
as the primary source of halakhic difference. The only reference to geographic deviations 
in Bet Yosef’s introduction comes in the form of a caveat when discussing minhag or 
custom; he defines these differences as a ḥumra, or additional stringency, thus 
differentiating such deviations from the law per se. He refers to these differences by stating, 
“If in some lands they hold a prohibition of a few things even though we decide otherwise, 
they should retain their customs … as it says in the chapter makom she-nahagu [in a place 
where one has the custom, a chapter in tractate Psaḥim in the Talmud].”605 The rule from 
tractate Psaḥim that deals specifically with geographic displacement states: “One obligates 
him with the stringencies of the place from which he left and the place to where he is 
going,”606 meaning that people remain bound to the stringent customs of their original 
place. Rabbi Karo’s reason for this rule is that, “they already accepted upon themselves the 
words of the sage who prohibits,” thus basing the obligatory status of the custom on implied 
individual acceptance.607 In Rabbi Karo’s universalist understanding, halakha applied 
equally, regardless of location. Moreover, he considered that one was bound to the custom 
of one’s origin by means of personal acceptance of the custom. This implied that, once the 
thread of personal transmission is rent, the obligation is no longer valid. His system did not 
allow for communal variation that was simultaneously legal. As Raz-Krakotzkin and 
                                                     
605 Yosef Karo, Bet Yosef, introduction:  ואם בקצת ארצות נהגו איסור בקצת דברים אע״פ שאנו נכריע בהפך
 יחזיקו במנהגם כי כבר קבלו עליהם דברי החכם האוסר ואסור להם לנהוג היתר כדאיתא בפרק מקום שנהגו.
606 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Pesaḥim 51a: נותנין עליו חומרי המקום שיצא משם וחומרי המקום שהלך לשם 
607 This is in line with an example in the next folio of the Talmud (tractate Pesaḥim 51b), where a 
rabbi, it is told, allowed his student to act upon a certain lenient custom and stated that this permissive 
behavior would be allowed only in front of the rabbi, because he himself had seen Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai 
do it. When the student was not in his teacher’s vicinity, however, it was no longer permitted. This religious 
behavior was passed on mimetically, and lost its force from one link in the chain to the next. 




Kelman have argued, this view related to the development of print culture; it is also 
important, however, to note its significance in terms of communal and geographic 
discontinuity.  
Because of geographic dislocation and the accompanying complete communal 
rupture, the issue of what constitutes a community in terms of halakhic obligation needed 
to be reinvestigated.608 Rabbi Karo’s approach represents one attempt; he suggested that 
halakha was universal, and any non-universal element necessarily belonged to the realm of 
custom, which was governed by a different set of rules, such as the notion of personal 
acceptance. Moreover, as Kelman notes, Rabbi Karo’s works equally included ashkenazic 
halakhic sources and sfardic ones, but he completely disregarded the ashkenazic method 
of adjudication.609 He considered the sfardic legal tradition the only legitimate one (perhaps 
even the only legal tradition) and attributed any irreconcilable differences between the two 
legal cultures to custom, which he posited as an extra-legal realm. In other words, his 
approach made it possible to unify different legal texts into one universal legal system but 
not to accept multiple legal traditions. Legal traditions, as we have noted, are much more 
difficult to negotiate textually and are thus in greater danger of getting lost amidst 
communal discontinuity. The halakhic tradition of Ashkenaz was not lost in the sense that 
the relevant sources had vanished or that its principles had been forgotten by its successors 
to the east. Rather, many of the legal traditions had lost their authority or changed in 
meaning. The change enabled innovative interpretations that previously would have been 
                                                     
608 See Joseph Davis, “The Reception of the Shulḥan Arukh and the Formation of Ashkenazic Jewish 
Identity,” AJS Review 26, no. 2 (2002): 251-276, for a thorough study of these investigations in Ashkenaz. 
609 Kelman, “Ktuvot be-ot barzel,” 22-23. 




impossible due to the limitations of the legal tradition; it also blocked earlier approaches 
to halakha. A case study will illustrate these dynamics. 
 
4. CASE STUDY: SANCTITY OF FIRSTBORN ANIMALS 
a. Introduction: Sanctity Of Firstborn Animals; Issues, Laws, Concepts 
 
According to biblical law, the firstborn of any kosher animal,610 if it is male, is to be 
sacrificed in the Temple in Jerusalem and some of its meat given to the kohanim (sing. 
kohen), members of the priestly class.611 Even after the destruction of the Temple, in the 
diaspora, the firstborns were, according to some opinions,612 considered sacred and 
designated for the kohanim; they therefore could not be eaten or used until they acquired 
an injury that rendered them unfit for sacrifice.613 They belonged to the kohen, who was 
permitted to eat or sell them, within certain limitations. Belonging to the priestly class had 
only very limited ramifications in the diaspora, since most of their tasks related to Temple-
service and rituals. In terms of actual repercussions, not much remained of the priestly 
status beyond certain honors and roles in specific rituals and prayers, particular marital 
restrictions, and care in avoiding contact with cadavers. It was also unavoidable that the 
                                                     
610 Exodus 13:2, “Sanctify for me every firstborn”; Leviticus 11: 3-8, and Deuteronomy 14: 4- both 
give the same general set of rules for identifying which land animals (behemot) are ritually clean. Any animal 
that "chews the cud" and has a completely split hoof is ritually clean, but those animals that only chew the 
cud or only have cloven hooves are unclean. 
611See Exodus 13:11-15; Numbers 18: 15-18; Deuteronomy 12:5-6, 17; see Babylonian Talmud 
tractate Zevahim 56b (Mishna), and Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot bekhorot 1:1-2. 
612 See Midrash Tana’im on Deuteronomy 14:23; אי מה מעשה...ת״ל קדש לי כל בכור, בין בארץ בין בחו״ל 
etc.  
See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot bekhorot 1:5, and the glosses of Ra’AvaD (Rabbi Avraham 
ben David, ca. 1125-1198, Provençe), who seems to have consulted a copy where Maimonides stated that it 
does not apply in the diaspora, and who corrects Maimonides’ “mistake.” The gloss of Rabbi Yosef Karo on 
Mishne Torah called Kesef Mishne, points out that Ra’AvaD used an erroneous copy of Maimonides’ work 
and that the firstborns born outside of the Land of Israel need not be sacrificed, but are nonetheless considered 
sacred and belong to the priests. 
613 Deuteronomy 15:21-22. 




priestly lineage of certain families had been forgotten. However, the kohen did maintain a 
certain honored social position and he would, for instance, be called up to read the Torah 
first. How this privileged position translated in the social and rabbinic imagination 
depended on the particular community and its culture. In the post-Temple period, nothing 
could be done with these firstborns until they became unfit for sacrifice. As it was 
prohibited purposely to injure a firstborn animal in order to render it unfit, the owner was 
required to feed and care for this animal without any profit for the rest of its healthy life. 
Both slaughtering and eating consecrated animals outside the Holy Land in violation of the 
requirements of purity are considered very grave sins, punishable with karet.614 Karet, often 
translated “extirpation,” is a form of spiritual excision (“that soul shall be cut off from the 
Jewish people”615) and is considered the worst form of biblical punishment. The following 
section will elucidate three topics of scholarly disagreement considering the halakha of 
firstborn animals.616   
i. Birth History of the Mother and Firstborn Status 
If an animal has given birth in the past, it can no longer be a first calver (female cattle 
pregnant with its first calf).617 The animals it bears subsequently will thus not be considered 
                                                     
 
615 See, for example, Genesis 17:14. 
616 There are several other questions such as, for example, what kind of injury renders a firstborn 
unfit to be sacrificed and thus permissible for slaughter? I shall deal only with those issues that appear 
frequently in halakhic discussions that are part of the ashkenazic tradition of stringency with regard to the 
sanctity of firstborn animals in Ashkenaz. 
See also Ta-Shma, Halakha, minhag, u-meẓiut, chapter 11, in which he lays out the earlier medieval 
ashkenazic approach to this issue and contrasts it with the non-ashkenazic approach, according to which there 
is no issue of firstborn animals outside of the Land of Israel. 
617 These are also called primiparous animals. See, for instance, Victor R. Squires, Range and 
Animal Sciences and Resources Management in The Encyclopedia of Life Support Sciences, vol. 2 (United 
Kingdom: EOLSS /UNESCO, 2010), 22. “Primiparous: An animal that has only experienced one pregnancy. 




firstborns. There are several ways to determine the animal’s birth history: If an animal had 
been in the same Jew’s possession when it gave birth previously, all the animals born 
subsequently are not considered firstborns. If the animal was purchased from another Jew, 
and the seller did not mention previous births, there are three different amoraic opinions.618 
If, however, the animal was bought from a non-Jew, it is uncertain whether the seller’s 
testimony regarding the animal’s birth history can be accepted. The testimony of non-Jews 
and women is generally not considered legally valid. In very urgent and exceptional cases 
such testimony may be accepted, provided that the seller is conveying information 
innocently (mesiaḥ lefi tumo), unprompted, and without intent to testify, but firstborn cattle 
is not such a case.619 Moreover, in this specific scenario, the seller has an incentive to lie, 
                                                     
In the case of cattle, these animals are sometimes referred to by ranchers as ‘first calf heifer,’ ‘first calf cow, 
or ‘first calver.’” 
618 Rabbi Yoḥanan is of the opinion that a Jewish seller is obligated to disclose the status of the 
animal (whether it is a first calver or not) at the time of its sale. If the Jewish seller said nothing, the next 
animal is definitely not a firstborn. (Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 21b.) Rav disagrees, contending 
that a seller’s silence implies that the animal never gave birth in the past and is, thus, a first calver. He bases 
this opinion on the assumption that any seller would prefer to disclose information regarding the animal’s 
birth history had the animal already given birth, as cattle that already gave birth in the past are more desirable 
products and can thus fetch a higher price. Thus, if the animal had already given birth in the past, it would be 
in the interest of the seller to mention this information. If the seller did not disclose any such information, the 
animal should be considered a first calver.  
Having calved before is a sign of good health, usually results in better milk production, as they wean 
faster, and the heifer requires less recovery time before being able to gestate again, compared to a first calver, 
which typically needs about ten days longer to recover (See Heather Smith Thomas, The Cattle Health 
Handbook [US: Storey Publishing, 2009], 25). Additionally, a Jewish buyer would also benefit from the fact 
that there is no risk of a firstborn. (This last reason cannot be countered by Shmuel’s counterargument.) 
Shmuel takes an intermediate position, claiming that the seller’s silence does not imply anything, and the 
first offspring born in the new buyer’s possession should be considered a questionable firstborn (safek 
bekhor). Explaining that the seller may have omitted the animal’s birth history because he assumes that the 
animal is being bought for meat consumption rather than for milk production or breeding. In that case, the 
animal will be slaughtered, and the information regarding the animal’s birth history is irrelevant. 
619 There are two possible ways in which having given birth in the past is a plus for a buyer. One is 
halakhic (the next offspring is not a firstborn); the other is universal (better milk, a healthier cow). See Tosafot 
in Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 21b on ה אישתבוחי”ד , who explain that RaShY’s choice of the kind 
of praise that is implied in saying that the animal gave birth in the past, namely, the fact that the cow has 
already given birth and is thus at lower risk of dying in birth the next time is a universal advantage (applying 
to Jews and non-Jews alike), rather than the halakhic one. 




saying that the animal gave birth previously, as this makes the product more desirable. Any 
statement from a non-Jewish seller concerning the animal’s previous births thus will not 
exempt its next offspring from firstborn status. According to some opinions, however, such 
testimony would serve to demote the animal from the status of a certain firstborn to the 
status of a questionable firstborn (safek beḥor). Such a questionable firstborn is not exempt, 
but it is not certain that the offspring is truly a firstborn, either. 
Another method of determining an animal’s birth history is by verifying milk 
production. Generally, lactation is considered proof that the animal has given birth in the 
past. In the Talmud, Rabbi Yehoshua620 claims that producing milk is enough to exempt 
any further offspring from firstborn status.621 According to others (Rabbi Akiva), this is not 
considered a sufficiently certain sign of having birthed in the past, and the subsequent 
offspring is considered a questionable firstborn (safek bekhor), but not fully exempt. 
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mentions that if one sees an animal with a suckling newborn, 
one may assume that this is its own offspring and not a random calf, because a mother loves 
only its own offspring enough to feed it. Therefore, one may assume that the animal 
                                                     
They explain that RaShY’s choice of the more universal praise implies that even if a non-Jew 
mentions the animal’s previous births innocently, he is still to be suspected. Had RaShY chosen the second 
interpretation, that the seller would surely have mentioned past births because of the inherent halakhic 
advantage, then perhaps a non-Jew’s innocent statement about the cow’s birth history would be believed 
because we would assume that he was unaware of the halakhic advantage, and therefore he was not planning 
“casually to drop” that information to entice the Jewish buyer. (As it happens, our editions of the Talmud 
have RaShY choosing the halakhic rather than the universal explanation. We could also explain that, saying 
that one would think a non-Jew is not suspect of knowing the halakhic advantage and using that to convince 
the buyer, and RaShY’s choice of the halakhic advantage rather than the universal one shows us that we do, 
in fact, suspect the seller in all cases). See also Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, there. 
620 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 20b. 
621 And see, for instance, Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Laws of Firstborns 4:§8. 
ואפילו היה זה שמניקה , לקח בהמה מניקה מן הנכרי אינו חושש שמא בנה של אחרת היא מניקה אלא הרי זו בחזקת שילדה
וכן בהמה שהיא חולבת פטורה מן הבכורה שרוב הבהמות אינן חולבות אלא , כמו מין אחר ואפילו כמין חזיר הרי זו פטורה מן הבכורה
 אם כן כבר ילדו




suckling was its mother’s own offspring, and is no longer a first calver. 622 The tosafist 
Rabbenu Tam (1100-1171) interprets even Raban Shimon ben Gamliel’s formulation very 
narrowly, reading “because she [the mother] does not meraḥemet [love/have mercy] unless 
she gave birth,”623 in line with the scenario described; specifically, an animal suckling a 
newborn, rather than simply producing milk. This leads him to understand that, even 
according to Raban ben Gamliel, milk production by itself is not sufficient evidence. 
Rather, one must witness lactation within the context of a caregiving relationship between 
mother and calf. If the animal is merely giving milk, but not seen actually suckling an 
animal, Rabbenu Tam would not consider this sufficient evidence. Other interpretations of 
Raban Shimon ben Gamliel are broader and consider his statement to apply to milk 
production generally, without requiring one to see an actual newborn animal suckling from 
the mother.624 
The halakhic discussion acknowledges that an animal rarely is capable of producing 
milk if it never gave birth in the past. However, a certain method of calculation is applied, 
namely, the method invoked by Rabbi Meir:625 “base the minority on the presumption 
                                                     
622 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 24a. The other opinion, “Tana kama,” disagrees on this 
point, because the animal might be feeding another animal’s calf, meaning that such a case should not exempt 
the subsequent offspring of that animal and instead merely demote it to questionable firstborn status (safek 
beḥor). 
623 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 24a: דאינה מרחמת א”כ יולדת 
624 Others take  אינה מרחמת to mean that she does not produce milk unless she gives birth, that the 
process of giving birth and the love/mercy and desire to feed her young is what makes her capable of 
producing milk in the first place. If one interprets the statement in that way, it is not related to witnessing the 
mother caring for any specific animal and is limited to the production of milk independently. 
625 This method can work in two ways: an assumption can also serve to weaken a majority. In 
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Nidah 18b, tractate Kidushin 80a: “If a child is found at the side of dough, and 
there is dough in his hand, R. Meir declares it clean; the Sages declare it unclean, because it is a child's nature 
to dabble. [among unclean things]... What is R. Meir's reason? He holds, most children dabble, yet there is a 
minority who do not, while the dough stands in the presumption of cleanness: hence combine the minority 
with the presumption, and the majority is weakened” (trans. Soncino). 




(ḥazaka) to be stringent.” This method uses a specific primary assumption (ḥazaka) to 
buttress even a weak minority, thus rendering even the exception to the rule significant 
enough to require a more stringent approach. In our case, this would mean relying on the 
presumption (ḥazaka) that an animal is assumed to have the status of a first calver until 
proven otherwise626 to apply even to the small minority of animals that produce milk 
without ever having given birth; this would require a stringent approach suspecting even 
animals that produce milk of being first-calvers and, thus, considering the subsequent 




                                                     
626 See Tosafot in Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 20b for a discussion of this method in the 
case of firstborn animals and in various domains of halakha in which minority/majority and exception issues 
arise. See also Rabenu Tam, Sefer ha-yashar. 
Base the animal on the presumption that it had never given birth, העמד בהמה בחזקה שלא ילדה. This is 
akin to the “presumption of the body” (חזקת הגוף) in general throughout the Talmud. This is a presumption 
that a body was in its primary physical state, unless reason can be brought to believe the contrary. For 
example, there is a presumption that a woman is a virgin, unless there is reason to believe that this is not the 
case, or that a physical defect was not present earlier, unless evidence is presented to the contrary (see 
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Ketubbot 65b and throughout the first chapter, for examples). The primary state 
of the body is considered to be whatever it is originally, unless there is reason to assume that something 
happened to it. Therefore, we assume that an animal never gave birth before unless we have reason to assume 
otherwise. 
627 The alternative approach to Rabbi Meir is to say that a minority is basically negligible. Thus, it 
is not a consideration at all, and even if we have a primary assumption that counters the majority, the principle 
is that a majority is stronger than a primary assumption. Apart from lactation and the seller’s testimony, the 
Talmud also proposes age limits, before which we can assume that certain animals did not yet give birth.  
In Ashkenaz, evidently, there were practices of trying to determine the animal’s history by looking 
at signs on its horns. Apparently, the horns were believed to show whether the animal had given birth in the 
past, as one responsum puts it; “according to the tradition that with each calf another circle is born on its 
horns,” but these are usually not considered sufficient evidence. Israel Bruna, ShUT MaharI Bruna, §278. 
The letter was written by Rabbi Eliezer of Pessau, who was a student of his and embroiled in a dispute with 
a Rabbi Eljahu of Prague (see Moshe Hershler, “introduction,” ShuT MaharI Bruna (Jerusalem: Makhon 
Yerushalaim, 1973), 5n32. 
י שאינם סימנים מובהקים לסמוך עליהם ”מ אם ראו סמנים בקרניה לפי הקבלה שבכל עגל נולד לו עוגל בקרניה אעפ”מ
 ...מדאורייתא




ii. The Correct Method of Sale: 
If the mother animal628 was owned by a non-Jew, even partially, 629 at the time that it was 
born, the newborn is exempt from firstborn status. A solution for sacred firstborns is, then, 
to sell the mother animal to a non-Jew prior to birth. Several conditions determine whether 
this sale is carried out correctly.630 The proper method of selling something to a non-Jew 
depends on how a Jew properly sells something to his fellow Jew. Various opinions 
regarding the correct method of sale between Jews appear in the Talmud.631 According to 
Rabbi Yoḥanan, transactions take effect at the moment that the money is handed over, 
whereas Resh Lakish considers a sale to become valid at the moment that the buyer takes 
possession of the newly bought object by means of physically pulling it, bringing it onto 
his property, or renting or buying the area on which it stands. The latter opinion is often 
referred to as meshikha, or “pulling.” The medieval ashkenazic interpretation of Rabbi 
Shlomo Yiẓḥaki (also known as RaShY, 1040-1105) differs from that of his son-in-law 
                                                     
628 While, theoretically, the newborn itself could be sold in advance, it is more complicated to do so 
correctly without falling into the problem of selling davar she-lo ba la’olam, something that is not yet in 
existence, which invalidates the sale. For this reason, most halakhic sources advise selling the mother rather 
than the offspring. 
629 Even selling only part of the animal could suffice, seeing as an animal owned in partnership with 
a non-Jew is also exempt from firstborn status. There are different opinions concerning the specifications for 
the size and type of body part of the animal that the non-Jew was required to own in order to exempt the 
animal from firstborn status. 
630 There are additional issues, for instance, the question of what part of the animal must be sold to 
the non-Jew in order to consider it properly owned by the non-Jew. The measure ranges from any body part 
that would render the animal treifah (an animal whose flesh was torn or ripped in a way that renders it 
unkosher for consumption) if missing, to anything that would render it neveilah (if an animal died before 
being slaughtered or was slaughtered improperly) if it were missing. There is also a question of how the 
injury was inflicted (by accident or on purpose, with premeditation or not, by a Jew or a non-Jew, etc.) I 
focus only on those questions engendering frequent disagreement in my sources. 
631Babylonian Talmud tractates Kidushin 28b, Eruvin 81b, Bava meẓia 46a and 47a-b, Ḥulin 83a, 
and others. 




Rabbenu Tam regarding which opinion –Rabbi Yoḥanan or Resh Lakish – should be 
followed.632 
Whatever the method for sales transactions with a Jew, in the case of transactions 
with a non-Jew, the exact opposite method will apply.633 Thus, whoever is of the opinion 
that a Jew buying from a fellow Jew must do so by accepting the money, will rule that, 
when dealing with a non-Jew, the sale will be concluded when the actual object being sold 
is physically transferred to the buyer. Vice versa, those who consider physical transfer of 
the object to effect a sale between Jews, will consider the monetary transaction to be the 
crucial element for transactions with a non-Jew. RaShY holds that, for transactions between 
Jews, the determinant is the physical transferring of the object;634 therefore, when selling 
to a non-Jew, the money changing hands determines the transaction. For Rabbenu Tam, it 
                                                     
632 Rabbenu Tam sides with Rabbi Yoḥanan that biblical acquisition is by means of money, while 
RaShY agrees with Resh Lakish that the merchandise changing hands is the critical moment. The principle 
is that the law is like Rabbi Yoḥanan when he disagrees with Resh Lakish, apart from three exceptions (this 
is not one of them).  
RaShY solves this by explaining that it is not really a disagreement of Rabbi Yoḥanan vs. Resh 
Lakish, because Resh Lakish is merely relating this opinion in the name of Rav Oshaya (see Babylonian 
Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 13b).  
Rabbenu Tam and RaShY’s opinions differ for several reasons: The formulation “mi-yad amitekha” 
(from the hand of your peer) is biblical support for Resh Lakish’s opinion that one buys from a fellow Jew 
(amitekha) by pulling (mi-yad )and also includes the notion that in the case of a non-Jew, the opposite is true 
(“mi-yad” – physical pulling, “amitekha” –> a fellow Jew). Rav Yoḥanan believes that, biblically, money 
buys (see Babylonian Talmud tractates Bekhorot 13b, Eruvin 81b, Bava meẓia 46b-47b, and others) but that 
the principle that the sale is only concluded when the buyer takes possession of the merchandise was a later 
rabbinic decision made to avoid situations in which the merchandise is still in the seller’s hands but not in 
his legal possession any longer and he would therefore make no effort to rescue it if endangered, as it is no 
longer his. He deals with “mi-yad amiteḥa” by explaining that any mention of buying (kinyan) implies the 
exchange of money; his proof texts are  שדות בכסף יקנו, "Fields will be bought for money" (Jeremiah 32:42) 
and  מכסף מקנתו “…out of the money that he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51). 
633 See Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 13a-b. The biblical mention in Leviticus 25:14 ( או
 ,or if you buy from the hand of your peer...”) specifies that it refers to buying from a peer…“ – קנה מיד עמיתך 
thus leading to the conclusion that transactions with non-Jews will be different. 
634 See RaShY on Babylonian Talmud, tractate Kidushin 14b, Bekhorot 3b. 




is precisely the opposite; the object must change hands for the sale with a non-Jew to take 
place.635 Most halakhic decisors agreed with Rabbenu Tam in this case.636 
iii. May the Kohen Return a Firstborn? 
In the time of the Temple, once the priest received the firstborn animal, he had to sacrifice 
part, and then was entitled to its meat.637 In cases of a questionable firstborn (safek beḥor), 
the animal had to be kept and treated respectfully until it was rendered unfit for sacrifice 
(by accidental injury) and only then could it be slaughtered and eaten by the kohen without 
requiring any sacrifice. Any disrespect to priestly gifts was considered very grave, and the 
animal could not be returned to the giver, as this was an act of disrespect.638 Firstborn 
animals were considered sacred whether or not they were born in the Land of Israel. Some 
opinions held that, while the animal was sacred outside of the Holy Land, there was 
nevertheless no obligation in such cases to give the animal to a kohen.639 According to 
others, even in a period when Temple sacrifice was not relevant, the firstborn was still 
considered the kohen’s property, as it is one of the twenty-four priestly gifts640 and their 
sanctity is determined by the firstborn status of the animal itself, not by the geographical 
                                                     
635 See Tosafot in Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bava meẓia 48b, Avoda zara 71a, on “Rav Ashi...” 
636 See, for instance, Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Laws of Firstborns 4:§85. 
פ שלא משך קנה "וכן אם קנה הנכרי מישראל בדיניהם ונתן מעות אע..., ישראל שנתן מעות לנכרי וקנה לו בהן בהמה
 .ופטורה מבכורה
637 For instance, because its mother was giving milk prior to the birth, which counts for something, 
but is not sufficient evidence to completely exempt the animal. 
638 See ROSh (Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel) on Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot, chapter 5. 
639 Regarding the medieval Spanish tradition, based on a phrasing in Mishne Torah that many 
considered mistaken, claiming that Maimonides held firstborn animals to have no sanctity at all outside the 
Land of Israel, see Ta-Shma, Halakha minhag u-meẓiut , 207-208. While most halakhists were of the opinion 
that this is not correct (Naḥmanides, Rabbenu Yonah, etc.), the common belief in the Spanish milieu was 
clearly that Maimonides did not consider firstborns sacred at all outside of the Holy Land and people acted 
in accordance with this belief. 
640 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bava kama 110b. 




location of its birth. Thus, in those cases, its owner could not slaughter the animal or benefit 
from it in any other way, and an unwilling kohen could not return such an animal to its 
owner even in post-Temple times.641 If the animal was definitely a firstborn, it would be 
considered disrespectful to return such an animal,642 but where the animal is only suspected 
of being one (safek beḥor), the law is indefinite. 
b. The Ashkenazic Tradition 
 
The following sections will investigate the laws mentioned above as they developed in the 
ashkenazic tradition of the post-tosafist period. After the ashkenazic “mythical past,” which 
is represented by the eleventh-century forefather of Ashkenaz, RaShY, the starting point 
for ashkenazic halakhic tradition is Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg (d.1293). I discuss the 
transmission of his approach in fourteenth-century likutim literature, primarily in the 
various iterations of Sefer haMordekhai. As discussed in precious chapters, likutim, 
manuscript compilations of a variety of halakha-related material from many different 
sources, reflect a highly fluid scribal culture in which the text depends heavily on non-
textual elements. Much of the textual transmission of ashkenazic halakha was via these 
                                                     
641 From Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, ShUT ha-ROSh, principle 49 §2 (also included in his Piskei ha-
ROSh on the Talmud, and printed as a stand-alone section called “Hilkhot pidyon bekhor” (The laws of 
redeeming the firstborn) at the end of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s commentary on tractate Bekhorot. וכן בכור
והכהן צריך . והכהן שומרו בביתו ומגדלו עד שיפול בו מום, כ נותנו לכהן”ואח...ז וצריך הישראל ליטפל בו ”בהמה טהורה נוהג בזה
משום דהוי כמבזה מתנות כהונה ואין מודה בהו, לקבלו ואין רשאי לסרב . 
642 See Ta-Shma, Halakha, minhag u-meẓiut, 211-212, regarding the opinion of Rabbi Elazar of 
Metz (in Sefer yere’im, §142), who suggested that the kohen can simply ignore the firstborn animal until it 
dies. This opinion was not adopted and, in fact, vehemently opposed by all halakhic authorities. Tosafot seem 
to mention that this was a possibility, but that waiting for it to become injured is a better option as in the first 
case, the kohen cannot derive any benefit from the carcass, whereas once it is injured, he can. Notwithstanding 
this explanation, no other ashkenazic authorities seem to have considered it possible that the kohen had the 
option of letting the animal starve. 




compilations. This mode was well suited to transmitting legal texts as a component, rather 
than a complete representative of, the legal tradition. 
 The echoes of what came to be characterized in these likutim as the quintessentially 
ashkenazic approach to firstborn animals reverberates in fifteenth-century responsa, where 
the awe for Rabbi Rothenburg is palpable. These responsa address several aspects of the 
ashkenazic legal tradition and its characteristics. First, I consider the logic of custom and 
its form of reasoning, which is centered, in these cases, on an authoritative figure, who 
comes to dominate an entire era. Second, I point out the ways in which the community at 
large is involved and show that “the common people,” while playing a crucial role, are not 
a monolith. Third, I study how rabbis working within the logic of custom treat conflicts 
between concrete situations and legal authority, often providing ad-hoc solutions. A 
separate section devoted to Rabbi Israel Isserlein’s (d. 1460) opinion on firstborn animals 
will show how his creative modes of investigation and argument, which tended to favor 
legal reasoning over the logic of custom, were nevertheless tempered by the strength of the 
ashkenazic legal tradition. Together, these insights illuminate the nature of the legal 
tradition of Ashkenaz as it existed before the rupture of the sixteenth century. 
The final part of this study will consider the fate of bekhor behema in the sixteenth 
century, in the writings of the main representative of the new ashkenazic tradition, Rabbi 
Moshe Isserles, and in the responsum of a more conservative figure, Rabbi Yosef Katz. The 
former provides an example of the kinds of reasoning that prevail in a reconstructed 
tradition and of the elements of a legal tradition that lose importance when transmitted by 
text. The latter will show that even a scholar with a strong conscious desire to continue 




earlier legal traditions cannot do so in the same manner as his predecessors across the 
chasm of communal rupture. The case as a whole analyzes the approach to firstborn 
animals when Ashkenaz was in its original surroundings and the subsequent early modern 
shift in approach, in an attempt to discern the lost legal tradition of Ashkenaz. It will point 
out the influence of the geographic move and reconstitution of the ashkenazic community 
on the new tone in the halakhic discussion in the sixteenth century. 
i. RaShY 
Several sources testify to Rabbi Shlomo Yiẓḥaki’s serious attitude toward the issue of 
firstborn animals. A collection of responsa attributed to him relates643 that someone 
accidentally slaughtered a firstborn, “and came and asked the Rabbi [RaShY] whether the 
law of firstborns applies in this day, and Rabbi answered, certainly, certainly it applies and 
it applies, and the one who slaughtered it is guilty of slaughtering outside the Temple...”644 
Building on this testimony of a spoken answer, the summary in a thirteenth-century text 
reads as follows: “A non-injured firstborn in this day and age, there is nothing one can do 
about it until he becomes injured, and both [regular] Israelites and kohanim are prohibited 
to [benefit from] it, and if someone slaughters it, he is completely guilty of karet...”645 
Another source, this time testimony about his actions, clearly shows the seriousness 
of the matter: “Rabbi [RaShY] had a calf that had not given birth yet, and he gave it to a 
                                                     
643 On the authors and editors of these responsa, see Israel Ta-Shma, Rabbi Zraḥya ha-Levi, Ba’al 
ha-maor, u-benei ḥugo (Rabbi Zrachya ha-Levi, Ba’al ha-maor and his circle) (Mosad ha-Rav Kook: 
Jerusalem, 1992), and Avraham Grossman, Ḥakhmei Ẓarfat ha-rishonim. 
644 This is written by a certain Rabbi Shmarya, who relates that someone asked RaShY, and it is 
printed in Sefer ha-orah (L’vov, 1905), 219 (emphasis added). ... ואחר שחיטה והפשטה הרגיש בדבר, ובא ושאל את
והשוחטו חייב משום שחוטי חוץוודאי וודאי נוהג ונוהג רבי (רש״י) אם דין בכור נוהג בזמן הזה. ואמר רבי  . 
645 See Shibole ha-leket (Stalks of the gathering), vol. 2, ed. Simḥa Ḥassidah (Jerusalem, 1988), §25. 
Written by Rabbi Ẓidkiyahu ben Avraham Rofeh in the 13thc. (Venice; Bomberg, 1546).  בכור בזמן הזה אין לו
 .תקנה עד שיפול בו מום, ומי ששוחט אותו חייב כרת גמור משום שוחט קדשין בחוץ




non-Jew to partner with him because he was worried it would give birth to male offspring. 
And he did not fear the prohibition of partnerships with non-Jews, and his opinion was that 
if the calf were to give birth to a male, it is prohibited.”646 RaShY was willing to partner 
with a non-Jew, something that halakhic sources frowned upon, in order to prevent the risk 
of a firstborn. These recollections of what RaShY said and did testify to the behavior of the 
“founding father” of Ashkenaz; moreover, they emphasize – note the doubling in the 
statement attributed to him: “certainly, certainly” and “it applies and it applies” – the high 
degree of precaution that he took to avoid this prohibition.647 Although these are legal texts, 
they share certain features with the realm of memory writing in terms of their affect. 
RaShY’s position as the forefather of this halakhic world adds to the weight of such 
statements, not only because of their legal implications but also because his example of 
exercising strong caution to avoid transgressing the prohibition became tied to the 
collective identity of Ashkenaz. 
ii. Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg 
 
Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg leaned toward stringency in all of the three key issues discussed 
above. The view that transgressing the sanctity of firstborns was a particularly grave sin 
punishable by karet, explains, to some extent, the tendency to be stringent with regards to 
                                                     
646 See Tshuvot RaShY, §183, quoted in Ta-Shma, Halakha minhag u meẓiut, 210.  עגלה היתה לרבי
שלא ביכרה, ונתנה לגוי בשותפות מפני שהיה מתיירא שמא תלד זכר. ולא חש לאותה ששנינו אסור לעשות שותפות עם גוי. ודעתו 
היתה שאם תלד זכר א״א לשומרו מתורת עבודה ומהויית מום...ואח״כ שמע שהיתה חורשת בשבת ואמרו לו לרבי, והשיב: מאחר 
וי, מותר, דלא אדעתאישאי אפשר לו שלא תהא תחת יד הג . 
647 Wood provides a strikingly similar example of the oral communication of local custom (in that 
example, about property), including the doubling for effect: “John Carpenter remembered that he had gone 
to see William Kere, ‘being very syck and upon his dethe bed.’ They discussed the dispute over Cleeve Hills, 
and William ‘seid to his wife oh lett them have itt, lett them have itt for they be in the right.” Wood, The 
Memory of the People, 9 (emphasis added). 




firstborn animals.648 His cautious attitude regarding the sanctity of consecrated animals 
would come to be identified as a communal trait of ashkenazic religious culture.649 Rabbi 
Rothenburg did not accept producing milk or non-Jewish testimony of any kind as 
sufficient evidence to prove whether or not an animal was a firstborn. When asked “whether 
a non-Jew conversing innocently that it [the animal’s mother] has already given birth in 
the past is reliable,”650 he answered in the negative, referring to the talmudic statement651 
that the testimony of a non-Jew conversing innocently is believed in only one very urgent 
case; that of declaring a husband dead, thus releasing his wife from being an agunah,652 
and permitting her to remarry. Otherwise, testimony from a non-Jew is halakhically 
invalid.653 
Concerning milk production, Rabbi Rothenburg writes that only if the mother was 
seen suckling an animal previously, the offspring born next could be exempt from firstborn 
status, in accordance with the opinion of Raban Gamliel.654 He follows Rabbenu Tam’s 
narrow interpretation of that statement, which implies that milk production by itself is not 
sufficient evidence; one must witness the mother actually feeding a calf. Rabbi Rothenburg 
also subscribed to the view that, although it was rare for animals to produce milk before 
                                                     
648 See Ta-Shma, Halakha minhag u-meẓiut, 214. 
649 See Ta-Shma, Halakha minhag u-meẓiut, 212n20: “And the strength of the living custom for this 
was stronger than any halakhic casuistry.” Note here, too, the implied bifurcation of law and textual reasoning 
on the one hand and living custom and practice on the other. וגדול היה כוחו של המנהג החי בזה מכל פלפול של הלכה  
650 Meir Rothenburg, ShUT Rabbi Meir mi-Rothenburg dfus Cremona, §312. Or, see Meir of 
Rothenburg, Tshuvot Psakim u-Minhagim (Responsa, rulings and customs), ed. Yiẓḥak Zev Kahana (3vols.) 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav kook, 1960), II:161. 
651 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yevamot 121b. 
652 Literally “chained” or “anchored,” since she is tied to him for the rest of her life and unable to 
remarry as a result of his unknown status. 
653 In the same responsum, he dismisses with similar ease the possibility of using markers of the 
animals age on its horns as a way of determining birth history. 
654 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bekhorot 23b-24a. 




ever having given birth, this rare minority is combined with the presumption (ḥazaka) that 
“every animal is presumed not to have given birth,” unless there is cause to think otherwise. 
He adheres to this stringent opinion even though some sources considered milk production 
in itself (even without actual suckling) sufficient evidence to disqualify further offspring 
from firstborn status: “Even though, if we force the matter, one should have said that milk 
exempts it, nevertheless, we act stringently regarding such a severe prohibition, because, 
if it is a firstborn, there are two prohibitions of karet...”655Aware that the rarity of cases 
where an animal that produces milk will be a first calver makes it seem ludicrous even to 
consider such a possibility, Rabbi Rothenburg nevertheless refuses to allow that fact to 
influence the halakha at hand. Indeed, he writes a strong rejoinder to anyone with such 
objections: 
And the idiots who protest this and wonder, “But it is only one case in thousands 
where it can be found that the milk comes before the birth!?” One should answer them: 
“And isn’t it the law that, if a man was seen to have fallen in infinite waters,  such as an 
ocean for example, and most probably drowned, his wife is still prohibited to marry anyone 
and has to remain chained all of her days?! This in spite of the fact that rabbis have applied 
many great leniencies to avoid a woman from being chained ... even so, if he falls in infinite 
water, she is prohibited [to remarry], even though it is more likely than in this case 
[firstborns] that not even one of tens of thousands survives in such a case [drowning], the 
rabbis are so stringent with prohibitions punished by karet and death, that they will even 
chain a woman all of her days!” ... How much more, then, should one not question this 
issue [firstborns] if one decides in favor of being stringent, where there is not such a terrible 
loss?!656 
 
                                                     
655 Rothenburg, ShUT MaharaM Rothenburg dfus Cremona, §312, or Rothenburg, Tshuvot Psakim 
u-Minhagim, II:160: 
אבל מכל מקום לחומרא עבדינן באיסור חמור כזה שאם בכור הוא יש בו , אף על פי שלפי דיחוי הוה לן למימר דחלב פוטר
הגוף שני כריתות משום שוחט חוץ ואכילת קדשים בטומאת  
656 Ibid.: והשוטים המתרעמים על זה ותמיהם הלא אחת מני אלף אלפים לא ימצא זה שחלבן קודם ללידה. יש להשיב
פ שכמה קולות גדולות היקילו ”אע, להם הלא נפל במים שאין להם סוף כגון בים וכיוצא בו אשתו אסורה וצריכה להתעגן כל ימיה
אף כל פי שברור הוא יותר מזה שאין ניצולין אחד מריבי , כשנפל במים שאין להם סוף אפילו הכי אסורה...חכמים בה משום עיגונא 
כל שכן שאין לתמוה על נדון זה אם נחמיר במילתא דלית . ... החמירו באיסור חייבי כריתות וחייבי מיתות לעגן אשה כל ימיה, רבבות
 .ביה פסידא כולי האי




The strong rhetoric is designed to drive home the seriousness of the prohibition, 
which a person should try to avoid, even if it entails incurring relatively minor discomforts. 
Rabbi Rothenburg explains that the slim survival chance of a husband who was seen to be 
drowning is taken as a serious possibility, even though taking such unlikely scenarios 
seriously has dire consequences, such as (in the case of drowning) rendering his wife an 
agunah for the rest of her life because of the off-chance that her husband survived. In the 
realm of agunahs, moreover, there is an injunction to search for solutions at all costs (as 
we have seen, testimony usually deemed questionable is accepted in such cases). 
Nonetheless, because the punishment of marrying a married woman is karet, the rabbis 
were fearful even of the unlikely case that the husband survived. Rabbi Rothenburg 
therefore, argues a fortiori, in the case of firstborn cattle, where the punishment is just as 
grave, but the downside is infinitely less serious, one should take seriously the unlikely 
possibility that a first calver produced milk before birth, and not rely on milk production 
for a lenient ruling. This halakhic argumentation about stringency and risk is intertwined 
with the emotional and moral exhortation to “the idiots” who are flippant about such a sin. 
Rabbi Rothenburg was similarly stringent with regard to selling the first calver to a 
non-Jew prior to giving birth. Many halakhic scholars consider one of the two forms of 
sale sufficient, usually the one prescribed by Rabbenu Tam; this stipulates that the animal 
for sale must change hands for it to be sold to a non-Jew in a valid manner. Rabbi 
Rothenburg required a monetary transaction (often referred to simply as “money”) in 
addition to the transfer of the object being sold (“pulling”), in order to effect a valid sale 




according to both opinions. One of his responsa657 contains instructions regarding the 
correct form of sale: “One must sell it to the non-Jew with ‘money’ and ‘pulling,’ because 
RaShY and Rabbenu Tam disagree whether… and if, for a Jew, one uses ‘pulling,’ then one 
uses money for a non-Jew, and if, for a Jew, one uses money, then for a non-Jew one uses 
‘pulling’; therefore, we are in doubt and do both.”658 
Rabbi Rothenburg, while stringent, was not oblivious to the reality: In another 
responsum, he addressed the case of people giving firstborn animals to a kohen out of 
malice, as a way of burdening him with an extra mouth to feed. He writes to “my guide, 
Rabbi Meir Kohen! What will I do and what can I answer you, concerning those people 
who intend for their animals to give birth to a firstborn, in order to give it to your son, a 
kohen, in order to be vengeful?!”659 Rabbi Rothenburg wrote scathingly of this practice and 
explained that these people transgressed several grave sins. First, in the post-Temple 
period, Jews are, in fact, required by halakha actively to avoid firstborns by selling the 
mother correctly prior to birth (as RaShY did). Whereas this may have been considered a 
loophole in Temple times, in the post-Temple age, however, it was actually preferable to 
avoid the birth of a firstborn because this prevented any risk of accidentally transgressing 
the laws that accompany the birth of a firstborn animal.660 Second, the above practice was 
                                                     
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid.: ויש להקנות לגוי בכסף ובמשיכה, משום דפליגי רש”י ור”ת אי הלכה כרבי יוחנן או כרשב”ל, ואי ישראל
הילכך מספקא לן ועבדינן תרוייהו, ואי ישראל בכסף אז גוי במשיכה, במשיכה אז בגוי בכסף . 
659 Meir Rothenburg, ShUT MaharaM Rothenburg dfus Prag, §78, or Rothenburg, Tshuvot Psakim 
u-Minhagim, II:155: מה אעשה לך ומה אשיבך על אותם בני אדם המתכונים לכך שתלד בהמתם בכור , מאיר הכהן’ אלופי הר
 כדי לתתן לבנך כהן להנקם ממנו
660 One of the other sources for the requirement to actively avoid the birth of a firstborn, rather than 
allowing it to be born and giving it to a kohen, in post-Temple period is from Asher ben Yeḥiel, ShUT ha-
ROSh, principle 49, §2 (also included in “Piskei ha-ROSh” and in “Hilkhot pidyon bekhor”). 




contrary to the spirit of the original commandment. The priestly gifts, he wrote, were 
“awarded to Aaron and his sons, not to spite and belittle and harm them, and whoever 
means to harm with this is not fulfilling the requirement to give these gifts at all!”661  
Third, the giver of gifts to the priest is prohibited from deriving any benefit from 
the kohen to whom he gives it, and, in this case, enjoying his suffering is a form of benefit. 
Last, Rabbi Rothenburg expressed moral disgust at that practice in his day, writing that 
whoever gives a kohen such an unwanted gift “is defiling the name of heaven and the 
consecrated gifts.”662 Notwithstanding this strong condemnation, Rabbi Rothenburg did 
not concede that the kohen  be permitted to use the animal in any way before it is injured, 
nor was he allowed to return such an animal to its owner. Rabbi Rothenburg held this 
opinion not only for a certain firstborn but even for a questionable firstborn (safek beḥor), 
leaving the recipient of such an animal with little choice but to feed it and care for it for 
the rest of its days or until it is injured. 
Clearly, not every common practice became custom, and not even Rabbi 
Rothenburg’s sympathy for the wronged kohanim provided him with enough grounds to be 
                                                     
כ נותנו ”ואח. ז וצריך הישראל ליטפל בו בבהמה דקה שלשים יום ובגסה חמשים יום”וכן בכור בהמה טהורה נוהג בזה
והכהן צריך לקבלו ואין רשאי לסרב משום דהוי כמבזה מתנות כהונה ואין מודה . לכהן והכהן שומרו בביתו ומגדלו עד שיפול בו מום
אלא אפילו קבלו כהן לא שרי ליה להכניסו לכיפה דלא אישתמט בשום דוכתא גבי בכור כדאמרינן גבי הקדש...בה  ... 
בתרא ’ והא דאמרינן בפ. ודם שיצא לאויר העולם שלא יבא להכשל בו בגניזה ועבודהומצוה להפקיע קדושת בכור ק
הכי קאמרינן , מרחם קדוש, בכור בדידן תליה מילתא, ופריך אי הכי בכור נמי, דבכורות דמעשר בהמה בטלו בזמן הזה משום תקלה
 ...ליקנינהו לאודניהו לגוי דלא ליקדש מעיקרא
ג דחזינן שנענש רב ”ואע. שטוב להקנות לגוי שלא יבא לידי תקלה’( דקא‘ה ”בכורות ג ד ’תוס)ל ”ת ז”והאידנא אומר ר
 ...מרי
661 Rothenburg, ShUT MaharaM Rothenburg dfus Prag, §78, or Rothenburg, Tshuvot Psakim u-
Minhagim, II:155: 
המכון לקנטור בהן לא יצא ידי נתינה כלל ד מתנות כהונה נתנו לאהרון ולבניו ולא לצער ולהקניט ולקנטור וכל”כל כ  
662 Ibid.:נמצא שהוא מחלל שם שמים ומחלל את הקדשים 




lenient. As a later source663 wrote in the name of Rabbi Rothenburg: “…and his [the 
kohen’s] complaint should not be to him [the Israelite who gave him the animal] but to 
God, who commanded him to take His firstborns, and therefore… as long as it is possibly 
a firstborn, he is required to take care of it because of the doubt, following the principle of 
‘for every doubtful prohibition, we are stringent.’”664 The legal tradition of stringency 
regarding firstborns crystalized around Rabbi Rothenburg, not merely as a rigid legal 
interpretation but as an ethical stance; a religious attitude that would come to be identified 
with Ashkenaz in the texts of the following generations. 
iii. Fourteenth-century sources:  
Likutim and the Making of a Legal Tradition 
 
Rabbi Meir Rothenburg died at the end of the thirteenth century, and his responsa circulated 
in the different manuscript collections that characterized Ashkenaz at that time.665 As his 
approach was transmitted in these halakhic compilations and summaries, his stringent 
tendency became identified with the main ashkenazic tradition. As previous chapters have 
                                                     
663This is the gloss called Bet Yisrael on the Arba Turim, which consists of two parts “Drisha” and 
“Prisha,” composed by Rabbi Yehoshua Falk (1555-1604), a student of Rabbi Moshe Isserles. 
664 Drisha on Arba Turim, Yoreh de’ah §315, cites Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, and concludes: “From 
a responsum which I found among the responsa of our master Rabbi A.K. [in Rabbi Shlomo Luria’s notes it 
says Rabbi Meir Rothenburg here], and I doubt that it is a responsum, also Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg 
responded thus in §315 “My Master, my Rabbi,” etc. (in his explanations of the Tur) 
אשר שאלת אם הישראל בעצמו חייב לטפל בספק בכור אם לא רצה כהן לקבלו ’...ואם תקפו כהן מוציאין וכו] א[   
רוצה לטפל בו ורוצה ליתנו לכהן צריך הכהן לקבלו ולטפל בו כי הישראל למה יש לו לטפל בו והא אפילו אם אין הישראל 
ואם הכהן יסרב מלקבלו הרי , אלא הכהן, בודאי בכור לא הזקיקו הכתוב אלא הזמן דמפרשינן ותו לא ומשם ואילך אינו חייב הישראל
 .זה מבזה פרס המלך
כ בספק בכור יכול ”ורים לבני אהרון וכל כהן שאינו מודה בהן אין לו חלק בכהונה אג דברים המס”ונראה לומר דכל כה
ואי בכור הוא כבר ...איני חייב ליטפל בו עוד דאי חולין הוא איני חייב לטפל דהא אי בעינא שחטינא ליה -נ ”הישראלי לומר ממ
ולא עליו תלונותיו כי אם על השם שציוהו ליטול , ראלאבל הכהן אינו יכול להטילו על היש, נטפלתי בו כשיעור שחייבתני התורה
כ”בכורו והשתא עד דספק בכור הוא צריך לטפל מספיקא כדין כל ספק איסורא לחומרא ומשום דילמא בכור הוא חייב לטפל בו ע . 
ק ומסופקני אם זו תשובה”מתשובה מצאתי בין תשובות מהרא . 
ו ”שט’  ם השיב סי”גם מהר  
665 See Simcha Emmanuel, “Introduction” in Tshuvot MaharaM me-Rothenburg ve-ḥaverav (The 
responsa of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg and his circle), ed. Simcha Emmanuel (World Congress of Jewish 
Studies: Jerusalem, 2012), 16. 




shown, these manuscript compilations represent the ashkenazic form of halakhic 
transmission, which was scribal and thus fluid, rather than strictly textual, relying heavily 
on non-textual elements for its transmission without purporting to provide a complete and 
sufficient legal source. This section will indicate the importance of the non-textual 
elements in the transmission of the laws of firstborn animals. Although the laws contained 
a textual component, its transmission by means of likutim led it to be strongly intertwined 
with the legal tradition, inviting reasoning closer to custom than law. 
One of the most famous ashkenazic likutim, a halakhic compilation from the 
thirteenth century known as Sefer ha-Mordekhai,666 discusses firstborn animals. The 
compilation first enumerates several opinions about whether milk production exempts 
animals from firstborn status. This is followed by the statement: “Our Master Rabbi Meir 
ruled that milk does not exempt...” It concludes this summary by stating that some opinions 
are lenient, but “…however, in all of Ashkenaz, one acts in accordance with Our Master 
Rabbi Meir; thus, it is still considered a possible firstborn (safek beḥor) and can be eaten 
only once it is injured.”667 Fifteenth-century sources addressing questions of firstborn 
                                                     
666 Written by Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel, who was a student of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, the 
likut was glossed and edited by Rabbi Schlittstadt, a student of Rabbi Mordekhai. In the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, the latter version was sometimes called Sefer Mordekhai katan (see Reiner, “Ashkenaz 
Yerushalaim,” 4-10). 
667 Mordekhai Katan, Ḥulin Ms. Hebr. Qu.10, Universitätsbiliothek Johann Christian Seckenberg, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
סמוך ’ למימ’ רוב איכ’ ותיפטר משו’ כ יולדו”אינן חולבות אא’ ם פסק דחלב אינו פוטר דמאי אמר רוב פרו”מהר’ ומי
ל ספק בכור ונאכל ”ה’ ם ומ”בכל אשכנז נהגו כמהר’ סתרו זה ואמרו...ומי’ ל פלגא, ותו”ילדה והלחזקת הגוף שלא ’ חילבו’ אינ
 במומו
see also Mordekhai on tractate Bekhorot, ch. 10 
ושוב מצאתי שמהר"ם כתב וז"ל דקדק ר"ת מדאיצטריך לטעמא דלא מרחמא אלא אם כן ילדה שמע מינה דחלב גרידא אינו 
וב בהמות אינן חולבות אא"כ יולדות איכא למימר סמוך מיעוטא דחולבות אע"פ שאינן יולדות לחזקת הבהמה שלא פוטר ואע"ג דר
ילדה והוה ליה פלגא ופלגא ואסור משום ספק ונאכל במומו לבעלים ולא יצטרך לתתו לכהן כשיומם דהממע"ה ואע"ג...אבל הכא 
יש בו שני כריתות משום שוחט חוץ ואוכל קדשים בטומאת הגוףחיישי למיעוטא להחמיר באיסור חמור כזה והוה בכור ו  




animals repeatedly cite this line. It ties Ashkenaz together as a halakhic community with 
allegiance to Rabbi Rothenburg’s opinion, which is stringent with regard to firstborn 
animals. Sefer ha-agudah by Rabbi Aharon Zuslein, a fourteenth-century compilation, 
similarly mentions Rabbi Rothenburg’s approach: “...a kohen who was sent a firstborn 
animal cannot return it... And Rabbi Meir of Blessed Memory was very stringent towards 
the kohen, even for an animal where the firstborn status is uncertain (safek beḥor).”668 
 This allegiance to Rabbi Rothenburg’s halakhic opinion does not perfectly overlap 
with the actions of the community as a whole. As mentioned, Rabbi Rothenburg was also 
stringent regarding the method of sale: both money and the object must change hands to 
consider the mother animal sold to a non-Jew. In Ashkenaz, fifteenth-century responsa 
reveal cases of less than ideal transactions involving only a monetary exchange and no 
physical transfer of the animal (“pulling”). In a number of these cases, sales involved only 
monetary transactions, but the animal did not physically change hands. The cases in which 
the animal was sold properly would not appear in responsa, because they would not pose a 
problem requiring rabbinic advice. It is significant, nevertheless, that questionable cases 
often stemmed from imperfect sales. More significant is the way in which the halakhic 
literature deals with this discrepancy. 
iv. Fifteenth-century Responsa:  
Logic of Custom and the Transmission of a Legal Tradition 
 
The statement, “in all of Ashkenaz one acts in accordance with Our Master Rabbi Meir to 
be stringent,” became the main trope when it came to firstborn sanctity, thus associating 
                                                     
668 See Alexander Zuslein (“RaZakh,” Erfurt d. 1349), Sefer ha-agudah (Cracow, 1571), on tractate 
Bekhorot, ch.3: 
ל החמיר מאד על הכהן אפילו ספק בכור”והרמז. כהן ששלחו לו בכור לא יחזירנו לבעליו עיין שם . 




the cautious attitude toward such prohibitions with Ashkenaz and uniting the ashkenazic 
legal tradition via the figure of Rabbi Rothenburg. This statement functioned not as a purely 
halakhic legal opinion but, rather, operated according to the logic of custom, in which the 
law that is linked to one’s authoritative source by the strongest transmission prevails. The 
following section examines the logic of custom and its relationship to common practice 
and the populace. Next, it analyzes the manner in which conflict between the accepted 
opinion and reality is treated in the context of this logic.  
iv-a. Custom and the Community: 
The attitude towards sanctity of firstborn animals is, thus, part of the legal tradition; it is 
halakhic, but not strictly legal. Many of these non-legal elements suggest that the correct 
mode of behavior regarding firstborn sanctity is a praiseworthy communal legacy in 
addition to being a technical legal issue. The following responsa examine the role of 
Ashkenaz as a community in this legal tradition, showing that the rather indefinite positive 
idea of the naïve and sacred community, is, in fact, a matter of only a specific part of the 
community. “Ashkenaz” as a community embodying a legal tradition is very precisely 
defined. It contains an idea of a lay populace as the “living archive”669 of the sacred 
traditions, but only in a very particular sense, which is constructed and limited by the 
scholarly class’s interpretation of the living archive. 
                                                     
669 For uses of the notion of “living archive” to describe the legal import of the common people, see, 
for example, Algazi, “Ein gelehrter Blick.” For such an example regarding Ashkenaz, see Haym Soloveitchik, 
Halakha, kalakala ve dimuy aẓmi 111-112. His phrasing emphasizes the opposition of text and people: “…are 
the actions of numerous communities of sacred pure people worth less than a line in the Yerushalmi to verify 
the intention of the Torah?!” 




Some evidence indicates that selling animals to non-Jews using only monetary 
transactions was a common practice among lay Jews, although it was frowned upon by the 
scholarly élite. A responsum to Rabbi Israel Isserlein from a Rabbi Ẓion of Bingen, 670 
mentions that, “many had the custom, and go out and see how the people act, to sell to the 
non-Jew the fetus by means of money without any ‘pulling.’”671 Clearly, it was a 
widespread practice to sell by monetary transaction alone. “Go out and see how the people 
act” is a talmudic statement referring to common practice while expressing faith in popular 
behavior as a legitimate halakhic source.672 It is clear why Rabbi Bingen used this 
expression, as his entire letter deals with defending the practice. He claimed that common 
practice conformed to “the ancient rishonim (first ones),”673 thus relating the imperfect 
form of sale to the founding fathers of medieval ashkenazic halakha who preceded Rabbi 
Rothenburg by two centuries and belonged to a much more distant period of the ashkenazic 
past. He acknowledged that, in an ideal case “if a person comes in advance to ask us how 
to sell to a non-Jew, we would have instructed him like Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, who was 
stringent and required money as well as pulling, in order to remove himself from any 
                                                     
670 Leket yosher was assembled by one of Isserlein’s disciples, Rabbi Yoizel Ostreicher (also known 
as Yosef Hochstadt). This particular responsum was copied and sent to Rabbi Moshe Mintz, who, in turn, 
sent it to Rabbi Isserlein, along with some remarks. See chapters 2 and 6 in this dissertation for more on Leket 
yosher. 
671Leket yosher, Yoreh de’ah, (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 2010), 134-135: hilkhot bekhor 
behema §71-72. שמקנים לגוי את העובר בכסף בלא , ופוק חזי מאי עמא דבר, הואיל ודשו ביה ונהגו רבים, ולמה זה לנו הבכורה
 משיכה
All subsequent page-references to Leket yosher are for this edition. 
672 See for instance Babylonian Talmud, tractate Eruvin 14b: “Rabbi Tarfon ruled that the following 
benedictions must be said…Said Rabbi Ḥanan to Abaye: ‘What is the law?’ Said the other ‘Go and see what 
is the usage of the people.” ר׳ טרפון אומר בורא נפשות...א״ל רב חנן לאביי הלכתא מאי א״ל פוק חזי מאי עמא דבר 
673 Leket yosher, hilkhot bekhor behema §71-72; 134-135. ותיקים הראשונים שהנהגו להקנות בכסף לחודיה 




disagreement”;674 he declares, however, “now that many have held like this to act according 
to RaShY and RaShbaM, we do not protest their actions.”675 
While the reference to these illustrious, almost mythical, forefathers, the “ancient 
first ones” provided some rhetorical support, an additional explanation that would address 
the legal aspect was needed. Rabbi Bingen provided this answer by means of a somewhat 
forced argument based on Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Vienna (d.1270), also known as Or zarua, after 
his halakhic compilation. 676 He was the teacher of Rabbi Rothenburg and preceded him by 
a few years but belonged to the same period of the ashkenazic past as his student. Or zarua 
introduced a novel interpretation, according to which handing over money is, in fact, the 
preferable method in this specific scenario, not only for RaShY, but even according to 
Rabbenu Tam, who usually required ‘pulling.’677 Rabbi Yiẓḥak explains that, in cases 
where there is no object to hand over, Rabbenu Tam, too, would agree that the money 
changing hands constitutes the decisive moment. This applies to cases of firstborn animals 
as they were being sold while still a fetus in the mother’s womb. Following a principle that 
                                                     
674 Ibid.:  ואם ספק, אם בא לכתחילה לשאול בפנינו היאך יקנה לגוי היינו מורים כמהר”ם שהיה מחמיר ומצריך מעות
 .ומשיכה לאפוקי נפשיה מפלוגתא
675 RaShbaM was a grandson of RaShY and a famous tosafist. Leket yosher, hilkhot bekhor behema 
§71-72. ם אין מוחין בידם”י וכרשב”ומאחר דאחזיקו ביה רבים למיעבד כרש . 
676 Or Zarua, 1: Laws of Firstborns § 408: 
מיהו צריך אתה לדעת . ...הבכורהם ולפטור מן ”מיהו במקומות שלנו נהגו להקנות לעכו.... ם ”הלוקח עובר חמורו של עכו
’ ם לא קני אלא בכסף כדאמ”דעכו, ם”רב מרי ידע לאקנויי קנין גמור שידע ליטול מעות מן העכו’ ם רבינו שלמה פי”האיך יקנה לעכו
.... כ”לקמן פ  
א קני אלא ם ל”בעכו -ם במשיכה ”לעכו -יוחנן דאמר דבר תורה מעות קונות ולעמיתך בכסף ’ ת דפסיק כר”מיהו לדברי ר
ם ”גוף האם עצמה לעכו’ אלא צריך להקנו, ם ולא פקעה קדושת בכור”ם וקבל דמיו לא קנה העכו”אם הקנה העובר לעכו. במשיכה
ם את האם”שימשוך העכו’ ובמשיכ . ... 
הוא  ם במשיכה”ת דפסק דעכו”לדברי ר’ ואפי. ם בין בו בין באמו”דשרי לן להקנות לעכו’ ל שפי”כדברי  רבינו יצחק זצ 
דבר [ל ”יוחנן כמו בישראל לדשב’ ם לר”יוחנן שהרי משיכה לעכו’ מה למשוך קני בכסף לר’ דקני ולא בכסף מיהו היכא דלית לי
]שלא בא לעולם .  
See also, Israel of Krems, Hagahot Asheri on Bava Meẓia ch.4 §8. 
 




“the fetus is not part of the mother” (ubar lav yarech imo), 678 physically handing over the 
mother would not necessarily effect a physical transfer of the fetus. Rabbenu Tam was, in 
fact, of the opinion that “the fetus is not part of the mother.” According to this 
interpretation, even Rabbenu Tam himself would thus agree: when selling an animal fetus 
to a non-Jew, it is, by default, the money changing hands, and not the object, that 
determines the actual sale, as the object cannot be held, much less, change hands. 
This interpretation was important for those seeking to defend the common 
ashkenazic practice because it offered an opportunity to justify such a sale to some extent. 
Of course, a transaction involving both money and physical ‘pulling’ as Rabbi Rothenburg 
required, remained the preferable method, but Or zarua’s argument at least made it possible 
to justify the imperfect method by providing a source for the popular frowned-upon norm. 
The opinion was often brought up in fifteenth-century responsa in this context. However, 
in every responsum where this leniency is suggested, the opinion is summarily 
dismissed.679 Sefer ha-Mordekhai, for instance, presents this opinion, but concludes with 
                                                     
678 See Babylonian Talmud, tractate Ḥulin 58a. 
679 Soloveitchik makes this important point in his essay on gentile wine, emphasizing that ashkenazic 
rabbis had a very high opinion of the piety of their communities but did not often avail themselves of 
possibilities to bring the law closer to the actual practice of the people, even if this would make their lives 
easier, and even when they had the opportunity to do so. 
Haym Soloveitchik, “Religious Law and Change: The Medieval Ashkenazic Example,” AJS Review 
12, no. 2 (Autumn, 1987), 218: “...Jews had much to gain from its allowance. Occasion presented itself for 
the tosafists to wipe yeyn nesekh from the books, but the idea was rejected with shock. Spanish Jewry, for 
example, were lax in their observance of this injunction, and made attempts to rid themselves of this annoying 
restraint. I have found, however, no evidence for anything similar in France or Germany … there are 
numerous issues in other areas where practice was far more conservative than theory. And this is significant 
both psychologically and religiously.”  
In our case, of course, there is a practice among lay people that is less conservative than the theory 
of the leading rabbis at the time, and the opportunity to “wipe” this prohibition “off the books” was quite 
weak (we will soon see that the Or zarua’s idea is not entirely convincing), but the parallels are clear. Perhaps, 
indeed, the rabbis identify with the pious self-image of Ashkenaz, the community that refuses leniency even 
when it would make their lives easier, but the lay people do not. 




the statement: “And Our Master the rabbi Rabbi Meir [Rothenburg] was stringent and 
required both money and ‘pulling,’ in order to remove ourselves from uncertainty.”680 This 
remains the bottom line for all subsequent halakhic inquiry in ashkenazic responsa.681 
Rabbi Moshe Mintz, who had received Rabbi Bingen’s letter, added a short response, 
strongly disagreeing with the latter. After claiming that most of the letter contained nothing 
new, Rabbi Mintz summarized: “…only this thing he innovates, that he wants to prove that 
money alone is preferable to money and ‘pulling,’ and this is against Our Master Rabbi 
Meir Rothenburg, who is stringent to require both.”682 With this, considered the matter 
closed. Popular custom, clearly, was not just any action practiced by the populace. Rabbi 
Isserlein responded similarly. Surprised at Rabbi Bingen’s attempt to elevate popular 
                                                     
680 Mordekhai on Bava meẓia (ch. “The gold,” ha-zahav §302) “From here, Rabbi Yiẓḥak of Vienna 
wanted to prove that money completes the transaction even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish [which 
is the opinion Rabbenu Tam follows] there where the non-Jew has nothing to ‘pull’ ... And in cases where 
there is nothing for the non-Jew to ‘pull,’ money is what buys, therefore, a Jew who has an animal pregnant 
with its firstborn, the Jew may accept money from the non-Jew and so sell him the fetus in order to exempt 
it from firstborn status, even though the non-Jew did not ‘pull’ the animal. ... This is even in accordance with 
the opinion of Rabbenu Tam, who ruled that ‘pulling’ is what buys for non-Jews and not money, because 
here there is nothing to ‘pull,’ seeing as the ‘pulling’ of the mother does not help for the fetus, since Rabbenu 
Tam himself ruled that ‘the fetus is not part of its mother’...until here [I cite] from the language of the book 
Or zarua.” 
... ל נשמע נמי לרבי ”ומדרשב, ם מה למשוך”דאין לו לעכול היכא ”ר יצחק מווינא דמעות קונות לרשב”מכאן הוכיח ה
מעות , ם מה למשוך”והיכא דאין לו לעכו… ם במשיכה”ם קונה ולא מעות מדעמיתך בכסף מכלל דעכו”יוחנן דאמר משיכה בעכו
ם ”כוג דלא משך הע”ם ולמכור לו העובר אע”קונות הלכך ישראל שיש לו בהמה מבכרת מותר לו לישראל לקבל מעות מן העכו
דאין כאן מה למשוך דמשיכת האם אינה מועלת לעובר , ם קונה ולא מעות”שפסק שמשיכה בעכו, ת”אפילו לר. ... להפקיעו מבכורה
.ז”ל ספר א”עכ, וכמאן דמנחא בדיקולא דמיא’ עובר לאו ירך אמו היא’ל גופיה פסיק ד”ת ז”דהא ר . 
681 There is also a summary of Or zarua’s opinion in Israel of Krems, Hagahot Asheri on tractate 
Bava meẓia §8: ל נשמע נמי לרבי ”ומדר -מעל , ל דמעות קונות דכמוכח ממתניתין דנתנה לבלן”והיכא דאין לו מה למשוך מודה ר
בעיני ישראל שיש לו בהמה  הלכך נראה, מעות קונות -היכא דאין לו לנכרי מה למשוך, יוחנן דאמר משיכה בנכרי קונה ולא מעות
ולהפקיע מבכורה וחוזר וקונהו מן הנכרי , ג דלא משך הנכרי”מבכרת מותר לו לישראל לקבל מעות מן הנכרי ולמכור לו העובר אע
ג דאי כפתה ”לאחר שיולד הואיל ואין יכול למשוך העובר מעות קונות ומשיכת האם אינה מועלת לעובר אלא בכפותה ומטעם חצר ואע
דהא גבי בלן נמי הוה , י משיכה דבהמה המעות קונות”ה הוה קנה לעובר אפילו הכי הואיל וכגוף העובר אין יכול למשוך אלא עומשכ
מעות קונות הוא הדין  ץה הואיל ואין יכול למשוך גוף המרח”י חליפין דשכירות קרקע נקנית בחליפין אפ”יכול לקיים השכירות ע
ז”מא. הכא . 
682 Leket yosher, 135. 
ת וכן הפלוגתא דחלב ”י ור”ראה אשר האריך שלא צריך והביא כל מקומות פלוגתא דרש, ו”יצ, ר יוזמן”ואתה אהובי מהר
וזה נגד , שרוצה להוכיח דכסף לחודיה עדיף מלעשות כסף ומשיכה, אך דבר זה מחדש. ג”יהושע ורשב’ ע ור”פוטרה פלוגתא דר
ועיין בו, ם דמחמיר לעשות שניהם”מהר . 




practice into something stemming from a custom of “the ancient rishonim,” he exclaims: 
“It is a great wonder to me to make a custom based simply on a talmudic discussion against 
the opinion of our ancient rabbis and our later rabbis,”683 thus rejecting the attempt to justify 
popular carelessness by promoting it to the status of custom. Although rabbis in Ashkenaz 
sometimes did regard their common custom as sacred and legally binding, the category 
designated as “custom” was not, it seems, determined solely by actual community 
practice.684 
In a question sent to Rabbi Yacov Moellin, a certain Rabbi Ḥaim Ẓarfati of 
Augsburg describes a case in which a Jewish owner left his cow with a non-Jew for 
caretaking without selling the cow to him. During that time, the cow calved. Based on 
several factors, the questioner concluded that the newly born calf was most likely not a 
firstborn. None of these signs was halakhically accepted evidence to declare the calf 
exempt from firstborn status according to ashkenazic practice. He provides some 
background information. The owner, he explains, “...sent the calf as a firstborn to the home 
of a certain kohen … and he is ‘average poor’ and his little children depend on him for 
                                                     
683 Ibid. (emphasis added) ופליאה גדולה לעשות מנהג מסוגיא דעלמא נגד דעת רבוותא קשישי ורבוותא בתראי. 
684 After this exclamation, Rabbi Isserlein evaluated the halakhic basis of these practices. There is 
mention of two sources presenting altogether three opinions that considered physical transfer of the object 
being sold preferable to money. At the technical legal level, Rabbi Isserlein easily rejected all of Rabbi 
Bingen’s arguments that selling by means of money alone is in any way preferable to selling by means of 
both money and a physical transfer of the object. Rabbi Isserlein was reluctant to spend too much time 
countering most of Rabbi Bingen’s arguments, but he did specifically address the aforementioned argument 
of Or Zarua. Rabbi Isserlein speedily dismissed the argument by stating that the principle “the fetus is not 
part of the mother” applies only to certain laws of slaughter and has nothing to do with laws of property and 
sale. Thus, the suggestion of the Or Zarua is dismissed and the approach of Rabbi Rothenburg prevails.  
Leket yosher, 135. קצת פירכי לא ראי זה כראי , דכמה וכמה פירכי איתנהו על ראיותיו ועל דבריו, דברים תמוהים הם
דכתב , א דאור זרועוההי. אפשר מובנים הם למדקדק בראיותיו ובדבריו, אין לי פנאי לבארם, וקצת פרכי בצד השווה אכולהו, זה
, לבד מטריפה, ל בכל התלמוד עובר ירך אמו הוא”כבר כתבתי לך נרגא רבה אההוא שריותא מן התוס פרק הפרה דפסקו להדיא דקי...
 .מזה אין להאריך יותר
See Babylonian Talmud tractate Ḥulin 58a and Tosafot on Bablyonian Talmud, tractate Bava Kama 
47a “ טעמאמאי  ”. 




sustenance.685 This kohen was not in town when it was sent to him, and he also warned him 
in advance not to send it to him because he would not accept it.”686 Additionally, there were 
other kohanim closer to the owner’s location, some of them richer. The kohen apparently 
had some reason to suspect that Moshe was planning to do this to him, as he already had 
told Moshe in advance not to send him anything.687 The responsum depicts a negligent 
owner, who sends his firstborn animal to a kohen who is described in stirring terms:  
And when the kohen came back home and found the calf, he was very fearful, 
because he did not know what to do – should he give it back or shouldn’t he? – because he 
is a simple person [am haareẓ]688and fearful that he might commit the sin of disrespecting 
it, and he lives in a place where there are no Torah scholars, but he declared before 
witnesses that he does not want to accept the calf, despite the fact that he will feed it until 
he can inquire from those who know Torah what he should do in order not to sin.689  
 
The recipient is depicted as a pious man, unlearned (am haareẓ), but all the more 
faithful to halakha,690 as his primary reaction – terror at committing a grave sin – shows. 
According to the questioner, the kohen actually kept the calf and cared for it twelve days 
the time at which the letter is being written, in order not to do anything wrong, even 
unintentionally.691 The questioner describes the case not as a unique occurrence but as a 
                                                     
685 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Ḥulin 18a.  
686 ShUT MahaRYL, §174 (204):  לסוף שלח העגל בתורת בכור בבית כהן אחד הדר בגייזנואלד, והוא עני בינוני
 ותלו בי' טפלי. והכהן לא היה בעיר בשלחו לו, גם הזהירו תחלה שלא ישלח לו כי לא יקבלנו...
687 Ibid. Later on, he also writes that “the kohen is complaining that the owner did not send it to the 
rich kohanim of their area but, instead, to him because of hatred that he harbors towards him.”  
688 Ibid.: ע”ה -עם הארץ או עבד השם?, most likely the former, but the latter, “a servant of God” would 
work here too. 
689 ShUT MahaRYL, §174 (204) וכשחזר הכהן לביתו ומצא את העגל חרד חרדה גדולה דלא ידע מה לעשות אם 
להחזירו או לאו מפני שהוא ע"ה וירא פן יעשה עבירה לזלזל בו ודר בישוב שאין בו בני תורה, אך לקח לו עדים ואמר שאינו רוצה 
א.לזכות בו כלל אף כי יתן לו מזונות עד שיחקור מפי יודעי תורה מה יעשה שלא יחט  
690 Ta-Shma, among others, related this notion of pious unlearned people (as opposed to scholars) 
to the Rhineland pietists. 
691 Moreover, there is an added risk involved, as the questioner explained, ShUT MahaRYL, §174 
(204): “…they both live under one ruler, and there is reason to fear that there will come destruction from this, 
God forbid.... And last week a certain kohen was fined by his superior [pakid] in the city of Rhein also 
because of a safek bekhor [uncertain firstborn] that had been sent to him in the past, and he left it with the 
shepherd with the other animals, and the superior accused him about this, that he did not do as the law of 




veritable plague: “And many times destruction (kilkul) result from these safek bekhorot 
[questionable firstborns], and this is all due to the misconduct of the owners (ba’alei batim, 
literally homeowners), who are not careful when they buy the cow, and also do not care to 
inquire from Torah scholars how to buy it so that it is exempt from firstborn status, and 
therefore in Schwaben the safek bekhorot have multiplied more than anywhere.”692 
The owners, it seems, often neglected to sell the mother animal properly, using only 
money without handing over the animal, either because of purposeful negligence or 
ignorance. This would fulfill the requirement of proper sale to non-Jews according to 
RaShY but not according to Rabbenu Tam and definitely not according to Rabbi 
Rothenburg’s injunction to use both forms in order to avoid risking transgression. The 
animals that were born after such incomplete sales were, apparently, often given to 
kohanim, who did not want them. In most cases these animals had been sold in some form 
or other, meaning that they were of questionable firstborn status (safek bekhor) rather than 
                                                     
Moshe and Israel requires and he fined him 50 gold coins because he should have taken care of it himself. 
And this kohen is poor and has nine children. And the community in Augsburg and the rabbi wrote to that 
superior to explain that the kohen did not transgress our laws, in order to save him, and it is not known what 
the outcome will be.”  
ויש לירא דליפוק חבורא מיניה ח״ו...ובשבוע שעבר נקנס כהן אחד לפקיד שלו בעיר ראיי״ן ג״כ מחמת  ושניהם דרים תחת שר אחד
ספק בכור שנשתלח לו מאשתקד והוא הניחו ביד הרועה אצל בהמות אחרות והפקיד העליל עליו בזה שלא עשה כדת משה וישראל 
ויש לו ט׳ בנים. והקהילה מאוישפור״ק עם הרב כתבו לאותו פקיד כדי וקנסו בנ׳ זהובים דהוה ליה לרעותו לבדו. ואותו כהן עני הוא 
  להצילו שלא עבר על דתינו בזה, ולא נודע איך יפול.
 
Only a week before the case of Moshe, a similar case apparently occurred, in which a firstborn was 
specifically sent to a poor kohen in order to cause him distress. It seems as though there were fines from the 
local non-Jewish authorities for Jews who did not keep their own laws (at least, when another Jew files a 
complaint) – I have asked other scholars what this might refer to… 
The kohen was accused by someone, most probably the sender, of not following Jewish law. It seems 
as though this accusation caused the non-Jewish authorities to become involved, and, as a result, the entire 
community had to intervene. Rabbi Ḥayim fears that this case is similarly motivated to cause the kohen 
trouble, especially considering the enmity between the owner and the kohen. 
692 ShUT MahaRYL, §174 (204) ופעמים רבות באים קלקולי׳ מאלו ספק בכורות והכל בפשיעות הבעלי בתים שאין
י התורה איך תהיה הקנייה לפוטר׳ מן הבכורה, ולכן רבו בשוואב״ן ספק מדקדקין בקניית הפרה, וגם אינם חוששין לחקור ביודע
  בכורות מבכל הארצות... 




certain firstborns. In that case, according to halakha, the owners themselves were permitted 
to keep the animal, albeit without making use of it in any way until an injury occurred. 
These animals were nevertheless often given to kohanim, often against the kohen’s will. 
The ba’alei batim, although negligent about selling their animals correctly, would not cross 
the line of keeping the offspring of a badly sold animal, choosing instead to burden the 
kohanim with the results.693 Clearly, some of these kohanim did not know that they had the 
option of refusing livestock of doubtful firstborn status (safek bekhor). Once accepted, 
however, the ashkenazic halakha determined that they could not return even uncertain 
firstborns (safek bekhor).694 In the letter, Rabbi Ẓarfati begs Rabbi Moellin, “in the name 
of God and in the name of peace,” to make a judgment and to attempt to exempt the animal 
from firstborn status, suggesting several ways of doing so. 695 Rabbi Moellin, in his 
                                                     
693 Why did such problematic partial sales happen so often? As some of the responsa discussed in 
this section will show, lack of awareness might be one factor: some of the responsa mention that the owners 
of the animals are “amei areẓ” (not educated) and thus perhaps not aware of the finer points of halakha. But, 
again, why are they unaware – why is this considered a “finer point” as opposed to other points, if it evidently 
has actual relevant halakhic consequences? Maybe Jacob Katz’s notion of “ritual instinct” (Jacob Katz, Goy 
shel Shabat [The Shabbat Goy], [Jerusalem: Shazar, 1984], 176-189.) is useful here: once money is handed 
over, it “feels” like the animal is sold, so no-one thinks twice, but then once firstborn is born they somehow 
do not feel at ease with keeping the safek bekhor themselves and insist on giving it to a kohen. 
Also, in terms of realia, in many cases the non-Jew actually kept the animal even before having 
bought it, and took care of it, fed it, etc. in the winter time in exchange for its milk. Therefore, it seems, when 
it was sold to the non-Jew it simply remained in the same place and there was no physical act of moving it 
or pulling it that took place. This might also be the cause for many of these mishaps - the Jew took money 
from the non-Jew in exchange for his animal, but it was already in the non-Jew’s stable, so the actual 
“pulling” was often disregarded or forgotten. Moreover, local business law did not require “pulling,” which 
is perhaps another reason it was so easily forgotten. 
694See Psakim u-Ktavim §166. 
695 According to Rabbi Ḥayim Ẓarfati’s description, there was a real problem of such consecrated 
animals being foisted on unwilling kohanim. Apart from the personal affront and damage, it seems that this 
phenomenon was causing wider problems to the community at large. He also wrote that he sent a special 
messenger to Rabbi Moellin to respond to this issue in order to attempt to avoid any escalation (ShUT 
MahaRYL, §174 [204]) ובנדון זה כדי לבטל המחלוקת טרחתי ונסעתי בגייזנבעלט ומצאתי בצוע זה בין שניהם ששלחו לכבוד :
 תורתך ציר הלז מיוחד לכך שתורה להם הדרך אשר ילכו בה




response, agrees that the situation is dire and, referring to the owners, says that they are 
dealing with “simpletons and feeble-minded people.”696 
This instance presents a complex division between lay and scholarly: On the one 
hand, the kohanim are the pious guardians of tradition. They are portrayed as carefully 
observing this commandment to the point of inaccuracy, accepting responsibility in cases 
where they were legally exempt, feeding into the ashkenazic self-conception of guarding 
the sanctity of firstborns. This religious attitude, while technically incorrect, is seen as part 
and parcel of accepted custom and encourages legal scholars in Ashkenaz to continue being 
stringent in their decision making. On the other hand, however, we have the ba’alei batim, 
the homeowners and members of the community who are also ignorant about the proper 
laws, but they are reviled for not learning to sell their first calvers properly in advance of a 
birth.  
The scholars rejected Rabbi Bingen’s attempt to justify the actions of the cattle 
owners as stemming from an ancient custom in similar terms. Some types of simple people, 
it seems, were sacred, while others were not. Rabbi Moellin’s responsum expresses his 
sympathy for the kohanim by mentioning the harsh words that Rabbi Rothenburg reserved 
for those who sent them unwanted firstborns.697 Although the rabbis admired the poor 
kohanim for their devotion – perhaps precisely because they admired them and considered 
them an authentic living archive of popular conduct – the rabbis had no solutions for them. 
                                                     
696 ShUT MahaRYL, §174 (204)דאתרוותא דעמי הארץ וקלי הדעת נינהו, כמו שכתבת בעצמך: 
697 Ibid.: “…as much as he [Rabbi Meir Rothenburg] was upset with the kohen who would refuse to 
accept it, he was even more upset at those who intended to humiliate and pour wrath on [lekanot] a kohen 
and send it to him as a means of exacting revenge [linkom], and he wrote how many sins such a person 
commits, as is specified in his responsum to Rabbi Meir ha-Kohen.” 




Rabbi Moellin’s responsum contains several attempts to alleviate the issue from different 
angles. Every time, however, he returned to the point that, “Even for a safek bekhor, Our 
Master Rabbi Meir is stringent,” concluding that there is no way of removing the firstborn 
status entirely, and he found himself at a dead-end. 
iv-b. The Logic of Custom and Conflict: 
Unlike the logic of law, the logic of custom precludes the option of limiting or diminishing 
the source of tradition, which must be accepted as is. Different iterations of Mordekhai and 
Sefer ha-agudah are used repeatedly as sources for Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg’s stringent 
tradition that the entire land of Ashkenaz must be careful with sacred firstborns. Despite 
the challenging situations that arose, the responsa from the fifteenth century show that, for 
the most part, rabbis upheld the stringencies. They thus faced the challenge of dealing with 
real -life problematic situations without opposing or limiting this stringent tradition. As 
previous chapters have discussed, the non-textual nature of halakhic transmission in 
Ashkenaz was accompanied by a strong reliance on rabbis’ personal ad hoc decision 
making. This fluidity, while unfortunate for textual transmission, in fact, provided the 
perfect tool for solving conflicts in practical situations. The use of ad hoc decision-making 
as part of the logic of custom can clearly be observed in cases of firstborn sanctity. Even 
when scholars suggested ways of exempting livestock from firstborn status, they would do 
so without directly opposing the legal tradition attributed to Rabbi Rothenburg and applied 
to Ashkenaz. Unable to confront the legal tradition of Ashkenaz by means of textual logic 
– proving it irrelevant or a less preferable interpretation of sources – they solved the 
problem by adjudicating based on a case specific factor. 




In the case presented to Rabbi Moellin of the poor kohen who was given an 
unwanted firstborn, the question mentioned that the animal’s owner had declared that, had 
he known that he was under no obligation to give the safek bekhor away, he would never 
have done so. Clearly, this owner was just as uninformed about the law as the kohen and 
just as careful about not transgressing it (although, unlike the kohen, the owner foisted the 
problem onto someone else). Rabbi Moellin took advantage of this formulation, and he 
declared that the gift was given under false pretenses, and, as a mistaken gift, it 
automatically returns to its owner, based on the principle that a gift given in error 
automatically returns retroactively to the owner. The authority mentioned for this principle 
is none other than Rabbi Rothenburg, as cited in the Mordekhai.698 Rabbi Moellin thus 
supported his solution in the face of the stringent tradition associated with Rabbi 
Rothenburg in accordance with another opinion stemming from that very same authority. 
This solution is, however, very specific for a case in which the giver reveals that he had 
not intended to give the animal to the kohen. Without such a declaration, there would be no 
turning back once the firstborn was bestowed upon the kohen. This is a creative but very 
specific ad hoc solution, in which a gift that was given under false pretenses automatically 
reverts to the owner. 
The following two responsa by Rabbi Moshe Mintz show both the possibilities and 
the limitations of ad hoc solutions and the place of local business customs when it came to 
these laws. Rabbi Israel Bruna asked for his opinion regarding a situation in which a non-
                                                     
698 ShUT MahaRYL, §174 (204) נראה לענ”ד כל היכא דאיתא ביה גזא דישראל בעל הפרה קאי, וכן פסק מהר”ם 
ומייתי ליה במרדכי פרק האלמנה ...דאדעתא דהכי לא שלח, מרייהודהדרי זוזי ל, על השולח מעות לחבירו ליתנם לגוי ושכחם הגוי
 .ניזונת




Jew was the guarantor for another non-Jew who took a loan from a Jew. The non-Jew could 
not pay his loan with money, but he did have sheep. The debtor and the guarantor gave the 
Jew some sheep in lieu of the loan. The Jew did not want to keep the sheep and agreed to 
sell them to the guarantor. The guarantor agreed to buy them, but he did not have any 
money. The Jew, therefore, took some of the sheep as a warranty. When these sheep arrived 
in the Jew’s courtyard, one of the ewes lambed.699 
In the responsum, Rabbi Mintz claims (amongst other arguments) that, following 
Rabbenu Tam, the sheep are not considered to be the Jew’s property because they were 
immediately sold to the non-Jewish guarantor, without the Jew ever having physically 
taken them into his possession. The sheep that the Jew did end up taking into his courtyard 
were taken merely as a warranty for the money, and not in order to own them. According 
to RaShY’s opinion, the monetary transaction is what counts, and in this case, no money 
changed hands.700 When the Jew took these sheep as a warranty, there was no reason to 
believe that bringing them to his courtyard implied that he owned them, as neither the Jew 
nor the non-Jew viewed this action as a sale. The Jew did not consider these sheep his 
property, but merely a warranty, and he treated them as such. Therefore, although the lamb 
was born in the Jew’s courtyard, it was not born in his possession. 
The responsum’s conclusion had to take into consideration that this line of 
reasoning does not fully follow Rabbi Rothenburg’s requirement to use both money and 
pulling for acquisitions with a non-Jew. In this case, perhaps when the Jew took some of 
                                                     
699 See ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §5. 
700 Rabbi Mintz also dismissed the possibility that the sheep were bought from the first non-Jew by 
forgiving the loan, which is sometimes considered a form of money. 




the sheep from the guarantor, even without pulling, it should be considered an acquisition? 
Rabbi Mintz denies this, claiming that even Rabbi Rothenburg himself considered pulling 
to be the real form of acquisition, and he added money merely as an extra level of certainty: 
“Although Our Master Rabbi Meir requires money and ‘pulling’ ideally, in order to remove 
ourselves from doubt, even so, he believes that it is pulling specifically that buys from a 
non-Jew, as most of the opinions of the scholars follow this ... and this is almost 
unilateral....”701 In this manner, Rabbi Mintz argued that Rabbenu Tam’s method of pulling 
is truly the valid transaction, and money is merely an added stringency measure. The Jew 
in question thus did not acquire the sheep, as no form of pulling took place until he had 
already sold the sheep to the guarantor, and the only sheep the Jew took into his possession 
were a warranty against future payment.702 
Rabbi Mintz supplemented this argument with a list of all the authorities who 
agreed with Rabbenu Tam and required only the object to change hands and not the money, 
including Rabbi Yiẓḥak al’Fasi (known by his acronym, RYF), Maimonides, and Rabbi 
Asher ben Yeḥiel (ROSh).703 As a result, there was no doubt that, when the ewe gave birth, 
it was not owned by the Jew. As a final justification, Rabbi Mintz explained that it was 
none other than Rabbi Rothenburg who wrote that “the custom of the people is to rule 
                                                     
 701 ShUT MaharaM Mintz §5:  ’ואפי’ את”ל דמנהג שנהגו חכמים עוקר דאורייתא, כגון סיטמתא, דכיוון דמוקמי
’ קדוש להפקיע מועיל אינו, גוים התגרים דנהגו קנייה האי מ”מ, מילי לכל קנייה הוי ממילא, הפקר ד”ב דהפקר, הלוקח ברשות חכמים
 על פרוטה’ אפי שנותן מי המקומות בכל הגוים מנהג הא - מפלוגתא נפשיה לאפוקיה’ ומשיכ כסף ם”מהר הצריך למה כ”דאל, בכור
פנים צריך דין ולית’ זהו’ אפי בו קונה המקח ?! 
702 The fact that the debtor was the one to drive the sheep that were used as warranty into the Jew’s 
courtyard played in their favor, as the Jew did not do any pulling, and the debtor could be considered an agent 
of the non-Jew, bringing the sheep to the Jew as a warranty. 
703 This was a later ashkenazic source by a student of Rabbi Rothenburg and thus, theoretically, 
could be considered more authoritative by virtue of being more recent (See Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, ROSh 
on Babylonian Talmud tractate Bekhorot, chapter 2:  א. הלוקח...הלכך ישראל שקנה בהמה מן העובד כוכבים אע״פ שנתן
 .(מעות פטורה מן הבכורה עד שימשוך. 




according to RYF unless the tosafists oppose his opinion.” 704 As, in this case, RYF is in 
accord with the tosafists, Rabbi Mintz explained, he saw no reason not to follow the opinion 
that the issue of a monetary transaction can be disregarded in this case. The use of “custom” 
in this statement refers to another aspect of the legal tradition, in this case a very clear 
principle regarding the correct hierarchy of authoritative sources. Rabbi Rothenburg also 
handed down this tradition. Once again, rabbinical authorities allude to Rabbi Meir 
Rothenburg’s legal tradition in order to support a decision to break with that rabbi’s 
tradition of stringency. 
Being very case specific, this leniency was also very limited. In a case that was very 
similar to the one above, Rabbi Moshe Mintz did not agree to release the animal from 
sanctity: In this question, Rabbi Mintz was responding to Rabbi Zalman Levi Ẓion, who 
describes a situation in which a Reb Isaac Kohen from Bendheim took a pregnant cow from 
a non-Jewish debtor of his as payment for the debt. A coin was given to seal this transaction. 
After having bought the pregnant cow, the Jew was worried that it would give birth; he 
therefore rushed to a non-Jewish woman, who agreed to buy the cow from him. She gave 
him money but did not physically take the cow. The Jew then took the cow into his 
courtyard for the night, planning to give it to the non-Jewish woman the next day. That 
night, the cow calved. The next day, the Jew bought the cow and its newly born calf back 
from the non-Jewish woman for two coins. Rabbi Mintz claimed that the calf is a possible 
                                                     
704 ShUT MaharaM Mintz §5:  ואיתא במרדכי בסוף נערה בתשובות מהר״ם דנהגו העם לפסוק כרב אלפס בדבר
 he mentions the “responsa of MahaRaM” for this principle, but as a source he provides ,שלא נחלקו עליו התוס׳
the Mordekhai (tractate Ktubot, § 170), which includes many of Rabbi Rothenburg’s responsa. 




firstborn (safek bekhor), whereas the rabbis of Nürnberg705 deliberated and considered the 
calf not sacred. Although, Rabbi Mintz remarks, “…they did not wish to permit the calf at 
all, seeing as I prohibited it,”706 Rabbi Ẓion nevertheless wrote to Rabbi Mintz to explain 
his opinion. 
Rabbi Ẓion, who sent the question to Rabbi Mintz, suggested a two-pronged 
explanation to exempt the calf from firstborn status.707 First, Rabbi Ẓion argued that the 
Jew never bought the cow because he accepted only a coin for the transaction, which, 
according to Rabbenu Tam, is not an acceptable form of transaction for buying from a non-
Jew. Then, the Jew indeed physically took the cow into his courtyard, but at that point, he 
had already accepted a coin from the new non-Jewish buyer with the intention of selling it 
to her. This sealed the transaction, and the cow was no longer property of the Jew: he was 
merely safeguarding the cow for the new owner. Therefore, Rabbi Ẓion wished to claim, 
the cow had already been bought by the non-Jewish buyer when it gave birth. Rabbi 
Mintz’s responsum rejected the latter’s entire structure. 
                                                     
705 This included Rabbi David Tev’l Shprinẓ and Rabbi Zalman Levi Ẓion: Rabbi Shprinẓ was a 
contemporary of Rabbi Isserlein and is mentioned in Leket yosher. See the introduction to Leket yosher, 18. 
Rabbi Zalman Levi Ẓion was the son of Rabbi Ẓion Bingen mentioned above. 
706 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §82: ומ״מ לא רצו כלל להתיר מכיון שאסרתי 
707 See the first part of ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §82, where Zalman Levi Ẓion’s suggestion is copied. 
Rabbi Ẓion explained that it would be permissible either following only RaShY or following only Rabbenu 
Tam. According to RaShY’s opinion that the acceptance of money completes a transaction, the cow was 
indeed successfully bought by Reb Isaac at first, by means of the coin, but it was subsequently sold to the 
non-Jewish woman for money, before having calved. 
According to Rabbenu Tam, who requires the physical transaction of the object being sold, on the 
other hand, the cow was never bought from the non-Jew in the first place, as the Jew only used the coin. 
When the Jew later took the cow into his possession for the night, Rabbi Zalman explained, he did not do so 
in order to buy the cow, as at that point he had already agreed to sell it to the non-Jewish woman and accepted 
her money. He was simply keeping it safe for the night in the meantime. 




Although this case seems very similar to the previous one, Rabbi Mintz refused to 
accept this line of reasoning. In the previous case, he conceded that the Jew took the sheep 
into his courtyard without intending to possess them; thus, the fact that the sheep were in 
his yard when one gave birth did not make the lamb sacred. Rabbi Mintz would not, 
however, extend such an argument to the current case. He dismissed the explanation that 
the Jew, Reb Isaac, merely kept the cow safe for the sake of the new owner (the non-Jewish 
woman) without intending to own it. Rabbi Mintz did not consider this plausible, 
considering that the Jew immediately bought the cow back the next day. Thus, clearly, he 
was keeping the cow safe for himself, as he intended to buy the cow back immediately after 
the birth. The Jew took the cow into his courtyard with the intention to possess it, and, as 
such, he became the owner as soon as he brought the cow onto his property. Rabbi Mintz 
asks rhetorically whether the Jew would put up any resistance had anyone tried to steal the 
cow from his courtyard while it was under the ownership of the non-Jewish woman, and 
replies, “In such a situation we can assume that Reb Isaac would have shouted out loud, 
‘The cow is mine! For I bought it and pulled it, and see – it is in my house!’” 708 
                                                     
708 If one follows Rabbenu Tam, who requires the physical transfer of the animal, then the Jew did 
not buy the animal from the first seller. Subsequently, however, in taking the cow for the night, he effectively 
accepted ownership over it. The fact that the non-Jewish woman already paid him money for that cow does 
not hold any weight for Rabbenu Tam. Thus, the cow calved in the Jew’s possession and is a firstborn. (ShUT 
MaharaM Mintz, §82  דמסתמ׳ אם בא גוי ורוצה לחטוף ממנו הפרה בדרך, או בא יודי ורוצה לחטוף ממנו הפרה .... אז מסתמא
 .(היה אייזק צועק בקול רם הפרה שלי כי אני קניתי ומשכתי וכן היא בביתי...
 Rabbi Mintz’s response also rejects the second prong of Rabbi Zalman’s argument. Rabbi Zalman 
claimed that, according to RaShY, who focused on the monetary transaction, the cow was indeed successfully 
bought by the non-Jew, but, by the same token, it was successfully sold to the non-Jewish woman by 
accepting her money and, thus, the calf was born in her possession and is exempt from firstborn status. Rabbi 
Mintz disagreed by explaining that these coins that were handed over when the Jew bought the cow from the 
non-Jew were simply given as a testimony, an “Ur Kund,” and not as a monetary exchange. This form of sale 
is not really money, and thus, according to RaShY, the Jew never bought the cow from the non-Jew. 
Similarly, when he sold the cow to the non-Jewish woman, nothing truly happened, because he was not the 
owner of the cow at that time and thus had no right to sell it. Subsequently, when the Jew brought the cow 
into his courtyard, he became the owner, not necessarily due to “pulling” but because “a man’s courtyard 




The differences in the above cases shows the ad hoc nature of such solutions and 
its potential draw for adjudicators. Rabbi Mintz’s solution could be applied to release the 
firstborn from sanctity in one case, but in a very similar case, where the specifics led him 
to intuit that the sale was not really genuine, he could retract the solution. The significant 
advantage of ad hoc decision-making is that it allows for the resolution of conflicts between 
stringent customary traditions and concrete situations without risking the slippery slope of 
opposing the law in principle and thereby opening the door to leniencies in other variations 
of this case. 
Both above responsa by Rabbi Mintz present a specific stance regarding local 
selling customs. Rabbi Ẓion advanced the argument that according to RaShY’s view, the 
Jew bought the cow by means of a coin and then sold it again by means of a coin; therefore, 
the cow was no longer his when it gave birth. Rabbi Mintz rejected this because the first 
coin, given to buy the cow, was not really money, he explained. This coin was, as the 
questioner attested, given as a “Weinkauf.”709 This accorded with local business practices, 
“...that which is called in the language of Ashkenaz an Ur Kund.”710 This refers to a 
                                                     
buys in his stead” in cases where he intended to own the object, which, in this case, he obviously did, 
according to Rabbi Mintz. 
709 Regarding the uses of Weinkauf and Trinkgeld (where the money was given to the witnesses to 
drink alcohol), Arrha, and Gottespfennig (where the money was given to charity) in these areas in the Middle 
Ages, see for instance the second definition of “Weinkauf” in the J. Grimm und W. Grimm, Deutsches 
Worterbuch (online via Trier Center for Digital Humanities © 1998—2017) or in Duden, Rechtschreibung 
der deutschen Sprache und der Fremdwörter. Der große Duden (in acht Bänden). 15. Auflage. Band 1, 
(Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1961)756, under „Weinkauf“(In the “small” Duden: Trunk, mit dem 
der Abschluss eines Vertrags oder Handels bekräftigt wird; Weinkauf.). 
710 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, § 82. דנתינה וויקו”ף הוא דקנה בדיניה’ אינו מטעם כסף, רק הווינקוף שנתנו המוכר
ואותן מעות נותן מוכר כמו הלוקח ויקנו עבורם שכר ’, כדי שיהיו עדות על המכיר ולוקח להסרסרות ולאנשי וועד לגמור המקח זהו
נותן מעות לעדים ואומר , וכן נמי בדיניהם מי שמייחד עדים על מה שהוא. או יין לשתות ולפרסומי מילתא ולהיות עדים על המכירה
ף הוי כמו אתם עדים”נ נתינת ויינקו”ה. ט”ור קרנ”א א”וקורים אותו בל, לעדים אתן לכם המעות כדי שתבא עדים ... 
See also Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ahskenaz ha-kadmon, 42-48. Ta-Shma considers certain 
ashkenazic customs that were meant to impress memories of events important for the public upon the 




business practice also termed arrha in which money is given, usually to a third party, 
sometimes for charity (in which case it was called Gottespfennig or Denarii Dei), in order 
to seal a sale or otherwise testify to a contract. These coins are not part of the payment, but 
rather given to those who were appointed to bear witness to the transaction. In the case 
mentioned by Rabbi Mintz, witnesses would use the money to buy some wine (hence the 
name “Weinkauf”) and thus make the transaction known. Rabbi Mintz concluded, 
therefore, that this is not really money, and, as a result, the Jew did not own the cow. When 
he then sold the cow to the non-Jewish woman, he was not the owner, and thus no 
transaction took place. Then, the Jew took the cow into his courtyard, which made him the 
owner of the cow prior to the birth.711 
Even in the case where Rabbi Mintz had permitted the firstborn lamb, he made a 
similar statement regarding local business customs: “And one should not release the 
firstborn from sanctity for the following reason: … that the Jew sold the sheep back to the 
non-Jew … with his kerchief, as he slapped the buyer’s hand with it, as the merchants do 
… this is a sitomta, in places where it buys, it truly buys. We shall reply, no, the custom 
cannot undo the biblical sanctity of a firstborn.…”712 
 
Insofar as such procedures successfully sealed a transaction according to local non-
Jewish law, they were also valid for Jewish business law, following the principle of sitomta, 
by which Jewish law considers accepted local business practices as binding.713 According 
                                                     
memories of children, so that they may serve as witnesses for the future. He places this in the local German 
context. 
711 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §82:  מ״מ בדינינו אין כלום ולא הוי אפי׳ רמז של מכירה...לכן ההוא מכירה כמאן דלית
של גוי הלוה, ואח״כ כשהביא ר׳ אייזיק הפרה לביתו דמי...כי אין אדם יכול למכור דבר שאינו שלו כי בההיא שעתא היתה הפרה עדיין 
 קנתו לו חצירו...מ״מ רשותו קנה לו...
Rabbi Mintz raises and then immediately rejects the possibility that the Jew is accepting the cow as 
an agent for the non-Jewish woman because a Jew cannot be an agent for a non-Jew and vice-versa. 
712 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §5:  ואין לפוטרו מטעם זה: דנהי דקנה הישראל הכבשים מיד שכנערכים בכסף מלוה
ביד הגוי, מ״מ הרי חוזר ומקנה אות׳ לגוי בעד ששה זהובים בסודר שלו, שהכה בו בכף הקונה כדרך התגרי׳ עושים...האי סיטומתה 
ליתא, המנהג לא מצי להפקיע קדושת בכור דאורייתא. באלרא דקני ממש קני. הא  
713 See Menachem Elon, “CONTRACT: Developments in the Formation of Contractual ties by Way 
of Custom” in The Principles of Jewish Law, ed. Elon, under IV. LAWS OF OBLIGATION; TORTS, 




to Rabbi Mintz, there was another aspect to this issue: although the non-Jew was now 
legally the owner of the cow when it came to property law in business, the cow was still 
property of the Jew when it came to acquiring sanctity. Thus, whereas the status of halakhic 
ownership usually follows local business law, Rabbi Mintz explains that this does not 
change the halakhic status in non-business realms, such as the sanctity of a consecrated 
animal.714 As a result, Rabbi Mintz explained, the calf was born in Rabbi Isaac Kohen’s715 
possession for the sake of sanctity and is considered a firstborn. 
In the case of the sanctity of firstborn animals, this stringency thus evaded even 
forms of sale that were halakhically accepted for business law. The view that selling the 
cow in a way that is halakhically acceptable in terms of property law did not mean that it 
was similarly acceptable in other areas where greater stringency was required was also part 
of the ashkenazic legal tradition regarding firstborn sanctity. Rabbi Mintz thus explained 
why local business custom was not a valid way of removing sanctity: “For if this were not 
the case [that business custom does not function], why did Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg 
                                                     
columns 250-251: “By means of the legal soruce of custom (minhag), Jewish law came to recognize a way 
of creating orally a legally valid transaction. According to Talmudic law, the existence of a trade custom 
whereby a transaction was concluded by affixing a mark (sitomta) on a barrel of wine was sufficient to render 
the sale legally complete, despite the absence of meshikhah – the recognized mode of acquiring moveable 
property (Babylonian Talmud tractate Bava meẓia 74a). The rule was justified on the grounds that “custom 
abrogates the law in all matters of mamon. (i.e., monetary matters or the civil law; see Minhag).” 
714 Therefore, Reb Isaac did not really own the cow at the point when he sold it to the non-Jewish 
woman and, as a result, that sale never took place. When the Jew later proceeded to bring the cow into his 
courtyard, doing so gave him ownership over the cow, as he had already showed willingness to buy from the 
debtor by means of the Weinkauf. The act of bringing the animal into his courtyard closed that transaction as 
“a man’s courtyard buys in his stead” [ )שלא מדעתו(חצרו של אדם קונה לו   etc.], after which the cow calved. 
ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §82 ף קנה לעניין קדושת בכור לא ”נ ווינקוי”ה, ל לא תלה דינא דבכור בדיניהם”אלא צ
 .קנה
 
715 Judging by the last name, he was probably a kohen himself. When a member of the priestly class 
is permitted to keep a firstborn animal, he is still obligated to care for it, to treat it with the proper respect, 
and to refrain from using it for any purpose until it acquires an injury (see Maimonides, Mishne Torah, “Laws 
of Firstborns,” 1: 7 and Or zarua 1: §491). 




require money and pulling to avoid doubt; the custom of the non-Jews everywhere is that 
whoever gives even one small coin for the merchandise, buys it, even a golden coin, so this 
needs no explanation.”716 Rabbi Mintz’s own reasoning why one could not rely solely on 
local business custom ultimately rested on Rabbi Rothenburg’s requirement of pulling and 
money in order to remove sanctity; otherwise, Rabbi Rothenburg would simply have 
proclaimed that local business law always determines the correct method of acquisition for 
firstborn animals. Rabbi Mintz’s ultimate argument is thus based on an assumption from 
silence, as implied by Rabbi Rothenburg’s stringent requirements. These cases demonstrate 
the use of the logic of custom in creating part of the legal tradition. 
 Rabbi Mintz thus found an ad hoc specific solution for the case where the sheep 
were given to the Jew to pay back a debt and then immediately sold, the Jew only taking a 
few sheep as a warranty for payment; he explained that the sheep were never acquired 
according to Rabbenu Tam, as the Jew did not pull them until after they were resold. Rabbi 
Israel Bruna rejected Rabbi Mintz’s solution. When this responsum was shown to him, 
Rabbi Bruna wrote that he concedes that this transaction fulfills the requirements of 
Rabbenu Tam, but that was not sufficient because the sale was not also acceptable 
according to RaShY; according to the latter’s view, the sheep may have been bought by the 
Jew when he accepted them as payment for the debt. Subsequently, they were not sold to 
the non-Jewish guarantor, who paid only after the ewe lambed. Thus, the ewe still belonged 
to the Jew when it lambed, and its firstborn was sacred. As we saw, Rabbi Mintz was aware 
                                                     
716 ShUT MahaRaM Mintz, §5:  מ״מ הני קנייה דנהגו התגרים גוים אינו מועיל להפקיע קדוש׳ בכור, דאל״כ למה
המקח קונה בו אפי׳ זהו׳ הצריך מהר״ם כסף ומשיכ׳ לאפוקי נפשיה מפלוגתא, הא מנהג הגוים בכל המקומות מי שנותן אפי׳ פרוטה על 
 ולית דין צריך פנים.




of this point of view and tried to justify his own reasoningby pointing out that most scholars 
side with Rabbenu Tam on this issue. He framed the requirement to satisfy RaShY’s 
opinion in addition to Rabbenu Tam’s as a mere stringency, which could be disregarded in 
this case. This “mere” stringency, however, was the legacy of Rabbi Rothenburg, which 
Rabbi Bruna considered unacceptable to counter. He therefore responded: “Are we better 
than Our Master Rabbi Meir [of Rothenburg] and Asheri who obligated us to be stringent 
[and also satisfy the requirement] according to RaShY?!”717 Rabbi Bruna ends his letter 
with the following admonition: “As for the firstborn animal, I am confident that you have 
not done any deed to permit slaughtering it without injury....”718 Once again, the logic of 
custom defeats the logic of law: Rabbi Mintz’s arguments regarding which opinion was 
preferable and, therefore, which one should be sufficient in less than ideal cases was based 
on acceptable legal argumentation. The ultimate conclusion, however, rested on authority 
pure and simple – the authority of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, the epitome of Ashkenaz. 
Rabbi Bruna’s counter-argument was not strictly legal; it was highly emphatic, employing 
statements such as “this is very puzzling,” and “are we better than Our Master Rabbi 
Meir?!” 
 iv-c. The Logic of Custom, the Likut, and Legal Periodization: 
In a letter to Rabbi Isserlein, Rabbi Mintz relates that he and his colleagues were asked 
concerning a cow that was producing milk before calving and was sold to a non-Jew while 
pregnant by means of monetary transaction alone, after which it gave birth to a male calf. 
                                                     
717 ShUT MaharI Bruna, § 245 (last section) ומה שכתבת שרוב הפוסקים דלא כרש”י, תימה גדולה - וכי עדיפי
י”מ ואשירי שהצריכו להחמיר  כרש”אנן ממהר ...?! 
718 ShUT MaharI Bruna, § 245 ולענין הבכור אבטח דלא עשית מעשה להתיר לשחוט בלא מום לא ניחא, ומ”מ
ישראל מברונא. ובכן יגדל שלומך וטובתך. היכי הוה’ הודיעני גופא דעובד . 




The letter explained that “some of the scholars of the yeshiva were tending towards the 
opinion that the firstborn was exempt… according to Maimonides, who ruled that milk 
exempts.”719 The scholars added that, even if one remains stringent regarding milk, many 
authorities, including Rabbenu Tam, would accept the monetary transaction as sufficient to 
sell the mother.720 Even after adducing all their reasons, Rabbi Mintz displayed discomfort 
with the yeshiva scholars’ opinion. His explanation constantly returned to Rabbi 
Rothenburg:  
And my opinion does not tend to exempt it at all, since Our Master Rabbi Meir 
ruled like Rabbenu Tam that milk does not exempt, and this source can be found in the 
tosafot and in Mordekhai in the last chapter of tractate Yevamot,721 and also in Mordekhai 
in the chapter ‘he who rents,’722 and in the first chapter of tractate Ḥulin723 and in ‘the 
gold.’724 And it is also brought in the Mordekhai katan in the first chapter of Ḥulin, that, 
‘In all of Ashkenaz we follow the custom of Our Master Rabbi Meir, that milk does not 
exempt.725 In this short paragraph, the Mordekhai is mentioned five times as a source, and 
                                                     
719 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §34 or in Leket yosher, 128-130. מקצת בני הישיבה דעתם נוטה להתיר, וחשבינן
ויש פוסקים כמותו, נות בגוי לריש לקישמ מעות קו”מ, ואם תימצי לומר אינו פוטר, כמו דיעבד דמיימוני פסק דחלב פוטר  
720 Rabbi Mintz reported that his colleagues added the interpretation of Or zarua (mentioned above) 
to their reasoning. Or zarua argued that “even for Rabbi Yoḥanan [who requires a transfer of the object], 
money is still valid in the case of a fetus, where there is nothing to pull” (Ibid.) אפילו לרבי יוחנן מועיל מעות , ועוד
 לאור זרוע בוולד דאין בו מה למשוך
721 Mordekhai on Yevamot, §126 תשובת מהר”ם שני עובדי כוכבים כו’ פסקינן דחלב פוטר ועיין לעיל פ”ק דחולין
... מ”שחלב אינו פוטר בבכורה ומחשיבו ספק בכור וכן נוהגין בכל ארץ אשכנז מ] קכו[ם ”ל דאף לפי דברי מהר”אני הדיוט הכותב נ: 
מיהו , פ' אותו ואת בנו’ ש בתוס”וע, ויש לומר יש מקומות שתקנו חכמים מחמת הספק דליהוי כאילו  מחצה הכי ומחצה הכי עד כאן
ל”וט אפילו כי ליכא חזקה בהדי מיעוט וזהוכיח מההיא דהלוקח בהמה דחיישינן למיע’ בתוס . 
722 “Ha-sokher et ha-po’el,” the fifth chapter in tractate Avodah zarah of the Babylonian Talmud. 
See Mordekhai there, §850 
בהמה וצריך ליזהר כשמוכר . אך יש פוסקים מעות דוקא ולא משיכה, ם קונה דוקא ולא מעות”מסקנא דמשיכה בעכו
י ואני מצאתי דאם אין ”ם כדי לפוטרה מן הבכורה צריך שימשכנה לביתו וגם יתן מעות ואז יא ידי כל הספקות ר”המבכרת לעכו
ם בית ישאיל לו ישראל מקום בחצרו וימשכנה שם”לעכו . 
723 See Mordekhai on tractate Ḥulin, ha-Kol Shoḥtin §592 (or 596 in some editions) 
שהרי , ם והיא חולבת שהחלב פוטר מן הבכורה”המיימוני דהלכה כדברי האומר פרק הלוקח דהלוקח בהמה מן העכופסק ...
משמע דחלב לבדו שלא ... ד חלב אין פוטר ”ואין הלכה כמ, כ יולדות”ורוב בהמות אינן חולבות אא, בכל התורה הולכין אחר הרוב
י דהתם מיירי בראוה חולבת קודם לידה דבההיא מודה ”אומר ר. בות בלא יולדותראינוה מניקה אינה פוטרת דחיישינן למיעוטא דחול
ותדע שכן הוא . דהלך אחר הרוב, דחלב אינו פוטר אם לא שראינוה מינקת אבל בעלמא סבירא ליה חלב פוטר  
724 ha-Zahav,” the 4th chapter in tractate Bava Meẓia of the Babylonian Talmud. See Mordekhai on 
tractate Bava Meẓia, ha-Zahav §302  
מעות קונות הלכך ישראל שיש לו בהמה מבכרת מותר לו לישראל לקבל מעות מן , ם מה למשוך”והיכא דאין לו לעכו
ת ”ם לאחר שיולד אפילו לר”ם להפקיעו מבכורה וחוזר וקונהו מן העכו”ג דלא משך העכו”לו העובר עא] ולמכור[ם ולמסור ”העכו
ל גופיה פסיק דעובר לאו ”ת ז”דמשיכת האם אינה מועלת לעובר דהא ר, ם קונה ולא מעות דאין כאן מה למשוך”דמשיכה בעכושפסק 
ל ספר אור זרוע”ירך אמו היא וכמאן דמנחא בדיקולא דמיא עכ . 
725 Mordekhai katan, Ḥulin Ms. 




the statement that “in Ashkenaz the custom is to follow Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg” is 
quoted as summarized in the Mordekhai katan.726  
 
Not only the trope, but also the sources that transmit it exemplify the Ashkenazic 
legal tradition: likutim were the ultimate form of transmitting local traditions textually 
without solidifying them into strictly legal modes. Rabbi Mintz was similarly hesitant 
regarding the method of sale, refusing to permit the firstborn in question because it was 
sold with money alone, “and …it seems to me that this also is not useful, as Our Master 
Rabbi Meir requires pulling and money.”727 He concluded728  against “taking any action 
that will put one into a potential prohibition punishable by karet of slaughtering 
consecrated animals outside the Temple.”729  
                                                     
ובמרדכי פרק בתרא דיבמות וכן ’ איתא בתוסוכן , ת דחלב אינו פוטר”ם פסק כר”דמהר, ואין דעתי נוטה להתיר כלל
ם דחלב אינו ”בכל אשכנז נוהגים כמהר, ואיתא במרדכי קטן בפרק קמא דחולין. במרדכי פרק השוכר ובפרק קמא דכחולין ובהזהב
 .פוטר
726 Ibid.: 
סמוך ’ למימ’ רוב איכ’ ותיפטר משו’ כ יולדו”אינן חולבות אא’ ם פסק דחלב אינו פוטר דמאי אמר רוב פרו”מהר’ ומי
ל ספק בכור ונאכל ”ה’ ם ומ”בכל אשכנז נהגו כמהר’ ומי...סתרו זה ואמרו’ ותו, ל פלגא”לחזקת הגוף שלא ילדה וה’ חילבו’ אינ
 במומו
727 Ibid.ומה שמכרו במעות נמי נראה דאינו מועיל, דהא מהר”ם מצריך משיכה ומעות 
728 He did so after evaluating (and rejecting) the opinion of the yeshiva scholars, mainly their 
interpretation, based on Or zarua, that, in this case, money is preferable to pulling. Rabbi Mintz strongly 
rejects this interpretation. He returned to the opinion of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg as summarized in 
Mordekhai and shows that the formulation there is, “...and Our Master Rabbi Meir is stringent and requires 
money...” (This formulation “is stringent and requires money” implies that the requirement of money is the 
additional requirement, the stringency, and can thus in no way be considered preferable over physically 
transferring the object for Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, which is the more basic requirement.) Thus, to Rabbi 
Meir Rothenburg, who requires both forms of transactions, the more important form of buying from a non-
Jew is clearly transferring the object (according to Rabbenu Tam), and the monetary transaction was merely 
added as an extra stringency, in order also to satisfy RaShY. Thus, the two forms of transactions were not 
equal in the eyes of Rabbi Rothenburg, but money was clearly the inferior option. This makes the reading in 
the Or zarua seem even less convincing, and, even if one could possibly read it independently as a legitimate 
structure for Rabbenu Tam’s opinion alone, there was no way in which it could be construed as something 
to which Rabbi Rothenburg would have agreed. Therefore, they cannot cast off Rabbi Rothenburg’s 
stringency, even if their interpretation of Or zarua was valid. 
729ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §34 or in Leket yosher, 128-130. דזה לא מקרי דיעבד לעשות מעשה להיכנס בספק
 Additionally, Rabbi Mintz pointed to his predecessor Rabbi Moellin, who was also איסור כרת לשחוט קדשין בחוץ
of the opinion that one must be stringent and disregard evidence from the animal’s milk production. Rabbi 
Mintz promised that he would copy Rabbi Moellin’s responsum on this topic at the end of his own letter, for 
Rabbi Bruna to study. 




Legal traditions are best transmitted when the legal text is supplemented with 
orality. A responsum written by Rabbi Bruna opens with the following lines: “I once asked 
My Master, the Rabbi Yacov Weil (ca. 1390-1460) the Great, of blessed memory, whether 
we force the kohen to accept the firstborn, and he responded that we do force him.”730  
These lines testify to a teacher’s orally transmitted answer encouraging stringency, which 
his follower recorded in written responsa of the next generation. Rabbi Weil’s own 
responsa show that belonged to the same legal tradition: He was stringent regarding the 
laws but similarly employed creative solutions to circumvent Rabbi Rothenburg’s legacy 
without opposing it. In a responsum, he wrote: “Concerning the firstborn. See here, in all 
the places where I have passed, I have not heard anything other than that we give the 
firstborns to kohanim and even questionable firstborns. [safek bekhor]. I have not heard 
anyone open their mouths and reject it.”731 The ashkenazic way of behaving is accepted as 
                                                     
730 ShUT MahaRI Bruna, §164. פעם אח’ שאלתי מהר”י וויל הגדול ז”ל אם כופין את הכהן לקבל את הבכור. והשיב
 .For Rabbi Weil’s original response, see Psakim u-ktavim §168 .דכייפינן ליה
From Rabbi Bruna’s responsum it is also clear that their predecessor, Rabbi Yacov Weil, was 
similarly stringent regarding these laws. Rabbi Bruna was asked about a specific firstborn animal that 
sustained an injury, and the questioner explained that this specific animal was a “confirmed firstborn, [which] 
was given to the kohanim of Erfurt in the times of Our Master Rabbi Yacov Weil, and every one of us [the 
kohanim of Erfurt] would care for it for one month, and so we acted for about two years” (ShUT MahaRI 
Bruna, §162)  
ממנו נטפלנו בו חדש וכן נהגנו זה שנתים ימים’ ו וכל א”ט בימי מהרי”אותו בכור ודאי ניתן לכהני ערפור  
Rabbi Bruna was surprised by the description of this arrangement in Erfurt, as it implied that nobody 
was required to accept the firstborn animal, and they shared the burden of caring for it. This would mean that 
“we do not force the kohen to accept even a firstborn of established status,” something that Rabbi Bruna had 
a hard time believing, because: “…once I asked My Master, the Rabbi Yacov Weil, in my days of youth, and 
he answered me that we do force the kohen, and I did not know from where he took this, and I found in the 
big Or zarua in the chapter ‘ein ẓadin’ ([one does not hunt] the third chapter in tractate Beiẓah), where he 
interprets RaShY in a way that implies that we force the kohen to accept”( ibid. emphasis mine) אשר כתבת
. אפילו בכור ודאי, ו משמע אחר לא רצה לקבל הבכור ולא כייפינן ליה לכהן לקבל”ט בימי מהרי”בכור ודאי הניתן לכהני ארפור
ג דדייק ”אין צדין באז’ ידעתי מאין לו ומצאתי בפ ו בימי חורפי והשיב לי דכייפינן ליה ולא”תמהני כי פעם אחת שאלתי את מהרי
י דכופין אותו לקבל”מפרש . 
731 ShUT MahaRY Weil, §127 מחמת הבכור. הנה בכל המקומות אשר עברתי לא שמעתי אלא שנותני’ הבכורות
ספק בכור לא שמעתי פוצה פה ומסרב’ לכהנים ואפי . 




correct. After speculating about the source of this approach,732 Rabbi Weil mentioned a 
responsum regarding this issue. The responsum in question is the above-mentioned case, 
in which Rabbi Rothenburg castigated those who insult kohanim by purposefully giving 
firstborns. Rabbi Weil’s conclusion from this responsum was that a kohen is not permitted 
to refuse the firstborn, “for if it were not so, then how would this insult the kohen?!”733 
Rabbi Weil inferred the law from the particular phrasing of Rabbi Rothenburg’s rebuke.734 
Ultimately, Rabbi Weil took a typically ad hoc approach to resolve the case that 
was posed to him: As the Israelite had been negligent in failing to sell the firstborn’s mother 
before the birth, he should be punished, and forced to keep the animal as a fine. Rabbi Weil 
based this on the statement in the Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel (or, Asheri), in which he states 
that, in post-Temple times, it is a requirement to prevent the firstborn from becoming 
consecrated by selling its mother before the birth, in order to avoid prohibitions and 
pitfalls.735 By introducing the idea of a fine, he managed to save the kohen from having to 
                                                     
732 Ibid.: “Probably it is based on the Asheri, who wrote that the kohen must accept it, and probably 
this is so even when it is only a questionable firstborn, because the reason is that it is a disrespect to priestly 
gifts and there is no difference between certain and uncertain [in relation to disrespecting priestly gifts].” 
Ibid. ספק בכור כיון דהוי טעמא משום מבזה מתנות כהונה ’ ומסתמא היינו לפי האשירי שכתב שצריך הכהן לקבלו ומסתמא היינו אפי
 .אין חילוק בין ודאי לספק
733 Ibid. משמ’ מתוך דבריו שהכהן צרי’ לקבלו דאל”כ היאך יכול להקניט הכהן כיו’ שהכהן יכול לסרב מלקבלו 
734 Ibid. Rabbi Weil mentions another source from Rabbi Rothenburg, “And so I have seen in the 
responsa of Our Master Rabbi Meir,: ‘there where a firstborn animal is born to a poor kohen and he wishes 
to give it to a rich kohen, he may not force him [the rich kohen] to accept it, as it is already in the possession 
of the poor kohen and he gained possession over it.’ This implies, however, that from an Israelite [a non-
kohen], the kohen is obligated to accept it”. לכהן עני ורוצה ליתנו לכהן עשיר  ם היכא דנולד בכור”וכן ראיתי בתשובות מהר
משמע אבל מישראל צריך לקבלו. העני וזכה בו’ שהוא כבר ברשו’ אינו יכול לכופו שיקבלו ויכול הכהן עשיר לסרב בו כיו . 
735 See Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s “Hilkhot pidyon bekhor” at the end of his commentary on tractate 
Bekhorot: 
אבל ...קיע קדושת הבכור קודם שיצא לאויר העולם כדי שלא יבא לידי תקלה ולהכשל בו בגיזה ועבודה דאמרינןומצוה להפ
ם משיביאו לידי תקלה”מוטב שיקנה לעכו, האידנא שאין אנו בקיאין בכך  
See also Rabbi Yacov ben Asher’s summary of his father’s opinion in the Arba Turim, Yoreh de’ah, 
§320: 6: 
ב קודם שיצא לאויר העולם כדי לפוטרו מהבכורה אף על פי שמפקיע קדושתו ”ובזמן הזה מצוה לשתף עם הגוי באזנו וכיו
 הכי עדיף טפי כדי שלא יבוא לידי מכשול ליהנות ממנו בגיזה ובעבודה




accept the animal in practice, while still adhering to Rabbi Rothenburg and the stringent 
approach in principle. 
In sum, all the above responsa sources concur that the formulation in Mordekhai 
katan – “In all of Ashkenaz, we follow the custom of Our Master Rabbi Meir” – 736 captures 
the ashkenazic tradition. This is a perfect example of what I called legal tradition: its texts 
are transmitted mainly via compilations, which resist textualization and contain many oral 
statements and testimonies, accompanying the text with impassioned exclamations. This 
tradition centers on a towering figure and is intertwined with the idea of a community (“in 
all of Ashkenaz”), which is represented by a combination of reports of actual popular 
practice in the community – albeit carefully selected by rabbis. The tradition employs the 
logic of custom, meaning that it is not based on offering better reasoning or interpretations 
of the law; rather, it relies on a strong source of authority, and any opposition to custom is 
based on very specific details of the actual cases rather than on opposing the custom itself 
on principle. 
To explain how Rabbi Rothenburg became conflated with Ashkenaz as a religious 
community we must return to the case where Rabbi Bingen attempted to justify popular 
practice using earlier medieval sources, but Rabbi Isserlein rejected it as follows: “Our 
Master Rabbi Meir, who is a recent authority (batrai), it is written in the Mordekhai that he 
was stringent and required money and pulling ... And so too, Asheri, who is a recent 
authority (batrai), concludes.... And how could it be possible to make a custom to be lenient 
                                                     
736 Mordekhai katan, Ḥulin Ms. 
סמוך ’ למימ’ רוב איכ’ ותיפטר משו’ כ יולדו”אינן חולבות אא’ ם פסק דחלב אינו פוטר דמאי אמר רוב פרו”מהר’ ומי
ל ספק בכור ונאכל ”ה’ ם ומ”בכל אשכנז נהגו כמהר’ ומי...סתרו זה ואמרו’ ותו, ל פלגא”לחזקת הגוף שלא ילדה וה’ חילבו’ אינ
 במומו




against all of these sages regarding a biblical prohibition that involves karet?!”737 Thus, 
common practice or no common practice, “ancient first ones” or not, Rabbi Rothenburg 
and his requirement to use both methods of sale had the last word. The two authorities that 
convince Rabbi Isserlein are designated as batrai – later ones, according to the principle of 
hilkheta ke-batrai (the law is like the later authorities),738 a well-known principle that it is 
the latest iteration of traditional views that should be taken into consideration. This final 
statement is not a purely legal one, it concerns the “legal tradition” more broadly speaking. 
Rabbi Rothenburg’s preeminent position and the use of his opinion in these texts, 
not for their legal reasoning, but as an anchor of authority for the custom to be stringent 
regarding everything related to firstborn sanctity, and as a culmination and representation 
of Ashkenaz, point to another aspect of legal tradition and how a religious community 
constructs its legal past. In his work on the legal scholar Nicolas Cusanus (1401-1446), 
Gadi Algazi not only dissociates the essential connection between scholarly law and text 
and common custom and orality, he also examines different ways of working with the past, 
which include thought operations carried out by scholars and peasants.  
One of these ways, he explains, in the case of legalists, is what he calls the creation 
of a “middle age.”739 This method allows scholars to link legal texts from the past to the 
                                                     
737 Leket yosher, 135.  וכן מהר”ם דבתראה הוה כתב במרדכי שהיה מחמיר ומצריך משיכה וכסף כדי לאפוקי נפשיה
ואיך יתכן לעשת מנהג להקל נגד כל הגאונים הללו באיסור דאורייתא שיש בו כרת...וכן אשירי דבתראה הוה. ...מפלוגתא ?! 
 
738 On the meaning of this formula, see Meir Rafeld, "The Halakha Follows the Later Sages,” in 
Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic Literature )1992:(  119-140; Israel Ta-Shma. "Hilkheta ke-batrai, 
Beḥinot histori’ot shel Klal Mishpati,” (The law is like the later authorities: historical aspects of a legal 
principle.) in Shenaton ha-mishpat ha-ivri: Annual of the Institute for Research in Jewish Law (1979): 405-
423; Israel I. Yuval, "Rishonim and Aḥaronim, Antiqui et Moderni: Periodization and Self-Awareness in 
Ashkenaz” in Zion 57, no. 4 (1992): 369-394, and many others. 
739 See Algazi, “Ein gelehrter Blick,” 342, “…eine ‘Funktion’ oder Dekoperation die sich 
‘Mittelalter’ nennen last.” 




present across time: by constructing a “middle period” of sources that have the authority 
of the past but are not as distant from the present as to be irrelevant. This operation 
resembles, in function, the principle of hilkheta ke batrai: It is highly textual and historical 
on the one hand, but not analytical and rational, on the other. It is a scholarly legal operation 
that functions like custom, searching for an anchor in the past that is close enough to 
function as a direct source of authority for the present. In the case of Ashkenaz in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth century, we can witness such a phenomenon: Rabbi Meir of 
Rothenburg, the last of the tosafists before the ashkenazic decline, rather than distant 
predecessors like RaShY, represents this bridging age. He is close enough to their own 
period to accurately represent the community of Ashkenaz but distant enough to be 
hallowed. 
iv-d. Rabbi Isserlein’s Investigations and their Limitations 
This section focuses closely on Rabbi Israel Isserlein, who had strong inclinations towards 
a totally different source of legal authority. In general, his opinion on the issue of firstborn 
animals is in accord with the ashkenazic rabbinic tradition of his contemporaries. In a 
responsum printed in Leket yosher,740 Rabbi Isserlein briefly considered the status of a goat 
that was bought from a non-Jew using only one coin (once again this coin was more of a 
token representing the agreement, rather than the sum in exchange for the goat), after which 
it gave birth. He engaged in a very short exposition of the opinions concerning monetary 
transactions versus physical transfer of the object, and concluded with a rhetorical question: 
                                                     
740 Rabbi Isserlein’s student, Rabbi Yoizel Ostreicher found a responsum of Rabbi Isserlein among 
the correspondence of Rabbi Yehuda Obernick.  Rabbi Yoizel copied this into his collection of Rabbi 
Isserlein’s teachings, behaviors and writings. This collection eventually became the compilation Leket 
yosher. For more on this compilation see chapters 2 and 6 in this dissertation, especially n217. 




“In any event, seeing as Our Master Rabbi Meir was stringent to require money and pulling 
in order to remove oneself from disagreement with RaShY, who can come after him to be 
lenient on his stringency?!”741 With this, the matter was settled. 
On the issue of milk-production as proof of the animal’s birth history, however, 
Rabbi Isserlein’s responsa betray his difficulty with the tradition that, “In all of Ashkenaz 
we follow the custom of Our Master Rabbi Meir that milk does not exempt.” In his 
responsum to Rabbi Mintz, Rabbi Isserlein held a different opinion regarding the nature of 
milk production among livestock. He concluded the responsum to Rabbi Moshe Mintz 
(mentioned in the previous section) with the following request: “I beg of you, inquire, and 
ask [others] to inquire in your whole territory from Jews and non-Jews [lit. Aramaeans] if 
there can be found any man or woman who ever saw in their lifetimes any cow that was 
producing milk before ever having given birth, and inform me about that which you find 
out by means of a letter.”742 Earlier  in the same response to Rabbi Mintz, for instance, 
Rabbi Isserlein mentioned his own research: “as I investigated and inquired from many 
Jews and non-Jews [lit. “Aramaeans”], women and men, if they ever saw a cow producing 
                                                     
741 See Leket yosher, 137.  
מי יבוא אחריו להקל נגד , י”ם היה מחמיר להצריך כסף ומשיכה כדי לאפוקיה נפשיה מפלוגתא דרש”מ  הואיל ומהר”מ
.נאום הקטן והצעיר שבישראל .ראין פנאי להאריך יות .חומרתו  
742 This is Rabbi Isserlein’s responsum to the responsum mentioned above, ShUT MaharaM Mintz 
§34. Rabbi Isserlein’s response is collected both in Psakim u-ktavim §167 and in Leket yosher, quoting here 
from Leket yosher, 131: במטותא מינך תדרוש ותבקש לדרוש בכל גבולך מיהודאים וארמאים אם ימצא שום איש או אשה שראו
מ”ומה שתעלה בידך הודיעני עי, חולבת קודם שילדה מעולםמימיהם שום פרה שהיתה  . These compilations included, among 
other material, copies from their master’s correspondence. In Trumat ha-deshen, the work of responsa that 
Rabbi Isserlein collected and edited himself to some extent, the remark requesting that Rabbi Mintz confer 
with others was not included. We do, however, find frequent mention of Rabbi Isserlein’s own inquiries, both 
in Trumat ha-deshen and elsewhere, which is in line with the style of Trumat ha-deshen, which removes the 
more personal epistolary elements from its contents. 




milk that had not given birth previously, and I did not hear even one of them who ever saw 
such a thing.”743 This statement reappears in several responsa in various formulations.744 
  Rabbi Isserlein’s collection of responsa, Trumat ha-deshen, contains one 
responsum directly discussing the issue of milk production.745 The question regards a 
pregnant cow sold to a Jew by a non-Jewish seller. The seller had mentioned, in passing, 
that it is hazardous to approach the cow while calving, based on past instances where the 
cow had behaved violently during labor. In addition, this cow was already giving milk 
when the Jew bought it. After the Jew acquired this cow, it calved, leading to the question 
of the firstborn status of this calf. 
Rabbi Isserlein proposed to adduce the two factors, milk production and the non-
Jewish seller’s comment, in order to exempt the calf from firstborn status. He explains that, 
“It seems to me that whoever is lenient according to this does not fail at all, as I will 
explain.”746 First, Rabbi Isserlein listed all the authorities who consider milk production 
                                                     
743 See Leket yosher, 129 or Psakim u-ktavim §167-168: 
לפי שדרשתי וחקרתי מיהודאים וארמאים , ג שכתבתי כבר באחד מתשובותי צדדים להקל עתה בזמנינו ובארצותינו”ואע
ילדה כבר ולא שמעתי אחד מהם שראה דבר כזה מעולםנשים ואנשים רבים אם ראו מימיהם פרה חולבת שלא  ... 
744 See Leket yosher, 139, Rabbi Isserlein’s responsum to Rabbi Yosman Katz ; this might be the 
responsum closest to the one printed in Isserlein, Trumat ha deshen (Venice, 1519), §271: משום , ותו העיקר
ואמרו כולם שמעולם לא ראו או , וגם הנחתי לשאול לכמה ארמאיות, שאלתי בכמה וכמה אנשים ונשים הבקיאים בדברדדרשתי ו
אמרתי דהא דאמר תלמודא בבכורות ....כ ילדה”שמעו שום פרה שחלבה חלב הרבה כמו בעד שנים או שלושי פשיטים בפעם אחת אא
אהא סמכתי בדהוה לי צד הוכחה ....מיהם אבל הבהמות שלנו חלוקות משלהםדמיעוט חולבות קודם שיולדות היינ והבהמות שהיו בי
ג דההיא צד לחוד לא היה מספיק לגמרי”אע, שביכרה כבר  
745 See Trumat ha-deshen, §271. It is not identical to the responsum addressed to Rabbi Mintz, but 
many parts recur. The other responsum that relates to such a question is §270 and regards the issue of selling 
by means of monetary transaction alone. In this response, Rabbi Isserlein rejects, once again, the 
interpretation of the Or zarua that one may rely on monetary transactions alone in the case of selling the 
mother animal, because one cannot physically take hold of the fetus, as “the fetus is not part of the mother.” 
He explains that Rabbi Rothenburg does not deem this sufficient, most likely because this principle is not 
true for any law other than slaughter and, thus, the fetus can, in fact, be physically transferred by means of 
pulling the mother. Rabbi Isserlein ultimately suggests kinyan ḥalifin (barter) in order to cover all opinions. 
The question is phrased as an advance inquiry, meaning that the questioner is asking about the correct mode 
of sale before carrying it out, rather than post factum. As a result, Rabbi Isserlein can afford to be more 
stringent and has no need to attempt finding leniencies and solutions. 
746 Trumat ha-Deshen, §271:יראה דהמקל כה”ג לא הפסיד כלל כמו שאבאר 




alone to be sufficient proof of a previous birth. “However,” he subsequently retracted, “it 
seems that one should not be lenient, as in all of Ashkenaz one is accustomed to be 
stringent, and so we find in the name of Our Master, Rabbi Meir, that he wrote that the 
custom is to be stringent.”747 Having paid his respect to Rabbi Rothenburg, however, Rabbi 
Isserlein returned to his own inquiries. He maintained that, (apart from the case of goats), 
he has never heard of any animal giving milk without having given birth previously, and It 
seemed clear to him that milk should be considered sufficient evidence, suggesting that 
“...their animals [in the Talmud] were different (lit. meshunim [strange]) from our 
animals...”748 In the past, Rabbi Isserlein conjectured, there was probably a substantial 
group of cows that constituted an exception and did, indeed, produce milk before giving 
birth; he even presents additional proof for the claim that the nature of the animals had 
changed over time.749  
In his day and age, Rabbi Isserlein asserted, the phenomenon of a cow that produces 
milk despite never having given birth would be not merely a normal exception, a usual 
                                                     
747 Ibid.: מ נראה דאין להקל, שכבר נהגו בכל אשכנז להחמיר, וכן נמצא בשם מור”ם דכתב המנהג הוא להחמיר” It is 
not clear exactly what  source Isserlein found “in the name of” Rabbi Meir Rothenburg, but we can assume 
that he knew this from several sources, such as the Mordekhai katan on Ḥulin (which specifically uses the 
words “custom” and “Ashkenaz” in the name of Rabbi Rothenburg), or from any of the other allusions to 
this in the Mordekhai and in other ashkenazic likutim such as Sefer ha-agudah or Sefer ha-parnes, §300-302: 
ם פסק למכור אוזן הבהמה עצמה לגוי ואז לא יהא שום ספק ”אבל מורי הר...כל שיש יד גוי באמצע פטורה מן הבכורה
גוי חצירו או רפת בקר בכסף ונמצא שהוא רשות הגוי איסור והגוי ימשוך הבהמה ברשותו ויקנה במשיכה ובמעות או היהודי מקנה ל
ם ”וכן טוב יותר כי משיכה אין קונה ברשות המקנה לבדו אלא בסימטא או לרשות הקונה וכשתלד זכר יכול הישראל לסלק מן העכו
 .במעות ואז מותר
אחריה ומניקתו צריכה פדיון  הלוקח בהמה מן הגוי ואין ידוע בעדות אם ביכרה אם לאו ואפילו חולבת אם לא שהוולד כרוך
ת שילדה כבר פעמים ושלש אין נאמן ומיהו אם ירצה הישראל אין נותן זה הבכור לכהן אלא ימתין עד שיפול בו מום ”ואם הגוי מסל
ם”ה מהר”ויאכלנו דהממע . 
שהלוקח בהמה משה בר מיימון ושאר גאונים פסקו ’ ור, אם עבר אדם ושחט הבכור טרם נפדה אסור בהנאה וצריך קבורה
כ יולדות”החולבת מן הגוי שחלב פוטרה מן הבכורה שבכל התורה כולה הולכין אחר הרוב ורוב בהמות אינן חולבות אא  
748 Trumat ha-deshen, §271:וי”ל דבהמות שלהם היו משונות מבהמות שלנו 
749 From the fact that the Talmud also considers it certain that an animal does not give birth before 
the age of three, whereas the tosafists and Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel all point out that, in their own day and 
age, animals gave birth at an earlier age, too. 




minority (mi’uta), but, rather, a negligible minority (mi’uta-de-mi’uta). Therefore, he 
concluded, “even if one could find one cow in a thousand, this is a minority that is 
completely unlikely, and to such a minority of a minority (mi’uta-de-mi’uta), we do not 
apply the method of supporting.”750 The stringency that had led some authorities to 
consider milk production insufficient was based on the method of using an accepted 
assumption (ḥazaka) to support the minority (mi’uta) and thus establish it as something to 
be taken seriously. In our case, the accepted assumption (ḥazaka) is that all animals are 
considered not to have given birth previously unless proven otherwise. He asserted that, 
whereas this method may apply to a regular minority (mi’uta), it would not apply to an 
almost negligible minority (mi’uta-de-mi’uta). Thus, the accepted assumption (ḥazaka) 
that animals are considered never to have given birth in the past can be used to buttress the 
minority (mi’uta) of animals that do produce milk prior to birth, and thus, milk would, for 
some authorities, be an insufficient factor – in the times of the Talmud. This accepted 
assumption (hazaka) could not be used, however, to buttress the almost negligible 
exception (mi’uta-de-mi’uta) of animals that give milk before birth in Rabbi Isserlein’s 
day. The ability to produce milk should, therefore, be acceptable proof, in his day and age 
that the animal in question had given birth previously. As a result, Rabbi Isserlein was of 
the opinion that any animal that produces milk in his times would henceforth not be 
suspected of giving birth to a firstborn. In this manner, Rabbi Isserlein secured his personal 
convictions, taken from the realm of empirical evidence and experience, on a foundation 
                                                     
750 Trumat ha-deshen, §271 וא”כ אפילו אי אשכחן פרה אחד מאלף הוי מיעוטא דלא שכיחא, ומיעוטא דמיעוטא לא
 אמרינן ביה סמוך




of legal argumentation. His certainty that animals never give milk prior to birth is expressed 
by the halakhic concept of mi’uta de-mi’uta, which allows him to propose a legal structure 
for disregarding the principle of “base the minority on the presumptive status,” because 
that applied to mi’uta, a regular minority, but not to mi’iuta de-mi’uta, a negligible 
minority.  
Regardless of his convictions and his ability to express these legally, Rabbi Isserlein 
could not override Rabbi Rothenburg’s dictum that milk production was insufficient. The 
imperative of finding an authoritative figure from the “middle age” becomes apparent: 
Rabbi Isserlein dismissed the opinions in the Talmud on minorities that gave milk even 
without giving birth by saying that their animals were different. Rabbi Rothenburg’s 
opinion, however, could not be dismissed as relating to other animals in different times, 
and Rabbi Isserlein is aware of this: “And Our Master Rabbi Meir wrote that the custom is 
to be stringent, in all likelihood he meant the custom of our areas.”751 This precluded the 
possibility of ruling based purely on his own convictions regarding milk production. 
Rabbi Isserlein nevertheless found a way in which he could give his opinion some 
degree of relevance. In cases where an added reason to support the cow’s prior births 
existed, this could be combined with the fact that the animal was evidently lactating. For 
instance, if the animal’s prior owner testified that the animal did, in fact, give birth in the 
past, this could be adduced to milk production in order to exempt the animal, even if the 
previous owner was not Jewish. 752 In this manner, the firstborn status of a newborn animal 
                                                     
751 Trumat ha-deshen, §271 ומור”ם כתב דהמנהג הוא להחמיר מסתמא ר”ל מנהג ארצותינו 
752 In the responsum, Rabbi Isserlein also voices an opinion whether this testimony is considered 
innocent. On the one hand, the seller presents it as an aside, and even a negative quality regarding this cow, 
that it is violent when calving, which, the seller explains, he knows from past experience. On the other hand, 




could be eliminated in cases such as the one in question, where the mother-animal was 
producing milk before the birth, and there was an added reason to be lenient. Rabbi 
Isserlein thus took a factor that, was, in his opinion, sufficiently strong by itself, and 
combined it with other considerations that encourage leniency. In this way, he managed to 
bolster his inquiries without blatantly countering Rabbi Meir Rothenburg’s tradition. Rabbi 
Isserlein further limited the repercussions of his innovation by stipulating very specific 
factors where his leniency would apply.  
In another responsum, Rabbi Isserlein refused to adduce his leniency regarding 
lactation to the other evidence, because, in that case, the additional factor regarded the form 
of sale. He explained that he could not adduce this element to the fact that the cow was 
giving milk, because, “The two have nothing to do with one another, because the reason 
why producing milk will exempt it is because it is proof that she already gave birth, and 
buying by means of money does not exempt it because it already gave birth, but rather 
because it is now owned partially by a non-Jew.”753 Since the other factor that inclined 
                                                     
Rabbi Isserlein considers the possibility that the seller is merely presenting this as a negative point 
surreptitiously, in order to convince the buyers that the cow has, in fact, given birth before, which ultimately 
makes the animal more valuable, without seeming too obvious about it. It is not certain, therefore, whether 
this could be considered an innocent testimony, mesiach lefi tumo. Rabbi Isserlein concluded that he thinks 
it “unlikely that the non-Jew is planning to trick the buyers to the extent that he will speak in riddles.” At the 
very least, Rabbi Isserlein concluded, this type of testimony suffices in order to combine it with the proof 
concerning about which he is really convinced – the milk  
Trumat ha-deshen, §271... ת שאין ”דהיכא דנכרי מסל, הלוקח בהמה’ ומוכיח בהיא באשירי פ, מכח דברי הנכרי
 .נראה להשביח מקחו סמכינן אדבריו
לפי שהבהמה שכבר ילדה חשובה , רמז שכבר ילדה ת הוא דאיכא למימר שגילה בדרך”ד נמי נהי דאין לגמרי מסל”ובנ
ואפשר הנכרי לא . פעמים מחלב שמבכרת’ או ג’ וגם החלב טוב יותר מבהמה שילדה ב, יותר ממבכרת מפני שאין מסוכנת עוד בלידה
כ לדבר בחידות ”מ הדברים נראין שאין בדעת הנכרי להערים כ”מ, רצה לומר בפירוש שילדה כדי שלא ירגישו שכוונתו להשביח מקחו
ג”כ יולדת וכן כל כה”וסגי בהאי סברא לצרף בהא דלעיל דאין בהמה שלנו חולב אא . 
753 Leket yosher, 130:  אבל בנד”ד אין נ”ל לצרף קנין הכסף לטעם דחולבת ולהתיר מבינייהו דשניהם דלא שייכי
הוא מתיר מטעם שלא ביכרה אלא משום שותפות וקנין הכסף אדרבה , דטעם דחולבת מתיר דמוכח מילתא דכבר ביכרה, אהדדי כלל
 .הגוי




toward leniency related to the ownership of the cow, not to its birth history, and the two 
factors were unrelated, he was reluctant to adduce them and exempt the newborn calf. 
Even as Rabbi Isserlein managed to give weight to his own reasoning and opinion 
in some way, he did so within limits, without going beyond the particular borders of the 
research he carried out and only in a restricted manner. Ultimately, he could not overturn 
Rabbi Rothenburg’s decision as it was summarized in the likut literature by the statement 
“in Ashkenaz, the custom is to be stringent in these matters,” which effectively closed the 
case. Rabbi Isserlein also considered Rabbi Rothenburg’s decision that a kohen may not 
reject the gift of a firstborn – even a questionable firstborn – as very problematic. In fact, 
once he apparently had decided in favor of a kohen refusing to accept a questionable 
firstborn: “And that which you wrote, if we force the kohen in such a case to accept it.... 
Know, that I was already asked regarding such cases, and I did not know then about the 
responsum…who wrote that Our Master Rabbi Meir was strict with the kohen who did not 
want to accept even a questionable firstborn and considered this to be disrespect of the 
priestly gifts.”754 Considering this very strange, Rabbi Isserlein wrote: “And I would have 
said that this is not called disrespecting priestly gifts in the least, because if the Israelite 
would not have wanted to give it to the kohen, he did not have to, as it is only a questionable 
firstborn, as we have learned.... And how is it possible that an Israelite can have that kind 
of power, to force the kohen to take his gift from him when he does not want it, on the 
                                                     
754 Ibid. (emphasis added) ומה שכתבת אי כייפינן לכהן כהאי גוונא לקבלו, הואיל ואית ביה כמה ספיקות. דע לך, כי
, ם הקפיד על הכהן שלא רצה לקבל אפילו ספק בכור”ג ולא ידעתי בפעם ההיא מתשובת אשירי שכתב שמהר”כבר נדרשתי על כה
 .וחשיב ליה מזלזל במתנות כהונה




contrary, such a thing should be considered disrespect of the priesthood!”755 Immediately 
after this adamant statement, however, Rabbi Isserlein retracted, and deferred to the 
authority of Rabbi Meir Rothenburg: “However, I did not come to disagree with the words 
of Our Master Rabbi Meir.”756  
Thus, Rabbi Isserlein was only lenient within very specific parameters and 
limitations;757 only regarding the rejection of uncertain firstborns (and not permitting the 
                                                     
755 Ibid.. והייתי אומר דנראה דלא חשיב כלל מזלזל במתנות כהונה, לפי שאם היה הישראל רוצה שלא לתתו לכהן הרשות
ואיך יתכן שיהא כח ביד הישראל לכוף הכהן ליקח מתנתו . ל דאפילו תקפו כהן מוציאין אותו מידו”כדקיי, בידו הואיל וספק בכור הוא
ג איכה זילזול כהונה”אדרבה כה, י שהוא אינו רוצה בהמת ! 
756 Leket yosher,130. 130-1 אלא שלא באתי לחלוק על דברי מהר”ם 
757 In this responsum, too, Rabbi Isserlein ultimately managed to insert his own opinion. He did so 
by distinguishing between two kinds of uncertainties (sfekot): those that stem from legal disagreements 
between rabbinic authorities, on the one hand (meaning that one is not sure which authority to follow), versus 
uncertainties stemming from reality itself, on the other. Uncertainties stemming from reality, meant, in this 
case, that there was an uncertainty regarding the calf itself – whether it was a firstborn or not, as there was 
substantial reason to think it is not a firstborn (the fact that its mother was producing milk prior to the birth). 
Such a reason was considered weak, one that, taken alone, would not suffice to exempt the animal. The 
uncertainties stemming from rabbinic disagreement, however, were considered less serious and could be 
disregarded with less risk, because they depend on a legal disagreement and, as such, even if one is wrong 
according to one rabbinic opinion, one is, at least, acting correctly according to the other. Uncertainty 
regarding the animal itself, on the other hand, is more serious, as there is a chance that the animal was, after 
all, a firstborn, and, in that case, one would be liable to karet for slaughtering it. 
Additionally, Rabbi Isserlein distinguished between the prohibition to slaughter or eat the animal, 
which is punishable by karet, and the prohibition to disrespect priestly gifts by refusing them, which is 
frowned upon, but does not approach the realm of karet. Rabbi Isserlein concluded with the suggestion that, 
at the very least, there was no reason to be as stringent concerning the latter, as the ashkenazic tradition 
seemed to have related to the former. He thus accepted stringency surrounding karet, but considered the 
danger of disrespecting priestly gifts less serious, and thus allowed for more leniency when it came to 
returning the firstborns. Such leniency was all the more acceptable, he claimed, when the uncertainty 
stemmed from a disagreement between authorities, rather than an uncertainty about physical reality 
(concerning the animal itself). In the case of an uncertainty stemming from rabbinic disagreement one would, 
in any case, exempt the animal from firstborn status according to at least one out of two rabbinic authorities. 
As a result, Rabbi Isserlein concluded, it was acceptable for the kohen to refuse a firstborn that was sold to a 
non-Jew according to only one of the two required methods of sale: Leket yosher,131: ם לא מיירי ”ונימא דמהר
אלא בספק דלא תליא בפלוגתא דרבוותא אלא בספק שנולד מעצמו כדאשכחן כמה ספיקות במסכת בכורות אבל כהאי גוונא דאיכא 
את ידי כולן לא ניזיל כולי האי להחמיר בשביל כמה ספיקות בפלוגתא דרבוותא אם אנו הולכים להחמיר משום איסור כרת כדי לצ
 זילזול מתנות כהונה
“In any case, one need not add even more [to Rabbi Rothenburg’s opinion], and we can say that Our 
Master Rabbi Meir means this only in cases of an uncertainty that depend not on a disagreement between 
authorities but an uncertainty that comes from the thing itself ... but, as in this case, where there are several 
uncertainties due to disagreements between authorities, even if we are stringent to avoid the prohibition of 
karet and fulfill all the different rabbinic requirements, we do not have to do all of this to avoid disrespecting 
the priestly gifts [which is not punishable by karet].” 




actual slaughtering of an uncertain firstborn), and then only when the firstborn’s mother 
was indeed sold in some manner or other, and the uncertain status of the firstborn was a 
result only of rabbinic disagreement concerning the correct mode of sale. If the sole reason 
to question the newborn animal’s firstborn status was the mother’s milk-production alone, 
he could not exempt the firstborn status – not even to the extent of letting the kohen reject 
the gift. 
One can also find a desire to release the animal from firstborn status in many other 
ashkenazic responsa, as we have seen. But whereas, in those responsa, the issue was 
resolved indirectly, by finding some helpful point in those particular cases; Rabbi 
Isserlein’s approach was more confrontational and innovative: he solved the case by 
introducing doubt as to the status of lactating cows, and expressed the conviction that this, 
in reality, would have been enough to exempt the cows. Notwithstanding this innovative 
approach, the final halakha, in most cases, conformed with the ashkenazic tradition as 
transmitted in the likutim. The logic of custom, resting on the ashkenazic identity and Rabbi 
Rothenburg’s authority, ultimately prevailed. This is not a pure ad hoc resolution, as he 
suggested an actual emendation to the legal structure of the halakha. Legal reasoning leads 
to very different potential repercussions than the logic of custom. In the sixteenth century, 
Rabbi Isserlein’s responsum was absorbed and transmitted in a very changed halakhic 
organizational framework.  In this new order, Rabbi Isserlein’s inquiries suddenly gained 
much broader significance. 
 
                                                     
 




c. Rupture: The Sixteenth Century 
i. Rabbi Moshe Isserles: Rupture as a Vacuum for Innovation 
The previous sections have allowed us to draw the general outlines of a legal tradition and 
to examine more closely the principles, dynamics, and characteristics of the legal tradition 
of Ashkenaz until the end of the fifteenth century. This final part will examine the fate of 
this legal tradition after communal rupture. Rabbi Moshe Isserles (1520-1572), also known 
as “Rema,”758 wrote a responsum about firstborn animals. The questioner describes three 
different stages. The first described a Jew who “...bought a cow from a non-Jewish woman 
and gave her the money without pulling, he merely left it with the non-Jewish woman, so 
that she watch over the cow for him...”759 The second stage complicated the situation, as 
“...the cow was stolen, and she agreed to pay the owner and return his money, regardless 
of the fact that the other non-Jews would have insisted that according to the law, she is 
required to pay only half of the cow’s value, and the other half is the Jew’s own loss.”760 
The woman’s agreement to pay the full value implied that she intended to buy the cow 
from him. Ultimately, the thief was found, “...and the non-Jewish woman sent a message 
to the Jew to come pick up his cow and redeem it...,” implying that the woman withdrew 
her intention to buy the animal, returning ownership to the Jew. Precisely as the Jew was 
on his way to collect the cow, however, it gave birth to a male calf. The questioner wished 
                                                     
758 Acronym:   ר - Rabbi מ- Moshe  א-Isserles, pronounced “Rema”  רמ”א- as his last name is very 
similar to Rabbi Israel Isserlein’s (the author of Trumat ha deshen), I will refer to Rabbi Moshe Isserles by 
his acronym “Rema,” in order to avoid confusion. 
759 Moshe Isserles, ShUT ReMa, §87: אשר שאלתם ע”ד ספק הבכור אשר נולד כאשר קנה פרה מן הכותית ונתן
ותשמור לו הפרה ולרעות אותה עם שאר פרותיה, לה המעות ולא משכה רק הניחה אצל הכותית . 
760 Ibid.: ואח”כ נגנבה הפרה ונתרצית הכותית לשלם לו הפרה ולהחזיר לו מעותיו. ושאר הכותים היו אומרים שמדינא
והחצי יפסיד הישראל, אינה חייבת לו לשלם רק החצי  . 




to know whether this calf is considered sacred.761 Rema’s very first sentence in the 
responsum displays his indebtedness to Rabbi Isserlein and, simultaneously, his break from 
the very tradition that Rabbi Isserlein embodies: “It seems that, certainly, if the cow was 
producing milk first, before this calf, it is obvious and simple that this is not a firstborn, as 
Our Master Rabbi Isserlein has written…762 that if there is any [additional] facet to be 
lenient with a milk-producing animal, one can count on it and exempt in our day and age.763 
At first glance, Rema seems to be deferring entirely to Rabbi Isserlein’s approach 
that milk production can serve to exempt the calf from firstborn status when combined with 
additional reasons. Rabbi Isserlein himself, however, had restricted the types of proof that 
could be adduced to milk-production to include only elements which, in line with the cow’s 
milk production, have direct relevance to the animal’s birth history.764 Rema, on the other 
hand, suggested that the milk production can be adduced to “any facet to be lenient,” 
                                                     
761 Several issues are thus unclear: first, whether the Jew bought the cow from the non-Jewish 
woman in the first place, seeing as he gave her money, but did not physically take the animal into his 
possession by pulling it. Second, it is not certain whether the non-Jewish woman bought the cow back in 
some way by agreeing to pay its full value after the theft. Finally, the fact that the non-Jewish woman told 
the Jew to pick up his cow after it was retrieved may have meant that she was at that point selling the cow 
back to him and, thus, the Jew had regained possession of the cow before the birth. 
ShUT ReMa, §87 , כ הוכר הגנב ושלחה הכותית אל הישראל שיבוא ויקח פרתו ויפדה אותה ממקום שמשכנה הגנב”ואח
ונסתפקת אם הוי בכור, ובעוד שהלך שם הישראל ילדה הפרה זכר . 
762 Psakim u-ktavim, §130 - the response to Rabbi Yosman Katz, which discusses a case where the 
cow is both producing milk and a non-Jew testified innocently that the cow had already given birth in the 
past. 
763 ShUT ReMa, §87 נראה דודאי אם חלבה הפרה תחילה קודם ולד זה דפשיטא דאין זה בכור כמ”ש מהרא”י סי ק”ל
ז”דאי איכא שום צד היתר אצל חולבת יש לסמוך עליו ולהתירה בזה . 
764 In the responsum cited by Rabbi Isserles as evidence, Psakim u-ktavim, §130 – Isserlein 
specifically wrote that, in his opinion, milk production is sufficient for exempting the calf, but “even so, we 
do not rely on this reason alone, but here, where there is also a non-Jew discussing innocently, and it seems 
that he is not doing so in order to praise his wares, that is the case in which I come forward and direct [to be 
lenient].” Evidently, both require adducing milk production to other evidence, but in the original responsum, 
this was a very specific category of evidence, not merely “any facet to be lenient,” as Rabbi Isserles 
paraphrases. 
כן הדבר , אלא היכא דאיכא בהדה נכרי מסל''ת ונראה דלא אכוון להשביח מקחו, אהך טעמא לחודאה לא הוי סמכינן ”ואפ
 .שכך אני מורה ובא




without discriminating. The additional considerations for leniency that Rema used in this 
responsum all stemmed from questions regarding the acquisition and sale of the cow, which 
Rabbi Isserlein specifically refused to adduce to milk production. Rema phrased his answer 
seemingly in line with Rabbi Isserlein, but, in fact, he took the leniency one big step further.  
Moreover, Rema reasoned that, even lacking the element of milk production, the 
calf could have been exempted from firstborn status on the basis of the method of sale. The 
cow had been bought from the non-Jewish woman by means of money alone, without any 
physical transfer of the animal. Later, when the woman agreed to pay the full price for the 
stolen animal to the Jewish owner, the Jew did not physically take the cow into his 
possession either. Rema claims that the calf could be exempted on the basis of the form of 
acquisition alone. According to Rabbenu Tam and many others who required physical 
transfer (“pulling”) of the object being bought when dealing with a non-Jew, the sale from 
the non-Jewish woman, which involved only money and no transfer of the object, never 
was consummated.765Rema insists that selling the animal by means of “pulling” is basically 
sufficient, and that this,  
can be seen from the words of the tosafot, who wrote first like Rabbenu Tam and 
wrote only after, ‘he who wishes to take into consideration the words of both RaShY and 
Rabbenu Tam,’ meaning that it depends on the desire of the actor [to be stringent], but by 
law he can certainly base the case in question on Rabbenu Tam as all the halakhic decision-
                                                     
765 Rema referred to a citation of this opinion in the name of the tosafists in Babylonian Talmud 
tractate Avodah zarah 61a. “Rav Ashi.” The original source also mentioned RaShY’s opposing opinion and 
the preferred option of using both money and physical “pulling” in order to satisfy all opinions. 
ם אינה קונה”אשי אמר משיכה בעכו’ ר . 
ב’ בכורות פ’ אלא לפי האמת כדמוכח במס, לא לדיחויא בעלמא קאמר רב אשי הכי ’,.... 
דמשיכה ‘י פי ”מיהו רש. ם ובכך סגי בלא כסף”ם כדי לפוטרה מן הבכורה צריך שימשכנה העכו”כ המקנה בהמה לעכו”א
ל ”ל כוותיה מדקאמר קרא ומתניתין מסייע ליה לרשב”ל משום דרבא ס”יוחנן אלא כרשב’ ם אלא כסף דאין הלכה כר”אינה קונה בעכו
ם מסימטא ”ם כסף וגם משיכת העכו”ם לפוטרה מן הבכורה צריך שיתן העכו”בהמה לעכות המקנה ”י ור”והרוצה לחוש לדברי רש... 
ם מקנה לו הישראל”ם שהוא שלו ואם אין לו רשות לעכו”או לרשותו של עכו ... 




makers have ruled that money is what buys among Jews; therefore, it follows, that for a 
non-Jew ‘pulling’ is required.766  
 
Most fifteenth-century responsa recognized the fact that Rabbi Rothenburg’s 
requirement to use money in addition to pulling was phrased as an additional stringency. 
Similarly, they all recognized that, if one had to prioritize one method, pulling would, in 
this case, present the preferable choice.767 Despite this insight, however, not one of these 
respondents deemed this sufficient reason to rely only on Rabbenu Tam. Rema was 
evidently reading his predecessors attentively and, in many ways, following in their 
footsteps, but he also took bold additional steps and clearly did not feel equally bound by 
the same tradition that obligated them. 
One of the arguments used in these cases, in which Rema’s conclusion differs from 
that of his predecessors, points to yet another part of the legal tradition that Rema did not 
continue. As we have shown, the understanding that ‘pulling’ was the preferable mode of 
sale and money was the less preferable one, did not lead Rabbi Isserlein or his ashkenazic 
contemporaries to conclude that, in cases where a Jew used only one symbolic coin to buy 
an animal, one could be lenient and declare that, as this is a less preferable method of 
                                                     
766 ShUT Rema, §87: ואע”ג דכתבו שם מיהו רש”י פי’ דמשיכה אינה קונה בכותי רק מעות כו’, עד והרוצה לחוש
ש ריש ”וכן כתב הרא’, המקנה בהמה לכותי לפוטרה מן הבכורה צריך שיתן הכותי כסף וגם משיכה וכו, ת”ולדברי רי ”לדברי רש
מ ”ש. ת”י ור”כ הרוצה לחוש לדברי רש”ת וכתבו אח”דכתבו תחילה כדברי ר’ כדמוכח מלשון התוס, היינו דווקא לכתחילה, בכורות
דאין . ת מדפסקו כל הפוסקים דמעות קונה בישראל ממילא גבי כותי משיכה”כר ל”דברצון העושה תליא מילתא אבל מדינא ודאי קי
ל שהארכתי בזה”ת הנ”כדמוכח בדברי הר, לומר דגבי כותי קונה תרוויהו  
The last sentence, “for one should definitely not claim that both methods buy successfully from a 
non-Jew, as can be proven from the words of Rabbenu Tam above, which I explained,” refers to the fact that 
even those who require stringency do not think that RaShY and Rabbenu Tam could be right simultaneously. 
It is not a stringency where you need both methods and, if you choose only one of the two, you are surely 
wrong. Rather, there is a certain chance of being wrong. Therefore, no matter what one chooses, there is some 
chance of being completely right. Between those two opinions, it is more likely that Rabbenu Tam was right, 
and more authorities agree with him in this case. Therefore, he is the more likely option here. 
767 Both in terms of consistency and in terms of consensus among earlier scholars, see, for instance, 
Leket yosher, 132. 




acquisition, the Jew never bought it. Rema, on the other hand, argued that, as money is 
merely the less preferable means of acquisition, buying an animal from a non-Jew by means 
of money alone would exempt the offspring born from this animal from firstborn status, 
concluding that, “the opinion of Rabbenu Tam seems to me sufficient support, and to say 
that specifically ‘pulling’ buys, in order to exempt this calf from firstborn status,” and not 
money.768  
Thus, Rema considered it obvious that, if something was  considered merely an 
additional requirement for correctly selling the animal to the non-Jew and exempting 
oneself, there is certainly no reason to  adopt such a stringency when buying the animal 
and thus obligating oneself.769 This is far removed from his predecessor’s view, which 
stated that even the vastly inferior mode of monetary acquisition (by means of a merely 
symbolic coin) should be enough to obligate the Jewish buyer to treat the calf as a firstborn. 
Rabbi Isserlein, in fact, phrased it as a logical conclusion that, if one permits something to 
suffice in cases of leniency, it is a fortiori true that this should suffice in order to be 
stringent. He thus concluded his discussion of the symbolic coin: “And thus, we can claim 
a fortiori, that if for sale by means of money, a coin alone can be enough, a coin should 
most certainly be enough in order to be stringent and buy from the non-Jew!”770  
                                                     
768 See ShUT Rema §87 .ולכן נ”ל דברי ר”ת לסמוך עליו ולומר דדוקא משיכה קונה, כדי לפטור ולד זה מן הבכורה
ש אם נולד זכר זה בבית גנב או בבית שמשכן דודאי היה ולדה בחזקת הגנב והקונה דהוי התם שנוי רשות ושינו השם ולכן פטירי”וכ . 
ל משה איסרלש מקראקא”כן נ. ואין להאריך עכשיו בזה . 
769 Regarding Rema’s systematic tendency to be lenient where financial loss was involved, see Ḥaim 
Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-poskim (The History of the Jewish Codes), vol. 3 (New York, 1946-1947): 62-70 . 
In those cases, the leniency usually involves big financial loss and urgent need. 
770 See Leket yosher, 137 (the responsum to Rabbi Yehuda Obernick). וכן המנהג פשוט להקנות לגוי עבור
ומה אפילו להקל ושיקנה הגוי מישראל סגי , ו”ומעתה ק. דסבר דקניינו של גוי אינו אלא בכסף, י”פשוט כדי לקיים גם דברי רש
ש”ישראל מן הגוי לא כלהחמיר ושיקנה ה, בפשוט !? 




While a fortiori reasoning itself is a neutral operation, the “direction” in which it 
functions depends on what is considered more  “obvious” or “serious,” and what is 
considered less “obvious” or “serious,” with the law that applies to the less serious 
statement then a fortiori applying to the more serious one. The determination of what is 
more obvious is almost by definition not something to be spelled out explicitly; it is 
absorbed as part of a legal tradition and its implicit web of priorities and hierarchies. In this 
case, the order clearly changed as the legal tradition moved eastward. For Rabbi Isserlein 
the tendency to be stringent was more obvious than the tendency to be lenient, and he 
constructed his logical claim in line with this assumption. Rema, on the other hand, 
believed that, if a certain standard is considered merely optional in order to be lenient, it 
will certainly not be used in for stringent requirements.771 The ways in which they ranked 
leniency and stringency were opposed, and thus their use of a fortiori worked in opposite 
ways. 
Rema argued that, even if we assume that the Jew first bought the cow, the non-
Jewish woman subsequently bought it back from the Jew according to the laws of sitomta, 
                                                     
771 For example, Maimonides, it seems, was of the opinion that there is no primary assumption that 
favors being stringent over being lenient or vice versa in these cases. (In other words, it goes both ways: 
giving a coin without pulling is sufficient to release the Jew from owning the mother animal, but by the same 
token, it is sufficient to burden a Jewish buyer with an animal that will give birth to a firstborn.) As 
Maimonides, however, unlike Rema here, is not speculating about any of the clauses – that is, Maimonides 
simply states that selling to a non-Jew by means of a coin will suffice to release the Jew and then states that 
the exact same rule applies vice versa – it gives us less of a window into his approach to the mechanism of 
leniency versus stringency in these cases, whereas for Rema, it is clear that, even absent some of the 
information, he feels safe to assume that, if we knew that something can obligate in some situations, it would 
most certainly have to exempt were the situation reversed, whereas Rabbi Isserlein thought that if an 
imperfect sale releases the Jew, it is obvious that, if the situation were reversed, the same sale would clearly 
obligate the Jew. See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Laws of Firstborn Animals 1:5, שנתן מעות לנכרי וקנה  ישראל
פ שלא "וכן אם קנה הנכרי מישראל בדיניהם ונתן מעות אע, לו בהן בהמה מנכרי בדיניהן אף על פי שלא משך קנה וחייבת בבכורה
 .משך קנה ופטורה מבכורה




which state that any accepted local practice that closes a sale transaction will also be valid 
according to Jewish law.772 Therefore, even if the cow was not sold by a full monetary 
transaction, the non-Jewish woman, at the very least, bought it from him according to 
accepted business practices, which should suffice. As we noted, Rabbi Moshe Mintz 
declared specifically that, although a sitomta has validity for Jewish laws of property, it 
does not determine issues of sanctity;773 therefore, even if the sale of the cow according to 
local business law sufficed for a halakhic sale, this did not mean the sale method was 
sufficiently valid to remove its sanctity, and the calf was thus still consecrated.774 This 
principle of whether and how legal status can “transfer” from one halakhic realm to another 
was thus not transmitted to Rema’s legal tradition. 
Rabbi Isserlein’s innovations in Trumat ha-deshen were couched in many levels of 
limitations. These were not mere apologetics, but additional qualifications that were rooted 
in the legal tradition to which he belonged, and they ultimately served to limit the 
applicability of his innovations in the matter of exempting animals from sanctity. Looking 
at Rema’s opinion on the matter, roughly one century later, it is clear how much has 
changed. In the responsum itself, Rema did not cite any new source that was unavailable 
to his ashkenazic predecessors. Moreover, although he was located in Cracow, a relatively 
                                                     
772 ShUT Rema §87 וא”ל דאע”ג דמד”ת אין מעות קונות מ”מ לא גריעי מעות מסיטומתא, דקניא מדרבנן כדאי’ פרק
,איזהו נשך . 
773 ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §82  אלא צ”ל לא תלה דינא דבכור בדיניהם, ה”נ ווינקוי”ף קנה לעניין קדושת בכור לא
 .קנה
Also, see ShUT MaharaM Mintz, §5 דכיוון , כגון סיטמתא, ל דמנהג שנהגו חכמים עוקר דאורייתא”את’ ואפי
אינו מועיל , מ האי קנייה דנהגו התגרים גוים”מ, ממילא הוי קנייה לכל מילי, ד הפקר”דהפקר ב, חכמים ברשות הלוקח’ דמוקמי
בכור’ להפקיע קדוש  
774 Rema is aware that this could be a possible argument (although he does not mention Rabbi Moshe 
Mintz’s responsa specifically), and he presents some counter-arguments to this (from Tosafot on Babylonian 
Talmud, tractate Bava meẓia 34a ה אי נמי ”ד  where they draw a similar comparison between laws of sale and 
laws of sanctity). 




new community, Rema clearly considered himself to be an integral part of the ashkenazic 
tradition. Indeed, the main justification that Rema presented for the publication of his gloss 
on the Shulḥan Arukh was the need for a specifically ashkenazic adaptation of the sfardic-
centered code. In the introduction to this gloss, Rema wrote that his goal was to “collect 
the words of the latter authorities and teach the ways of the customs that are kept in these 
areas,” seeing as, “most of the customs in these countries are not carried out like theirs.”775 
He explained that, as a result of Rabbi Karo’s principle of ruling, “…in his books have 
been spread many things that are not in line with halakha according to the words of the 
sages whose waters we drink, these are the poskim (halakhic decisors) famous among the 
sons of Ashkenaz.”776 Clearly, Rema considered himself not just a part of the ashkenazic 
tradition, but a crucial link in its transmission.777 He identified himself as a descendant of 
“...the tosafists and the sages of France, whose offspring we are.”778 If Rema identified 
                                                     
775 See Rema’s introduction to the Shulḥan Arukh with his gloss, Mapah: אמר משה...בהיות כי הגאון
טבח טבחו וערך שלחנו לא הניח אחריו מקום להתגדר בו לולי ללקט דברי האחרונים ולהורות דרך ... המחבר בית יוסף ושולחן ערוך 
ובלא זה השלחן אשר הוא ערך ... המנהגים שנהגו במדינות אלו באתי אחריו לפרוס מפה על שלחן ערוך שחבר ועליה כל פרי מגדים 
א נתנו עדיין לבני אדם שבמידנות אלו אשר רובי מנהגי מדינות אלו לא נהיגין כוותיהי ול-לפני י ... 
776 Ibid. כ”ש מן הכלל שכלל הגאון הנ”ל מעצמו לפסוק אחר הרי”ף והרמב”ם במקום שרוב האחרונים חולקים עליהם
הם אנו שותין והם הפוסקים המפורסמים ואל ידי זה נתפשטו בספריו הרבה דברים שאינן אליבא דהילכתא לפי דברי החכמים שמימי
ק והגהות מיימון ”ג והסמ”י והסמ”האור זרוע והמרדכי והאשר: ופסקו מהם קמאי דקמאי והם’ בבני אשכנז אשר היו לנו תמיד לעני
ובזה יסתרו כל מנהגי  ...ל בהקדמת ספרי”אשר כלם נבנו על דברי התוספות וחכמי צרפת אשר אנו מבני בניהם וכבר הארכתי בזה ת
על כן . ש בדורות האחרונים אלו”ל  כי הרבה דברים בין בני מזרח ובני מערב אף בדורות הראשונים כ”וכבר אמרו חז, המדינות 
ראיתי לכתוב דעת האחרונים עם המקומות שלא היו נראים לי דבריו בצדו כדי לעורר התלמידים בכל מקום שידעו שיש מחלוקת 
שידעתי שאין המנהג בדבריו אחקרה ואמצאהו אכתוב הכי נהוג ובצדן אשים’ וקובדבריו ובכל י . 
777 See Rema’s introduction to Darkhei Moshe, his glosses on Bet Yosef: וע”י זה הדבר סתר כל המנהגים
 Rema explained that Rabbi Yosef Karo employed a different authoritative tradition “...and אשר באלו המדינות
thereby he countered all the customs in these areas.” By this Rema means not only custom “proper” but 
rather: 1) the scholarly practices of psika (halakhic decision-making), in Ashkenaz centered on hilketa ke-
batrai, which indeed ends up giving more weight to later renditions of halakha as passed on (and thus to the 
transmission rather than the earlier text); 2) specific works that follow this scholarly practice  וכן פסקו האחרונים
י ”ק ומהרא”ובראשם מהרי, תמיד - Trumat ha-deshen and Rabbi Yosef Kolon as main representatives of this 
tradition. See also Joseph Davis, “The Printing,” on the definition of a halakhic community in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the wake of the printing of Shulḥan Arukh with Mapah. 
 778Rema’s introduction to the Shulḥan Arukh with his gloss, Mapah והם: האור זרוע והמרדכי והאשר”י
ק והגהות מיימון אשר כלם נבנו על דברי התוספות וחכמי צרפת אשר אנו מבני בניהם”ג והסמ”והסמ  




himself as part of the ashkenazic tradition and did not reveal any new authoritative halakhic 
sources, what, then, had changed to produce such a different result? 
Some of the reasons discussed earlier, namely print and codification, apply to this 
case study, too. The printing of the Shulḥan Arukh and its ultimate dominance in Ashkenaz 
meant that halakha became increasingly more textual and less oral. Rabbi Karo’s 
universalistic approach to halakha had the effect of weakening local differences, especially 
custom. Moreover, the method of summarizing the bottom line of the ashkenazic laws 
appropriate to the literary conventions of codificatory glosses enabled Rema to present the 
tradition of Ashkenaz in a manner that corresponded to his own view, as opposed to the 
stylistic conventions of the likut, where different sources were allowed to remain layered 
and generational seams were often visible. The central discussion of firstborn animals in 
the Shulḥan Arukh reflects the sfardic tradition: “He who takes a lactating animal from a 
non-Jew …And, so, too, an animal that is producing milk is exempt from firstborn status 
...”779 This legal tradition does not see any firstborn issue whatsoever if the mother was 
already lactating before the birth.780 Rema’s gloss, meant to adapt the Shulḥan Arukh for 
the ashkenazic world, in order “to teach the ways of the customs that are kept in these 
lands,”781 glosses the section on milk production to reflect the ashkenazic tradition: “And 
there are those who say, we do not rely on the fact that she is producing milk, and, similarly 
                                                     
779 Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah, §316: 2-3. 
780 The only representative of the ashkenazic tradition in the body of the Shulḥan Arukh is the Tur, 
which follows the tradition of its author’s father, Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel. In this case, the Tur recognized 
that some authorities were stringent, but, in accord with his father’s opinion, also ruled leniently in the case 
of milk-production. Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, §316: 3, gloss (Mapah) (See n784, here for full quotation). 
781 Rema’s introduction to the Shulḥan Arukh with his gloss, Mapah ולהורות דרך המנהגים שנהגו במדינות
 ...אלו 




the later authorities have ruled, and so we have the custom to act in all these areas.”782 
These words accurately transmitted the ashkenazic tradition. Rema added that: “if there is 
an additional facet to permit it, or if the non-Jew is testifying innocently and not in order 
to praise his wares, and says that she gave birth, we rely on this to permit it.”783 These 
words, inserted seamlessly into the gloss as though they merely summarize the ashkenazic 
sources, in reality, do more: At first sight, this additional line is a rather close paraphrase 
of Rabbi Isserlein’s regarding the issue.784 One small part of the paraphrase, however, is 
not an accurate summary of his predecessor’s words. Rema wrote that “if there is an 
additional facet to permit it, or if a non-Jew is testifying innocently … we rely on this to 
permit...” A more accurate paraphrase would not have presented the non-Jew’s testimony 
as one of many examples of “additional facets to permit,” as Rema summarized it here. In 
reality, the non-Jew’s testimony functions more like a limiting example. Only factors that 
resemble it, relating directly to the cow’s birth history, could be adduced to milk-
                                                     
782 Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah, §316: 3, gloss (Mapah): (See n784, here for full quotation). 
783Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah, §316: 3, gloss (Mapah): 
ת שלא להשביח מקחו ואומר שילדה ”ם מסל”מיהו אם יש עוד צד היתר לזה או שעכו. אלווכן נוהגין בכל המדינות  ....
ודוקא בפרות ובמקום שלא נשמע שחולבות בלא ולד אבל בעזים שדרך שחולבות בלא ולד לא. סימכין להתיר  
784 The next line makes it even clearer that Rabbi Isserlein is the source for this law: “And this is 
specifically so for cows… but with goats… we do not rely on this....” The distinction between cows and goats 
is taken directly from Rabbi Isserlein in Psakim u-ktavim §130. Rema also adopted the larger underlying 
principle of Rabbi Isserlein’s reasoning, namely, the need to research the current status of animals in one’s 
area and the circumstances in which they produce milk: Rema envisioned the possibility of adapting the rules 
after further study of the nature of livestock and milk production in every place and time. In his words: “And 
it seems to me that in places where the way of goats would not be like this, or (conversely, if) the way of 
cows would be like that, one should not distinguish between animals, and one should inquire into this issue.” 
Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh de’ah, §316: 2-3, gloss (Mapah): 
ם ואינו יודע אם בכרה”ז דין הלוקח בהמה מן העכו”ד שט”ע יו”שו  
ם אינו חושש שמא בנה של אחרת היא מניקה אלא הרי זו בחזקת שילדה”הלקח בהמה מניקה מהעכו. ב ... 
אינן חולבותוכן בהמה שהיא חולבת פטורה מהבכורה שרוב הבהמות . ג . 
וכן פסקו האחרונים ( נ והגהות מרדכי פרק האשה”ויש אומרים דאין סומכין על מה שהיא חולבת טור בשם ה: ה”הג
מיהו אם יש עוד צד היתר . וכן נוהגין בכל המדינות אלו ד”ו סימן קע”ט ומהרי”ו ובתרומת הדשן סימן רע”י בפסקיו סימן קס”מהרא)
ודוקא בפרות ובמקום שלא נשמע שחולבות בלא ולד אבל . להשביח מקחו ואומר שילדה סימכין להתירת שלא ”ם מסל”לזה או שעכו
ואיכא למימר אבל אחד דאינו בכור ’ במקום דאיכא ספק ספקא כגון שילדה ב’ אפי. בעזים שדרך שחולבות בלא ולד לא סמכינן על כך
ם בכך או שדרך הפרות בכך אין לחלק ויש לחקור אחר זהל דבמקום דאין דרך העזי”ונ ל”ק’ י סי”פה אסור פסקי מהרא”א . 




production. By using “or,” however, Rema summarized Rabbi Isserlein’s opinion in a way 
that presents it as though any cause for leniency no matter in what category could be 
adduced to milk production in order to exempt the calf. The halakhic tradition was thus 
codified in the Shulḥan Arukh, rendering Rema’s summary of the ashkenazic tradition in 
his glosses much closer to his own interpretation of these laws than to the laws as they 
existed in Ashkenaz. Rema isolated Rabbi Isserlein’s insight without preserving his 
predecessor’s larger efforts to embed this within the ashkenazic tradition. Placed within a 
new context, that of the Shulḥan Arukh, the opinion led to very different halakhic 
consequences. 
The printing of the Shulḥan Arukh (1565), especially with Mapah, Rema’s gloss 
(1570s), changed the way in which halakha was studied. The Shulḥan Arukh did not undo 
the sources of authority so much as detach them from the legal tradition in which a scholar 
would have consulted his sources. It became the central (although certainly not the only) 
source to consult when halakhic adjudication was needed. Most of the halakhic works of 
the subsequent generations were in the form of glosses on this work. The ashkenazic gloss, 
which aims at inserting the ashkenazic decision is, in effect, a complement to the Shulḥan 
Arukh and thus becomes integrated into its genre, order, and formulation, operating on its 
terms: “In all of Ashkenaz one is accustomed to follow Our Master, the rabbi Rabbi Meir,” 
is transmuted into “And there are those who say that one does not rely on the fact that it is 
producing milk.” That entire tradition, the communities and the attitude that this 
authoritative line represented had now been distilled into one “ve-yesh-omrim” (“and there 
are those who say”) among many;  memory is lost, leaving only the textual remnants of 




history. The new halakhic “starting point” became the body of sources as they appeared in 
Shulḥan Arukh, its codified structure constituting a more strictly textual form of 
transmitting halakha.  
The move away from compilations such as Mordekhai to codes like the Shulḥan 
Arukh was, as a shift from scribal to printed transmission, also a shift from a more personal, 
holistic, affective form of transmitting less rigidly defined topics within halakha to a more 
demarcated, rational, and modular approach, which divided topics into their smaller 
constituent elements. in Ashkenaz, concerns about the seriousness of karet had dictated a 
careful and stringent approach to the entire issue of firstborn animals; the gravity of the 
subject was transmitted in an almost visceral sense by the expressions used and the stories 
told, even the stories that depicted behavior that was not halakhically required and 
somewhat ignorant – perhaps, even, especially these stories. The approach can be sensed 
beyond the specific cases and decisions, not only in the attitudes implied by the specific 
linguistic expressions and hesitations of scholars such as Rabbi Moellin, but also in the 
writings of the innovator, Rabbi Isserlein. They are also reflected by the “simple” lay Jews 
in some of these questions, such as the poor kohen described in one responsum, who was 
seized with fear and trembling when he noticed a questionable firstborn animal on his 
property.  
The Shulḥan Arukh encouraged textual legal reasoning. Because of its 
organizational structure, the division into sections and subsections creates a modular 




scheme,785 in which all the elements of a very narrowly defined halakhic topic (sale to non-
Jews, milk-production, etc.) are examined separately. This organization facilitates 
combining the various smaller modules in different ways. Rather than each module being 
woven within the larger textual context of the topic within one chain of transmission, every 
subtopic could now be found separately, alongside the alternative halakhic opinions about 
that specific subtopic. Being surrounded by a broader collection of alternative traditions 
reduced the apparent dominance of any particular halakhic approach. In addition, the act 
of separating a larger topic such as pidyon bekhor behema into its constituent modules 
(milk production/sale/testimony) made it much more difficult to transmit the general 
approach that underlies a larger topic in a specific culture. 
The older responsa preserved in compilatory sources such as Mordekhai managed 
to communicate the overall ashkenazic approach. In the Shulḥan Arukh, however, the 
halakhic stance on firstborn animals depends on the opinion that one follows regarding a 
combination of very discrete modular halakhic issues. The process of re-organizing the 
older ashkenazic sources from halakhic compilations into a more systematized code 
contributed to the loss of the ashkenazic attitude transmitted in its legal tradition. Gone was 
the long shadow of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg; the new starting point was Rabbi Isserlein. 
The concentration of authority in one figure who comes to represent the community and 
determines its decisions was a part of the legal tradition that clearly shifted in the sixteenth 
                                                     
785See also Tirẓa Kelman, ha-Shimush be-poskim Ashkenazi’im be-Sefer bet Yosef: Hilkhot nidah 
ve-t’vilah ke-mikre mivḥan (The use of ashkenazi legal decisors in the book Bet Yosef: The laws of menstrual 
impurity and ritual bathing as a case study.) M.A. thesis, (Be’er Sheva: Ben Gurion University 2012). Kelman 
studied the ways in which Rabbi Yosef Karo integrates certain ashkenazic textual material into his work. The 
central work, in that case, was Rabbi Isserlein’s Trumat ha-deshen, and Kelman notes how Rabbi Karo tended 
to “take apart” sections from different responsa and insert them into their respective place in the Bet Yosef.  




century. The choice of Rabbi Isserlein in itself is very significant. If Rabbi Rothenburg 
embodied the “middle age” for Rabbi Isserlein and his generation, following communal 
rupture, Rabbi Isserlein himself came to represent the “middle age,” the latest 
representative of Ashkenaz as it existed in its original geographic location.786 The 
periodization of the legal past, it seems, is demarcated by tragedies: the medieval 
persecutions in the case of Rabbi Rothenburg and the expulsion from Ashkenaz in the case 
of Rabbi Isserlein. As the final great rabbi of his period, Rabbi Isserlein came to occupy 
the same position for sixteenth-century scholars that Rabbi Rothenburg had for the 
previous period. One sixteenth-century rabbi described him as follows: “...we, in our lands, 
who in all our teachings drink from the wellsprings of the rabbi Rabbi Isserlein of blessed 
memory, who was from the sons of Ashkenaz, and the last of the last...,”787 and a 
contemporary of his writes, “And it is known that our Master Rabbi Israel of blessed 
memory, the author of Trumat ha-deshen, he is the greatest of the aḥronim (later ones), and 
it is from his wellsprings that we drink.”788 Rabbi Isserlein is considered the figure who 
brought the wealth of all the ashkenazic generations before the persecutions to the next 
generation, the final summation and repository of ashkenazic halakha. 
In sum, several factors contributed to this change. One was the change in the 
organization of halakhic knowledge and the order of halakhic books; these, in turn, resulted 
from a combination of two intertwined factors, namely, the emergence and spread of new 
                                                     
786 As mentioned earlier in this case study, the function of looking for this “middle age,” something 
historical yet late enough to be more useful, can be related to the principle of hilkheta ke-batrai, which was 
especially strong in Ashkenaz (See Ta-Shma, “Hilkheta ke-batra’i,” 58-78. 
787 ShUT ha-BaḤ ha-ḥadashot, §66. 
788 Rabbi Moshe Lima (1604-1658, Poland), Ḥelkat meḥokek, even ha-ezer, 17: 21. 




technologies – primarily print – and the new books of halakha that were published, in 
particular the Shulḥan Arukh, and their organizational paradigm, that of a code. This led to 
more textualization and a type of legal argument that was less based on custom. This, 
however, is not sufficient. Scholarly and religious cultures, especially highly traditional 
ones, can continue for a very long time, even in the fact of new technologies and alternative 
organizational paradigms. The crucial factor for the transformation of ashkenazic halakha 
was communal rupture, which led to a loss of the legal traditions of Ashkenaz. This 
fundamental shift enabled a departure from the ashkenazic tradition such as Rema’s 
decision on firstborn animals to occur. 
The succession of persecutions, expulsions, and migrations that started with the 
Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century led to a situation in which, by the sixteenth 
century, the original ashkenazic communities were no longer in existence and had been 
replaced by the new communities in Eastern Europe. These new ashkenazic communities 
considered themselves, by and large, to be a faithful continuation of the communities of 
old.789 Certain aspects of scholarly and religious culture, however, such as the amorphous 
legal tradition, did not carry over into these new communities.790 Moreover, approaches 
                                                     
789 In the “Seder dorot” section of the version of Sefer yuḥasin, printed in Cracow in 1579, with 
glosses by Rema, he inserts himself into the ashkenazic genealogy, adding his direct Polish predecessors to 
the traditional ashkenazic lineage. By doing this, Rema clearly positioned the Polish rabbinic tradition as a 
direct continuation of Ashkenaz of old. A sense of continuity clearly persists. The “Seder dorot” (Order of 
generations) is a genealogical chain that is part of Sefer yuḥasin (Book of heritage) by Avraham Zacut, which 
deals mainly with astronomy. It is based on the 18th chapter of the late fourteenth-century work Yesod olam 
(Foundation of the world) written by a student of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, which itself is based on Sefer ha-
kabala (Book of tradition) by Rabbi David ibn Daud(12th century, Spain). The first printed edition of Sefer 
yuḥasin (Constantinople, 1566), contained only the 18th chapter of Yesod olam, without glosses. On the study 
of this work among Polish rabbis, see Elhanan Reiner, “Yashan mipnei ḥadash” and David Fishman, “Rabbi 
Moshe Isserles and the Study of Science among Polish Jews” in Science in Context 10 (1997): 571-588. 
790 Elhanan Reiner, “Aliyat ha-kehila ha-gdola: Al Shorshe ha-kehila hayehudit ha-ironit be-Polin 
ba-et ha-ḥadasha ha-mukdemet” (“The Rise of the Big Community: On the Roots of the Jewish Community 




reflecting the self-perception of the ashkenazic communities as a kehila kedosha (a holy 
community) with its ties to martyrdom and self-sacrifice, which found expression in 
responsa studied here – approaches such as the one regarding the simple but pious kohanim  
–  were now very far removed from their actual community, their social, geographical, and 
physical source. The political and legal position of Jews was far different in Eastern Europe 
than in Ashkenaz; their position as a minority in relation to the non-Jewish surroundings 
was entirely different, their security was improved, and the sense of being a persecuted 
minority was reduced. As Reiner explained, the size, demographics, and economic 
occupations of these communities led to a shift from small sacral communities to larger 
communities that were in many ways economic entities. The self-perception of the 
ashkenazic communities as a kehila kedosha was connected to overall tendencies towards 
religious caution and self-sacrifice, above and beyond halakha. The manuscript 
compilation – the characteristic form of textual transmission of ashkenazic customs – did 
not lend itself to integration with the new forms of halakhic writing and organization. 
Moreover, the extremely local nature of ashkenazic law increased the difficulty of 
transporting local customs to a new geographic locality.  
It is not, however, merely an issue of losing individual customs or detaching from 
halakhic authorities of the past – after all, there was, obviously, a demand to derive halakhic 
decisions precisely from the pool of ashkenazic authorities, hence Rema’s justification for 
glossing Shulḥan Arukh. Rema’s interpretation, however, assigns a very different weight 
                                                     
in Poland in the Early Modern Period”) in Gal-ed 20 (2006): 13-37. On the kehila kedosha, see Haym 
Solovetichik, Halakha, kalkala, ve-dimu’i aẓmi: ha-mashkona’ut bi-yemei ha-beinaim (Pawnbroking in the 
middle Ages: A study in the interrelationship between halakha, economic activity, and self-image) 
(Jersualem, Magnes, 1985), 54-55; 72; 111-112. 




to these ashkenazic sources. He places Rabbi Isserlein at the center of his summary and in 
his responsum, whereas he barely mentions Rabbi Rothenburg, and refers only once to the 
Mordekhai in this discussion. Sefer ha-Mordekhai was not lost, nor was the statement 
inside it that “in all of Ashkenaz, we follow the custom of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg.” 
Clearly, Rema continued to study the Mordekhai. There are glosses from Rema on Sefer 
ha-Mordekhai, including on tractate Ḥulin,791 the same tractate that includes the remark 
that “in all of Ashkenaz we have the custom to be stringent like Rabbi Meir Rothenburg.” 
What was lost is the legal tradition of which sources take precedence and how leniency and 
stringency are subordinated; which authorities are the final word for a culture; and which 
ones are negotiable. It is not that the source was lost – Rabbi Isserles had access to the very 
same quotes – but their potency was gone. Nora’s insight that the communal memory is 
affective as opposed to history based on texts, which is critical, applies here too. Shifts took 
place not only the direction in which a fortiori reasoning works with stringency versus 
leniency but also in the rules of which source to follow and the assumptions of how 
business and sacred halakha interact. The sanctification of the poor, simple kohen was 
replaced by concern for his livelihood; the pride in being extra careful with sacred animals 
was gone – the affect – the anxiety at opposing Rabbi Rothenburg, was not transmitted 
along with the legal texts that stated precisely this. Consequently, textual transmission was 
open to new forms of reasoning and interpretation that were inconceivable to Rema’s 
                                                     
791 Rema’s glosses on Mordekhai here, on Ḥulin §592:  ואפשר דאף רשב”ג סבר חלב פוטר. תוס’ בדף י”א
מ חייש למיעוטא ”ה לר”בד  – he thinks that ג ”רשב might also think that milk is enough, and it really depends on 
how you interpret the  כרוך אחריו statement. 




predecessors in the original areas of Ashkenaz, not because of intellectual inadequacy, but 
because it clashed with the full import of their legal tradition. 
ii. Rabbi Yosef Katz: Traditionalism after Rupture 
Not all halakhists in Ashkenaz were clamoring to introduce new forms of reasoning. Rabbi 
Yosef Katz, the author of a collection of responsa titled She’erit Yosef (Cracow, 1590) and 
a relative of Rabbi Isserles, who was a well-respected member of the Cracow rabbinical 
court, is a good example. Rabbi Katz was asked about a pregnant cow bought from a non-
Jewish woman, which gave birth in the Jew’s possession.792 Two people went to the first 
owner’s village, in order to find out whether the cow had calved previously. The former 
owner and an unrelated villager answer in the affirmative. Rabbi Katz was asked if this can 
be considered acceptable testimony under the law of a non-Jew “speaking innocently.” It 
is problematic to consider this “speaking innocently,” as the question was obviously 
prompted. The acceptability of non-Jewish testimony is based on testimony regarding a 
deceased husband, in order to free his widow for remarriage. Rabbi Katz concludes that 
the rules are very stringent as to what is considered “speaking innocently,” and the 
testimony about the cow’s birth history falls short of those standards. 
Rabbi Katz then suggests a fundamental distinction between non-Jewish testimony 
regarding firstborn animals and non-Jewish testimony about husbands who are presumed 
dead: in the latter case, non-Jewish testimony is considered unreliable when it follows even 
a very weak prompt because these laws are well known to gentiles, who realize that the 
desired answer would be that they witnessed the husband’s death. Any form of prompting, 
                                                     
792 In Wrocław (or Hohensalz in later German), a city in north-central Poland. 




therefore, renders it a guided question, which disqualifies the testimony from being spoken 
“innocently.” However, since Non-Jews are unfamiliar with the laws of firstborn animals, 
prompted testimony may acceptable in those cases. Rabbi Katz, provided the prompt was 
not too obvious. He nevertheless rejects this, writing “there is no reason to differentiate 
...”793 His reason for rejecting such a distinction has nothing to do with the nature of these 
laws or with the rationale for accepting testimony. Rather, he explains, such an argument 
is unacceptable, “Because we do not have the liberty to distinguish based on gut theories 
something that cannot be found in ancient books, especially when it comes to a biblical 
prohibition.”794 He thus rejects this suggestion because a rational argument is unacceptable 
without a precedent in tradition. Here, then, is a scholar who, after communal discontinuity, 
is seeking precisely to maintain the older legal tradition of stringency regarding these laws, 
and he does so using the logic of custom, claiming that new laws based on reasoning should 
not be introduced where no predecessors explicitly did the same. 
Next, Rabbi Katz invokes Rabbi Isserlein, referring to something the latter wrote 
in his ktavim or “writings,” that is, not  the more edited and organized collection of responsa 
printed under the title Trumat ha-deshen, but Psakim u-ktavim, the less edited compilation 
of responsa and other writings that was printed alongside Trumat ha-deshen. Rabbi Katz 
chooses this source although, in this case, the halakhic conclusion in Psakim u-ktavim and 
its counterpart in Trumat ha-deshen overlap. Rema also quoted this source, but Rabbi Katz 
refers to it significantly as “…his ktavim … that is, for a ma’aseh (a case) that came before 
                                                     
793 Yosef Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef §24  ואין סברא לחלק שבעדות אשה יודעים הגוים ויש לחוש לשקר יותר
 מדין בכור.
794 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef §24  כי אין בידינו לחלק מסברת הכרס דבר שאינו נמצא בספרים קדמונים, ובפרט
 במילי דאורייתא.




him…”795 Rabbi Katz favors Psakim u-ktavim because they are closer evidence of Rabbi 
Isserlein’s actual decisions.796 The emphasis that this was a “ma’aseh,” a case, thus 
highlights that this text deals with an actual decision, not a quote from a written law. In 
doing so, Rabbi Katz favors the source that is less textual in nature, even when the more 
textualized, edited, and structured counterpart was written by the very same rabbi. In this, 
too he is appealing to a traditional and non-textual form of ashkenazic halakhic authority. 
Rabbi Katz rejects the possibility that firstborns in his day and age do not have 
sanctity at the biblical level. As he explains, Rabbi Isserlein obviously thought that 
firstborns are considered to have biblical sanctity even in his day and age, as he quotes the 
statement that gentiles speaking innocently are unacceptable when it comes to biblical 
prohibitions in a responsum to a contemporary question. Rabbi Katz concedes that 
Maimonides may have considered firstborns not sacred outside of Israel, as it is quoted in 
Arba Turim: “…and Maimonides wrote that it does not apply outside of Israel...,”797 but 
rejects this source, because, Rabbi Katz concludes: “Rabbi Isserlein knew this source [the 
Arba Turim] and nevertheless wrote simply … that firstborns in this day and age are a 
                                                     
795 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef §24 ...ומהרא״י...כתב בפשיטות בכתביו הנ״ל...דהיינו על מעשה שבא לפניו 
796 See Yedidya Dinari, Hakhmei Ashkenaz be-hilhei yemei ha-beinaim: Darkeihem ve-kitveihem 
ba-halakha (The sages of Ashkenaz at the end of the middle Ages: Their ways and their writings in halakha) 
(Jerusalem: Bialik, 1984), 297-302, for a discussion of these preferences across rabbinic culture. He shows 
that ashkenazic rabbis in the 15th century, such as Rabbi Yacov Moellin, specifically preferred Psakim u-
Ktavim and Leket yosher over Trumat haDeshen, writing that “this is halakha le-ma’aseh (for action) we 
learn from these more than from the words of halakhic books (poskim)that were not at the time of teaching 
(also:deciding halakha).” ShuT MaharYL §72. He compares this to later rabbis, for instance Rabbi Yonah 
Navon, who lived in the 18th century in Jerusalem, and wrote that edited works are preferable to responsa, 
because “sometimes a person cannot investigate in depth as he should because of the hurry to answer his 
questioner,” in Yonah Navon, ShUT NeHpa ba-Kasef vol.2: Even ha-Ezer §27. See chapter 6 in this 
dissertation for more discussion of this issue. 
797 Arba Turim, Yoreh de’ah §306: 1, בכור בהמה טהורה נוהג...בין בזמן הבית בין שלא בזמן הבית. וכתב הרמב״ם
 שאינו נוהג אלא בארץ ואפילו אם הובאו מחו״ל לארץ לא יקרבו שהם חולין גמורין...




biblical prohibition...”798 The reasoning used is thus based on custom: Maimonides is 
irrelevant, Rabbi Katz claims, because Rabbi Isserlein knew of the source but did not take 
it into consideration.799 Thus, Rabbi Katz does not tally and analyze arguments in favor or 
against this interpretation of Maimonides – Rabbi Isserlein had known of this source and 
disregarded it, and this was all Rabbi Katz needed to know. In itself, calling the sanctity of 
firstborn animals outside of Israel into question is a sign of rupture. The older ashkenazic 
sources did not consider it an option. Additionally, it is significant to note that Rabbi Katz 
relied on the authority of Rabbi Isserlein, not Rabbi Rothenburg. If periodization of the 
legal past was determined by ruptures, and the last great figure before any break was 
considered the culmination of what came before, Rabbi Katz was as much a post-rupture 
scholar as his more innovative colleagues, whether he wanted to remain traditional or not. 
Moreover, at a closer look, his ideological position, too, displays the results of 
communal rupture, no less than the Rema’s revolutionary approach. Rabbi Katz’s 
exclamation against making independent halakhic distinctions relate to theories “that 
cannot be found in ancient books,” rather than pointing to oral transmission or independent 
decision making. Similarly, in a responsum about customs of slaughter, he is hesitant to 
accept a custom because “it is not present in any old book.” He repeats that “it is difficult 
for me to add to the laws of treifah from my own reason…but I will not rest until I search 
                                                     
798 ShUT she’erit Yosef §24:  ומהרא״י ידע הי״ד ומ״מ כתב בפשיטות בכתביו הנ״ל דבכור בזמן הזה דאורייתא דהיינו
דהוה בדאורייתא.על מעשה שבא לפניו   
799 Ta-Shma’s study of the ashkenazic attitude to tradition and custom presents a similar argument 
when a medieval figure defends his ancestors’ traditions in the face of textual evidence that questions this 
tradition:“and although the rabbi (R Tam, who opposed the tradition based on legal reasoning from a text) 
found a basis for his words in the Sheiltot…the early sages also knew the decision as it is brought in the 
Sheiltot and they disregarded it…” cited in Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Kadmon, 35 




for old books…”  At the end of that responsum, he mentions having witnessed a similar 
case in his youth and remembering the conclusion; however, having forgotten the details, 
he disregards his recollections. Thus, even Rabbi Katz favors textual sources over his own 
memories.800 Following an attenuated (or, perhaps, a more general) version of Hobsbawm’s 
idea, we see here an attempt at (re)inventing tradition. It is an example of traditionalism, a 
forcible attempt to reconstruct a lost legal tradition. In his attempts at creating continuity 
across the communal rupture, this traditional figure wishing to uphold the custom of 
Ashkenaz is forced to rely on books. Textuality was the only remaining option, as the 
alternatives were gone. 
Clearly, communal rupture and its reconstruction provided a great opportunity for 
rabbis such as Rema to introduce new, more textual and conceptual legal methods and to 
imbue them with authority. The only point of connection to tradition after rupture was 
textual, even for those who resisted the introduction of new methods. Thus, inevitably the 
traditionalist source of authority changed too. This complete reliance on textuality 
eliminated the primary tool for legal flexibility and innovation in traditional culture, which 
was, as we have seen in the fifteenth-century responsa, fluidity, ad hoc decisions, and the 
rabbi’s personal authority. Its replacement, the stable text and textuality does not allow for 
adaptations and change. Legal reasoning is thus better suited as a method of textual 
interpretation for this body of texts, whereas attempts to use the logic of custom and 
transmission on them is very limiting.  
                                                     
800 Katz, ShUT sheerit Yosef §47:  וגם ההיתר שכתוב בשם מהרא"ה אינו בנמצא בשום ספר ישן...רק שקשה לי
להוסיף בטריפות מסברתי והן ולאו ורפיא בידי כי לא אוכל להחליט הדין על בוריו. אבל לא אשקוט עד שאדרוש אחר ספרים ישנים 
ש איזה קבלה או טעם מספיק, ודי מזה. ואמת שבילדותי קרה מעשה כזה בבית הגאון מהר"ר וגם אכתוב למקומות אחרים, באולי י
 משה יפה ז"ל בעל אחות אמי ז"ל ואסר אבל איני יודע איכות המעשה ומהותו. 





5. CONCLUSION:  
COMMUNAL CONTINUITY, LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SCHOLARLY CULTURE 
 
Let us return to the question that opened this chapter: why did Ashkenaz not continue its 
older form of organizing knowledge despite new technologies – they did not necessarily 
have to accept new paradigms. Considering the strength of custom and non-textual 
transmission alongside text in Ashkenaz, this scholarly culture would have been a prime 
candidate to resist these challenges. As this chapter has shown, precisely Ashkenaz’s 
reliance on non-textual elements, such as oral and fluid scribal transmission; the flexible, 
ad hoc personal decision-making of individual rabbis; local halakha and custom as a legal 
source; and the idea that the legal tradition itself could not be transmitted in a stable, textual 
and universal form made their scholarly culture so dependent on communal continuity. 
This legal tradition encompassed non-textual and non-articulated teachings about 
the interpretation of halakhic texts, about the hierarchical importance of sources, and about 
the determination of who represents the communal custom for their era. It also transmitted 
more general attitudes regarding which areas of law were to be taken lightly, and which 
were mortally serious, when a good member of their community should exert himself, and 
what characterized their religious identity as Ashkenaz. The legal tradition’s mode of 
transmission was scribal, meaning that it was textual, but with a high degree of fluidity, 
leaving much to be determined by orality and leaving room for the communication of affect 
and emotion, adding memory to history. Its mode of reasoning was custom, leaning on 
reliability of transmission rather than legal reasoning, and using ad hoc decision-making 




to resolve practical issues without directly opposing the tradition. This legal tradition, 
however, requires communal continuity for its transmission. 
Once communal rupture occurred, this continuity disappeared and the legal 
tradition that accompanied the texts was lost. This rupture provided an opportunity for 
innovators to introduce new forms of thinking even as they based them on traditional 
authorities. The starting point now became the end of the preceding legal period, rather 
than the older period’s own starting point, which was in turn, the final representative of the 
legal period that preceded them. This pushing forward of the final authority already offers 
a new point of entry. The texts were transmitted without the legal tradition in its original 
form, meaning that even where legal traditions had been preserved in writing, they were 
now simply texts and no longer held the power, the moral and emotional persuasion that 
they had held earlier; nor did they convey the sense that a member of “Ashkenaz” would 
simply never do such a thing. Last, as the rupture leads to textual rather than oral 
transmission, as the latter is impossible without physical communal continuity, even those 
wishing to use the logic of custom and rely on tradition lack the fluidity that was part of 
the earlier legal tradition. Applying the “logic of custom” to a stable textual world leads to 
petrification. 
In the source that Rabbi Katz so faithfully presents as the ultimate in halakhic 
tradition, Rabbi Isserlein stated that testimony from a non-Jew speaking innocently is not 
sufficient on its own to free the calf from sanctity. Generally, however, Rabbi Isserlein 
concluded that, when supplemented by another source of proof for this animal’s birth 
history, such testimony may be accepted to release the firstborn from sanctity! Rabbi Katz, 






firstborn calf in 
Fürth’s community 
graveyard in the 18th 
century. The 
community, 
apparently, did not 
force a kohen to 
accept and take care 
of the firstborn calf, 
but they were clearly 
not slaughtering it 
either. 
however, took from this only Rabbi Isserlein’s opinion that the testimony of a non-Jew 
speaking innocently cannot release a suspected firstborn from its sanctity. Thus, both Rema 
and Rabbi Katz, the innovator and the traditionalist, allude to the same textual sources, 
from the final representative of Ashkenaz as it used to be, and neither of them continues 
the legal tradition that accompanied the textual source in fifteenth-century Ashkenaz. 
Grasping at these texts from across a communal chasm, they both find themselves reading 
a legal text without a given legal tradition, which they must then construct for themselves. 
Whether innovative or traditionalist; any legal tradition in sixteenth century Ashkenaz was 
fated to be a reconstructed one. 
From: Georg Liebe, Das Judentum in der Deutschen Vergangenheit. Leipzig, 1903 
 
 






IMAGE 15. A Manuscript of 
Mordekhai katan on tractate Ḥulin.  
Ms Heb. qu10 at the 
Universitätsbibliothek in Frankfurt am 
Main. The passage in the green frame 
is one of the iterations that, 
notwithstanding opinions to the 
contrary, “in all of Ashkenaz the 
custom is like Rabbi Meir of 
Rothenburg.” This is the context in 
which most 15th-century ashkenazic 









EARLY MODERN RESPONSA IN ASHKENAZ 
FROM LETTER TO BOOK 
THE EMERGENCE OF A GENRE 
  




RESPONSA AND THE RABBINIC REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 
Scholarship, Correspondence, and the Imagined Community 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Having presented an overview of the organization of halakhic knowledge in Ashkenaz in 
the previous three chapters, in the remaining two chapters, I shall focus on one genre in 
particular – responsa, called She’elot u-Tshuvot (or ShUT for short) –  questions and 
answers regarding (usually) practical halakhic problems. Responsa have traditionally been 
part of halakhic writing at least since talmudic times, and is thus considered a self-evident 
part of the halakhic canon. Each responsum is an isolated unit of halakhic writing that 
brings together diverse topics and subtopics depending on the particular question, thus 
lacking an overarching organizational structure. The genre’s long history, together with the 
organizational challenges it presents, makes responsa an invaluable key to my inquiry into 
the reorganization of halakhic texts. Responsa are, on the one hand, representative of the 
various heterogeneous types of halakhic writing such as reshimot psakim (lists of rulings) 
and sdarim (“arrangements,” for instance, an arrangement of the preparation of a divorce 
document and the processes and rituals this involves) that did not easily find a home in the 
world of codifications and printed books.801 On the other hand, responsa are exceptional in 
                                                     
801 The obvious comparison for rabbinic responsa, from which the translation for the term was 
derived, are the responsa in Roman law. Zacharias Frankel already makes this comparison (and points out 
contrasts) in his Entwurf einer Geschichte der nachtalmudischen Responsen (Breslau: Druck von Grass, 
Barth & Co., 1865), 8-9: “Diese Bescheide sind daher ebenso fern von den Regeln des canonischen Rechts, 
wie den als leges sich gebende Responsen des römischen Rechts. Im canonischen Recht sanctionirt eine 
geheiligte, im römischen Recht eine gelehrte Autorität; dort soll das Motiv nicht durchsichtig sein: der 
inspirirte Wille genügt zur Motivirung; hier ist das nicht durchsichtig, es genügt, dass ein anerkannter 
Rechtslehrer seine Meinung ausgesprochen. Im Judenthum ist die Autorität nicht maßgebend, nur die klare 
einleuchtende Begründung vermag dem Ausspruche Achtung zu verschaffen.” 
Other genres for comparison would be the medical consilia of the early modern period. See, e.g., 
Ian McLean, “The Medical Republic of Letters before the Thirty Years War,” Intellectual History Review 18, 




that they ultimately persisted and emerged, not only as a category of rabbinic writing, but 
also as a unifying principle for printed books of halakha. An investigation that does not 
take the existence of responsa as a book genre as a given, but, rather, examines its 
development, can also illuminate the fate of the other miscellaneous types of halakhic texts 
in the sixteenth century, as Jewish legal knowledge is reorganized. The current chapter will 
focus on responsa as letters; the subsequent chapter will examine the afterlife of these 
writings in their post-letter stage, as they are published in printed collections of responsa. 
The category “responsa” is often used as the classification of a subgenre in halakha, 
positioning these writings as part of the textual canon of Jewish law. The printed books of 
responsa, or sifrei ShUT familiar to us, are the finished product of a series of scholarly, 
technological, and editorial actions that obscure the life of the letters that preceded them. 
As this chapter seeks to emphasize, responsa also have a place in the epistolary universe, 
                                                     
no.1 (2008): 15-30. On a purely isomorphic basis, one could also compare responsa to the problemata about 
natural philosophy (themselves inspired by the Socratic dialogues). These problemata also take the form of 
questions and answers but the questions were not addressed specifically to the person answering. They had 
been circulating in earlier literature and were copied, often along with parts of the answers, then adapted and 
changed to suit the particular state of natural philosophy at the time. They were usually published as series 
of questions and answers. See Brian Lawn, The Salernitan Questions: An Introduction to the History of 
Medieval and Renaissance Problem Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Ann Blair, “The 
Problemata as a Natural Philosophical Genre,” in Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in 
Renaissance Europe, ed. Anthony Grafton and Nancy Siraisi (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 171-204. 
Thus, the above question and answer format did not reflect an actual situation with a real questioner. 
It was used as a format to impart knowledge, a certain way of framing information. In most cases, the 
motivation for using such a format was didactical. It was often described as a short, simple, easily absorbed, 
or engaging way of teaching different topics. Later (in the 17th century) it was often advertised as a guide to 
intelligent and witty conversation. In other words, it was a good way of presenting, explaining, and framing 
assorted tidbits of information. Responsa, in contrast, cannot be called simple or easily accessible in any 
sense of the word. If anything, studying halakha from the codes would be much simpler and more easily 
accessible than diving headfirst into a complex practical case and the winding logic of the respondents, who 
often use only vague references to other texts and tend to pre-empt their opponents’ objections and provide 
preliminary counter-objections to them. We can, however, draw some parallels. The loose organizing logic 
allows for some freedom in selection and structure, the didactical framing as though it were a conversation, 
and the variety that can be included in the genre. Ann Blair explains these very advantages as the reason why 
Jean Bodin chose the question-and-answer format in for his Theatrum; see Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature: 
Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 77-81. 




in the ties that bind together scholars, colleagues, rabbis, and communities at a particular 
time and place. Responsa were written, circulated, preserved, and exchanged before being 
published as books. Some responsa were never meant to be printed; indeed, countless 
responsa never were.802 Sifrei ShUT collect disparate letters, unifying them according an 
(albeit loose) organizing principle, most often by their author. The letters themselves, on 
the other hand, were dispatched and dispersed, often according to entirely different 
principles. The unprinted and dispersed letters are a reminder that responsa, when they 
were written, belonged to another environment. Embedding rabbinic responsa in the world 
of scholarly networks, of epistolary culture, and of the circulation of knowledge can 
facilitate understanding them as part of a larger structure that held together a religious 
scholarly community. 
An emphasis on the interplay of correspondence and rabbinical scholarship is 
especially fruitful given the more nuanced approaches to intellectual and cultural history 
that have developed in recent studies of early modern correspondence, such as a focus on 
epistolographical practices of scholarly cultures. These studies have highlighted the social, 
cultural and intellectual importance of correspondence beyond simple communication – 
for example, enforcing or questioning social hierarchies and practices and supporting 
phenomena such as humanist collaborations and the sharing of empirical data so crucial to 
early modern science.803 Focus on the material aspects of correspondence, the actual tools 
                                                     
802 See for example, Yiẓḥak Hershkovitz, ed., She’elot u-tshuvot harerei kedem (Responsa of ancient 
mountains, after Deuteronomy 33:15) (New York: Hershkovitz publ., 1988), which includes over 100 
responsa that had, for the most part, not been printed before. 
803 On the importance of the Republic of Letters for science, see Gianna Pomata, “Observation 
Rising: Birth of an Epistemic Genre, 1500-1650,” in Histories of Scientific Observation, ed. Lorraine Daston 
and Elizabeth Lunbeck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 45-80; Dirk van Miert, ed., 




and circumstances necessary to support letter writing, has augmented our simple notions 
of the letter as a unidimensional communication of information from the writer to the 
addressee. Letters are, instead, understood as complex, multi-layered phenomena 
containing a variety of meanings regarding society, culture, identity formation and so forth, 
which can be unlocked by reading letters materially.804 
Recent studies of social networks also point out the need for a re-examination of 
rabbinic communication. The extensive and illuminating scholarship on the early modern 
humanist Republic of Letters, from Hans Bots and Françoise Waquet’s seminal La 
République des Lettres to more contemporary works, 805 are enriched by network theory 
perspectives. Social network theory, enhanced by the digital humanities, has become 
increasingly important to our understanding of correspondence. This focus on networks 
                                                     
Communicating Observations in Early Modern Letters (1500–1675): Epistolography and Epistemology in 
the Age of the Scientific Revolution (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013); Adam Mosley, Bearing the 
Heavens: Tycho Brahe and the Astronomical Community of the Late Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 1: “Tycho Brahe and the Republic of Letters”; Ian Maclean, 
“The Medical Republic of Letters before the Thirty Years’ War,” Intellectual History Review 18 (2008) 15-
30; Brian Ogilvie, “How to Write a Letter: Humanist Correspondence Manuals and the Late Renaissance 
Community of Naturalists,” Jahrbuch für europäische Wissenschaftskultur/Yearbook for European Culture 
of Science 6 (2011): 13-38. 
804 James Daybell, the Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript Letters and the 
Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing, 1512-1635 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 12. 
805 Hans Bots and Françoise Waquet, La République des lettres (Paris: Belin, 1997). The best 
starting point for scholarship on the Republic of Letters is a short essay by Anthony Grafton, “A Sketch Map 
of a Lost Continent: The Republic of Letters,” in his Worlds Made by Words: Scholarship and Community 
in the Modern West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2010), 9-34. 
 For a focus on letter writing, see Lisa Jardine, Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of 
Charisma in Print (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Richard Kirwa, ed., Scholarly Self-
Fashioning and Community in the Early Modern University (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013); Diana G. Barnes, 
Epistolary Community in Print, 1580–1664 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013); James Daybell, The Material Letter 
in Early Modern England; Jeanine de Landtsheer and Henk Nellen, eds., Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Learned Letter Writers Navigating the Reefs of Religious and Political Controversy in Early Modern Europe 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011); Constance M. Furey, Erasmus, Contarini, and the Religious Republic of 
Letters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 




among humanists in the Renaissance806 has led to increasing interest in early modern 
correspondence as one of the most important ways in which scholarly networks were built, 
enforced, and maintained.807 Considering studies of the humanist Republic of Letters and 
its significance in social, cultural, and intellectual history together with social network 
theory proves instructive for our consideration of rabbinic responsa from the same time 
and area, which one historian has called a “unique republic of Jewish letters.”808 
Moreover, viewing responsa as building blocks of a scholarly social network adds 
perspective to our understanding of halakha and its functions as a legal system in a given 
time and place. The centrality of epistolary communication for constructing the scholarly 
community in which halakha is determined encourages us to examine further the 
implications of this particular mode of communication for Jewish law. The fact that a 
considerable part of the discussion of Jewish law took place in this specific way has an 
impact on halakha and how it was negotiated and understood by rabbis and by the wider 
practicing community. This impact will be explained using concepts from legal theory, 
specifically, theories of common law, and applying those to a social network understanding 
of the Republic of Letters. 
                                                     
806 Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1994); Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the 
Republic of Letters, 1680-1750 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 
807 See, for instance, projects such as Stanford’s “Mapping the Republic of Letters” project: 
http://republicofletters.stanford.edu and the “Cultures of Knowledge” project based at Oxford: 
http://www.culturesofknowledge.org. 
808 Elisheva Carlebach, “Letter into Text: Epistolarity, History, and Literature,” in Jewish Literature 
and History: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, ed. Eliyana Adler and Sheila Jelen (Bethesda, MD: 
University Press of Maryland, 2008), 115-6. “Letters of inquiry and the responses they engendered form the 
basic units of rabbinic discourse from the post-Talmudic age until our own times, a unique republic of Jewish 
letters....”  




Given the potential evident in combining the perspectives of intellectual history 
with an understanding of early modern scholarly communities, network-formation, and the 
world of epistolary correspondence, it is clear that a study of early modern responsa could 
benefit from such a treatment. Viewing responsa as both a form of scholarship and a form 
of correspondence can help us understand the literary, scholarly, and legal phenomenon of 
responsa, as well as the intellectual culture of early modern rabbis more broadly. This 
chapter utilizes these perspectives to study the responsa of Rabbi Moshe Isserles (ca. 1530-
1572), Rabbi Shlomo Luria (1510-1574), and their circle in sixteenth-century Eastern 
Europe. In addition to describing responsa as crucial for building an imagined community 
of scholars, I address its significance to halakha and to the Jewish community at large. This 
broader community both buttressed the rabbinic network and, in turn, was supported by it. 
I argue that responsa in their function as correspondence play a unique and key role in this 
conception of halakha, which is not reflected in other genres of halakhic writing. 
 
2. RESPONSA AS CORRESPONDENCE:  
MATERIALITY, CIRCUMSTANCES, PRACTICES 
a. The Material Letter 
This section considers the material circumstances of writing, sending, and reading letters 
in the early modern period. The material perspective helps us place responsa in their early 
modern context and can illuminate some of the perennial questions about responsa as a 
genre, on the one hand, and its peculiarities in this period, on the other. Recent focus on 
the materiality of the letter emphasizes different ways of considering the letter in its 
embodied state, and includes a variety of elements, ranging from the tools necessary for 
correspondence through more far-ranging aspects, such as the “social-materiality” of letter-




writing, as James Daybell calls it, meaning the influence of social elements such as 
education, epistolary models, and status on correspondence, to the ways in which the 
different environmental factors such as the postal system had an impact on the world of 
letter writing.809 These different aspects of materiality and their impact on rabbinic 
epistolarity are presented here in connection with the stages of correspondence: writing, 
sending, and reading. As the preservation of correspondence is part of the afterlife of the 
letter and the various purposes inherent in its creation and its preservation, that stage will 
be discussed in detail in the following chapter. The stages are interrelated – just as with 
any text, expectations of how a letter will be read, for instance, influence the ways in which 
it will be written – thus, my discussion of a particular stage may, at times, refer to the other 
stages as well. 
This chapter does not aspire to provide a complete survey of the material conditions 
of rabbinic epistolarity, but rather, to serve as a preliminary inquiry into the insights gained 
by approaching responsa with a material consciousness and to relate this to questions of 
networks and the history of knowledge. As background, I shall use the descriptions of 
confiscated Jewish personal letters from the sixteenth century by Bernard Weinryb (letters 
from Turkey and the Balkans to Western Europe in 1533)810 and David Ginsberg (letters 
from Cracow to Prague in 1588).811 Although these are not responsa, they are some of the 
                                                     
809 Daybell, The Material Letter, 15, 70-79. 
810 Bernard Weinryb, “A Pekel Briv in Yiddish fun yohr 1588,” Historishe Shriftn fun YIVO 2 
(1937): 640-655. 
811 David Ginsberg, “Private Brivn funm yohr 1533,” Yivo Bletter 13 (1938): 344-325. Also 
significant, although later in date, is a collection of letters from Prague Jews in 1619, published by Alfred 
Landau and Bernhard Wachstein, eds., Jüdische Privatbriefe aus dem Jahre 1619 (Vienna: Braumüller, 
1911). These letters were marked litterae hebraicae interceptae, seeing as they were confiscated by 
authorities rather than delivered. See also Lisa-Maria Tillian, “Von Prag nach Wien - nicht zugestellt: 
jüdische-deutsche Privatbriefe aus dem Jahr 1619,” Judaica Bohemiae 46 (2011): 75-85. Joseph Davis, 




earliest Jewish personal letters that we have in their material form, and the time period and 
geographic locations are comparable to the responsa under study.812 The letters can provide 
some information about writing practices and material circumstances for Jewish 
correspondence in general and help us speculate about the material aspects of Jewish 
correspondence for responsa. Additionally, I include illustrations from responsa that 
contain remarks about the circumstances of letter writing. Other sources such as portraits 
from the period and letter-writing manuals can also be useful in clarifying material 
circumstances.813 
Letter writing, especially in the early modern period, is a complex phenomenon. 
Due to several factors, including the Renaissance discovery and publication of classical 
familiar letters such as those of Cicero by Petrarch (Epistolae ad Atticum, Verona, 1345) 
and the resulting rise in the phenomenon of familiar letters (ars familiaris), early modern 
correspondence was especially multi-layered and flexible compared to the formally 
structured medieval letter, which was based primarily on ars dictaminis with its sources in 
rhetoric. Frequently, early modern letters were not exactly the Erasmian intimate, private 
                                                     
“Concepts of Family and Friendship in the 1619 Yiddish Letters of Prague Jews,” Judaica Bohemiae 49, no. 
1 (2014): 27-58, uses these letters to study notions of family and kinship at the time of the Thirty Years’ War. 
812 The ideal way of collecting information regarding the materiality of letters is, of course, by 
studying actual surviving letters. The lack of surviving letters of responsa in their original physical state limits 
the possibilities of a material study. 
813 In the case of manuals, one must take into consideration the gap between the prescriptive manual 
and the actual letter. Daybell cites Alan Stewart’s claim that manuals give a wrong impression (Daybell, The 
Material Letter, 70). 
For the use of paintings to unearth material information, see the PowerPoint from Peter Stallybrass’ 
lecture on filing (Stallybrass, “String, Pins, Thread, Wire, Laces and Folds” [lecture, The Gathered Text, 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK, September 3, 2010]), in which Stallybrass analyzes the different kinds of 
filing methods on the basis of archival material and by studying Jan Gossaert’s painting of Jan Snoeck, a 
merchant from Antwerp surrounded by his paperwork. I thank Professor Stallybrass for sharing the 
PowerPoint file of this lecture with me. 




“conversation between absent friends” that we may imagine.814 In fact, they were often 
written and read by several persons, for multiple purposes. Similarly, responsa were not 
private letters in the way that we envision private correspondence: they were usually 
addressed to and read by more than the addressee alone and even copied and circulated 
among scholars and students alike. Thus, rather than conceiving of a simple model of 
private communication exchanged between the inquirer and the recipient (the rabbi), I 
place these letters in a much wider intellectual, social, and cultural universe with a 
multiplicity of readers, writers, dynamics and purposes. Moreover, responsa did not exist 
in a vacuum. The letters were, both functionally and materially, part of a larger web of 
rabbinic scholarship, written text, and religious study and communal administration, and 
should be studied as such. New sensitivity to the multiplicity of purposes behind writing, 
reading, and distributing letters thus broadens our understanding of this form of rabbinic 
writing. 
b. Writing 
At the most basic level, the materiality of the letter touches upon its physical form. Letter 
writing required materials such as paper, pens, ink, a desk, and wax. Usually, letters were 
folded and the information for the courier placed on the outside, after which the letter was 
sewn together and sealed with wax. Daybell explains how material aspects such as the 
particular paper that was used, the handwriting, or the color of the wax conveyed meaning 
concerning the correspondents’ status, the contents, and the nature of the letter. These 
meanings were readily accessible to early modern readers. For instance, liberal use of paper 
                                                     
814 Daybell, The Material Letter, 12. 




not only signaled status and wealth, it could also make the contents harder to read without 
opening the letter, thus adding a layer of privacy. 815 We do not have much specific 
information regarding the different kinds of paper, ink, and tools necessary for Jewish letter 
writing, but we can assume that it had much in common with letter writing in the general 
context. In a business letter from Prague to Cracow published by Weinryb, both sides of 
the paper were filled with writing, not wasting any paper. 816 The facsimile of another letter, 
from the community scribe of Cracow to the community leaders was written clearly and 
evenly spaced, understandable, as the scribe was a professional. Here, too, the page was 
filled until the last row.817 Rabbi Yosef Katz (ca. 1511-1591) opens a responsum with the 
statement: “from the land of Lo’ez [Italy] flying scrolls written on both sides, regarding a 
widower were sent to me…”818 
In these letters, the information regarding the sender, the addressee, and the location 
was written on the outside. Usually, this information started with “le-yad” (to), with the 
names of the recipients and their location, followed by the location of the sender. In one 
letter from Cracow to Prague at the time of a plague, a note in Hebrew on the outside of a 
letter warns the recipient to “pass the letter through the smoke of gall before reading the 
writing, to counteract the contaminated air...” 819 This is a poignant reminder of the nature 
of letters not merely as disembodied messages being passed around, but as real physical 
                                                     
815 Letter writers would sometimes first fold the paper in half and write only on one side, then fold 
it in half again and write the information on the outside, thus leaving one fold of the sheet blank (Daybell, 
The Material Letter, 98). 
816 Weinryb, “A Pekel Brivn,” 50. 
817 See Weinryb, “A Pekel Brivn,” 51 (plate after p. 48). 
818 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §39. ...נשלחו מארץ לועז לידי מגלות עפות כתובות משני עבריהם, בענין אלמן 
819 See Weinryb, “A Pekel Brivn,” 59.  ביי דער זייט צוגעשריבן: קודם קריאת הכתב תן אותו לעשן של מרה
?]קבר: אפשר[לבטל האויר המעופש כאולי הלך על קרוב   




objects that connected people and were capable of carrying disease. This example makes 
another important point regarding letter writing practices: In a letter from a prominent 
Tuscan trading family sent in 1569 from Cracow to Ferrara, the front of the letter says 
“purgata esteriorimente,” which Miroslaw Bojanowicz explains to be “a usual precaution 
taken against the spread of the plague prevalent in those times.” 820 Thus, by virtue of shared 
material circumstances, Jewish correspondence displayed many of the same practices and 
technical aspects of letter writing used by non-Jews at the same time in the same geographic 
locations. 
Letter writing also involves an element of social materiality, that is, the social 
circumstances that influence the letter, primarily the means by which people learn how to 
write letters. As in early-modern society in general, Jewish letter writers learned the art of 
correspondence in various ways. Both letter-writing manuals and letter books provided 
models for composing letters. Strictly speaking, letter-writing manuals were created 
explicitly for this purpose. Letter books – collections of letters that were not originally 
intended to provide models for letter writing – over time, were often used similarly to 
manuals. Italian manuscript igronim, or collections of Hebrew letters from the sixteenth 
century, for instance, served as models in this manner.821 The earliest printed Hebrew letter 
manual titled Sefer igrot shlomim (Book of familiar letters) was published as early as 1534 
in Augsburg by the Shaḥor press. It contains samples of letters for a variety of familiar, 
                                                     
820 Miroslaw A. Bojanowicz, The Kingdom of Poland and the Associated Postal History (London: 
The Royal Philatelic Society, 1979), 1, 145. 
821 Igrot yehudei Italyah be-tkufat ha-Renaissance, mivḥar me-ha me’ah ha-16, vols. 6 and 7, ed. 
Yehuda Boksenboim (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Ẓvi, 1994). See David B. Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance 
Jew: The life and thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 
1981), 17-18. 




business, and religious situations.822 Some of these letters touch upon topics that also 
appear in responsa, such as a letter from a community writing for monetary help or a person 
warning his friend that he is planning to sue him. 
Standardized manuals often belie the variety found in practice, in actual letters. 823 
The early modern letter was a particularly protean form that allowed for more variation 
and personalization than highly fomulaic letter-writing manuals suggest. The opening 
section of letters featuring salutations, greetings, and praise of the recipient, however, 
consistently maintained a high level of standardization. 824 This is equally true for early 
modern responsa. While the contents of responsa were quite flexible, enabling every letter 
writer to tailor the letter to the particular situation, approach, and addressee, the salutations 
were typically the most formulaic part of the letters. They usually praise the recipient, often 
using scriptural allusions and rhyme. In many cases when responsa were copied into 
scholarly collections, the salutations were the first sections to be omitted, 825 but salutations 
                                                     
822 Yehudit Halevy Zwick, Toldot sifrut ha-igronim ha-ivri’im (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1990). Five 
Hebrew letter-writing manuals were published in the 16th century, the first three not attributed to any single 
author or compiler. In the words of Elisheva Carlebach, this is “a sign that such collections had been 
circulating in manuscript for decades, or even centuries, adding and shedding materials to suit the time and 
place.” See Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 22. 
823 Daybell, The Material Letter, 70-71. 
824 “Where early modern letters most closely adhere to the epistolary norms outlined in the letter-
writing manuals, however, is in the use of conventional opening and closing modes of address, and in the 
rendering of forms of salutations, subscription, and superscription” (Daybell, The Material Letter, 71). 
825 When a secretary, for example, would copy a letter into the records before sending it off, it was 
common to transcribe the whole letter, or sometimes just a précis, but the salutations were usually not copied, 
as they were superfluous for a personal record of correspondence. See Daybell, The Material Letter, 183. 
Even before the printing of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s manuscript collection of responsa, many 
responsa were divided and reorganized and the salutations were removed (most likely by a son or student). 
See Ephraim E. Urbach, “ShUT ha-ROSh be-kitvei yad u-be-dfusim,” Shnaton ha-mishpat ha-ivri 2 (1975): 
1-153, which contains a detailed description of the responsa in manuscript collections, including attempts to 
reconstruct the original responsa with appropriate salutations before they were taken apart and rearranged. 
(See p.3 for a general description and the following pages for reconstructions of the letters from which the 
responsa originated.) 
Rabbi Yair Ḥayim Bacharach, who published his own responsa (Frankfurt, 1699), writes in the 
introduction that he often abridged or removed the salutations in the questions addressed to him. One of the 




could be valuable as models for aspiring letter writers. In one responsum, written by Rabbi 
Isserles to Rabbi Luria, his senior colleague,826 the salutation was taken from an older 
collection of responsa. The letter begins with a lengthy rhymed greeting, which is copied 
almost wholesale from a fourteenth-century responsum to Rabbi Yiẓḥak ben Sheshet found 
in a collection of his responsa printed in Constantinople, 1546-7.827 In this manner, earlier 
responsa collections served as models for this formulaic part of the rabbinic letter. 
Salutations were a central element in the Hebrew printed letter manuals. The 
disproportionate emphasis on salutations in the Augsburg manual led one scholar to 
conclude that the word “shlomim” (peace/greetings) in its title referred not to the familiar 
and personal nature of the letters inside (called igrot shlomim) but, rather, to the many 
opening salutations (greetings) found in the book. It contained, in addition to examples of 
letters in full, tens of elaborate rhymed salutations for different kinds of addressees. 
Another component that was more formulaic than the other parts of responsa was the 
designation of the date, which usually included intricate and sometimes oblique references 
to the month, Jewish holidays, and the weekly Torah portion. The Augsburg manual 
includes many such formulas using allusions and word games to refer to the date. Many of 
the forms of address and salutations in the manual are specifically labeled for addressing 
rabbis and scholars, with a large proportion of the salutations described as meant for letters 
                                                     
reasons he presents for this editorial decision is that it is improper for him consciously to publish the excessive 
praise that others bestowed on him in these salutations. He adds that any oversight where praise is included 
is a mistake of the copier or the printer. " ומה שלפעמים גאוני ארץ הפריזו על מידתם לתארני בתארים וכינויים ושבחי
ות מדרגתי היה לאהבת עוז ותוקף חיבתם עם כי בחרוזים ובשירים מיטבם כוזבים ומה אני שבחין אשר הם זרה הלאה ממעלתי ושפל
יכול לעשות ומה שהיה בכחי מחקתי בהעברת קולמוס ומעט שנשאר על ידי העלמת עין או שגגת המעתיק או המדפיס לא במרד ולא 
."במעל הוא  Yair Ḥayim Bacharach, ShUT ḥavot Yair (Frankfurt, 1699), Introduction. 
826 Moshe Isserles, ShUT Rema, §5. 
827 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §5. For this reason, it rhymes with Shaltiel and is in the plural. See ShUT 
Ribash, §369 and ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 18 n1. The letter was written by Rabbi Shaltiel Ḥen. 




“to a scholar,” “to a learned man,” to “a rabbi or important man,” and so forth.828 This 
highlights the function of letters as a site for proving erudition.829 As rabbis and learned 
men were a primary group engaged in these activities, epistolarity became a realm for 
showing one’s literary and scholarly skill at biblical and talmudic references, for proving 
that one truly belonged to this letter-writing group. 
In addition to consulting published letter collections such as manuals or to reading 
earlier responsa, rabbinical scholars learned to correspond by means of personal 
participation. On many occasions, responsa from a rabbi to his student, or from a senior 
rabbi to a younger colleague contain instructions, pointers, critique, and advice on letter 
writing itself. In this manner, students were schooled in the practices of epistolarity that 
would allow them to become fully fledged members of the rabbinic world of 
correspondence. Rabbi Isserles remained in touch with several of his students after they 
had moved away from his vicinity, and his published book of responsa has several 
exchanges in which the same students appear repeatedly. One of these students was Rabbi 
Hirsch Elzaser Shur. In one of their halakhic discussions, Rabbi Isserles rebuked his student 
for assuming that there were mistakes in the rabbi’s [i.e., Isserles’] letter. In the process of 
this scolding, Rabbi Isserles included pedagogical remarks and instructions regarding 
letter-writing practices, and he demonstrates his own practices as a letter writer: “But I will 
say, please always look closely at my responses to your words carefully ... Since I do not 
send a responsum to your highness without reviewing it once and twice … and how should 
                                                     
 .(etc. See Igrot shlomim (Augsburg, 1534 לרב, ליודע ספר, לרב או לחשוב 828
829 See the lengthy index of these in Igrot shlomim in the six pages that follow the introduction, (no 
page numbers,) and a few more later on in the manual. 




I fall into such mistakes that you thought [to find] in my words according to your 
writing...?!” 830 
These exchanges also point to other writing practices, such as the use of scribes. 
Rabbi Hirsch correctly assumed that a scribe was copying his rabbi’s letters. Perhaps he 
knew this from his days as a student, or maybe he simply recognized that the letters were 
not in his rabbi’s handwriting. Rabbi Isserles readily admits to this practice: “...all my 
words are copied letter for letter from the body of my writing, because it is a burden to me 
to write everything twice. Therefore, I leave the body of my writing in my archives and I 
have the words copied in order to send them....” 831 Rabbi Hirsch also assumed that his 
rabbi would simply sign and send these copies without reviewing them, which led the 
student to suggest that an earlier letter from Rabbi Isserles contained a scribal error. The 
rabbi was appalled at the idea: 
And you wrote to me now that you did not look at the response yet and you think 
that there is a scribal error there, and you asked me that if I respond to you again, I should 
read the writing before sending it.... God forbid that I would send something and sign it 
before I know and check if it is as it should be! And therefore, I know that it is not a scribal 
error, rather your lack of inquiry into my response and the fact that you are in a rush to 
respond to everything that comes up in your mind regarding my response, and your 
highness should have checked and inquired into all the angles for maybe you would have 
                                                     
830 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §40 (punctuation added). 
כי בדרך זה אתה פוגם את , אך אומר במטותא מינך שתעיין היטב בתשבתי על דבריך תמיד ואל תעבור עליהם בעיון נמהר
כי איני שולח תשובה למעלתך עד שאעבור עליה פעם ושתים ואדע שיש עיקר בדברי לפי דעתי ואיך אפול בטעויות אלו אשר . שנינו
 ....חשבת בדברי לפי כתיבתך
831 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §40: הנה דע כי לא כן לבבי עם מעלתך, רק כי כל דברי מועתקים אות באות מגוף כתיבתי
ואני מניח להעתיק הדברים לשלחם למעלתך או , ולכן אני מניח גוף הכתב באוצרותי. כי קשה עלי המשא לכתוב כל ענין פעמיים
. לאחרים השואלים ממני  
In a responsum to Rabbi Luria, Rabbi Isserles declares that he does not have a scribe. Isserles, ShUT 
Rema, §7: כי אין לי סופר מהיר להעתיק לשוני וגם כבד עלי המשא להעתיקו.  “…for I do not have a speedy scribe to 
copy my language, and it is a burden for me to copy it…” This, however, is likely a responsum from Rabbi 
Isserles’ younger days, when he was just starting out as an established rabbi, officially appointed by the 
Crown in 1547 (something that Rabbi Luria refers to in this exchange, making it appear likely that the letters 
were written close to this event). 




found the point in your inquiries and not blamed the matter on a deficiency in the writer. 
832 
  
Rabbi Isserles is not only clarifying his intent, the impassioned reply also educates 
his student regarding the correct practices of writing and reading letters. 
Rabbinic epistolary exchanges were conducted in rabbinical Hebrew, a language 
reserved almost exclusively for rabbinic scholarship and halakhic matters.833 As opposed 
to its biblical counterpart, rabbinical Hebrew allowed for leeway regarding grammatical 
rules and permitted mixing of languages such as Aramaic, Yiddish, Italian, or German. In 
rare cases, rabbis disparaged the linguistic abilities of their fellow correspondents. Rabbi 
Luria, in the process of a bitter exchange with Rabbi Isserles, writes: “With a thousand 
apologies, his honor should rather have studied the science of grammar, because your 
writing is like a breached wall with direct and indirect and feminine and masculine, and 
singular and plural.”834 He then goes on to point out specific examples, such as a place 
where Rabbi Isserles, “wrote: ‘what my master have asked from me,’ which are two 
opposites, like one single and plural.”835 Rabbi Isserles, while very defensive about all the 
other accusations in the letter, seemed entirely unconcerned by this critique and responded 
                                                     
832 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §40: 
יבך שנית שאקרא וכתבת לי עכשיו כי עדיין לא עיינת בתשבותה וכמדומה לך שיש שם טעות סופר ובקשת ממני שאם אש
אבל חלילה לי . ואני מניח להעתיק הדברים לשלחם למעלתך או לאחרים השואלים ממני... הנה דע. הכתב קודם שאשלחהו למעלתך
אלא מיעוט חקירתך בתשובתי ושאתה , ולכן ודאי לי שאין כאן טעות סופר. לשלוח דבר ולחתום עליו עד שאדע ואחקרנו אם הוא כענין
והיה למעלתך לחקור ולעיין בכל הצדדים באולי תמצא הענין בעיונך ולא , ל דבר העולה בדעתך בענין תשובתינחפז להשיב על כ
 .לתלות הענין בסרחון הכותב
833 The private letters and the community’s administrative letters in Weinryb and Ginsberg are 
mainly in Yiddish; those parts that are in Hebrew are usually meant to be more “high-brow,” learned, or 
impressive. For instance, the letter in Ginsberg, page 331, begins with a letter on prosaic, practical issues in 
Yiddish and then contains a letter to the letter writer’s grandfather in Hebrew with greetings and regards. 
834 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6. 
כי כתבך הם חומה פרוצה לרוב בנוכח ונסתר ונקבה וזכר ויחיד , ובאלף מחילות יותר היה למר לעיין בחכמת הדקדוק 
, בעדו וזולתו כאחד מדבר, כתבת הייתי יוכל לתרץ. הוא שני הפכים כאחד יחיד ורבים, כתבת כמה פעמים מה שבקושונו אדוני. ורבים
 .וכן רבות
835 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6. 




with an allusion to the biblical Moses, explaining that he is not a man of words, and “I am 
careful with the intended meaning, not with the words that do not add or remove anything 
to the topic at hand.” 836 He adds, “I shall not adorn myself with that which I do not have, 
because in all my days, I have not studied the science of grammar,” and he then goes on to 
blame the more obvious mistakes on practicalities. 837 As important as showing erudition 
was to these correspondents, correct grammar was, so it appears, not universally considered 
an important marker thereof. 
A responsum that will be discussed in more detail later contains the following 
postscript in the printed edition of Rabbi Isserles’ responsa: “And this is what the gaon our 
master the rabbi Meir of Padua responded to this: ‘...I also received your second writing. 
And I already received a bundle (agudah) of writings with the second composition that you 
wrote … and you did well, because you found a way to contradict all his statements.” 838 
Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen of Padua (ca. 1482-1564), a relative of Rabbi Isserles who was 
almost fifty years his senior, the oldest rabbi in his milieu at the time, provided feedback 
to Rabbi Isserles’ letter. Beyond praising its halakhic analysis, the older rabbi provided 
advice regarding writing strategies and style: “But you made it too lengthy, sometimes 
writing needlessly in the style of ... because for a man like him short words and hints 
suffice. … For example, you wrote in a long manner about ... and it is obvious that a rabbi 
like him would not think to compare that to the issue at hand. ... In any case, you wrote 
                                                     
836 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §7.  אינני מכת המדברים בעלי הלשון כי כבד פה ולשון אנכי, כי אנכי נזהר בענין המכוון
 ולא במלות
837 Ibid.:  איני מתפאר במה שאין בי כי מימי לא למדתי חכמת הדקדוק. אך באלו הדברים המבוארים  לא נפל טעות מחמת
 ....מיעוט ידיעתי רק מחמת הנחוץ
838 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48. 




very nicely....” 839 Although this responsum was not addressed to Rabbi Katzenelbogen, 
Rabbi Isserles sent it to Padua in order to receive approval. Letters were not only a crucial 
means for students and rabbis to stay in touch; they were also a way for them to be schooled 
in epistolary practices. 
c. Sending 
The early modern period saw unprecedented expansion of the international postal service 
by merchants such as the Fugger family in Augsburg, who, with their extensive banking 
and mercantile activity controlled much of the European economy, and independent 
contractors such as the princely house of Thurn und Taxis. The trading house of the Fuggers 
had, for example, already established themselves in Cracow in the fifteenth century. They 
ran a monthly service from Cracow to Antwerp and another to Rome via Vienna and 
Venice. Locally, the postal service in Cracow was organized by Severin Boner, the court 
banker of Queen Bona Sforza. The first appointed Master of Posts in Poland was granted 
his privilege in 1558. He ran a successful mail route from Cracow to Rome and merged the 
Royal Post with the posts of the trading houses and guilds, operating them as a unified 
service. 840 
Jewish correspondence traveled some similar long distance routes. Rabbi Isserles’ 
correspondence, for instance, contains several exchanges between Italy and Poland.841 It is 
                                                     
839 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48, end of the responsum: וזאת אשר השיב על זה הגאון מוהר”ם פדוואה: שאירי
, ו”להשיג על פסק הגאון הקארוכבר קבלתי אגודה של כתבים עם החבור השני אשר חברת . ם קבלתי גם כתבך השני”האלוף מוהר
אך הארכת יותר מדאי לכתוב לפעמים שלא לצורך דרך ואין לומר כי לאיש כמוהו . והיטבת לעשות כי מצאת פרכא על כל דבריו
ללא צורך ....ואדרבה הדברים נותנים לו מקום להשיב והמשל שמעלתך העמיק בפלפולו בענין, יספיקו דברים מעטים ורמיזות לבד
מאיר פדוואה ’ ל ר”עכ. ויהי מה יפה כתבת לסתור דבריו בכל פנה. ...ופשיטא שרב כמוהו לא יחשוב לדמותו לנדון שלו...ולרב כמוה
ל”זצ . 
840 See Bojanowicz, The Kingdom of Poland, 1, 145. 
841 Edward Fram’s chapter, “A Difficult Beginning” in his forthcoming book project [no title yet], 
also mentions the many connections, intellectual (humanism), religious (Catholicism), political (Poland’s 




unlikely, however, that they used the royal postal service, as these were not always open 
to private mail. Letters were sent primarily with Jewish couriers, who were often employed 
by merchants.842 In one of the letters published by Weinryb, a certain Asher Horowitz from 
Prague writes to a business partner, Moshe ben Eliezer, in Cracow in September of 1588. 
He complains that as soon as the courier arrived in Cracow with a letter for him, the whole 
community knew about it. 843 Evidence of the use of couriers also appears in responsa, 
where rabbis often apologize for their brevity, explaining that they wrote quickly because 
the courier was waiting for the response. This trope is evident in familiar letters as well. 844 
 The letters from Weinryb and Ginsberg show that pertinent information such as the 
names and locations of the addressee and the sender were written on the outside of the 
letter in Hebrew characters, 845 leading to the conclusion that these were meant for Jewish 
                                                     
Zygmunt I married Bona Sforza of Milan), economic and cultural (print industry), etc., between Poland and 
Italy in the 16th century, both among the general and the Jewish population. Jewish scholars such as David 
ha-darshan also travelled back and forth. Yacov Elbaum discusses connections between rabbis in Italy and 
Poland in his Ptiḥut ve-histagrut: ha-yeżira ha-ruḥanit ha-sifrutit be-Folin u-ve-arẓot Ashkenaz ba-shilhei 
ha-me’ah ha-shesh esrei [Openness and seclusion: Spiritual and literary creation in Poland and Germany in 
the late sixteenth century] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), chapter 2. 
842 See, for instance, Francis W. Carter, Trade and urban development in Poland: An economic 
geography of Cracow, from its origins to 1795 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107. 
Carter distinguishes that “Merchants must have been accustomed to two forms of transportation, one carrying 
information through couriers, and the other actual conveyance of merchandise.” He points out that the latter 
travelled much slower than the former, setting the pace for a courier at 100km/24h on average, while the pace 
for transporting merchandise was measured in weeks. 
843 Weinryb, “A Pekel,” 46, and also mentioned in Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 121. דען בריב געבט
האב אימש פר באטין נאך קודם אז ער צו מיר קומען איז זויא ’ אויך אן טוט איין מצוה איך האבש מיט דען שליח בסוד גיהלטין אונ
איז די גנץ קהילה פול גיוועזין דז איך איין שליח מיוחד האב פון אייך ווי וואול דז איכש גילייקינט האב איר העט אימש דארטין זאלין 
 .פר ביטן
844 Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 118. “One of the most common expressions in premodern letters 
is the invocation of urgency because the courier was waiting to be off.” 
845 There are examples from the 18th century where this was not the case; for instance, in the London 
letters published by Jacob Maitlis, there are addresses in English and Dutch (see “Carlebach, “Letter into 
Text,” 118, n 19) and in some cases in Italy (see Debra Glasberg Gail’s doctoral dissertation on Rabbi Yiẓḥak 
Lampronti: Debra Glasberg Gail, “Scientific Authority and Jewish Law in Early Modern Italy” (Ph.D., diss., 
Columbia University, 2016)  
(see Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8N58MNN). 




couriers (usually called a messenger or shaliaḥ, or sometimes ha-raẓ or ha-ẓir). Rabbi 
Isserles, for example, mentions that one of the couriers who brought him a letter worked 
for an important merchant with international business connections: 846 “Your honor’s 
writing has reached me by means of the courier who came yesterday that has gone by,847 
and it was in the evening and the stars came out and brought to me by mister Shlomo the 
servant of Leib Sinai, who is the intermediary between us for the arrival of mail.” 848 
Daybell describes the carrier of the letters as an “extension of the sender,” who was 
often tasked with other roles such as delivering an oral message or waiting for and 
delivering the reply.849 Rabbi Luria mentions that, when a former student of his fled and 
refused to return to his wife, the rabbi personally ensured that someone went to the wife’s 
home and read the letter to her prior to sending it, in order to lift her spirits.850 A letter from 
some representatives of the Jewish community leadership in Cracow to other leaders who 
fled from the plague to a different location (Alkush) contained urgent matters; large sums 
of money were needed to deal with the plague and its consequences, Jews were being 
attacked by hooligans, countless dead had to be buried, and others were fleeing en masse. 
The writer mentions that the courier is “called Moishe, and he is a good Jew.” The leaders 
are asked to send money with this courier and, while the writer had designated him as 
                                                     
846 See Isserles, ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 498n2. 
847 Psalms 90:4. 
848 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §125: הגיעני כתיבת מעלתו ע”י הרץ הבא אתמול כי יעבור והיה לעת ערב וצאת הכוכבים
. הביאו אלי כמר שלמה משרת ליב סיני אשר הוא האמצעי בינינו בהגעת הכתבים  
849 “Letter bearers represented corporeal extensions of the letter; meaning was therefore generated 
orally and materially as well as textually” (Daybell, The Material Letter, 24). 
850 Shlomo Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §55:  אחרי גומרי מגילתא דא צויתי להקרות המגילה לפניה לדבר על לבה
....ה למשיב נפש ותצפה לביאתך אז העניה הרימה קולה בבכי באמרה אין תועלת בכל אלהשיהא ל  




reliable and a good Jew, he still tells the leaders to “write how much you are sending,”851 
thus enabling him to verify that the sum arrived in full. Interestingly, the outside of this 
letter contains a note in Yiddish, in Hebrew characters, with instructions addressed to 
“Pany Sender,”852 showing that Jews, too, used this honorific. The note asked that the letter 
be taken to the community leaders and adds, “you will be paid for it.”853 
 Daybell draws important connections between the insecure state of private letter 
delivery and the ways in which they were written: “...postal conditions were 
unsystematized and idiosyncratic, which in many ways fundamentally structured the 
culture and practices of early modern letter writing. ... Throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, then, the letter remained a consistently insecure form of 
communication, which forced writers to censor what they committed to paper.” 854 In 
Jewish letters, we witness a similar concern for privacy. Some letters contain directions to 
the courier to deliver the letter to the addressees and add “ve-lo lezulatam” (and not to 
anyone else) after their names.855 The information on the outside of the letters usually 
contained an acronym threatening those who open it without permission. The frequently 
recurring “ve ḥal be N.Ḥ.Sh. deR.G.” means that the Nidui Ḥerem Shamta of Rabbeinu 
Gershom applied to the letter. This refers to the edict attributed to the medieval Ashkenazic 
rabbinic giant, Rabbenu Gershom, prohibiting opening another’s mail. The implication of 
                                                     
851 Weinryb, “A Pekel,” 67, Letter 7:  דען יהודי דען מיר שיקן דער היישט משה איז איין גוטר יהודי זיכט גאט אן
שרייבט וויא פיל איר שיקט’ שיקט וואש דא מויגליך איז אונ’ אונ . 
852 Sender is a first name (short for Alexander), so they may have been addressing a particular person 
tasked with passing this letter to the next person. Alternately, it could refer to the person sending the letter 
(as in senden in German). 
853 Weinryb, “A Pekel,” 67, Letter 7: מען ווערט אייך עש צאלן. 
854 Daybell, The Material Letter, 232. 
855 See, for example, Weinryb, “A Pekel,” 65. 




Nidui Ḥerem Shamta extends beyond a legal prohibition; it functions like a curse, and 
alludes to the excommunication that will afflict the transgressor.856 These exhortations to 
privacy point to the anxiety and to the lack of privacy and security in such a delivery 
system. There were no technological or legal means, no postal regulations that could truly 
protect the contents of the letter. Ultimately, the writer could rely only on the fear of God 
(and rabbis) in the hearts of the people through whom the letter must pass in order to reach 
its destination. 
 Secrecy within the letters was also a reaction to the lack of security and privacy of 
the postal conditions. 857 Rabbi Isserles’ responsum §11 is introduced as “A thing that was 
done [for different reasons] for the sake of peaceful relations; 858 the reader can infer it 
himself from the contents of the letter.”859 It is described in the table of contents of the first 
printed edition (in rhyme) as “an apologetic writing speaking about seeking peace, to 
another great man.” 860 The letter is filled with roundabout references to the case such as 
“and this thing that happened, we have never seen anything evil like it.” 861 The letter 
clearly discusses the many sacrifices that should be made for the sake of peace, but it is 
                                                     
856 Sometimes this acronym for excommunication, which can be read as “snake” (or naḥash), is, in 
turn, folded within another acronym: v-h-P.G.Y.N. (ve-ha-poreẓ geder yisheḥeno naḥash), which stands for 
a curse based on a passage in Ecclesiastes 8:10 as interpreted by the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Avodah 
Zarah 27b, “and he who breaks the fence, a snake (naḥash) will bite him.” In other words, may the rabbinic 
punishment (nidui ḥerem shamta) apply to those who open it. See Ginsberg, “Private Yiddishe,” 331 (Letter 
2). 
857 See Chapter 6 in Daybell, The Material Letter. Daybell interprets the different forms of 
encrypting letters in the early modern period as a result of the paranoia created by the insecure postal 
conditions. 
858 The expression ‘מפני דרכי שלום’ is often employed as a halakhic concept, when peaceful relations 
between the Jewish community and non-Jews are used as a consideration for halakhic leniency (for instance, 
Jewish doctors are permitted to treat non-Jewish patients on Sabbath for the sake of peace – מפני דרכי שלום). 
859 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §11, ed. Siev, 52n1,n64. 
860 Isserles, ShUT Rema, Table of Contents under כתב התנצלות מדבר. בענין רדיפת שלום לגדול אחר - יא. 
861 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §11, ed. Siev, 55. 




phrased so cryptically that it is impossible to reconstruct the actual case at hand. One 
modern-day editor of the responsa concludes that from the letter itself “one cannot know 
to whom or to what community these things were written.” 862 
Not only the threat to privacy posed by the postal conditions affected letter writing. 
The speed and reliability of communication also had important consequences. Daybell 
makes this point, explaining, “Viewed from the perspective of delivery, letter-writing 
emerges as an innately reactive activity, dependent on the vagaries of postal conditions, the 
availability or sudden departure of a suitable bearer, or affected by the favorability of tides 
and weather.”863 The two collections of letters published by Weinryb and Ginsberg were 
confiscated by the authorities and are thus a case in point, showing that many letters did 
not reach their destinations. One could not assume, moreover that even the letters that did 
reach their addressees would arrive on time or with any regularity.864 In a responsum 
mentioned earlier, where Rabbi Isserles explained that the servant of Leib Sinai, an 
important merchant, served as a messenger, he also alluded to the irregularity of this 
system: “And as I am writing, I don’t know whether I can send it with this courier, because 
they do not go by order everyone on their specific day; the one simply comes as the other 
one goes. And I could not answer until your honor’s writing arrived, and immediately with 
                                                     
862 Isserles, ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 52n1 – he speculates that it relates to the Prague Jewish 
community. 
863 Daybell, The Material Letter, 232. 
864 Reiner has used an exchange between Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles to study the timing of the 
correspondence, which probably traveled between Lublin and Cracow. Reiner has reconstructed the exchange 
and noted that there must have been at least six letters, some of which did not make it into print; he used the 
dates to conclude that it took about two weeks for a letter to be read and a response to be written and delivered 
between the two. See Elḥanan Reiner, “Al sod haka’at ha-żur ve-koaḥ ha-dibur” (Concerning the secret of 
striking the rock and the power of speech). In this case, the locations are not too far apart (about 300 km) and 
a courier was used. 




sunrise, the second courier went out. In any case, I did not withhold myself and I put all 
my business aside to answer your honor.” 865 
Three consecutive responsa between Rabbi Isserles and his student Rabbi Hirsch 
indicate some of the confusion that arose as a result of the irregular postal system. In the 
first of these, Rabbi Isserles writes “I received your writings by means of Wolf,” 866 no 
doubt the name of the messenger. It seems, however, that the student repeated some of his 
earlier questions to Rabbi Isserles, who responds that he had, in fact, already sent back 
responses to those questions. Concluding that those answers must not have arrived yet, 
Rabbi Isserles refuses to address any of the student’s repetitive remarks concerning these 
questions. They would have to wait until the earlier responses reach the student.867 Rabbi 
Katzenelbogen, too, mentions a courier in explaining why a responsum is so late in coming:  
I received your letter about the deaf woman after it was delayed on its way or in the 
hands of someone else for many days, and even after it arrived in my hands, it was with 
me for many days because I did not find a delivery person by means of whom I could 
answer and Mister Lozan hid his ways from me [?] because he passed through my town 
and was two parsa’ot868 away from it, but he hid his coming and going from me. 869  
 
                                                     
865 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §125: ואני כותב ולא אוכל לדעת אם אוכל לשלחו ע”י הרץ הסמוך, באשר כי אינן הולכין 
ולא יכלתי להשיב עד כי בא אלי כתיבת מעלתו ומיד כעלות השחר יצא הרץ . כסדרן ביום מיוחד להם רק כאשר יבא האחד יצא השני
למעלתו מ לא עכבתי עצמי ופניתי מכל עסקי להשיב”ומ. השני . 
866 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38. 
867 Ibid.:  קבלתי כתבך ע”י וואלף וראיתי אותו מלא שאלות וספיקות שנתחדשו למעלתך...ועל הענין הראשון
אבל אשער אם לא בא עדיין תשובתי ההיא כללת גם אותה בתוך . כבר השבתי לך ולא הודעתני אם הגיעה התשובה לידך...ששאלת
.ולכן לא אשיב רק על אלו שבאו לי על ידי וואלף. לי עתההאחרות אשר שלחת  . 
868 This is the plural of parsa, an itinerant distance measurement borrowed from the Iranian 
parasang. The average distance a man can walk in a day is about 10 parsa’ot, and one parsa equals about 
2.5 miles. 
869 ShUT MaharY Mintz and MaharaM Padua (Venice, 1553), section 2, §8. 
מכתבך מדבר החרשת קבלתי אחר נשתהה ימים בדרך או ביד זולתי ואף אחרי הגיע לידי היה איתי ימים רבים שלא מצאתי 
העלים ממני בואו ושובופרסאות ו’ מוביל לענות על ידו וכמר לזן העביר עלי דרכו כי עבר דרך עירי וקרוב לה ב .  
Daybell, The Material Letter, 9-10. 




Letters functioned as a part of a series of texts, enclosures, and documents. 
Enclosures, additional material sent together with letters, could be court documents, 
testimonies, and, in one case, even an object; Rabbi Katz, in his responsa, mentions having 
received from his colleagues in Padua an old sandal used for the ḥaliẓa ceremony, which 
he then proceeded to examine for the required positioning of the straps.870 One example of 
the phenomenon of enclosures can be reconstructed from the printed responsa of Rabbi 
Isserles. Entries 12-16 in his responsa all relate to the same case, in which Miriam, daughter 
of Mordekhai, was accused of adultery by her husband.871 The first section is a summary 
from the Cracow rabbinical court, together with assorted witnesses’ testimonies in Yiddish 
that were, according to the summary, taken by a lay court. The testimony includes 
incriminatory statements against Miriam, such as a man who testified to seeing “him by 
her on the bench completely, for our great sins, they were laying on each other” 872 and a 
man named Shlomo ben Eliezer known as Zelkind, who saw her with the other man “under 
the door[way]873 in the dark, and she wore her brown fur [?]and an undershirt, so I got a 
shock and felt upset and told my wife.” 874 It also included the statements of two men who 
testified that the husband actively sought people to testify falsely against his wife, even 
                                                     
870 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §81. ועוד בא לידי מנעל שהובא מק"ק פדואה המנעל נראה בו שעשייתו כאלו נעשה
....והיו הרצועות למטה, לפני מאה שנים  
871 Asher Siev wrote an article on this case in Ha-darom 25 (Spring 1967): 219-211. 
872 See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §12 or Rabbi Shlomo Luria, ShUT MaharShaL (Lublin, 1573-4), §33 
for the fuller version. 
זא זאה ,איך העט גימיינט עש ווער איין נכרית גיוועזט . איך האב גיזעהן מיט מיין אויגן דז פלוני איז גישפרונגן פון איר
פלוניתאיך  ... 
873 In Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §33; it is the wall rather than the doorway. 
874 See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §12 or Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §33 for the fuller version. 
ר ברוין טשמלטי פעלצל האט אי’ איך בין היים גנגן דא איז אשתו בייא פלוני אונטר דער טיר גישטנדן אין דער פישטר און
האב עש מיינם וייב גיזאגט’ האב מיך מצער גיוועזן אונ’ אלזו בין איך דער שראקן אונ, אין אונטר העמד’ אום גיהאט אונ . Hurwitz 
translates: “He had embraced her with one arm and placed his other hand under her underwear.” See Simon 
Hurwitz, The Responsa of Solomon Luria (New York: Bloch, 1968). 




offering to pay for false witnesses; these were supported by summaries of additional 
statements as to the questionable character of the husband’s witnesses. The entry mentions 
an earlier legal case from a Prague court, where the husband was embroiled in a monetary 
dispute with his father-in-law, providing a motive for the husband’s attempt to frame 
Miriam.875 
This material is followed by Rabbi Isserles’ halakhic analysis, clearing the woman 
of the charge of adultery and even of lesser infidelity. The next section is Rabbi Luria’s 
responsum to the same case.876 This is followed by Rabbi Hirẓ of Brisk’s opinion, who, it 
appears from a note at the top, was first shown Rabbi Shakhna’s decision on the case – not 
printed here – at the fair in Lublin. Rabbi Hirẓ skimmed the decision and attested on the 
spot that “the words of the aforementioned gaon seem in my eyes to tend to the truth,” 
which he noted on the margins of Rabbi Shakhna’s decision. Later, when Rabbi Hirẓ 
returned to his home and library, “to my Torah-room where the seats of justice are, the 
sacred vessels, the diverse vessels877 to bring light to mysteries,” 878 he sat down to write a 
more detailed legal analysis of his own, which is presented in this entry. The following 
                                                     
875 The responsum by Rabbi Isserles leaves out some of the testimonies that he considers have no 
halakhic bearing. In the printed responsa of Rabbi Shlomo Luria, who also presented his opinion on the case, 
the full accounts of the testimonies are present in §33. Perhaps Rabbi Isserles copied his responsum from the 
same (or a similar) packet of letters and decided to copy only a section, while Rabbi Luria added his response 
to the entire packet, which was then printed in his responsa in full. Moreover, the first printed edition of 
Rabbi Isserles’ responsa often leaves out responsa when a parallel appears in Rabbi Luria’s ShUT, which was 
printed a few decades earlier, although those parallel entries usually contain a note by the editor mentioning 
where, in the latter book, the responsum in question can be found. See chapter 6 in this dissertation for more 
discussion of this issue. 
876 This responsum is also featured in Rabbi Luria’s own collection of responsa, with some 
differences. 
877 Esther 1:8. 
878 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §14: ואני אמרתי בחפזי בטרדת היריד נראין הדברים היינו תורף הענין, אבל לא נתתי
 .ההסכמה עד אבא חדר תורתי אשר שמה כסאות למשפט כלי הקודש כלים מכלים שונים להוציא לאור תעלומה




entry contains a rather short letter from Rabbi Kalman of Worms (d.1590 L’viv), a famed 
older rabbi, endorsing Rabbi Isserles’ decision, 879 followed by the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer 
ben Manoaḥ, who agreed with the others. This type of unit, containing a succession of 
letters, testimonies, and other documents, is a common phenomenon in early modern 
printed collections of responsa and an excellent example of letters with diverse enclosures. 
These units consisting of many enclosures are called a koveẓ (quire or booklet), 
which was sometimes circulated as a stand-alone unit in manuscript or print. Alexander 
Marx analyzed one of these in his article “A Jewish Cause Célèbre in Sixteenth-Century 
Italy,”880 which discusses a collection titled Psakim (legal decisions), published by the 
Venice rabbinate in 1519, involving a complex and drawn-out disagreement between two 
former business partners that snowballed into a case about the local jurisdiction of 
rabbinical courts. This collection also includes a series of letters, testimonies and other 
materials regarding the specific case, resembling a “letter miscellany.” 881 Marx explained 
that these collections were created and published in order to enable others to form an 
independent opinion. 882 He conjectures: “The publication was meant to be ephemeral and 
very likely only a very few copies were printed; that is probably the reason for its rarity.” 
                                                     
879 See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §15, ed. Siev, 99n13. 
880 Alexander Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre in Sixteenth-Century Italy,” in Abhandlungen zur 
Erinnerung an Hirsch Perez Chajes, ed. V. Aptowitzer and A.Z. Schwartz (Vienna: Alexander Kohut 
Memorial Foundation, 1933), 150-193. Another example from sixteenth-century Rome is described by 
Bernard Cooperman as “…a small pamphlet of fourteen octavo folios containing rabbinic opinions about an 
ongoing case of litigation.” See Bernard Cooperman, “Organizing Knowledge for the Jewish Market: An 
Editor/Printer in 16th Century Rome,” in Perspectives on the Hebraic Book: The Myron M. Weinstein 
Memorial Lectures at the Library of Congress, ed. Peggy K. Pearlstein (Washington: Library of Congress, 
2012), 86-87. 
881 He defines the letter miscellany as “discrete pamphlets of related letters that circulated 
together...” Daybell, The Material Letter, 176. 
882 Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre,” 149-150. 




883 He also points out an important difference between responsa of this nature and the 
standard ShUT, namely, “This collection of decisions ... was not expurgated for publication 
but gives all the details of the case with full names as well as the personal remarks made 
by the rabbis about each other.... When responsa are published as a permanent record of 
legal decisions such matter is almost invariably omitted.”884 
This model can also apply to the above-mentioned adultery case from Rabbi 
Isserles’ responsa, which includes a variety of relevant material (responsa, endorsements, 
testimonies and court documents), and mentions all the names, appellations, locations, and 
other identifying details. As Rabbi Naftali Hirẓ of Brisk mentioned in his letter, he was 
shown the material at the fair and asked for his approval, which fits with Marx’s notion 
that such collections were created “to enable outsiders ... to form an independent opinion.” 
The term “outsiders” should be taken with a grain of salt; it refers to insiders of this 
                                                     
883 Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre,” 149-150. 
884 Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre,” 149-150. This can also explain a puzzling statement in ShUT 
MaharShaL, §89: Rabbi Luria is called upon to evaluate a prior decision made by other rabbis. Rabbi Luria 
makes an interesting statement on the issue of using the actual names of people involved: “...and before I 
enter this alley with the great [those who made the prior decision] and speak against kings without shame 
[Psalms 119], it surprises me about them – why did they hide their [the involved parties’] face with nettles 
[Proverbs 24:31] to compare the act of these sinners [lit. Uncircumcised ones] to Shimon and Levi the 
complete [pure], are they not the known ones R’ Yitẓḥak and his friends and in-laws [relatives], Reb Dovid 
Sendler’le? And perhaps they [the rabbis/judges] meant to compare it to the passage in scripture that refers 
to “Simeon and Levi ... their swords are weapons of violence” [Genesis 45:9]...”  
Contrary to the accepted practices of responsa, Rabbi Luria is criticizing the fact that the names 
were omitted. Not only does Rabbi Luria see no need to respect the involved with any privacy, least of all 
using the names of esteemed ancestors, but he also seems to consider the personalities of the people involved 
to be a meaningful part of the description, saying, “It is clear to me that if R’ Yitẓḥak would not have begun 
with a stumbling block such as R’ Dovid, he would never have thought of carrying out such deeds.” That is, 
the personalities of the figures involved in the case are to some degree relevant for determining whether the 
accusation is likely, which is why full knowledge of their names is necessary. If we use Marx’s distinction 
between the ephemeral koveẓ and print publication, it would make sense that Rabbi Luria appears to consider 
it necessary to include the names; he is referring to the need to include the names in the koveẓ, not the printed 
work. (The fact that these names were ultimately published in print is related to the uneven editing of the 
work prior to printing, which will be discussed in the following chapter of this dissertation.) 




scholarly group who nonetheless do not have a personal connection to those involved in 
the legal dispute.885 
                                                     
885 The model suggested by Marx helps explain the only printed work that we have from Rabbi 
Shakhna, which was printed by Johannes Helitz in Cracow around 1540. This short publication numbered 7 
pages. The only known surviving copy of this printed document is found at the British Library. (A similar 
version is reproduced in Ḥidushei ha-rav Aharon ha-Levi on Tractate Kidushin, first printed in Husiyatin in 
1904.) Barring these writings, however, there is nothing in writing that Rabbi Shakhna published. Some of 
his “psakim” did circulate in manuscript, as mentioned by Luria (§21) and Rema (§30) in their responsa, and 
as we can see in manuscripts that survive in the National Library of Israel, Oxford, and in Columbia’s 
collection. Further responsa from Rabbi Shakhna can be found in ShUT asifat ge’onim he-ḥadash (Jerusalem: 
Zikhron Aharon, 2010). 
The title page of Rabbi Shakhna’s printed ruling declares the text to be about: “...issues of marriage, 
specifically the marriage of Moshe, son of the experienced doctor Shmuel [the Italian] who married Breindel 
daughter of Mano’aḥ, also known as Handel of Cracow, and so he [Rabbi Shakhna] has shown from his great 
pilpul that this marriage was completely valid, and that all of the People of Israel must be warned about her 
that she is a married woman of the aforementioned Moshe, and whoever wishes to see it in the handwriting 
of the above-mentioned ga’on [Rabbi Shakhna] and with his signature can come and go to the above-
mentioned Moshe and find there in his hands everything he seeks....” I thank Professor Elhanan Reiner for 
providing me with a copy of the document from the British Library. See also Avraham Haberman, Prakim 
be-toldot ha-madpisim ha-ivri’im ve-inyanei sfarim (Jerusalem: R. Mass, 1978) 141-142. 
פשוקים [פסוקים] שחבר וארגן ורקם בקסת זהב מופז האחד המיוחד בתוך עדת יעקב ההולך ונושא דגל מחנה  
כמר ’ ו על עניין קידושין ובפרט על קידושי”ר שכנא יצ”ישראל הגאון ראש גלותינו הנר המערבי המשמש ביום ובלילה כבוד מהר
בריינדל בת מנוח המכונה הענדל מקראקאו’ שמואל לועזי יזייא שקידש מר’ השר הרופא המומחה כמרמשה בן   
ובכאן הראה מתוך פלפול הגדול שהם קידושין גמורים ושכל בני ישראל יהיו מוזהרים בה כי היא אשת איש  
 של כמר משה הנ"ל.
וימצא בידו כל חפצו’ משה הנל’ ל כמריבא וילך א’ ומי שרוצה לראות כתיבת יד וחתימתו של הגאון הנל  . 
 נדפס פה קראקו הבירה 
  על יד 
 יהניס העליץ 
It can be argued that this responsum, like the koveẓ discussed by Marx, was published for a very 
specific reason, namely in order to publicize Rabbi Shakhna’s decision as an expert on halakhic marriage, 
and, as a result, to establish the marital status of those involved, in order to make it clear that no one was to 
marry the woman in question without making sure that she was properly divorced first. If someone married 
her without doing so, their children would be considered mamzerim or bastards, which meant they would not 
be able to marry most other Jews. 
That this writing was not primarily intended as a form of scholarly publication or intellectual 
transmission is also made clear by the fact that the statement on the title page is focused on the marital status 
of Breindel and on clearly identifying all the people involved by listing their fathers’ names, as well as their 
locations and any other names by which they were known, something that would not be a priority if the main 
intention was simply to publish a halakhic interpretation of an intellectual scholarly matter. Moreover, the 
exhortation with Rabbi Shakhna’s signature on the title page to go to the groom in question and look at the 
original document shows that this printed decision is mainly a way to make public the fact that Rabbi Shakhna 
ruled this woman to be married. The printed text would not be very important without the existence of the 
original signed letter to which it referred. Therefore, the ruling was written and signed, in the first place, as 
a type of marriage document, because it seems that the bride’s father retracted and claimed that no marriage 
actually took place. Rather than having only the one official letter with the signature, it was printed and 
distributed in order to make clear the status of Breindel, because her family did not consider her married and 
would perhaps try to marry her to someone else without first making her obtain a divorce from Moshe. Thus, 





                                                     
the reason for publishing these writings was not scholarly-halakhic, but mainly an official matter of marital 
status.  
On the identity of Moshe’s father, the doctor Shmuel the Italian, see Edward Fram’s chapter, “A 
Difficult Beginning” in his forthcoming book project [no title yet]. Shmuel was the personal physician of 
Bona Sforza of Milan. See also Favel Wettstein, le-toldot Israel ve-ḥakhamav be-Polin (On the history of 
Israel and its sages in Poland) (Cracow: Fischer, 1909), 9. 
 Within the printed ruling, there is evidence of at least one other ruling by Rabbi Shakhna that was 
purposely and consciously copied for publication, albeit probably in manuscript: The last part of the printed 
ruling, in which he explains why it does not matter that the daughter was underage, seems to have been culled 
from an earlier ruling which, as Rabbi Shakhna wrote, “I wrote regarding the sivlonot to Moravia, it is 
publicized to the many and the biggest scholars have agreed with me and required her to receive a kosher 
divorce document from her intended match, as is known to everyone. And whoever wants to come copy it 
can copy it, because that ruling can be found in the hands of many.” (emphasis added) 
 It seems that this case concerned a groom by the name of Yacov, not Moshe. It is likely a version 
of the above ruling reprinted in Husiyatin: וגדולים ן מפורסם לרבים ”הלא מה שכתבתי בעניין הסבלונות למדינת מערהרי
החכמים הסכימו על ידי והצריכוה לקבל גט כשר מן המשודך כידוע לכל: ומי שרוצה להעתיק יבא ויעתיקה כי מצויה אותה פסקא ביד 
 .רבים
The printed ruling concerns a case in which a couple (or, rather, their fathers) had intended and 
agreed to marry, and the groom-to-be gave his bride-to-be a gift (as Shakhna explains it, the father of the 
groom was worried that the father of the bride would retract the agreement and explicitly advised his son to 
give the bride this gift to seal the deal). The girl took the gift from the groom’s hand after encouragement 
from her father (though it seems that they thought it was simply a present). Rabbi Shakhna argued that this 
gift giving should be considered the transaction of kidushin and thus bind the couple together in matrimony, 
although the gift was not given to the bride in the context of a wedding ceremony. He engages in an original 
and highly pilpulistic interpretation of two texts in Tractate Kidushin (6ab and 50ab) to show that the mere 
giving of a bridal gift (called sivlonot), could, in fact, constitute the legal marriage (kidushin) itself, even 
without uttering any words that signaled that the groom intended to marry the bride by doing so. In his 
opinion, it was sufficient for the couple to have intended to wed and for the groom to manually and directly 
give his prospective bride a gift to effect an actual marriage. Rabbi Shakhna’s interpretation of sivlonot here 
was not the most obvious one to many scholars. Most considered sivlonot to be merely a gift that, in some 
cases, (depending on local practice of when sivlonot were typically given) could at most be considered proof 
that the couple had already married earlier, but it was more complicated to claim that the sivlonot itself could 
be the transaction of kidushin. Moreover, simply handing over something of value without orally stating any 
intention (e.g., saying “harei at mekudeshet li” or at the very least by talking about marriage-related issues 
before) is not sufficient to effect the marriage. The problem is augmented in this case, where the bride was 
still a minor when she received the gift. (To respond to the issue that the bride was, in this case, underage, 
and thus could not accept it of her own will, he explained that it sufficed if the father of the bride agreed to 
the match at the time that the gift was received, even though the father retracted his agreement later on.) By 
(re)interpreting the mishnaic and talmudic sources as discussing a very specific, more complex modified 
case, drawing support from their specific formulations as well as from the formulations of questions, 
explanations, and summaries by the classic medieval authorities that the texts are, in fact, about this more 
complex situation and not about a plain case of sivlonot, Rabbi Shakhna rejects these issues to conclude that 
the woman was considered the wife of the man who gave her the gift, and that anyone wishing to marry 
Breindel would need to make sure she received a proper divorce document from Moshe first. 




The introduction to one of the letters in the adultery case 886 explains the process of 
the legal battle, clarifying how and when the different documents within the unit were 
accumulated. As Rabbi Kalman explains, the disagreement went on for a very long time 
until both sides came before the rabbinical court of Cracow, which was comprised of Rabbi 
Moshe Landau (d. 1561), the oldest member, Rabbi Isserles, and his brother in law Rabbi 
Katz.887 The material in the first part of the koveẓ (§12 out of §12-16), which includes the 
testimonies against the wife, the summary of the case, and Rabbi Isserles’ opinion, is thus 
itself a composite. The summary of the case, with the remark that the testimonies against 
the wife were taken by an unfit and unlearned court, are probably from this rabbinical court. 
The court in Cracow would usually write down its decisions, which were copied as needed. 
This can be seen in a communal decision dating from 1592, which lists the responsibilities 
of the different levels of the Cracow rabbinical court. One of these responsibilities is 
recording and copying: “And they [the court] are also obliged to write their decisions in 
the pinkas for free, and for a copy [they charge] one large coin….”888 The testimonies 
                                                     
886 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §15. Rabbi Kalman’s letter is an endorsement of the earlier legal decision 
and a repudiation of the husband. This letter explains that Miriam’s father showed him the legal decision 
from Prague (in the father’s favor) regarding the prior business disagreement, thus providing the motive for 
the accusing husband and proving his evil character. According to Rabbi Kalman, the rabbinical court in 
Cracow, which dealt with the adultery case, never saw the Prague decision itself. The decision as it is rendered 
in ShUT Rema, §12, indeed, only mentions the Prague case without providing an actual copy of the decision. 
This piece of evidence strengthens Miriam’s case, as it disqualifies the adultery witnesses, annulling their 
testimony entirely rather than just weakening it. The halakhic import of this evidence is that the accusing 
husband may not choose to accept the negative testimony about his wife, and he is thus not merely allowed, 
but, rather, obligated, to receive her forgiveness and return to her. 
887 His responsa collection also includes some overlapping material about this case and some with 
differences from it. 
888 Published in Favel H. Wettstein, Kadmoniot mi-pinkasa’ot yeshanim: le-korot Israel be-Folin 
bikhlal u-vi-Cracow bi-frat. [Early material from old notebooks: on the history of the people of Israel in 
Poland in general and Cracow specifically] (Cracow: Fisher Press, 1892), 10-11. ..." בעניני ממון והם ישפטו הכל
גם מחייבים לכתוב פסקיהם . ל"ה כנ"אך לא יקנסו שיגיע לכיסם רק לב, וגם ישפטו על זלזולים אשר יעשה בפניהם. ל"עד הסך הנ
..."גם מחוייבים לישב בדין בכל יום מלבד ערבי שבתות. גדול' א –בפנקס בחנם ומן ההעתקה   




copied in this section of the responsa collection were thus those taken at a previous stage 
of the dispute by a court of lay-people. Rabbi Isserles appended the reasoning for his 
decision in the Cracow court in the form of a responsum. Next, as Rabbi Kalman explains, 
“their legal decision traveled to the remaining sages of these environs who are present in 
this kingdom, and not one remained who did not agree with the decision of the great 
ones....” 889 The other letters in this unit, as well as those mentioned and reproduced in other 
collections that pertain to this case but did not make it into Rabbi Isserles’ collection, are 
thus probably reactions to this peripatetic legal decision,890 of which one unit ended up 
being printed into Rabbi Isserles’ ShUT. 
We can view such a unit as a kind of “circular letter” that is copied and sent around 
with additional material added as it develops. As Harold Love reminds us about manuscript 
publication versus printed publication, manuscript publication does not emerge from one 
center and is not simultaneous; it publishes matter in a de-centralized and consecutive 
manner, meaning that material can be added or deleted, depending on where and when it 
is being copied. 891 This can explain why different printed collections of responsa from the 
same time and place, in this case, the collections of responsa of Rabbi Luria (§33) and of 
                                                     
889 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §15: ונתגלגל פסק דינם עד יתר חכמי הגלילות הנמצאים תוך המלכות הלז, ולא נשאר בהם
ל וצריך סליחה וכפרה ”ל מותר לשוב לביתו ואל יוציא עוד שום לעז על זוגתו מרים הנ”שהבעל הנ...שלא הסכים לפסק דין האלופים
ל”על מה שהוציא שם רע על בת כהן הנ . 
890For an insightful comparison and contrast between official community records of the court and 
responsa, see the introduction in Edward Fram, A Window on their World: The Court Diary of Rabbi Ḥayyim 
Gundersheim, Frankfurt am Main, 1773-1794 (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2012). 
 
891 Cited in Daybell, The Material Letter, 190-1. See also Harold Love, Scribal Publication in 
Seventeenth Century England (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), especially Part II, 
chapter 4. 




Rabbi Katz (§77), all contain units with material about the same case that display overlap 
with those in Rabbi Isserles’ collection, but are not identical. 
d. Reading 
Contrary to idealized notions of correspondence, in which a single message is relayed from 
one author to one recipient, the readership of early modern letters usually showed more 
variety and multiplicity. 892 In the case of Jewish letters, too, correspondence was often 
addressed to several readers,893 and a number of notes to different people were often added 
one after another on one and the same sheet of paper, meaning that they could all be read 
by all the addressees and different authors. For instance, the letter in Weinryb’s collection 
to the Cracow community leaders also includes separate greetings from the scribe to his 
“Aunt Etta,” and when a Yosef Levi wrote a letter from Bulgaria to his brother-in-law in 
Padua in Yiddish, it is immediately followed by a letter to his grandfather in Hebrew. 
Unlike many other societies in the early modern period, but similarly to humanist circles, 
the rabbinic community is one in which literacy was a prerequisite. This meant that all the 
participants could read and write their own letters rather than having to rely on scribes, 
readers, and amanuenses. 
In practice, however, as we have already seen, many rabbis, including Rabbi 
Isserles, used scribes to copy their letters, thus preserving one copy for their own record 
without having to write the same thing twice and perhaps also ensuring that the addressee 
                                                     
892 See Daybell, The Material Letter, 12. 
893 For instance, in Weinryb, “A Pekel,” 67, Letter 7 and Ginsberg, “Private Yiddishe,” 331, a letter 
addressed to two brothers. 




receives the neater and more legible copy. 894 Thus, although responsa could have been 
more private than contemporary correspondence in general, because there was no strict 
need for scribes or other amanuenses, in fact, this, apparently, was not the case, and at least 
one person other than the author (the scribe) was familiar with responsa before they even 
left his desk. Likewise, there are examples of responsa written by several questioners, such 
as the members of a rabbinical court895 or a group of students rather than an individual.896  
Susan Whyman’s notion of “epistolary literacy,”897 which includes the particular 
knowledge of how to read and write letters of correspondence, a skill beyond basic literacy, 
can apply here too. In his work on the Talmud, Rabbi Luria explains the following passage: 
“A torah scholar (talmid ḥakham) must learn three things: writing, [ritual] slaughter, and 
circumcision.”898 Regarding the first of these, “writing,” RaShY explained that he must be 
able to sign his name. Rabbi Luria’s interjection and alternate explanation is very telling 
of the notion of epistolary literacy as part of early modern rabbinical scholarly culture: 
                                                     
894 In one 15th-century manuscript collection of responsa from Rabbi Yacov Moellin, the 
introduction contains a note from a scribe who was tasked with copying all the letters because his master’s 
handwriting was difficult: שהיה רוצה ) 1428(ל באותו הזמן בקיץ קפז "י סג"ץ מהר"כי הסכים עמי פיו טהור אמ...ואני הגבר
בשביל שהיה סופר מהיר , לםכי עדיין הוא בידו כתיבת ידו מכו, להניחו להעתיק אליו כל התשובות שהשיב מיום שהיה מורה הלכה
ובכן נתקבצו תיבה , והניח להעתיקה ושלח בכל פעם ההעתק והגוף החזיק, נחוץ בקריצותיו ולא היתה מכתב ידו נקראת בעיני כל
.מלאה  
This introduction is copied in Israel Yuval, Ḥakhamim be-doram: Ha-manhigut ha-ruḥanit shel 
yehudei Germanyah be-shilhei yemei ha-beinaim (Sages in their generation: The spiritual leadership of 
German Jewry at the end of the Middle Ages) (Jerusalem, 1989), 111-113. He mentions that it was first 
published in Ha-mazkir 9 (1869): 23. Later a collection of his responsa was printed as ShUT MaharY Moellin 
(Cremona, 1556). 
895 See Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §33. 
והנה אנחנו דיינים מחולקים בזה ולא רצינו לברור שלישי מחכמי וויניציאה כי כולם ....אנחנו דיינים מבוררים נתבררנו
.כן יקום וכן קבלו עליהם שני הכתותי דין תורה "ת להודיע דעתו עפ"בחרנו במכ. קרובים ונוגעים בדבר  
896 See, for instance, Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §10, which presents a “great dispute between the 
students,” describing the position of one group and then explaining that “other students doubt this….” על  
ותלמידים אחרים מפקפקים בראיה הזאת ....יש מהם שרוצים, ת שמעון נפלה מחלוקת גדולה בין התלמידיםהטענה הזאת ועל תשוב
...לכן אל יהא למשא להשיב. ד"ואומרים שאינה דומה לנד  
897 See Daybell, The Material Letter, 28, for different degrees of being “fully literate in the epistolary 
arts” and for Susan Whyman’s term of “epistolary literacy” as a skill. 
898 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Ḥulin 9a. 




“And it is obvious that he can sign! Rather, [‘writing’ signifies that] he should be capable 
of writing responsa and halakhic decisions and also familiar letters in the clear language 
that befits a Torah scholar.”899 The skill of writing personal letters appears alongside 
halakhic skills. As the section about writing detailed, the acceptable ways of reading and 
writing responsa were not automatically acquired once one knew how to read. Rather, they 
had to be taught by means of manuals, collections of responsa, and guided practice, 
instruction, and feedback on actual letters. 
The question of privacy and readership brings us back to the purpose of the unit 
composed of many enclosures, sometimes called a koveẓ. Marx, in his study, explained that 
they were created and published to enable outsiders to form an independent opinion.900 As 
I pointed out, these outsiders whose legal opinion was sought were, in the first place, other 
rabbis. Clearly, however, there was another audience for this kind of circular letter. Marx 
points out that responsa of this nature were not expurgated for publication but gave all the 
details of the case with full names. 901 The same can be said about the adultery koveẓ: even 
the cited excerpts include multiple names, many of them enhanced with nicknames and 
other identifying details. This concern with identification leads us to an additional audience 
for the koveẓ: the Jewish community in general, or, at least, anyone interested in Miriam’s 
                                                     
899 Luria, Yam Shel Shlomo Ḥulin, Chapter 1, §15: אמר ר"י אמר רב ת"ח צריך שילמד ג' דברים.כתב פירש"י  
ת ופסקי דין ואף אגרת שלומים בצחות לשון נאה "ל לכתוב שואלא שיכו, ופשיטא שיכול לחתום. שידע לחתום שמו, כתב לכתוב
.ח"לת  
900 Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre,” 149-150. 
901 Marx, “A Jewish Cause Célèbre,” 149-150. 




marital status. An additional purpose of publishing this unit was as an open letter902 that 
Miriam and her family would use as proof of her innocence to protect their reputation. 
This additional purpose may also explain some of the rhymed openings in this unit 
and in other similar cases. In such letters, the salutations address an unnamed general public 
instead of greeting and praising a particular recipient as is usually the case. The opening 
passage in Rabbi Luria’s letter, for instance, lacks any specific recipient and the opening 
lines do not target any individual, but focus, instead, on the plight of the victims, on the 
false nature of the accusation, and then, on the author’s intention to “restore the crown to 
its former glory”903 and clear Miriam’s name. The impression that this is an open letter is 
buttressed by the salutation’s unusual length and its meticulous rhyme scheme with a 
number of scriptural allusions and a degree of pathos extreme even for rabbinic letters: 
I saw the tears of the wronged. /Who goes down and cries from market to market./A 
keening cry, a whining cry, a cry of weeping./Mightier than the thunder of great 
water904/Mightier than the breakers of the sea905/These are the raging waters906/The bitter 
waters/Its source from the Rock of Contention907 from ROSh Ẓurim908.... 
 
This continues for more than ten lines. 909 
                                                     
902 A so-called kol koreh (after Isaiah 40:2) is a term used for open letters or public declarations in 
the rabbinic context, (for instance from the orthodox Jewish news site www.CrownHeights.info: “107 
Rabbonim [Rabbis] and Dayanim [rabbinic Judges] have signed a kol koreh [public proclamation] affirming 
the Halachic obligation of all Jews immediately to report and notify secular law enforcement when they know 
of an instance of child abuse.”) In modern Hebrew, for instance, a call for papers or a call for bids is also 
called a kol koreh. They all denote a message that is intended to reach a wide audience that is not known in 
advance. 
903 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL §33. להשיב עטרה לישנה  
904 Psalms 93:4. 
905 Ibid. 
906 Psalms 124:5. 
907 I Samuel 23:28. 
908 Bamidbar 23:9. 
909 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §13 and Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §33: ראיתי דמעות העשוק. היורד ובוכה משוק
מקור נובע מסלעי . הם מים הזידונים מי המרים. מקולות מים רבים משברי ים אדירים. קול נהי וקול בכי וקול תמרורים. לשוק
 The last section in the adultery koveẓ as it appears in Rabbi Isserles’ printed responsa is .המחלוקת מראש צורים




Moreover, a letter may have had different purposes at various times, for diverse 
readers, or different purposes simultaneously: Reading, circulating, and keeping such a 
responsum may have been a scholarly matter for some, a question of solidarity for others, 
a legal and marital matter, a question of evidence for a rabbinical court, or a proof of 
innocence for a slandered woman. The multiple purposes make for diverse kinds of 
reading, with a focus on differing parts of the letters. One reader may concentrate on the 
scholarship or the legal analysis, while another would skip to the signatures and care only 
about the stature and final decision of the rabbis who signed; Miriam and her family might 
show this to others to prove their vindication; suitors might want to know what her current 
marital status was, and, perhaps, there were those who were just reading the adultery 
testimonies for the gossip, entertainment, or titillation. This insight also explains the 
circulation of some of these cases which, from a halakhic intellectual perspective, do not 
necessarily add much in terms of original scholarship or legal precedent. Responsa, clearly, 
are a complex phenomenon. Moreover, these correspondences were rarely private 
communication. 
3. RESPONSA AND RABBINIC DISCOURSE 
a. Introduction: Responsa and Social Networks  
 
The study of social networks enables us to re-examine rabbinic communication. The 
scholarship on the early modern humanist Republic of Letters, from Hans Bots and 
Françoise Waquet’s seminal La République des Lettres to more contemporary works have 
                                                     
a letter from Rabbi Eliezer ben Mano’aḥ, containing a rhymed opening that is, likewise, more public 
declaration than personal salutation. 




explored this phenomenon for early modern Europe.910 Social network theories, which 
have become ever more central thanks to new approaches practiced in digital humanities, 
have become increasingly important to our understanding of a broad range of phenomena, 
including the formation of scholarly communities and the circulation of knowledge. 
Christian Loeber, a later member of the humanist Republic of Letters, emphasized 
that their society was, in fact, not a republic at all because it wielded no political power.911 
This insight is particularly relevant with regard to the rabbinic community, which held no 
real political power or control over contiguous territory. The boundaries of the rabbinic 
network encompassed Europe, stretching from Northern Italy to Eastern Europe, the 
Balkans, and the Levant.912 The nodes, in cities such as Padua, Frankfurt, Prague, and 
Cracow, were linked by merchants and their merchandise, couriers, traveling scholars, 
migrants, books, and letters. Its important cities hosted religious institutions such as courts 
that adjudicated Jewish law, or batei din, houses of learning, or yeshivot, community 
leaders, and famous rabbis. The canon for this scholarly community included the entire 
corpus of Jewish law, from the Talmud through halakhic manuscript miscellanies, to 
recently printed works of halakha, such as the Shulḥan Arukh (Venice, 1565). Two years 
after its initial publication, the Shulḥan Arukh codified both sfardic and ashkenazic 
interpretations of Jewish law, thus putting the two traditions on the same page (both 
                                                     
910 Hans Bots and Françoise Waquet, La République des lettres (Paris: Belin, 1997); Anthony 
Grafton, “A Sketch Map of a Lost Continent: The Republic of Letters,” in idem., Worlds Made by Words: 
Scholarship and Community in the Modern West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 9-34. 
911 Quote is from Christian Loeber, Dissertatio politica forma regiminis reipvblic, cited in Bots and 
Waquet, La République, 21. 
912 See Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §19 to Rabbi Eliezer Ashkenazi, who came from Egypt to Poland, 
and Isserles, ShUT Rema, §114 from Rabbi David ben Yakov ha-Kohen, who studied with Rabbi Isserles 
and became a rabbi in Turkey. 




literally and, to some extent, figuratively). Their written communications were carried out 
by means of responsa. The topics under discussion in these letters of responsa touched 
upon all areas of life and religion from the perspective of Jewish law. They contained 
discussions of real cases with specific circumstances, but in some instances, debates 
touched on the issues in a more general form or were explicitly theoretical. 
One study suggests that letters about halakha had, in fact, been one of the main 
catalysts for the development of communication in the Jewish world, surpassing Christian 
communications in medieval Europe, which increased noticeably only in the early modern 
period.913 This centrality of epistolary communication for constructing the halakhic 
scholarly community supports a deeper examination of the implications of this particular 
mode of communication for Jewish law. By establishing a scholarly network, 
correspondence also enabled the creation of an imagined rabbinic community. The term 
“imagined community,” borrowed from Benedict Anderson,914 does not imply that the 
rabbinic community is a phantasm, but, first, that it is something that must be constructed 
rather than a pre-existent entity, and, second, that it has importance as an idea in the 
rabbinic imagination and in the imagination of the Jewish community. 
Viewing responsa as both a form of scholarship and a form of correspondence 
broadens our understanding of the phenomenon of responsa and the intellectual culture of 
early modern rabbis. Utilizing defining concepts constituting the humanist Republic of 
                                                     
913 Sophia Menache, “Introduction,” and “Communication in the Jewish Diaspora: A Survey,” in 
Communication in the Jewish Diaspora: The Pre-Modern World, ed. Sophia Menache (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 
10, 26, 45-46. 
914 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983). 




Letters, such as consensus, openness, intellectual freedom, and equality, I shall elaborate 
the connecting thread for these ideas. Theories of common law will be used to explain how 
the existence of this imagined community is crucial for legal authority, justifying Jewish 
law not only from its scholarly perspective, but also for the larger Jewish community bound 
by its obligations. 
b. Responsa Beyond Conduits of Communication  
 
What is the significance of responsa when they are regarded as correspondence, and how 
does epistolarity, the medium for these communications, shape halakha? At a basic level, 
responsa answer a practical need: exchanging information over distance. Elisheva 
Carlebach emphasizes the importance of responsa as “...a conduit for some of the most 
enterprising minds in the early modern period.”915 Recent studies in the field of 
communication, however, indicate that conduits are not, as the term might imply, 
immaterial or transparent; rather, correspondence impacts the discourse itself, requiring an 
examination of the effects of this particular scholarly mode. 
Anderson’s study of nationalism in the 1980s introduced the important insight that 
there is no such thing as a pre-existent community, nation, or other cohesive social unit, 
even given a unified continuous geographical, political, linguistic, or social sphere.916 
Rather, national communities are constructed, by means of mass communication. 
Anderson’s notion of an imagined community has, as one scholar put it, given a “new lease 
on life” to the Republic of Letters as a concept of an autonomous sociocultural space, as it 
                                                     
915 Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 115-6 (emphasis added). 
916 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 




links the existence of a shared literary universe to the formation of a community.917 A 
similar notion is implied in Jürgen Habermas’ studies of the constitutive role of 
communication for the creation of a modern public sphere.918 Without communication, 
there is no such sphere. This claim applies especially to the Jewish diaspora, which was 
not a defined or continuous geographic, linguistic, or political unit. A connection can be 
made between these insights and the assumptions implicit in the approach of social network 
analysis. Social network theories identify, measure, and interpret phenomena by tracking 
their communications. Such research does not assume that a community exists a priori; it 
is mapped by tracking the connections between individual nodes without positing the 
existence of a network outside the aggregate of links connecting those nodes. The 
communication is what constructs the very network. 
Based on these insights, we may say that, beyond the practical need to share 
information about halakhic issues, the deeper effect and significance of rabbinic 
correspondence was the creation of a network and a community.  Rather than assuming the 
existence of a rabbinic community as an established space in which correspondence is 
merely the “conduit” that permits the circulation of information, correspondence should be 
seen as a building block – perhaps the building block – that creates this community. The 
use of network theories has become increasingly popular in intellectual history given the 
recent evolution of the digital humanities, which facilitates the analysis of large amounts 
                                                     
917 Avriel Bar-Levav, “Amsterdam and the Inception of the Jewish Republic of Letters,” in The 
Dutch Intersection: The Jews and the Netherlands in Modern History, ed. Yosef Kaplan (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
235. 
918 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). 
 




of data and enables mapping out the information in graphic form. Such a project could, in 
theory, be carried out for the rabbinic correspondence of the sixteenth century by recording 
every individual correspondent who wrote or received responsa as a node and every 
instance of correspondence as a connection. This could then provide information about the 
size of the network; its density; its distances; its centers of influence; the nature of those 
centers; and the interrelationship of the centers. We could, for instance, probably establish 
that the rabbinic network was a strongly “assortative” social network, meaning that all the 
nodes formed ties with others who were similar to them (in terms of race, gender, 
occupation, educational achievement, and so on). As there were many more instances of 
communication within Eastern Europe than between the latter and Italy, and even fewer 
instances of correspondence between Eastern Europe and the Levant, we could also 
establish that the network was propinquitous (the nodes tend to have more ties with others 
that are geographically close). We could identify figures such as Rabbi Katzenelbogen of 
Padua, who connected the ashkenazic Jews in Northern Italy to their Eastern European 
counterparts, as one of the “bridges” in the network, an individual providing the sole link 
between two other nodes, and we could probably point out social circles or groups in which 
all the individuals are tied to one another directly or indirectly, and distinguish these from 
cliques, in which every individual is directly tied to every other individual. In short, using 
network theory to map rabbinic correspondence could provide us with a wealth of 
interesting information. 




Without first taking a step back to inquire into some larger preliminary questions, 
however, this approach carries serious risks.919 First, epistolary correspondence, 
particularly in this period, was a complex phenomenon. Composing correspondence was 
not limited to a single author, its circulation extended beyond an individual addressee, and 
its reading and preservation entailed various goals, and included multiple complex 
meanings. Therefore, even identifying the sender and the recipient of every single letter 
would not produce an accurate map of the communication network. Moreover, as studies 
of early modern humanism have pointed out, printed books rivaled, perhaps even surpassed 
individual letters in their importance for communication.920 Any map of epistolary 
correspondence, no matter how complete, would thus still fail to represent the resulting 
community as a whole because it would neglect the role of print in creating the scholarly 
republic. Ultimately, quantitative studies cannot be interpreted meaningfully without first 
establishing the nature of questions that are relevant to such a study, the context of the data, 
and the larger import of this information.921 This study poses some of these preliminary 
questions concerning rabbinic communication and their meaning. 
                                                     
919 In his introduction to a study of 19th-century French correspondence, Roger Chartier has reflected 
on the need to connect the larger data with individuals and the historical narrative. See Roger Chartier, ed., 
La Correspondance: Les usages de la lettre au XIXe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 10-13. 
920 The unique contribution of letters as opposed to other types of texts for halakha will be discussed 
in the concluding case study. See Daniel Stolzenberg, “A Spanner and His Works: Books, Letters, and 
Scholarly Communication Networks in Early Modern Europe,” in For the Sake of Learning: Essays in Honor 
of Anthony Grafton, 2 vols., ed. Ann Blair and Anja-Silvia Goeing (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 2:157-172. Similar 
arguments have been made for other non-letter modes of communications, such as sketches and technical 
drawings, objects, etc. Oral, person to person conversation should, of course, not be neglected either. 
921 This dilemma has been discussed at length among data analysts and digital humanities scholars 
who use these methods. For accessible and interesting treatments of these issues, see, for instance, H. Ekbia, 
M. Mattioli, I. Kouper, G. Arave, A. Ghazinejad, T. Bowman, V. R. Suri, A. Tsou, S. Weingart, and C. R. 
Sugimoto, “Big data, bigger dilemmas: A critical review,” Journal of the Association for Information Science 
and Technology 66 (2015): 1523–1545, doi:10.1002/asi.23294; Shawn Graham, Ian Milligan and Scott 
Weingart, The Historian's Macroscope (working title; under contract with Imperial College Press), Open 




c. Responsa and Sociability 
Responsa were the driving force of communications that, along with the exchange of 
halakhic information, established a sociability.922 Friendships between scholars are often 
initiated and carried out via responsa,923 and correspondents kept each other informed of 
their whereabouts, family life, health, and employment situations,924 thus allowing ties of 
friendship that were initially formed in physical proximity to continue across a distance.925 
In some cases, responsa even included two distinct parts: one halakhic, the other social, but 
they were meant to be read together as one communication. Rabbi Katz, Rabbi Isserles’ 
                                                     
Draft Version (Autumn 2013), http://themacroscope.org; and Scott Weingart, “Demystifying Networks, Parts 
I & II,” The Journal of Digital Humanities 1, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 9-22. 
922 See Françoise Waquet’s earlier study of the Republic of Letters and her insistence that the 
Republique des Lettres cannot be understood in purely political terms without considering its sociability. 
Françoise Waquet, “Qu’est-ce que la République des Lettres? Essai de sémantique historique,” Bibliothèque 
de l’École des chartes 147 (1989): 473-502. 
923 The two aspects were clearly related in the minds of the participants: At the conclusion of a 
question to Rabbi Isserles, Rabbi Luria writes: “And I am surprised that you did not add anything for me in 
the courier that came from your father, not even a friendly letter.” He expected to find a responsum along 
with the courier from Rabbi Isserles’ father, or, given the absence of a proper halakhic responsum, at least 
some friendly regards. Rabbi Luria closes the above remarks with a declaration of friendship laced with some 
misgivings about whether the recipient sufficiently appreciates the relationship, given the lack of letters: 
“Finally, I accept from this day, that your love shall be engraved upon my heart, and I wish that it should be 
appreciated from your end even half so much....” See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6. 
924 Rabbi Hirsch Elzaser, for example, writes to Rabbi Isserles that he returned safely to Poland from 
his rabbinical work in the German lands, to which the latter replies that he is happy to hear of his safety: 
“Although I told you to stay in Ashkenaz to be a rabbi and teacher to them somewhere.” Isserles had given 
his student career advice, telling him to take up a more lucrative teaching post in the West, which Elzaser 
ended up disregarding. Isserles ultimately gives his blessing, explaining that the choice to live with less 
remuneration in exchange for a more peaceful political situation is understandable: “Perhaps it is better to 
have dry bread and peace in these countries, … since in these lands their hatred of us is not as strong as in 
the countries of Ashkenaz...” (Isserles, ShUT Rema, §113, ed. Siev, 464). See also n1 there and Isserles, ShUT 
Rema, §95. 
925 Likewise, apologies for the brief or incomplete nature of responsa frequently mention the author’s 
reasons for brevity, whether his declining health, his many journeys, and the resulting distance from his books 
or the many troubles, worries, and responsibilities hindering him from formulating a better response. Rabbi 
Meir of Padua, for example, refers to the burning of the Talmud in 1554 when he mentions that a responsum 
should not be considered final, “as the wellspring of the Talmud is not in his hands, due to our many sins, … 
because this was when the books were burnt as a result of the decision in the lands of Loez (Italy)….” This 
is paraphrased in the last lines of Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §1. Another example is Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, 
§16, where he complains about issues and rivalries between him and other rabbis and also mentions his own 
teaching activities and students. 




relative who sat with him on Cracow’s bet din (rabbinical court), sent Rabbi Meir of Padua 
his decision on a case and subsequently replied to the response from Padua, opening the 
reply as follows: “…your honor wrote to me ‘as soon as I received your psak (halakhic 
decision),’ thus implying that your honor did not receive the mikhtav shlomim (familiar 
letter, letter of friendship) …, in which I write an apology of sorts, explaining what led me 
to the situation where I contemplated, in my humiliated spirit, to send a halakhic decision 
to your honor!”926 Rabbi Katz feared that the recipient received one letter without the other, 
meaning that there were two physically distinct elements included in the responsum: the 
halakhic decision or psak, which he originally wrote for the people who brought the case 
to his rabbinical court, on the one hand, and the personal letter that he added in order to 
provide the necessary context and apologies regarding the circumstances of the psak, on 
the other hand. Although the two entities were separate, they were meant to be read 
together, the personal letter providing context for the halakhic document, which required 
the greetings and apologies of the personal letter in order to be socially and intellectually 
appropriate. This combination illustrates the dual role inherent in responsa letters in 
general. 
In one instance, a halakhic request by Rabbi Katz had been circulated among many 
rabbis. “Rabbi Eliezer from Egypt,” who lived in Posen and whom he did not know 
                                                     
926 See Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §1(.2) ed. Siev, 13. כתבתי שנית להגאון מהר"ר מאיר מפדוואה אחר
ר מאיר "ג כמהר"הוא אהובי הרה, הוד קרנו יגדל לדור דורים, המאיר לארץ ולדרים': הובררנו לדון'ל המתחיל "ששלחתי לו פסק הנ
ת "והנה מכ. מכתב דמר הגיעני ושמחתי כעני מוצא שלל רב, אהובי]: יאריך ימים אמן וכל אשר לו שלום יראה זרע[ש "א וכאל"יזיי
מי הביאני הלום לשבר , כ לא בא ליד מר איגרת שלומים שיחדתי למר ובו כתוב התנצלות מה"וא, כתב אלי איך שבא לידו הפסק
ולא לפסוק קמי מר כי מן הראוי לשאול שאלות. ברוחי הבושה ולשלוח פסק קמי מר . 




personally at the time of this letter,927 was insulted at not having received the appeal in a 
letter addressed to him personally, or, as Rabbi Katz writes: “It was told to me that his 
honor was angry and fuming about the fact that I did not write to his honor myself....”928 
Indeed, the substantive information arrived, but receiving a responsum was considered a 
form of respect, and not receiving a personally addressed responsum was perceived as an 
insult. Responsa correspondence was a social act whose significance exceeded the sharing 
of specific information, and every responsum thus built and fortified a network. 
d. Responsa’s Role in Creating a Discursive Network 
Responsa thus did not circulate within a pre-existent network; they created the social ties 
that constituted the community. Moreover, the responsa communications established the 
discourse that took place within this community. This is clear from the many discursive 
functions that responsa carried out. This section will study several of these functions, such 
as education through study; pedagogical remarks; moral guidance; enforcing correct modes 
of reasoning by means of games; and the establishment of a language that is particular to 
the community and internally stratified. These functions, together, show that responsa 
effectively established, negotiated, and supported a scholarly community with its own 
sociability, paradigms, language, and modes of reasoning, creating a discursive 
community. 
 
                                                     
927 Rabbi Katz makes this clear by means of the salutation: “Thus I replied to Eliezer who came from 
the land of Egypt … and his nickname is Leizer (L..iZR) and his one name, Eliezer, may the E-l (God) of our 
fathers come to his –ezer (aid), but he is li-zar (Heb. – a stranger to me)…” ר אליעזר אשר בא "זאת השבתי למהר
זר-ליברם הוא , אלהי אבי יהיה בעזרו –ושם האחד אליעזר , וכינויו ליזר...ממצרים   Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §19. 
928 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §19. אכן מעלה עשן קא חזינא הכא, וכמו שהוגד לי גם כן איך מ"כ היה כועס 
כ בעצמי"ומתרעם על שלא כתבתי למ . 





Students used correspondence to remain in touch with their rabbis, and Rabbi Isserles’ 
printed responsa contain many such exchanges. Unlike individual responsa that center 
around one or two questions regarding one case followed by a lengthy, complex answer, 
his correspondence with Rabbi Hirsch929 contains a series of several short questions, most 
of which concern distinct investigations into specific halakhic texts, rather than longer 
complex cases drawn from life. For instance, a letter from Rabbi Hirsch contains a series 
of twelve short questions, each of which centers on one specific textual source (a passage 
from the Mordekhai or one point in the Bet Yosef). Rather than dissecting a complex, 
practical halakhic issue, Rabbi Isserles answered all of them in short, successive 
paragraphs, resembling a scholarly text-specific conversation. Rabbi Hirsch was in the 
process of preparing novellae and glosses on the Mordekhai together with his father-in-
law, which is why many of Rabbi Hirsch’s questions discuss this work. The student thus 
was keeping his teacher involved in an ongoing scholarly project of his.930 
                                                     
929 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38, 39-§113 and 95, 105, 131 are all communications between Rabbi 
Isserles and the same student. 
930 From Rabbi Isserles’ correspondence with Rabbi Hirsch Elzaser Shur, a student and the son-in-
law of the great Rabbi Israel Shakhna, we can reconstruct that a single responsum in the printed work (§40) 
was preceded by at least five letters that were part of the same conversation – three from the student and two 
replies from the rabbi. Some of these were printed in the book, while others were not. Rabbi Isserles’ book 
contains several additional exchanges between the two. 
See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §95, ed. Siev, 417n1, which explains that Rabbi Hirsch and his father-in-
law were in the process of writing notes on Mordekhai, which explains all of the questions concerning this 
text. Siev also claims that the volume that purportedly represents Rabbi Isserles’ glosses on Mordekhai were, 
in fact, the product of Rabbi Hirsch and his father-in-law’s project and were thus not written by Rabbi Isserles 
himself. See Asher Siev, “Hagahot ha-Rema al ha-Mordekhai,” (Rabbi Isserles’ glosses on the Mordekhai) 
in Hagut ivrit be-Amerika (Studies on Jewish themes by contemporary American scholars), ed. Menahem 
Zohori, Arie Tartakover, Haim Ormian (Tel Aviv: Yavne: 1972), 426-439. 




Likewise, Rabbi Beer, another former student, asks Rabbi Isserles about some of 
the latter’s glosses on the Shulḥan Arukh. The student’s questions were based not on the 
printed glosses but on manuscripts, perhaps those he had written in his student days under 
Rabbi Isserles, as the rabbi answers with the following reference to his newly printed work: 
“Have you not heard yet, did you not see931 with your own eyes the Shulḥan Arukh on Oraḥ 
ḥayim with my glosses that were printed here?” 932 Subsequently, he assures the student 
that the glosses as they appear in the printed book lack the ambiguities that appeared in the 
student’s manuscript copy. In format and structure, the letter to Rabbi Beer resembles those 
between Rabbi Hirsch and Rabbi Isserles, containing a succession of multiple, short text-
based questions. Responsa of this kind were, in effect, a way for students to continue 
studying with their rabbis even after they no longer lived close to them. Thus, it also ties 
the correspondence to the scholarly archive and the rabbi’s “working notes,” discussed in 
further depth in the following chapter. 
ii. Pedagogical Remarks 
Responsa permitted rabbis and students to carry on their student-teacher relationship in 
other realms, in effect, teaching across a distance. Throughout the epistolary exchange 
between Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Hirsch, many pedagogical remarks are included, such as 
Rabbi Isserles’ evaluations of his student’s questions and educational suggestions. As we 
have seen, students also received advice and guidance regarding the art and skill of 
responsa writing itself. In general, Rabbi Isserles often remarks on the scholarly level and 
                                                     
931 Isaiah 40:28. 
932 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §132. הלא כבר שמעת אם לא ראית בעיניך השלחן ערוך על א”ח אם הגהות שלי הנדפס
ושם אין מקום לקושייתך, בכאן . This volume of the glosses on Shulḥan Arukh, on volume Oraḥ ḥayim (Cracow, 
1571), was the only one printed in Rabbi Isserles’ lifetime. 




the halakhic validity of his student’s questions, sometimes rebuking his student: “...this is 
something simple in my opinion, the explanation is thus, and I am surprised at your sense 
and your good understanding that you did not notice that which is so clear....” 933 On other 
occasions, he complimented him, writing,  “you asked beautifully with this,” 934 or he 
paraphrased the student’s question, stating, “the law is with you, but the question is 
nothing.” 935 In this manner, the correspondence allowed rabbis to continue educating 
students across the republic, preserving connections and educational allegiance. In some 
instances, students used responsa to request halakhic help from their rabbis in legal court 
cases.936 
iii. Moral Guidance 
Sometimes, responsa to students were used for moral exhortations. An example can be 
found in the responsa of Rabbi Luria, in which he rebukes a learned scholar and former 
student of his who left his wife and children, ignoring the many rabbis who commanded 
him to return. Although the letter is couched in the language and rhetoric of halakhic 
responsa – it does, for instance, analyze the different rabbinic opinions on the extent of the 
religious obligation to rebuke one’s fellow and on the permissible amount of time that a 
husband can be absent from his wife –it is patently an emotional plea for his former student 
                                                     
933 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38.2. וזה דבר פשוט בעיני שפירושו הכי, ותיהתי על שכלך וטוב הבנתך שלא שמת לבך
 .על זה שהוא מפורש לנגד עיני
934 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38.4. זהו תורף שאלתך ויפה הקשית בזה אבל על פי האמת נראה לי דלא קשה כלל. 
935 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §39.1. הדין עמך אבל הקושיא אינה כלום. 
936 In one responsum, Rabbi Isserles comes to the aid of a former student who asked the rabbi for 
his endorsement in a case that directly implicated the student, who was making a legal claim to his wife’s 
inheritance. Rabbi Isserles, as he mentions, did not personally see the point of writing anything, as he 
considered it obvious that the student’s claim was legitimate. Nevertheless, he indulges the student, and adds: 
“...since this is so simple to me, I will not lengthen it with proofs, but if it is too little for you, I will add more 
to it” (Isserles, ShUT Rema, §112). כהנה וכהנהואם מעט לך אוסיף , ובהיות הדבר פשוט בעיני לא אאריך בראיות . 




to return home. The index of the first printed edition of the response places the letter under 
“laws of marriage,” but described it as “a letter of rebuke to a learned scholar who traveled 
to a distant place…”937 Clearly, the legal discussion is primarily a way of transmitting the 
emotional and moral sensibilities. Rabbi Luria calls upon the student to “leave your former 
sins and come, for the sake of your wife and sons, and stop living for this mortal life but 
rather the eternal life, ‘for it is your life and the length of your days’938....” Having tried 
flattery, mentioning his great regard for the student’s learning, in an attempt to convince 
him, Rabbi Luria also uses threats, writing that in the student’s attempts to justify his 
immoral behavior, he “already dived into deep waters and brought up nothing but a ḥeres 
(shard)”; 939 “therefore,” Rabbi Luria cautions, “take care that the samakh will not be 
changed into a mem.” The substitution of samakh, the last letter in the word for shard 
(ḥeres), turns it into the word for ḥerem, rabbinic excommunication.940 
iv. Games 
An idiosyncratic exchange and its unique role can elucidate yet another facet of this 
rabbinic scholarly community. The end of a letter from Rabbi Luria to Rabbi Isserles 
contains the following statement: “And please, my lord, show me your honor: a woman 
who claimed land and homes and seats in the synagogue with her marriage contract941 
                                                     
937 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, Index, under “laws of marriage,” :הלכות אישות  
להביא טרף לביתו ושהה יותר מעש׳ שנה כו׳’ כתב מוסר לחכם אחד שהלך למרחקי   
938 Deut 30:20. 
939 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava Kama 91a, an expression that denotes a worthless attempt at 
explaining something. 
940 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §55. לכן הנח מהראשונות ובא בגין אשתך ובגין בניך ואל תצפה עוד לחיי שעה אלא
ם”ך במ”לחיי עולם כי היא חייך ואורך ימיך כי כבר ראית שצללת במים אדירים והעלית חרס ולכן תראה של איחליף סמ ... 
941 Meaning that she used the debt owed to her in the marriage contract after her husband’s death to 
claim these items. 




[followed by a halakhic question…].942 And I adjudicated that they cannot, and my proofs 
are hidden with me until I see your words.” 943 If the only purpose of responsa were the 
exchange of halakhic information, this is a strange way to present the question; first, it is 
introduced in an almost taunting register, “And now, my lord, show me your honor” which 
is an allusion to Moses’ request to understand God.944 Even stranger is the declaration that 
Rabbi Luria is already satisfied with his own answer but nevertheless refuses to reveal it 
before seeing his colleague’s explanation. The halakhic question here constitutes a kind of 
challenge, a riddle or test for a scholar to prove his abilities, and the recipient understands 
it as such. 
Rabbi Isserles considers this question a distinct element of the correspondence, and 
he therefore decides to answer in a separate booklet. In two separate letters, Rabbi Isserles 
refers to this question using the words “you tested/checked me.”945  He also addresses the 
decision to conceal the original answer, calling out Rabbi Luria’s intention to present a 
challenge: “… I thought that it is an advantage and a great thing to display all … And his 
highness announced himself to me with concealment.... And what did his honor wish to 
tell me with this, if not to scare me and frighten me so that I will fear answering … in any 
                                                     
942 Rather than having to give back the lands and seats that she confiscated. 
943 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6. ,ונא אדוני הראני כבודך, אשה שגבתה בכתובה קרקעות ובתים ומקומות בית הכנסת
וראייתי כמוס עמדי עד שאראה דבריך, ואני פסקתי דלא. כ הבנים אם יכולין לסלקה במעות מזומנים”אם העשירו אח . 
944 Exodus 33:18. 
945 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §7, ed. Siev, 38. מה שהשיב לי מר בענין הפסק ובדק לי בענין הכתובה, אחבר קונטרס
ה ואשלחו למר”אי . 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, §9, ed. Siev, 42 (emphasis added). ומה שבדקני מר בשואלו ממני שאחוה לו דעתי בענין  
הנה גופא דעובדא לא ידעתי וגם . ל דמר”עכ...אשה שגבתה, ונא אדוני הראני כבודך: ל דמר”וז, שומא של כתובה אם הדרא אי לא
למשש בה כל הצדדים שאוכל למצוא בדעתי טעמו דמר ולהשיב כפי מיעוט שכלי ולכן אצטרך, השאלה סתומה מאד . 




case, I will speak against rabbis and not be ashamed946....” 947 Thus, the question was posed 
by Rabbi Luria and received by Rabbi Isserles as a kind of test, as the words “checked me,” 
and Rabbi Luria’s decision to hide the correct answer make abundantly clear. Although his 
reasoning was concealed, Rabbi Luria did mention his ultimate conclusion at the outset. 
Rabbi Isserles, perhaps precisely because he was taking this up as a challenge, disagreed 
with the conclusion – reasoning unseen – and set out to prove the exact opposite. Rabbi 
Isserles ends the letter by sending regards to relatives and reassuring Rabbi Luria that he 
will care properly for his brother, who was coming to town. 
The continuation of the exchange bears out the nature of these responsa as 
belonging to a kind of scholarly game. Rabbi Luria’s own answer to the halakhic question 
(the one he had prepared in advance) can be found in his printed responsa, followed by a 
summary of Rabbi Isserles’ attempt at resolving it, interspersed with criticism. Rabbi 
Isserles never asked Rabbi Luria for the correct answer,948 which insulted the latter: “And 
I will respond … the law that I wrote, which is as follows ... and you girded your loins 
bravely to show us miracles and say the opposite against me, and you decided the issue for 
yourself to the extent that you did not even ask me to show you my opinion, rather you 
                                                     
946 Psalms 119:46. “I will speak of thy testimonies against kings and will not be ashamed.” 
947 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §7  ומר בסתום חכמה הודיעני במה ששאלני אדוני, וז”ל: והנה פסקתי דלא וראייתי כמוס
ומכל מקום אדבר נגד רבנים ולא . ומה הודיעני מר בזה אם לא להבהילני ולהפחידני שאירא מלענות על רב. עמדי עד שאשמע דבריך
 .אבוש לומר מה שבדעתי על זה
The challenge is mentioned once again in the printed collection, when Rabbi Isserles starts a 
response with the disclaimer that, although he had intended to send the test as a separate enclosure, the scribe 
ended up copying it as part of the larger letter: “Now I will come to negotiate concerning the writings of my 
lord, and I wanted to compose it in a separate booklet but the scribe tricked me and connected it all together, 
and they became one in his hand.” 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, §8. אך . ומעתה אבא לישא וליתן על הכתב של אדוני והיה בדעתי לחברו בקונטרס בפני עצמו
 .שהסופר מעל בי וחברו יחד והיו לאחדים בידו
948 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §8, which is Rabbi Isserles’ attempt at solving the question, indeed does 
not include a request for Rabbi Luria’s answer. 




treated [your decision] as though it was adjudicated in the court of the Prince.” 949 Having 
voiced his annoyance at not being asked to reveal his own opinion, Rabbi Luria continues 
with an oath before nonetheless presenting his opinion, unprompted: “On God’s life, if not 
for my love for you, I would not reveal to you my opinion as you did not ask for it, but it 
is Torah study, and I will not hold myself back from saying it, and if you accept it, accept 
it.” 950 What follows is a complete dismissal of Rabbi Isserles’ approach to the issue, 
“Know, that all the proofs that you presented, I already knew their proofs as well as the 
rejections of them....”951 Rabbi Isserles also wrote a defense to that takedown,952 which 
Rabbi Luria summarizes, laced with pointed remarks such as, “By the life of God … you 
did not grasp the root of the words … until I awakened you regarding this ... now you have 
grasped the root of the issue, but before you did not....” 953  
A similar phenomenon to the above can be observed in the writings of Rabbi David 
Darshan, a student of Rabbi Isserles who was a popular preacher belonging to the 
                                                     
949 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §50. ואשיב ואומר הדין שכתבתי דלא הדרא שומה גבי כתובת אשה ואזרת כגבור
והחלטת הדבר לעצמך עד שלא בקשתני אפילו להראות דעתי אלא כאילו נפסק בבי דינא של חלציך להראות פלאות לומר היפך נגדי 
 .בי נשיאה
950 Ibid.  חי ה’ לולי אהבתך לא הייתי מגלה דעתי מאחר שלא בקשתני אבל תורה היא ולא אמנע מלאומרה אם תקבל
 .תקבל
951 Ibid. דע שכל הראיות שהבאת כבר ידעתי ראיותיהם ודחיותיהם... 
952 Not all the letters of this exchange are printed in ShUT MaharShaL, and, as we see, the order of 
the correspondence in the book is not chronological. We know that Rabbi Luria first wrote his own answer, 
then asked Rabbi Isserles (without showing his answer), then received the latter’s responsa, then criticized 
it, received a response to this criticism, and finally responded to that defense as well. In Rabbi Luria’s book, 
the responsum with his original opinion also includes his very last response. This should not be a problem if 
we consider, as I argue we should, that the book may be based on Rabbi Luria’s letter book, in which he kept 
records of his correspondence that were not necessarily originals or word-for-word copies of the actual letters. 
He may have taken his original opinion and summarized his final response at the bottom and kept these 
together with the letters from Rabbi Isserles that were part of this exchange. See chapter 6 in this dissertation 
for more. 
953 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §49. חי ה’ לא אדע מה אשיב חורפי דבר כי מרגיש אני שלא ירדת כלל לשורש של
ובטוח אני במעלתך שעכשיו ירדת לשורש של העניין אבל לא מקודם, וכן כתבתי בפסק שלי....בעניין’ עד שעררתי אות’ דברי התו ... 




secondary intelligentsia. His printed collection of sermons, entitled Shir ha-ma’alot le-
David (A song of ascent for David), contains additional material, including a few responsa, 
one of which bears the following description: “With this question, the gaon our master the 
rabbi Yakov Reiner, the head of the yeshiva, tested me in the year 1557 in the holy 
community of (Ferrara), and he is now the head of a yeshiva in the land of Ashkenaz.” 954 
Rabbi David also sent a copy of his attempted response to his rabbi, Rabbi Isserles, perhaps 
to find out whether he had answered well.955 In Rabbi Luria’s collection, we also find two 
responsa that include a few lines of approval from more senior rabbis at the bottom – yet 
another example of authors of responsa showing their writings to colleagues and superiors 
other than the designated recipient, for intellectual feedback or halakhic backing.956 
These responsa aim not only at resolving questions of inheritance and marriage 
contracts but also function as an intellectual game to challenge and intimidate, to forge 
                                                     
954 Shir ha-ma’alot le-David (Cracow, 1571), 8a. בזאת השאלה בחן אותי הגאון מהר”ר יעקב ריינר ריש מתיבתא
לעת עתה בארץ אשכנז’ ק פיררא והוא ריש מתיבת”ק בק”ז לפ”שנת שי . 
955 This letter was included in the printed responsa of Rabbi Isserles without any mention that it was, 
in fact, written by a student, and not authored by Rabbi Isserles himself, leading many to assume that the 
latter wrote it. It was probably found among his correspondence and printed. See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §62, 
ed. Siev, 285. The note by Siev there (*) points out the mistake. 
956 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48-49. As mentioned earlier, Rabbi Isserles himself also showed a 
responsum to Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen of Padua, who was almost fifty years his senior. In addition to 
providing feedback on the style and form of the letter, which we focused on earlier, Rabbi Katzenelbogen 
also evaluated the halakhic reasoning: “I already received an agudah (bundle) of writings with the second 
composition that you wrote to remark upon the decision of the Karo, and you did well, because you found a 
way to contradict all his statements.” See Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §15, §1. Both contain a type of 
approbation at the bottom: 
In §1: ל הגר בלאדמיר ”ר בצלאל ז”נאם יצחק ב: יפה כיון וכתב האלוף הגאון על ככה כמסיני למשה הלכה . This is 
arranged in a typographically separate part of the page in the first edition. 
In §15: ר בצלאל הגר בולאדמר”יפה כתב ויפה דן נאם יצחק ב . The rabbi in question was Rabbi Yitẓḥak ben 
Beẓalel, the rabbi of Ludmir, who was older than Rabbi Luria. He wrote responsa and glosses, which did not 
survive. One responsum from Rabbi Yitẓḥak is printed in ShUT ha-BaḤ ha-ḥadashot §70). In another 
responsum, Rabbi Luria attacks Rabbi Yitẓḥak over the rights to collect the alcohol tax (§35-36), which the 
latter seems to have adjudicated on his own. Rabbi Luria then sends this to Rabbi Yosef Katz, who thinks 
that Rabbi Luria was wrong to condemn Rabbi Yitẓḥak. See She’erit Yosef, ed. Siev, 52n1 (§17) and Meir 
Rafeld, “Ha-MaharShaL ve-yam shel Shlomo” (Rabbi Shlomo Luria and the sea of Shlomo) (Ph.D. diss., Bar 
Ilan University: Ramat Gan, 1991), 48-49. 




connections and to determine intellectual status.957  One-upping and intellectual jousting 
frequently took place between the lines of responsa, but this type of responsum dedicated 
entirely to such a pursuit makes explicit the discursive functions hiding behind those hints 
of competition. Beyond solving pressing halakhic problems and sharing essential 
information, responsa were used as a game to educate younger members, inviting them to 
join the rabbinic community. It was a way of initiating some into the community while 
excluding others and establishing and clarifying the “rules of the game.” In modern 
theories, both languages and discourses are often compared to games (respectively by 
Wittgenstein and Foucault, but also by “speech act” theorists such as J. L. Austin),958 whose 
rules are taught, established, enforced, and clarified through use within a community. The 
                                                     
957 For a medieval precedent of this practice, see Simḥa Goldin, “‘Companies of Disciples’ and 
‘Companies of Colleagues’: Communication in Jewish Intellectual Circles” in Communication in the Jewish 
Diaspora: The Pre-Modern World., ed. Sophia Menache (Brill: Leiden:1996), 134: “...Rabbenu Tam 
perceived that his brother-in-law and colleague was in fact testing his knowledge and cleverness, and so hints 
at this unpleasant situation: ‘I knew that although his questions are deep, he knows the answers, but he asks 
me in order to test my skills with his riddles.’” 
Regarding other kinds of halakhic riddles, see the literature on “katafot” or “kataves,” which were 
games and riddles related to halakha that scholars presented to one another, for instance by using numerical 
values of words or acronyms to refer to halakhic concepts and laws. They were often used for educational 
entertainment on holidays and other festive occasions. An example of this is §86 in the responsa of Rabbi 
Luria. The first usage of this term for such phenomena is in 15th-century Ashkenaz in Leket yosher, which 
relates it to Rabbi Isserlein. In the case of the riddles in this discussion, however, the halakhic case was itself 
the riddle. These katafot, and their appearance in Ashkenazic halakhic scholarly culture in the period under 
discussion, support the suggestion that responsa fit somewhere on the spectrum of pedagogical game-like 
tools, and were perhaps used as such. See David Gulenkin, “Ha-milah katafot be-ivrit ve-kataves be-yiddish: 
mekoroteha, perusheha, mekora” (The word ‘Katafot’ in Hebrew and ‘Kataves’ in Yiddish: its sources, 
meaning, and source), Sinai 106 (1990): 165-183; Heinrich Gugenheimer, “Katafot, katavot, ve-ha-be-
la’azim be Sefer MaharYL” (Katavot, katafot and foreign words in Sefer MaharYL), Sinai 108 (1991): 165-
182. 
958 See, for instance, Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,”§3.4 The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall2016 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/wittgenstein. 
See Foucault’s notion of discourses and “games of truth,” in Gary Gutting, “Michel 
Foucault,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/foucault/>. 
On speech act and language games, see Mitchell Green, “Speech Acts,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/speech-acts/>. 




“games” in responsa do just that for the scholarly rabbinic discourse about halakha; they 
establish and enforce the accepted rules of reasoning. 
v. Language 
The language in responsa is very revealing about the community formed by its participants; 
although written in Hebrew, only those inside the community understood its subtleties. I 
shall present two examples of this stratified literacy: Rabbi Isserles was approximately two 
decades younger than Rabbi Luria, and the age gap was a sensitive issue.959 Rabbi Luria 
refers to his opponent twice in a responsum as a “youth,” (once in a veiled manner and 
once more openly). 960 In 1547, Rabbi Isserles was appointed the official rabbi of Cracow. 
A responsum from Rabbi Luria salutes his colleague in glowing terms: “And the man 
Moshe is very great ... my beloved relative, the leader – young, but the wisest in his 
generation – our master the rabbi Rabbi Moshe.” 961 Praise inflation was normal in 
salutations, and although there must have been standards to which members of the 
community were sensitized, the precise economy of status and praise are not always easily 
understood by outsiders. Rabbi Siev, who edited the responsa in the 1970s, used this 
                                                     
959 Rema’s birth date is around 1530; Rabbi Luria was born in 1510. Rabbi Isserles mentions being 
very young at the time of his appointment, which led Siev and others to confirm that he must have been in 
his twenties. See Asher Siev, Rabbi Moses Isserles (Ramo) (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1972), 12, 
for discussion of his age. 
960 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §49. מהר”ר משה יניק and מה אשיב חורפי - (he who taunts me). This also 
alludes to ימי חורפי  in Job 29:4, where  refers to youth (because winter is the time to begin sowing). For  חרף
the place of this responsum in the larger back-and-forth between the two, see the discussion in the following 
sections. 
961 Isserles, ShUT Rema. והאיש משה גדול מאוד, נערמו מימיו נצבו כמו נאד אהובי שארי האלוף יניק וחכימא דדרא
 .כמהר״ר משה יצ״ו וכל דילך שלום.
Siev writes in a note to this responsum (Isserles, ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 294n2*): 
יחס הכבוד שהראו אחד . כ מתמרמר עליו”פ שאח”מראה לו כבוד גדול אעל היה קשיש מרבינו ופה הוא ”הרש 
 .לשני התגבר על החיכוכים הזמניים שעברו ביניהם




example to praise the extraordinary love and respect between the two rabbis. 962 The 
acrimonious tone of the remainder of the letter, however, 963 lends credence to Elhanan 
Reiner’s more recent assumption964 that such praise was probably meant cynically. 
Unwritten rules regarding proper modes of address were readily accessible at the time to 
members of this community, enabling the recipient to assess the tenor of this salutation, 
although it is more difficult for us to interpret precisely from a temporal and cultural 
distance. 
Historians frequently cite a particularly spiteful exchange between Rabbi Isserles 
and Rabbi Luria (of which only parts have made it into the printed collections) because of 
its allusion to Aristotle.965 At first glance, the contents seem purely halakhic, dealing with 
                                                     
962 For example, in the opening of §7 (in ed. Siev), “Who can say his strengths and glories, it is ... 
my relative our master and rabbi Rabbi Moshe, may the Lord preserve him, and greetings also to the throne 
and the whole camp who camp around his divine presence. May God grant that his throne remain complete 
without any attacks....” 
963 The correspondence continues with an accusation that Rabbi Isserles had purposefully let the 
wrong people read a responsum in which the latter attacked Rabbi Luria’s position, thus making him look 
bad. 
964 Reiner mentioned this in conversation. 
965 This responsum has often been quoted as one of the key texts for the so-called “Kupfer thesis,” 
named for an article by Ephraim Kupfer, “Le-dmuta ha-tarbutit shel yahadut Ashkenaz ve-ḥakhameha ba-
meot ha-14-15,” (Concerning the cultural image of ashkenazic Jewry and its intellectuals in the 14th-15th 
centuries.) Tarbiẓ 42 (1972-1973): 113-147, which contended that there was a long-standing Ashkenazic 
tradition of philosophy and rationalism that found its way to Eastern Europe in the sixteenth century; this 
view countered the earlier thesis that philosophical traditions were imported from the outside, via Italy and 
the sfardic world. For an enlightening discussion of this thesis, see David Ruderman, Jewish Thought and 
Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 54-99. 
Historians have often described this responsum as containing an accusation that Rabbi Isserles’ 
students were saying tfilat aristo (the prayer of Aristotle), but that is not what Rabbi Luria writes. In the 
responsum, he writes that he heard that some of the young men (baḥurim) have this prayer written in their 
prayer books. Rabbi Luria blames Rabbi Isserles because, by quoting Aristotle and others, Rabbi Isserles 
creates the impression of endorsing philosophy and buoying this phenomenon, thus legitimizing it. Rabbi 
Isserles answers in §7 that he never even saw this. Thus, the responsum, at most, proves that there was such 
a tradition in Ashkenaz, but it is not conclusive regarding Rabbi Isserles’ position regarding this tradition. 
Moreover, while this responsum was often cited as proof that Rabbi Isserles was at the center of 
such an ashkenazic tradition of rationalism, all he claims is that those men who copied the prayer of Aristotle 
were following the legacy of their fathers ( מאותן להם מאבותיהם רק כל זה עדיין הוא שורש פורה ראש ולענה ירושה 
 None of this implies that Rabbi Isserles was part of this tradition .(שהמשיכו עצמם אחר הפילוסופים והלכו בדרכיהם
or even saw it in a positive light. Lawrence Kaplan, in an article arguing for an ashkenazic rationalist tradition 




the laws of slaughter. The underlying discussion, however, touches upon mystical and 
philosophical issues. Several letters in this exchange are missing, pointing to the possibility 
that it was never meant for a print audience and was added by the publishers without too 
much thought.966 One of the reasons why this disagreement is so difficult to decipher, apart 
from the gaps created by the missing epistles, is the language used by the rabbis in their 
communication. 
The stratified nature of rabbinic Hebrew in general and the linguistic and 
grammatical flexibility of Hebrew in responsa in particular, as well as the rabbis’ 
propensity for wordplay in letters, meant that the potential for allusions, metaphors, and 
equivocal writing was immense. Rabbi Luria remarks that Rabbi Isserles’ statement was 
problematic and “hard as a stone,” using the word tinra, the halakhic term for a lump in an 
animal’s lungs. The latter responds that the stone is, in fact, filled with water, symbolizing 
Torah. The figure of speech develops throughout the exchange, referencing, in no particular 
                                                     
that continued to Eastern Europe, (Lawrence Kaplan, “Rabbi Mordekhai Jaffe and the Evolution of Jewish 
Culture in Poland in the Sixteenth Century,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Bernard 
Cooperman [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983], 266-282) misleadingly translated and 
paraphrased this responsum from Rabbi Isserles as follows: “…the rationalist current in Polish Jewry was, 
as R. Moses Isserles himself states, ‘a legacy of the fathers,’ i.e., …a continuation of the Ashkenazic 
tradition…” (Kaplan, “Rabbi Mordekhai Jaffe,” 267), thus obscuring the fact that Rabbi Isserles clearly 
excluded himself from this tradition. This erroneous paraphrase then found its way into Ruderman’s Jewish 
Thought and Scientific Discovery, where he uses the quote to illustrate this so-called “Kupfer thesis.” 
Ruderman cites Rabbi Isserles (via Kaplan) as writing that the prayer of Aristotle belongs to “the tradition of 
our fathers” (Ruderman, 56, see note there), thus further strengthening the impression that Rabbi Isserles 
identified himself as part of this tradition. Ruderman concludes, “Despite the obscurity of his [Rabbi Isserles’] 
answer to his rabbinic colleague [Rabbi Luria], and despite the seeming traditionalism of his astronomical 
commentary, the pedagogical and theological novelty of Isserles’ position should not be overlooked” 
(Ruderman, Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery, 76). In the original responsum, Rabbi Isserles is clearly 
distancing and excluding himself from the tradition of “their forefathers.” 
966 For instance, the first printed letter in this exchange, §5, from Rabbi Isserles to Rabbi Luria, 
begins with a quote in which Rabbi Isserles cites Rabbi Luria’s earlier letter. Within this quote, Rabbi Isserles 
is cited in Rabbi Luria’s words, meaning that letter §5 was preceded by at least two earlier letters that were 
part of this altercation but did not make it into the printed collection. 




order, Moses’ hitting the rock and varying interpretations of this episode; the kabalistic 
meanings of water and rocks in the creation of the universe; the laws of slaughter and 
different types of lumps in the carcass; and, finally, the validity of Rabbi Isserles’ initial 
argument. These different levels of meaning are deployed simultaneously, and the frequent 
shifts from one metaphor to another – not to mention a digression asking what is more 
important, the metaphor, or the signified – make it almost impossible to tell which 
conversation is taking place at what point or what, precisely, is being discussed. 
This veiled language not only reflects the stratified nature of rabbinical Hebrew and 
the linguistic conventions of responsa, but also it relates to a point discussed often by 
Daybell, namely, the lack of privacy in these letters. Due to the sensitive nature of some of 
the issues in this exchange – both the esoteric topics that are broached and the personal 
nature of the attacks – they may be using this language to hide part of the discussion. At 
one point, Rabbi Isserles reproaches Rabbi Luria for committing mystical secrets to 
writing.967 The shared language thus represents the rabbinic network’s shared cultural 
standards, social norms, and intellectual universe. At the same time, the use of epistolary 
vocabulary to hide the contents also underscores the hierarchical nature of the rabbinic 
community; although anyone literate in Hebrew was able to read the words in the letter and 
anyone familiar with rabbinic scholarship could understand parts of it, some participants 
in the exchange were nonetheless able to communicate in ways intelligible only to an inner 
circle, even within this elite group. 
                                                     
967 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6 (the responsum is from Rabbi Luria to Isserles, the first citation is the 
former quoting the latter, the second part is Rabbi Luria in his own name). ואם אדע בהן אין מרדכי לכתוב או לרמוז
הראיתנו מוסר במה שכתבתי דברים פנימיים כאלו...מהם דבר ... 




This language was both deployed and created in responsa; it was taught, enforced, 
and developed by means of responsa itself as personal connections were initiated and 
evolved, and as social structures were established and negotiated. Moreover, analyzing the 
characteristics of different readers of responsa through letters that address distinct 
communities shows that the audience for responsa was stratified; there was an inner circle 
of scholars and a wider circle from the community at large; each read responsa in its own 
ways. This leads us to the question: who was the assumed audience for these responsa? 
e. Responsa and Their Audience: 
i. The Open Letter 
 
Often, responsa clearly were not addressed to a specific recipient: In those cases, their 
introductions point to a different purpose than simply solving a halakhic question. Instead, 
the author provides the halakhic justification for a previous controversial action. This type 
of responsum functions as an apologia aimed at those who took issue with the rabbi’s 
halakhic decision. For instance, Rabbi Isserles once performed a marriage ceremony on 
Friday. The families had some qualms, which delayed the ceremony, bringing it 
dangerously close to sundown, the beginning of the Sabbath. Rabbi Isserles proceeded with 
the ceremony because he feared that postponing the wedding would lead the groom’s side 
to change their minds and call off the match, humiliating the bride. Ultimately, the 
ceremony extended into the Sabbath, which evidently upset some people.968 After the 
event, Rabbi Isserles wrote what would become a responsum in his collection (§125), 
opening not with a salutation to a specific recipient, but with the following address: “And 
                                                     
968 These people considered the performance of marriages on Sabbath to be forbidden because the 
act of marriage involves a transferal of property, which resembles a financial transaction. 




I heard behind me the sound of a great noise, that they let a voice go round in the camp969 
saying, ‘Look at Moshe!’970 regarding the deed that was done by me recently, when I 
conducted a marriage … and this is the deed that was done.” 971 What follows is an almost 
literary description of the case: 
There once was a man.... And it was in the days that a match was sought ... the 
father went to the world to come ... and the daughter remained, bereft and lonely.... And it 
was when the days of … her marriage came to pass ... she saw no sign of the dowry … 
except for a voice telling her to immerse and prepare herself for her wedding…. And this 
maiden did as she was commanded by her female neighbors.… They also covered her on 
Friday with a veil as is the way of the maidens.... And as the evening shadows lengthened 
and the day was almost over ... the relatives closed their fists.... Also the groom … his heart 
did not heed anything that the town leaders were speaking to him, telling him not to 
humiliate a daughter of Israel because of abhorrent money.... And as a result, time was 
passing by.... And the works of Satan succeeded until the time finally arrived … and the 
groom agreed to come to the marriage canopy, and so as not to humiliate an upright 
daughter of Israel, I stood up and officiated the marriage at the aforementioned time.”972 
 
The narrative of this case is not merely technical; it injects a sense of drama by 
describing the events as they unfolded rather than simply summarizing the final situation. 
The narration of the chain of events, first portraying the poor father arranging the match, 
then his death, and every subsequent occurrence, constantly noting how the time was 
passing and “the evening shadows lengthened” was not necessary, but it does draw in the 
                                                     
969 Exodus 36:7. 
970 Exodus 33:8. 
971 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §125. ,ואשמע אחרי קול רעש גדול אשר העבירו קול במחנה לומר הביטו אחרי משה
והמעשה , והיה בעישון לילה בליל שבת כשעה ומחצה בלילה...כדרך הארץשסדרתי קידושין תחת החופה , י מקרוב”במעשה הנעשה ע
וזה המעשה אשר נעשה, לכל באי שער עירנו, והסבה אשר הכריחוני לזה הוא מבואר נגלה . 
972 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §125. איש היה בארץ ותם הכסף ממנו...ויהי בימי שידוכיה...הלך האב לעולמו ...ונשארה 
והיה כאשר באה בימים זמן נישואיה ...וגלמודה אין לה אב ואם כי אם קרובים נעשו לה רחוקים והעלימו עיניהם ממנההבת שכולה 
זולתי קול אחד הבא לה שתטבול ותכין עצמה לחתונה כי , לא ראתה שום תמונת הנדוניא ושאר צרכים...אשר היה ראוי לטבוח טבח
. בהינומא כדרך הבתולות’ צוו עליה נשים השכינות ושמעה לקולם גם כיסו אותה ביום ול עשתה כאשר ”והבתולה הנ. יהיה לה הנדוניא
גם החתן נסוג אחור ולא רצה . והיה נחסר מן הנדוניא כמעט שליש הנדוניא...קמצו ידיהם ...וכאשר נטו צללי ערב וכמעט קדש היום
ולא אבה . שלא לבייש בת ישראל מכח כסף נמאס, בשום אופן לכנסה ולא שת לבו לכל הדברים אשר דברו אליו מנהיגי העיר
, ל שהשוו עצמן ונתרצה החתן ליכנס לחופה”והצליח מעשה שטן עד שהגיע הזמן הנ...י זה נמשך הזמן מכח קטטות ומריבות”וע...שמוע
ל”ושלא לבייש בת ישראל הגונה קמתי וסדרתי הקידושין בזמן הנ  




reader. Similarly, the many details, such as the description of the bride’s hesitance and the 
neighbors’ convincing her to immerse in the ritual bath and covering her with a veil, serve 
to introduce emotional elements, rendering the bride completely innocent and her 
impending potential humiliation even greater. 
The language, too, is more lyrical and dramatic than usual, including countless 
details and powerful biblical allusions, even when superfluous. Compare the above 
description to Rabbi Isserles’ own, much drier reference to this case, in his gloss on 
Shulḥan Arukh’s statement that one does not perform weddings on the Sabbath: “...and 
there are those who permit … because human dignity is important, and so it is the habit 
that sometimes when one could not agree about the dowry on Friday until nightfall, that 
one performs the ḥuppa and marriage on the night of Sabbath, as everything was already 
prepared for the festive meal and the wedding, and it is a humiliation for the bride and 
groom….”973 Some of the facts, such as the bride’s potential embarrassment, clearly do 
have some halakhic relevance, but the choice of words and the tenor of the entire 
description in the responsum is not halakhic; it is emotional. 
The description in the responsum concludes with an explanation of why he wrote 
this down: “And here, since one is complaining about me, I came to remove their 
accusation from myself, to bring proof and my reason and justification that were with me, 
and what it was that I relied on....” Everybody was probably talking about this case 
independently of the halakhic question, as implied by the remark that the case was “known 
                                                     
973 Isserles, Mapah on Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ ḥayim, §339:4. ולא מקדשין, הגה: ויש מתירין לקדש...מ״מ
סומכין על זה בשעת הדחק כי גדול כבוד הבריות כמו שרגילין שלפעמים שלא היו יכולים להשוות עם הנדוניא יום ו׳ עד הלילה דעושין 
...א יכנוס אזהחופה והקידושין בליל שבת הואיל וכבר הוכנו לסעודה ולנשואין והוי ביוש לכלה ולחתן אם ל  




and revealed to all those who enter the gates of our town.”974 The public preparations for 
the wedding and the turmoil caused by the delay was probably enough to attract everyone’s 
attention, and Rabbi Isserles’ decision caused some controversy. The responsum explains 
that “everywhere, and especially in our town which is populous, thank God, there 
sometimes are five or six weddings on the same day and they extend into the night and 
nobody says a word....”975 It was apparently an all too common occurrence that weddings 
were held on Friday and started so late that they ended up extending into Sabbath. While 
most such cases were overlooked, this case attracted attention because of the surrounding 
drama, and, perhaps, because of Rabbi Isserles’ prominent standing, which may have led 
some detractors to fear that his involvement would be understood as a message that 
weddings on the Sabbath now had a rabbinic seal of approval. 
Following his stirring account, Rabbi Isserles provides a long halakhic explanation 
of his considerations. The halakhic argument is book-ended with yet another general 
statement addressed to no one in particular: 
And with this I conclude … that of course, one should be swift before Sabbath not 
to arrive at this situation. But, if everything possible was said and done, and the time has 
slipped away until dark has fallen, and there is a fear that the match will break up or the 
virgin will be humiliated, etcetera, he who relies to be lenient does not transgress (lit. “lose 
out”), and he can enjoy the joy of Sabbath peacefully thereafter. And the mitzvah can atone 
for him if his intentions are for the sake of heaven and Peace. Thus writes Moshe, son of 
my lord and father Rabbi Israel of righteous and blessed memory, also known as Moshe 
Isserles of Cracow.976 
 
                                                     
974 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §125. והמעשה והסבה אשר הכריחוני לזה הוא מבואר נגלה, לכל באי שער עירנו, וזה 
 .המעשה אשר נעשה
975 Ibid. ומה לי להאריך פוק חזי מה עמא דבר בכל מקום, ובפרט בעירנו אשר יש בה קיבוץ עם ת”ל ולפעמים עושים 
ונמשכים עד הלילה ואין פוצה פה ומצפצףחופות ביום אחד ’ או ו’ ה ... 
976 Ibid.  




Such a responsum serves multiple purposes: a defense of Rabbi Isserles’ decision 
from a halakhic perspective directed at his scholarly detractors, a more emotional defense 
of his actions to less halakhically proficient readers, and a way of emphasizing to both 
audiences that he made this decision because of the urgency of the situation, although he 
in no way endorses such actions in general. This would educate the public about the 
prohibition while also appeasing his accusers by trying to attenuate the strong message that 
his actions sent. There is no evidence of the steps taken to distribute this open letter, leaving 
us to wonder whether he posted it in a public place, whether it was read aloud, or copied 
and sent to specific key figures. Possibly, he simply trusted that, once written, it would 
reach the desired audiences in the usual ways. He expected that the usual scholarly readers 
of responsa would judge him on this matter from a halakhic perspective; he hoped the 
popular audience would react to the dramatic narrative features. 
Books of responsa provide multiple examples of this kind of discussion and 
justification before an anonymous tribunal. 977 The duality of the writing styles in this letter 
introduces an additional broader audience. The denser, scholarly halakhic argument is 
                                                     
977 Rabbi Yehuda Minẓ introduces a responsum by writing that a friend “... ordered me in defense 
of my own honor not to provide any of the wagging tongues with reasons to protest what I ruled regarding....” 
See Minẓ, ShUT MaharY Minẓ, §3. 
Rabbi Yoel Sirkis, a student of Rabbi Isserles, has a responsum that is also an open letter regarding 
a ruling he made about a divorce document. He introduces it as a defense before a tribunal and a threat to his 
detractors. See Rabbi Yoel Sirkis, Tshuvot ha-baḥ (Frankfurt am Main, 1697), §95: 
“And now I have come to suggest my reason and justification before the great heads of the yeshivot 
of Israel in this kingdom, they will see and understand and admit to the truth, as lovers of truth are wont to 
do.... Here, I have brought in a book my reason and justification ... and anyone who comes to complain and 
be arrogant and dispute me, I am not worried about my honor at all, but he should be concerned about himself 
because one day he will have to justify answering for not knowing and thinking that he knows!” 
Rabbi Yair Bacharach (ShUT Ḥavot Ya’ir, §105) explains that, at a meal with friends, he declined 
to eat gravy after a flea had jumped inside because insects are not kosher, something that caused the others 
to ridicule him. After he returned to his home, he sat down to write a halakhic justification of why his decision 
made sense. 




addressed to the rabbinic audience. The letter was written, however, to elucidate and 
educate a secondary audience who may not have read the technical portion of the letter but 
was still concerned about the goings on he or she had witnessed or heard about. For this 
audience, he used a combination of emotional writing and a very clear, simple, and 
practical conclusion. This kind of responsum, a combination of public letter and apologia, 
thus teaches us not only about the multiplicity of the functions of responsa but also about 
the mixed nature of its audience. 
ii. the Forum 
Even beyond such open letters, the audience of responsa is still more complex than it 
seems. As we have seen, some letters that included responsa alongside other enclosures 
related to a specific case were purposefully created as open letters. But even those letters 
that were ostensibly addressed to a single recipient had larger implied audiences. In one 
responsum, Rabbi Luria accuses Rabbi Isserles:978 “I have received your writing from Ploni 
Almoni (anonymous) smudged and open, as though it were already ancient, so that your 
desire has been fulfilled, namely that all the eyes of the readers have plowed and navigated 
through it so that they knew that I have humiliated myself in the eyes of a king like you.”979 
He then quotes all the praise that Rabbi Isserles heaped upon him, calling it, “a fatty tail [a 
                                                     
978 He opens with the usual praise. See Isserles, ShUT Rema, §67: והאיש משה גדול מאוד, נערמו מימיו
ו וכל דילך שלום”ר משה יצ”האלוף יניק וחכימא דדרא כמהר אהובי שארי כמו נאדנצבו  . 
979 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §67. קבלתי כתבך ע”י פלוני אלמוני מטושטש ופתוח כאלו ישן נושן, עד שיצא תאותך אל
 הפועל שחרשו ושוטטו בו כל עיני הקוראים עד שידעו שנתביישתי בעיני המלך כמותך




delicacy] with a thorn inside,”980 meaning that the praise was worthless in the face of Rabbi 
Isserles’ betrayal.  
The nature of the accusation itself reveals the assumption that letters were more 
often than not read by others. Instead of blaming Rabbi Isserles for not guarding the letter 
more carefully, Rabbi Luria accuses him of exaggerating, knowing full well that the 
audience for the letter would extend beyond the addressee; he may even secretly have 
counted on this fact. In keeping with these expectations, Rabbi Luria fights the negative 
impression by the same means: “Therefore, I have made public in writing, to have it copied 
by one person and then sent by another (and not your brother-in-law), so that the matter 
should be made public, just as this issue did here even before your letter reached me, and 
the whole city was full of tumult981…”982 The communications in responsa do indeed exude 
a sense of the theatrical, of taking place on a certain platform for a larger audience, a forum 
composed of fellow scholars, peers, and students.983 This forum, the imagined aggregate 
of the potential audience of responsa, was the rabbinic Republic of Letters. 
Most importantly, early modern correspondence was not necessarily private in our 
sense of the word. In her discussion on humanist letter writing, Judith Henderson shows 
how the very notions of private and public meant very different things in ancient times, in 
                                                     
980 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §67. The expression comes from the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate ROSh 
Hashana 17a: “R Aḥa, son of R Ḥanina, said, ‘we have here a fat tail with a thorn in it.’” ל”וז, תחילת מכתבך :
כל אותן הדברים הם כאליה וקוץ בה’. וכו...עוקר הרים  . 
981 Isaiah 22:2. 
982 Isserles, ShUT Rema §67, ed. Siev, 297. ע״כ גליתי בכתב להעתיק ע״י אחד ושלחתי ע״י אחר שלא ע״י גיסך
כמו שנתפרסם פה טרם בא כתבך לידי ונעשה העיר הומיה, כדי שיתפרסם הדבר  
983 On the connection between the public sphere and “theater,” and how this relates to the oral and 
to argumentative transparent discourse, see, for instance, Marcel Hénaff and Tracy B. Strong, “Introduction: 
Vision, Speech, Theatricality,” in Public Space and Democracy, ed. Marcel Hénaff and Tracy B. Strong 
(Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 2001), 5-6. 




the Renaissance, and in modern times. This affects the private or public nature of the letter. 
Moreover, different epistolary traditions expect different audiences, be it the more 
conversational classical ars familiaris revived in the Renaissance or the more formal, 
public rhetoric-driven medieval ars dictaminis. The medieval letter was “almost never 
private, but usually semipublic in nature,” 984 a function that persisted in some forms of 
humanist letter writing alongside the ars familiaris, which was directed at close friends. 
There is, additionally, a gap between any officially proclaimed theories and assumptions 
about privacy in letter writing and the actual status of letters in practice. In Henderson’s 
words, “The humanist might write as if he were engaged in a private conversation, but that 
conversation was often intentionally, or at least potentially, a public discussion....” 985 
Erasmus stated that his letters were intended for individuals, as opposed to his 
books, which were for general consumption. Henderson points out, however, “This 
distinction between the letter ... and the book is disingenuous, of course, for like other 
humanists, Erasmus composed or at least revised letters with a second … audience in 
mind.” 986 Humanist letter collections, Henderson explains, are “the equivalent of our 
literary review or scholarly journal, as a forum for professional discussion and career 
building.”987 Lisa Jardine’s seminal work Erasmus, Man of Letters, has shown the central 
                                                     
984 William D. Patt, as quoted on page 26n31 of Judith Rice Henderson, “Humanist Letter Writing: 
Private Conversation or Public Forum?” in Self-Presentation and Social Identification: The Rhetoric and 
Pragmatics of Letter Writing in Early Modern Times, Supplementa Humanistica Lovaniensia (18), ed. Toon 
van Houdt, Jan Papy, Gilbert Tournoy, and Constant Matheeussen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 
17-39. 
985 Henderson, “Humanist Letter Writing,” 17-18. 
986 Henderson, “Humanist Letter Writing,” 33 (Quote from standard edition of Erasmus’ Opera 
omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, translation and quote from Henderson, 33n67). 
987 Henderson, “Humanist Letter Writing,” 25. 




role that such letters played in Erasmus’ self-fashioning. 988 In an article about the letters 
of the humanist Joseph Scaliger (1540-1609), Dirk Van Miert points out: “In the practice 
of Renaissance epistolography, recipients customarily showed letters to their peers, who 
sometimes copied them out or excerpted them.”989 
Even as notions of confidentiality and ideas of privacy as we know it were taking 
shape with the rise of Protestantism, letters were considered as belonging to a private 
sphere that was not strictly private. Van Miert points out: “...even if letters were read by 
people surrounding the recipient, as they usually were,” this would still be “regarded as 
falling within the boundaries of the confidentiality of mail, even if he [the author of the 
letter] never specified how to define the circle of those authorized readers.” 990 In other 
words, even when humanists did expect letters to be private, this did not exclude showing 
them to a certain circle, and they were aware that their correspondence would sooner or 
later reach audiences other than the addressee. “Scaliger knew that his letter would be read 
by more than one person, and he seems not to have objected to this, as long as the 
distribution was kept to a minimum.” 991 This applies also to rabbinic responsa, and the 
participants in this epistolary culture did not expect otherwise. 
The notion of an early modern sphere that was private in some ways, but not private 
precisely in our sense of the word facilitates our understanding of the audience of early 
                                                     
988 Lisa Jardine, Erasmus, Man of Letters. Jay Berkovitz’s study of the responsa of Rabbi Yair 
Ḥayim Bacharach as an act of self-fashioning is an important reading in this vein for seventeenth-century 
responsa. See Jay R. Berkovitz, “The Persona of a Poseq: Law and Self-Fashioning in Seventeenth-Century 
Ashkenaz,” Modern Judaism: A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience 32, no. 2 (2012): 251-269. 
989 Dirk Van Miert, “Confidentiality and Publicity in Early Modern Epistolography: Scaliger and 
Casaubon,” in For the Sake of Learning, 1: 3-20, particularly pages 4-5. 
990 Van Miert, “Confidentiality and Publicity,” 18-19. 
991 Van Miert, “Confidentiality and Publicity,” 18-19.  




modern rabbinic responsa. In order to envision the readership of responsa, it is helpful to 
avoid a public/private binary approach and, instead, consider such intermediary notions 
such as the “semiprivate sphere” suggested by Van Miert or the notion of “coterie” 
publication introduced by Love. These allow for notions of a discussion that is public and 
meant for a larger audience than the recipient alone, on the one hand, but, on the other, is 
limited to a very close-knit exclusive community. According to Van Miert, showing a letter 
to people “surrounding the recipient” was an acceptable form of sharing such 
correspondence. Printing correspondence was considered crossing the boundary from 
private into public.992 This intermediate form of publication, to a forum both carefully 
selective yet decidedly public, can help us comprehend the connection between the 
responsa correspondence and the community that it created. 
This semi-private audience was, in fact, a constitutive aspect of responsa. Responsa 
are performative in that they convey a sense of the theatrical, of taking place on a certain 
platform for a larger audience, a forum composed of fellow scholars, peers, and students. 
This audience is a crucial factor in responsa communications and the establishment of its 
discourse. Discourses are determined not only by their active participants, but also include 
the entire implied audience, including “passive” observers, because their horizons of 
understanding affect the formation of the discourse, as the “feedback” circuit in 
communication studies clarifies.993 The notion of a “forum” encompasses the public, 
                                                     
992 Van Miert, “Confidentiality and Publicity,” 4-5. 
993 The meanings and messages in the discursive “production” are organized through the operation 
of codes within the rules of “language.” Thus, each stage will affect the message (or “product”) being 
conveyed as a result of its “discursive form.” See, for instance, Theodor Clevenger, Jr. and Jack Matthews, 
“Feedback,” in Communication Theory (2nd ed.), ed. C. David Mortensen (London and New York: Routledge, 
2017), 41: “…the term feedback refers not to any catalog of listener behavior, but to a relationship between 




theatrical element while also emphasizing limited accessibility; the responsa were 
simultaneously public and private, accessible yet elite. 
If we combine the elements contributing to the building of a sociability – the 
discursive aspects of education, the use of an internal language, intellectual games 
establishing circles of insiders, and the semi-public nature of the responsa, we can conclude 
that the community that responsa created was a discursive forum. It created, negotiated, 
and enforced the accepted scholarly discourse, which took place in an open, but elite forum. 
The creation of this community with its concomitant discourse is the most important 
meaning of the Rabbinic Republic of Letters, as comparisons to the humanist republic and 
theories of common law will show in the next section. 
 
4. CONCLUSION:  
RESPONSA AND THE RABBINIC REPUBLIC OF LETTERS  
a. Comparative Questions 
 
An exploration of intellectual correspondence among rabbis – an erudite scholarly 
community living at the same time and in the same geographic sphere as the members of 
the humanist Republic of Letters, and displaying similar practices and material conditions 
– can yield comparative insights on the role of material circumstances, social structures, 
knowledge practices, and power in early modern Europe. It can shed light on the 
specificities of humanism and its particular cultural context, on the one hand, and rabbinic 
scholarship, on the other. Burke lists seven criteria for testing the extent to which the 
                                                     
the behavior of the speaker, the response of the listener, and the effect of that response on the further feedback 
of the speaker.” 




republic of letters, which definitely existed in the consciousness of its members, as Bots 
and Waquet have shown,994 “was translated into practice.” They are: invitations to foreign 
scholars, the internationalization of libraries, visits to famous scholars as part of the 
practice of travel, the album amicorum, the learned society, the learned journal, and 
correspondence.995 
Some phenomena do not have a parallel in the Jewish world for this period. For 
instance, the Jewish scholarly periodical was non-existent until the eighteenth century and 
limited even then.996 It is significant to note, however, that the first such periodicals were 
outgrowths of responsa – Pri eẓ ḥayim (1721-1761), periodically published rabbinical 
responsa, which presented the novellae of the scholars of Eẓ ḥayim, the sfardi bet midrash 
in Amsterdam; one historian described it as “another sign of an emerging republic of 
letters.”997 Another early attempt at publishing a rabbinic periodical was made by Rabbi 
Yiẓḥak Lampronti (1679-1756) in Ferrara, and, likewise, contained responsa.998 Other 
entities, such as libraries,999 display somewhat similar practices to the non-Jewish world 
                                                     
 994 Bots and Waquet, La République, chapter 1. 
 995 Peter Burke, “Erasmus and the Republic of Letters,” European Review 7, no. 1 (1999): 5. 
 996 The first Jewish newspaper, the Gazeta de Amsterdam, dates from the 1670s. It was aimed at 
sfardi merchants and focused on trade. See Bar-Levav, “Amsterdam and the Inception,” 225-238. One scholar 
uses a term by Daniel Gutwein to point out that Pri eẓ ḥayim shows the adoption of a modern pattern for 
traditional communication. See Kerstin von der Krone, “The Representation and Creation of Spaces through 
Print Media,” in Space and Spatiality in Modern German-Jewish History, ed. Simone Lässig and Miriam 
Rürup (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 127. 
997 Bar-Levav, “Amsterdam and the Inception,” 235. 
998 This publication, titled Reshit bikurei kaẓir Talmud Torah de kehilat-kodesh Ferrara (“The first 
of the first fruit of the harvest of the Talmud Torah of the holy community of Ferrara”) failed after three 
issues. See David B. Ruderman, “Contemporary Science and Jewish Law in the Eyes of Isaac Lampronti of 
Ferrara and some of his Contemporaries,” Jewish History 6 (no. 1-2), 1992: 211-224.  
999 Although some historians considered the bet midrash to be a kind of public library for scholars, 
there is little evidence of any real libraries among sixteenth-century rabbinical scholars that could be 
compared to those used by humanists. See Roberto Bonfil, “La lecture dans les communautés juives de 
l’Europe occidentale au Moyen Âge,” in Histoire de la lecture dans le monde occidental, eds. Guglielmo 




that we can investigate.1000 One could draw some comparisons between international 
learned academies and yeshivot, where students often crossed borders to study with 
different rabbis. Traveling scholars and invitations of scholars to academic posts abroad1001 
are another comparable criterion.  As many have pointed out, the degree of geographical 
mobility at many different levels of Jewish life increased greatly in the early modern 
                                                     
Cavallo and Roger Chartier (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001, 2nd ed.) 182-221; and Simcha Assaf, “Sifriyot 
batei-midrash,” Yad la-koreh 1 (1947): 170-172; most of his examples, however, are from a later time period. 
In the 17th century in Europe, see also L. Fuks, “Jewish Libraries in Amsterdam in 1640,” in Aspects 
of Jewish Life in the Netherlands: A Selection from the Writings of Leo Fuks, ed. Renate G. Fuks-Mansfeld 
(Assen, NL: Van Gorcum, 1995), 38-57. 
Yosef Hacker presents proof for semi-public libraries called “midrash”[sing.] among early modern 
sfardic communities. Testimony points to one such institution in Salonika, and Azariah de Rossi mentions 
having found the books that he was looking for in a “midrash” in Ferrara, but there is little knowledge of 
such a phenomenon being widespread or common. See Yosef Hacker, “Ha-medrash ha-sfaradi – sifriya 
ẓiburit yehudit,” (The sfardic midrash – a Jewish public library.) in Rishonim ve-aḥaronim: meḥkarim be-
toldot Yisrael mugashim le-Avraham Grossman (Earlier and latter ones: studies in Jewish history presented 
to Avraham Grossman), ed. Yosef Hacker, Yosef Kaplan, B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 
2009), 263-293. The reference to Azariah de Rossi is on page 275n50. 
 1000 In the ashkenazic world in Eastern Europe, there is evidence, if not of an actual library, then at 
least of a plan to build one. Rabbi David Darshan describes his plan to, “build a midrash … And I will place 
within it ... four hundred select books and more, and they will all be handsome ... and I collected them from 
the four corners of the earth and have spent on them several hundreds of golden coins ... and these books will 
be ready and waiting for anyone who wishes to understand and know God.” See David Darshan, Shir ha-
ma’alot le-David, Introduction, 2a: ואני . ה”י ישראל באיזה מקום שיזמין לי הקבאשר נתן בלבי להעמיד מדרש לכבוד אלק
אשר טרחתי בעבורן ...והן הן כולן בעלי יפת תואר. אכניס לתוכו ליקר הוד תפארת השמים והארץ ארבע מאות ספרים נבחרים ויותר
כמה מאות  פינות העולם והוצאתי עליהם’ וקבצתי אתן מד, ה שנה”עד עתה כ...ט שנה כידוע להגאון”מזמן בחרותי שהייתי בן י
 See Avriel Bar-Levav, “Ma efshar la’asot be-400 sfarim? Haẓa’a le-sifriya Yehudit, Cracow shnat .זהובים
1571” (“What Can One Do with 400 Books? A Proposal for a Jewish Library, Cracow 1571”), Zmanim 112 
(2010): 42-49. He proposes to be in residence at the library to aid scholars with their inquiries and even to 
write to rabbis with questions that he cannot answer. David Darshan, Shir ha-ma’alot le-David, Introduction, 
2b: ומה שיקשה מהשואל ועצמי אני אטריח לשאול מן הגדולים. Siev believes that a question sent from Rabbi David in 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, §81, is, in fact, such an inquiry. The question ends, “So I beg of you, your small student 
David Darshan with agreement of the friends.” כה מעתיר תלמידך הקטן דוד דרשן בהסכמת החברים. See Isserles, 
ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 334n6. 
 1000 Elḥanan Reiner, “Darshan noded madpis et sfarav: perek alum be-toldot ha-tarbut ha-ivrit be-
Europah ba-meah ha-17,” (A wandering preacher prints his books: A hidden chapter in the Jewish cultural 
history of 17th-century Europe) in Ḥut shel ḥen: Shai le-Ḥava Turniansky, (A strand of favor: A gift to Ḥava 
Turniansky) ed. Israel Bartal et. al (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2015), 123-157. See also David 
Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 23-
41. For correspondence between Rabbi David and Rabbi Isserles, see Isserles, ShUT Rema, §62. 
 1001 Burke, “Erasmus,” 10. 




period. 1002 David Ruderman notes the widespread phenomenon of itinerant scholars, 
rabbis, preachers, and other intellectual figures in the early modern period and designates 
mobility as one of the main characteristics of Early Modern Jewry.1003 Other criteria could 
be formulated that are unique to the Rabbinic Republic, such as, perhaps, the intense 
binding of the scholarly community by means of marriage and family ties. Whether this 
republic existed to a lesser or a greater extent, its participants most definitely conceived of 
                                                     
 1002 Sophia Menache points to itinerant scholars as one of the main factors contributing to high levels 
of communication across Jewish communities as early as the Middle Ages, explaining that they acted as 
“communication channels.” “The centrality of the halakhah in communication developments is further 
reflected through wandering scholars and students who became itinerant either to enhance their erudition or 
to assure their sustenance.... Whether as visitors or in their capacity as preachers, such itinerant scholars acted 
as communication channels among the different communities they visited. Itinerancy, moreover, went far 
beyond irregular transmission of information: it stood at the core of medieval study in general and Jewish 
learning in particular.” (Emphasis in original.) Menache, “Communication,” 34. 
 Yosef Hacker, Yosef Kaplan, and Evelyne Oliel-Grausz have shown this for the sfardic diaspora in 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. See Evelyne Oliel-Grausz, “La Circulation du Personnel Rabbinique dans 
les Communautés de la Diaspora Sépharade au XVIIIe siècle,” in Transmission et passages en monde juif, 
ed. Esther Benbassa (Paris: Publisud, 1997), 313-34l; Yosef Hacker, “Spanish émigrés in the Ottoman 
Empire in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries,” [Hebrew transliteration] in Ha-pezurah ha-yehudit ha-
sfaradit aḥarei ha-gerush, ed. Michel Abitbul et. al (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1993), 27-72; Yosef 
Kaplan, “The Travels of Portuguese Jews from Amsterdam to the ‘Lands of Idolatry’ (1644-1724),” in Jews 
and Conversos: Studies in Society and the Inquisition; Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of Jewish 
Studies Held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, August 16-21, 1981, ed. Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem: 
Magnes Press, 1985), 197-224. 
The travels of Ashkenazi Jews from the German Lands to Eastern Europe and back again are 
described in Mordekhai Breuer, German-Jewish History in Modern Times, Volume 1: Tradition and 
Enlightenment 1600-1780, ed. Michael A. Meyer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and in Eric 
Zimmer, Gakhalatan shel Ḥakhamim: prakim be-toldot ha-rabanut be-germania ba-meah ha16-17. (The 
Fiery Embers of the Scholars: The Trials and Tribulations of German Rabbis in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries) (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 1999), 12-13. On the rivalry between German 
Ashkenazic rabbis and Polish Ashkenazic rabbis, see also Eric Zimmer, “rabanei Germania ba-meah ha16 
ve-zikatam le-rabanim be-tfuẓot aḥerot” (“The 16th Century Rabbis of Germany and their Attitudes towards 
Contemporaries beyond their Borders”), Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies (1985): 129. 
Moshe Idel has shown this for the spread of mystical ideas from Safed to Italy. On the role of 
traveling scholars in the transmission of new ideas in kabalah from Safed to Italy, see Moshe Idel, “On 
Mobility, Individuals and Groups: Prolegomenon for a Sociological Approach to Sixteenth-Century 
Kabbalah,” Kabbalah 3 (1998): 145-73, and Moshe Idel, “Italy in Safed, Safed in Italy: A Chapter in the 
Interactive History of Sixteenth-Century Kabbalah,” in Cultural Intermediaries: Jewish Intellectuals in Early 
Modern Italy, ed. David Ruderman and Giuseppe Veltri (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 239-269. For the case of Ashkenaz, see Elḥanan Reiner, Darshan noded madpis et sfarav, 123-157. 
 1003 David Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 23-24. 




it as a real community. 
Some actual overlap between the two republics occurred, especially among those 
humanists who were interested in Hebrew as part of their scholarly activity. Some excellent 
examples of learned Hebrew letters were, in fact, written by Christian members of the 
humanist Republic, such as Johannes Reuchlin, Christian Wagenseil, or Isaac Casaubon. 
In the case of the latter, Casaubon expressed great hopes that the conversion of Julius 
Conradus Otto (formerly Naftali Margaliot from Vienna), with whom he corresponded, 
and whose letters he found “delightful,” would benefit the entire Republic of Letters.1004 
When these overlaps occur, and scholars cross boundaries from one Republic of Letters to 
another, this “could enable the transmission of knowledge between cultures, but it could 
also reveal the fault lines between them,” as Theodor Dunkelgrün notes.1005 The 
comparison of humanist Hebrew letters to rabbinic correspondence can be a stimulating 
study of cross-cultural adoption, “transposing a humanist literary genre into Hebrew,” in 
Dunkelgrün’s words.1006 
Comparing the two Republics can, in addition, point to the elements shared by both 
early modern erudite communities – the Christian humanist and the rabbinic – thus 
emphasizing the independent significance of religiously and ideologically neutral scholarly 
cultural practices and circumstances. Bots and Waquet have solidly contextualized the 
                                                     
1004 Anthony Grafton and Joanna Weinberg, I have always loved the Holy Tongue: Isaac Casaubon, 
The Jews, and a Forgotten Chapter in Renaissance Scholarship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011), 244. For more on Casaubon’s Hebrew correspondence with Otto, see 231-293 and 304; on Scalinger, 
see 87. 
1005 Theodor Dunkelgrün, “The Humanist Discovery of Hebrew Epistolography,” in Jewish Books 
and Their Readers: Aspects of the Intellectual Life of Christians and Jews in Early Modern Europe, ed. Scott 
Mandelbrote and Joanna Weinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 257. 
1006 Dunkelgrün, “The Humanist Discovery,” 217. 




members’ conscious definitions of the humanist Republic of Letters in their time and place, 
explaining that, in its Golden Age (1550-1750), participants defined the humanist republic 
in terms of their scholarly, religious, and political surroundings, sometimes echoing their 
environs, while at other times juxtaposing their own republic as a kind of utopian mirror 
image.1007 Given this contextual definition, it is useful to provide the Rabbinic Republic as 
a counter-example; an intellectual community in so many ways similar, but lacking such 
conscious references to itself. Many of the similarities, in fact, reside at the level of erudite 
practices, technologies, and methods, such as letter writing, travel, and internal social 
codes, and it may, perhaps, be helpful to balance the more politicized and historically 
reactive view with these more neutral elements as a significant part of what defined the 
Republic of Letters. Some correspondence in scholarly communities developed as they did 
simply because letter writing was an accepted practice, a central part of pedagogy and one 
of the main ways in which mastery of a language was acquired, practiced, tested and 
displayed to peers. 
Comparing the enormous growth of communication in Christian Europe in the 
Golden Age of the humanist Republic of Letters to the more continuous development in 
the Rabbinic Republic before and after the early modern period offers ground for fruitful 
                                                     
1007 Humanists defined their community as a body, similarly to ideas of the state in this period; they 
highlighted its nature as a unified state, as opposed to a fragmented Europe, and portrayed it as universal 
rather than the divided “Europe of the Christian Princes” (Bots and Waquet, La République, 25; reference to 
Michel Peronnet’s term). See Peronnet, “Guerre et paix de la Respublica Christiana a l’Europe des princes 
chrétiens,” in Le cheminement de l’idée européenne dans les idéologies de la paix et de la guerre, ed. Marita 
Gilli (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991), 9-18. Humanists emphasized a multi-confessional space, in opposition 
to the “cajus regio ejus religio” that reigned around them. They also highlighted the internal principles of 
equality and intellectual freedom of the Republic of Letters, calling it, as Pierre Bayle did in the Dictionnaire, 
“an extremely free state” (Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire, under “Catius”) in contrast to the absolutist state. The 
Republic’s far-reaching goals of spreading truth widely were also contrasted to the comparatively limited 
institutional circles of the contemporary Academies. See Bots and Waquet, La République, 23-27. 




speculation. What factors contributed to this growth, ranging from increased mobility, 
print, and trade to increasing ideas of universalism due to the “désenclavement 
planétaire,”1008as Bots and Waquet put it. It may, for instance, be interesting to place these 
ideas of scholarly cosmopolitanism in the context of the emergence of the Shulḥan Arukh 
and its universal aspirations for halakha in a de-localizing, cosmopolitan vein.1009 
Additionally, the humanist Republic of Letters, which is so often read in the teleological 
terms of its successor, the Enlightenment,1010 could benefit from comparison to an 
epistolary community among scholars of halakha that existed at the same time in 
overlapping areas but boasted no such afterlife. This chapter will utilize investigations of 
the aspect of sociability and discursivity in the République des Lettres as a tool to 
comprehend the importance of rabbinic correspondence to its own Republic of Letters. 
This insight will serve our inquiry of correspondence and its meaning for law. Clearly, 
however, we have not come close to exhausting the topic; there are many other significant 
comparisons waiting to be made. 
b. Discourse and Law 
Rabbinic responsa contributed to building a community that we can characterize as a 
                                                     
1008 Bots and Waquet, La République, 31, citing Pierre Chaunu, Histoire, science sociale: la durée, 
l’espace et l’homme à l’époque moderne (Paris: S.E.D.E.S., 1974). 
1009 This idea was put forth by Elhanan Reiner in his lecture, “The Urge for Codification in the 
Sixteenth Century: The Project of the Shulḥan Arukh (1531-80)” (presentation, Katz Center for Advanced 
Judaic Studies, Philadelphia, PA, February 12, 2014). See also Joseph Davis, “The Reception of the Shulḥan 
'Arukh and the Formation of Ashkenazic Jewish Identity,” AJS Review 26, no 2 (2002): 251-276. 
1010 To give but two examples, see Charles B. Schmitt, “Science in the Italian Universities in the 
Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities 
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 42 n14. See Gianna Pomata, “Observation Rising: Birth of an Epistemic 
Genre, 1500-1650,” in Histories of Scientific Observation, ed. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 45-80. Many of Elisabeth Eisenstein’s arguments could also 
be read in this vein. 




discursive forum, but what is the significance of this discursive forum for the halakha that 
constitutes the contents of the responsa? The Rabbinic Republic of Letters consisted of a 
small number of members and, as the previous section has shown, it was elitist in nature, 
scholarly in occupation, and intellectual in its focus. It was, however, closely linked to the 
larger transnational Jewish community in many ways; the two networks supported one 
another and frequently overlapped. It is, therefore, crucial not only to understand how the 
discursive forum impacts halakha in the scholarly sense but also to examine its effect as a 
legal system on this larger community. In order to answer the first question, we turn to 
scholarship by social, cultural, and intellectual historians of the humanist Republic of 
Letters in the early modern period. This scholarship, with its insights into a learned 
community that existed in the same space and time as the Rabbinic Republic of Letters and 
inspired the use of this term, is helpful for considering the significance of the rabbinic 
forum for its scholars. I shall utilize concepts from legal theory to delineate the connection 
between the scholarly community and the legal authority of the halakhic discussions for 
the Jewish community in general. 
c.  The Meaning of the Republic: Cooperation, Consensus, Openness, Equality 
In the case of the République des Lettres, what is the significance of the idea that an 
amorphous group united in the same communication network considers itself one 
“Republic?” Bots and Waquet have pointed to the participants’ self-image as members of 
an “invisible church.”1011 Burke confirms that the Republic of Letters is “an invisible or 
                                                     
1011 One can draw obvious comparisons (and distinctions) between this invisible church and the 
halakhic universe – both imagined religious kingdoms with aspirations that crossed borders. In 1718, 
Christoph August Huemann compared the humanist universe to the “invisible church.” See Bots and Waquet, 
La République, 20. 




imagined community.”1012 What is the central significance of a community in these cases? 
Erasmus, the most exemplary member of the humanist Republic of Letters, emphasized its 
cooperation across confessions and geographical boundaries;1013 cooperation in the 
Rabbinic Republic also often takes place through letters. 
Beyond this epistolary aspect of cooperation, Burke points out a more central 
element in the idea of the humanist Republic – that of consensus.1014 This also applies to 
the Rabbinic Republic: practically, responsa contributed to a shared canon of sources, rules, 
and logic, enabling rabbis to compare, inform one another, and unify their respective 
halakhic textual collections. For instance, Rabbi Isserles informs a former student that he 
recently reviewed a certain halakhic work that they had previously studied together. In the 
meantime, new interpretations had come up. He gives the student instructions should he 
wish to copy the new interpretations from the glosses of current students to add to his own, 
and he directs him to a scholar in Poznan who noted the most up-to-date teachings in his 
glosses and would let him consult it.1015 The idea of consensus, however, is far more 
significant than the practical aspect of sharing texts and opinions. 
 The idea of intellectual equality1016 was another crucial element in the humanist 
community. In his Dictionnaire, Bayle explains that the Republic of Letters “…est un Etat 
extrêmement libre. On n’y reconnoit que l’empire de la vérité et de la raison; et sous leurs 
                                                     
1012 Burke, “Erasmus,” 8, and Bots and Waquet, La République, 31-32. 
1013 Bots and Waquet, La République, 31-32. 
1014 Burke, “Erasmus,” 8. 
1015 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38: וכן מצאתי כתוב במרדכי שלי שכתבתי הפירוש אצל העמוד בחורף שעבר. ואל תתמה
כי ידעתי , בספר המרדכי של מהרר מרדכי מפוזנא ותמצאנו שם ועיין...שלא פירשתי לכם כן בהיותכם עמי כי אין דומה שונה פרקו
 .שכתבו במרדכי שלו
1016 This is already emphasized by Bayle in the Dictionnaire. See Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et 
critique (Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1697), s.v. Catius. 




auspices on fait la guerre innocemment à qui que ce soit.” 1017 There is an aspect of liberty 
and freedom to the Republic – related to a lack of hierarchy and to the use of reason – that 
is shared by the Rabbinic Republic. Although the dynamics of hierarchy among rabbinical 
scholars determining who was worthy of participating in the rabbinic correspondence were 
clear, in many ways this correspondence was an open playing field: any student of halakha 
could attempt to write a responsum to any rabbi (provided he used the correct salutations 
and appropriate apologies). The type of reasoning employed in responsa was not based on 
hierarchy, meaning that hierarchy was not considered the source of authority, and a more 
prestigious status was not a convincing argument in itself. The reasoning in responsa, in 
essence, requires nothing more than the knowledge and mastery of specific principles and 
a certain body of texts, thus opening the discipline to any halakhic scholar without 
excluding anyone a priori. 
The various definitions of the meaning of “republic” – an imagined community, the 
notion of cooperation and sharing information, the idea of consensus, and intellectual 
equality – are all profoundly connected. A “republic” in this sense does not mean that the 
participants lived in a particular geographical place or were part of the same milieu or 
political sphere. Rather, it implies that this community shared paradigms, that they are part 
of one common discourse, that which Bayle calls “la vérité la raison.” A discursive 
community establishes what constitutes truth and reason, or, in other words, the accepted 
texts and the accepted modes of reasoning that determine the community’s discourse. The 
                                                     
1017 As Burke adds, “at least in principle.” See Burke, “Erasmus,” 8. Bots and Waquet, too, point to 
centers, peripheries, hierarchies and other internal distinctions within the Republic. 




idea of an open, free, scholarly community is thus founded on the idea of a dynamic 
consensus, i.e., the shared paradigms of a discursive community. This discursive element 
defined the humanist Republic of Letters and its rabbinic counterpart at their most 
fundamental level. 
d. Consensus, Community and Legal Discourse 
Although humanists did study law, and some of them were involved in legal projects in 
different capacities, that scholarly community was not primarily engaged in legal issues.1018 
In the case of responsa, however, the legal element is central. The importance of a 
discursive forum for the theorization of law can be explained through the perspective of 
legal theory. Common law did not really have a fully developed legal theory.1019 Its 
practitioners were averse to philosophical inquiries; instead they focused on ways in which 
the legal intersects with concrete adherence, execution, and enforcement. This practical 
                                                     
1018 Much of humanist scholarship grew out of older disciplines, including jurisprudence, which was 
centered mainly on Justinian’s Corpus Iurus Civilis. Some of the earlier streams of jurisprudence, in fact, 
display interesting parallels with the study of halakha, but a clear shift in the focus of legal studies towards 
philological aspects took place in the early modern period, in line with general humanist interests. This 
removed the kinds of inquiries that interested humanist lawyers even further from what halakhists were 
discussing at the time. This can be seen in the shift from the medieval Italian school of jurisprudence (“mos 
italicus”) to the French school of humanist jurisprudence (“mos gallicus”) in the 16th century. The latter was 
philologically and historically oriented, exemplified by scholars such as Guillaume Baudé, François 
Baudouin, and Denis de Godefroy. See Donald R. Kelley, “Civil Science in the Renaissance: Jurisprudence 
in the French Manner,” History of European Ideas 2, no. 4 (1981): 261-276, and Chapter 1 of Harold J. 
Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation on the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). For a consideration of the similarities between the tosafist 
halakhic method and that of the Pavian law schools in the 12th century, see chapter 5, in Israel Ta-Shma, 
Creativity and Tradition: Studies in Medieval Rabbinic Scholarship, Literature, and Thought (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Interestingly, the different stages of commentators and glossators also 
line up in parallel moments for the scholastic and halakhic worlds. 
1019 In Postema’s words, the common law jurists’ “lack of theoretical persistence was partly due to 
the fact that they were, in almost every case, not philosophers and theoreticians but active practitioners, and 
there was not any immediate practical need to work out the theoretical details” (Gerald J. Postema, 
“Philosophy of the Common Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. 
Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, Scott J. Shapiro [New York: Oxford University Press, 2004], 600). 




attitude provides an interesting comparison with halakha1020 because, like early common 
law jurists, most rabbis concentrated on practical scholarship and were not interested in 
formulating legal theories. According to Gerald Postema, classical common law lawyers 
considered that the source of authority for common law lies in the concept of common 
reasoning. Their mantra was: “the common law is no other than common reason.” 
This idea did not refer to some natural, innate or commonsense notion of law. Nor 
does “common” refer to the “man on the street.” Rather, “common reason” designates the 
disciplined practice of reasoning. Thus, in Postema’s words, “If ‘reason’ legitimated some 
doctrine, this was only because that doctrine survives critical scrutiny in a process of 
reasoning and disputation.”1021 The meaning of “common” thus relates not only to the 
discipline’s consideration of customs and society but also to an idea of a “public”; the 
intelligibility of its reasoning among a public of practitioners is the main proof, in the eyes 
of its experts, that common law is indeed a legitimate form of law. Jurists in their own 
community, not the general population, carried out this scrutiny.1022 Common law is based 
on an essentially collaborative, public form of reasoning1023 – public in the sense that 
                                                     
1020 It would make little sense to study the legal theories of the authors of responsa in a philosophical, 
moral, or theological vein, as the religious basis for halakha and the possibilities for its enforcement are so 
different from those of the legal systems of states. It is, on the other hand, interesting to consider legal 
discourse in terms of its relationship to the community in which it existed, both the scholarly community of 
jurists and interpreters of law as well as the larger legal community that was bound to live their lives 
according to halakha. 
1021 Postema, “Philosophy of the Common Law,” 595. 
1022 Ernst Kantorowicz has already pointed out how the highly specialized (and increasingly 
specializing) nature of legal reasoning, on the one hand, and its broad application, on the other, in essence 
turned the practice into a full-fledged “profession” belonging to a particular class. In fact, this allowed for 
the rise in the Middle Ages of a class of scholars alongside the more established classes with political or 
religious power – the clergy and the king. See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Kingship under the Impact of Scientific 
Jurisprudence in Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society (Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1961), 89-111. 
1023 The specific forms of reason for common law are primarily precedent and analogy. In Postema’s 
words, “Dworkin's mythical superhuman judge ‘Hercules’ is not a hero of common law reasoning. His 




legally trained scholars were capable of evaluating in a public forum. The status of such a 
“public,” simultaneously open and elite, which represents a certain intellectual discipline, 
is very similar to the halakhic discursive forum established by responsa. Why is this 
discursive forum, however, so important for a justification of law? 
Any explanation of law is, in fact, incomplete without addressing its nature as a 
discursive practice. In Postema’s words: “…the practice of law is essentially, if not wholly, 
a practice of argument – a practice constituted by deeds, to be sure, but the deeds essentially 
involve words, that is, publically articulated arguments. … No theory of law can hope to 
illuminate its nature, structure, and characteristic mode of operation without putting at the 
center of its explanation an account of its discursive, argumentative, and forensic 
character.”1024 The argumentation about law is, essentially, its practice. Ronald Dworkin 
considers this a characteristic that sets law apart: 
Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, is argumentative. Every actor 
in the practice understands that what it permits or requires depends on the truth of certain 
propositions that are given sense only by and within the practice; the practice consists in 
large part in deploying and arguing about these propositions. … a good part of what their 
law reveals about them cannot be discovered except by noticing how they ground and 
defend these claims.1025 
 
Similarly, the meaning of halakha as it is practiced throughout history cannot be 
explored without addressing its discursive nature. The discursive nature of halakha, I 
contend, is in large part supported by the idea of the Rabbinic Republic. 
                                                     
theoretical successes, if they fail to take fully into account their dependency on intelligibility to others in a 
context of public justification, fail…” (Postema, “Philosophy of the Common Law,” 609). 
1024 Gerald J. Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Legal 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: The Common Law World (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 537. 
1025 Robert Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1986), 13. Cited in Postema, A 
Treatise, 432. 




The idea of a shared discourse is inextricably tied to the idea of argument and even 
disagreement. In fact, discursive consensus is the necessary basis for disagreement.1026 At 
first glance, most of the writing in responsa strikes us as disagreement rather than 
consensus, but viewing responsa as a means of creating a discursive community of scholars 
reveals the deeper underlying consensus. Not only joint interpretation but also intelligible 
disagreement requires a measure of consensus. 1027 Meaningful disagreement is possible 
only with a shared discourse and basic shared paradigms – as vague and general as they 
may be – that determine the rough outlines of an authoritative canon and the limits of valid 
reasoning. Just as in the case of common law, where the justification, at its most basic and 
non-theoretical level, was “common law is common reason,” the idea of the Rabbinic 
Republic implies that halakha is supported by a common form of reason. This underlies all 
their communications, even (or especially) those that involve controversy and divergence. 
Much of the communication that takes place in rabbinic correspondence, while concerned 
with disagreeing, is thus, at the same time, strengthening the notion of a shared halakhic 
paradigm.1028 
                                                     
1026 In the words of Postema: “Among classical legal positivists, most notably Hobbes and Bentham, 
the aim may have been, as Hume put it, to ‘cut off all occasions of discord and contention.’ The neo-formalists 
held the same view. Dworkin, in contrast, treated law as providing a focus, language, and forum for political 
debate about matters of serious common concern” (Postema, A Treatise, 425). Postema cites Hume, A 
Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 322. 
In addition, he refers to his own work and to Robert Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 338; and Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 413, respectively, in this passage. 
1027 “First, Dworkin’s sting argument challenged the assumption that we can sensibly argue with 
each other only if there is consensus among us on the ground rules for deciding when claims are sound … 
Although there is typically no consensus with respect to interpretation of the object, there must be a 
substantial amount of consensus to fix the object of interpretation” (Postema, A Treatise, 432). 
1028 The analogy to common law also helps clarify an important difference between the Rabbinic 
Republic of Letters and the Republic of Letters in the early modern world in general. Whereas, in the case of 
the Renaissance, scholars have emphasized the importance of collaboration for the establishment of 
empiricist science (see n1010 here), such “collective empiricism” was not a concern of the Rabbinic 




This focus on the correspondence of the Rabbinic Republic of Letters has helped 
us to understand the significance of its resultant community. To be sure, information is 
exchanged within these letters; cases and decisions are communicated; texts are compared; 
and halakhic conclusions are announced. The true achievement of responsa, however, is 
the creation of a scholarly community with a shared discourse, a forum in which halakha 
can be meaningfully discussed. As with common law, the existence of this “common 
reason” can function as a basis for the authority of the law that emerges from it. The 
primary contribution in the construction of such a forum, far beyond the practical 
communications, is thus the implication that a discursive forum exists for this entire 
discipline, lending legal authority to its halakhic discussions. An imagined community and 
its concomitant shared discourse are thus necessary for any attempt to establish authority 
for law as a real and existing field in space, time, and society.1029 
Scholars of common law concerned with comprehending the meaning of “law,” 
rather than presupposing its existence as natural law theories do, or defining it, as in 
Benthamian legal positivism, by considering how it is executed, turn precisely to this 
shared discourse when searching for the site where “law” is located in a given society. In 
such theories, the shared discourse is not necessarily the source for the legitimacy of law, 
but it is proof of its existence as a meaningful system. In fact, even certain positivist ideas 
of law (typically the more complex and systematic ones) also depend on the existence of a 
                                                     
Republic. The collaborative aspect of the Rabbinic Republic does not entail the pooling of empirical data 
but, rather, the collaboration on a legal discourse that Dworkin and others discuss. 
1029 This is different from inquiring into its philosophical or moral source of validity – the two are 
not contradictory; they are different perspectives of inquiry. Halakha can have a certain source of validity 
related to divine revelation and the transmission of canonical texts, but to ask whether and how it functions 
in an existing society is a different question. 




discursive community. When H. L. A. Hart sought to define the legal system, his main 
lynchpin became the “rule of recognition,”1030 or the existence of a principle that 
determines what constitutes acceptable law.1031 
The discursive semi-public character of the legal community is also linked to 
different theories of how common law, as formulated by jurists, relates to law as lived and 
practiced by society.1032 This function of legal discourse is important not only for those 
scholars formulating and interpreting the law but also for the community bound by its 
rules.1033 The notions that the laws are addressed to a community at large and the 
community’s understanding of them is important play a role in the reasoning behind the 
laws. Although the law need not be debated with every member of the legal community 
                                                     
1030 “The rule of recognition of the system is not itself a valid rule of law, but is the standard of 
validity for all other legal rules or norms. Thus, a rule of recognition exists and is binding not as a valid rule 
of the system, but as a social rule, accepted and practiced by law-applying officials as a common public 
standard” (Postema, A Treatise, 269). 
1031 “The concept of a rule of recognition (resting on the notion of a social rule) is the pivot on which 
Hart’s theory of law turns. With it, he believed, he could explain how law is fundamentally a matter of 
convention or custom, broadly construed, and yet transcends local custom; how law constitutes a systemic 
unity and persists through time; how legal rules can be authoritative not in view of their content or merit 
(justice, wisdom, or reasonableness) but by virtue of their source in an institutionalized form of social 
recognition …; how the perspective of a law elite can diverge from that of ordinary citizens without losing 
its status as authoritative; and thus, how law, which purports to control and guide social interaction 
normatively, can, without entirely losing its claim to status as a legal system, appear to most of those subject 
to it as an alien coercive machine” (Postema on Hart in Postema, A Treatise, 269). The centrality of this rule 
in Hart’s definition derives from the understanding that a legal system, in order to be both legal and a system, 
must be based on some shared paradigm, general as it may be, of what makes a law legitimate or not. 
1032 Postema argued that the structure and the rational dynamics of the interaction among officials, 
especially judges in their law-identifying, law-interpreting, and law-applying activities, are influenced by the 
simultaneous interaction between officials and citizens. “The decisions and choices of officials and of 
ordinary citizens,” he argued, “are in complex ways interwoven, and this interdependence is rooted in the 
very nature of law” (Postema, A Treatise, 498-499). 
1033 In Postema’s words, “law’s ability to guide in this manner depends crucially on the uptake of 
the rules by those to whom they are addressed. … So, each individual’s grasp of the rule’s import depends 
in part on anticipating how the rules are understood by their peers and by officials who have responsibility 
for administering them. ‘The structure of practical reasoning on which the practical import of rules of law 
depend[s] cannot be a matter of private insight but must be part of a shared, public practice of rule 
understanding and rule following’” (Postema, A Treatise, 500; he cites Postema, “Coordination and 
Convention,” 189). 




bound by it, its source in a discursive discipline that can be argued gives the law legitimacy 
in lived life as well. Similarly, rabbinic correspondence was crucial not only to the 
scholarly community but also to the broader legal Jewish community. 
e. The Scholarly Community and the Legal Community 
The scholarly Rabbinic Republic of Letters was supported by, and, in turn, served as an 
important component of a much larger network that pertained to the Jewish community at 
large. As studies of the early modern humanist Republic of Letters have pointed out, the 
expansion of other networks of correspondence, such as those of governments, religious 
orders, merchants, and trading houses, facilitated communication among scholars, thus 
enabling the growth in scope and density of the network of the République des Lettres.1034 
The same is true for the Rabbinic Republic of Letters. It was a distinct republic, but it made 
use of, supported, and was itself intertwined with other networks, such as communal 
networks, family networks, merchant networks, and others. 
The contents of the communications passing through this scholarly network had a 
direct connection to the Jewish community at large: the cases discussed by the rabbis would 
affect the slaughterers, scribes, business partners, cantors, and lay people. The rabbi 
himself in his function as a judge, halakhic authority, or executor of religious rites and 
ceremonies could serve as the mediator between scholarship and community. At other 
                                                     
1034 “As the critical elements in the infrastructure of early modern communications, they made 
possible – but did not compel – the emergence of the republic of letters. The most mundane element of the 
Republic of Letters was also its sine qua non; that is, the regular and reliable circulation of correspondence. 
... Expansion of overseas trade, colonial administration, and missionary work thus laid the foundation for a 
truly global network of epistolary exchange and, at the same time, an increase in the density among European 
commercial and governmental centers” (Steven Harris, “Networks of Travel, Correspondence, and 
Exchange,” in For the Sake of Learning, vol. 2, 348). 




times, the link was indirect, passing through community leaders (often rich and influential 
laymen), who ran the community’s daily affairs and administered to its needs. At one level, 
the Rabbinic Republic of Letters was a scholarly republic of its own. Because it dealt with 
practiced religious law, it was also linked to the legal community, which consisted of all 
Jews who considered themselves bound by the laws studied in these rabbinic writings 
(either voluntarily, through social allegiance, or pressure). The relationship between the 
Rabbinic Republic and the legal community is immensely significant, especially because, 
like the Rabbinic Republic, the legal community was an imagined community that barely 
possessed any real executive legal power. 
The rabbis’ power (albeit limited) was similarly tied to this network of letters, which 
Carlebach has termed “instrumental to the exercise of rabbinic authority.”1035  Some 
responsa were actually read by wide groups of Jews, and many additional responsa could 
affect their lives. In practical terms, a threat of excommunication, one of the only punitive 
measures available for rabbis to enforce their decisions, was considerably less forceful if 
the person being threatened could simply go to another rabbi in another community. The 
idea of a Rabbinic Republic that crossed borders was, therefore, crucial for rabbinic 
authority in a very practical sense. Rabbi Luria, for instance, in a responsum to the 
aforementioned student who deserted his wife, threatens the student with 
excommunication, adding that he will not hesitate to send the responsum to the rabbis at 
the location where the husband is hiding, should he refuse to obey.1036 Without the Rabbinic 
                                                     
1035 Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 115-116. 
1036 This was not Rabbi Luria’s first attempt at convincing the student to return to his family. The 
student kept ignoring him, however, and his wife asked Rabbi Luria to enlist the important rabbis at the 
location where her husband was hiding to help convince the husband and publicize his evil actions. See Luria, 




Republic of Letters, it would be much easier for individuals to escape the bounds of Jewish 
law, claiming that they left the realm of its jurisdiction or that they found a parallel and 
unrelated community with the authority to interpret halakha. 
The significance of the imagined community, however, far exceeded practical 
questions of execution: the idea of the Rabbinic Republic was of greatest importance for 
the legal community and similarly, the idea of the legal community mattered for the 
scholarly Rabbinic Republic. Without the notion of a Rabbinic Republic of scholars 
immersed in halakhic knowledge and sharing a discourse, of a group of experts who were 
subject to mutual censure if they came short, the legal community would be much weaker. 
Conversely, without the imagined legal community that was bound to follow halakhic 
decisions, the intellectual debate loses much of its importance and urgency. The highest 
level of halakhic study was always a liba de-hilketa,1037 for the sake of law. The legal 
community that rested on the halakha gave added weight to the scholarly deliberations; for 
what is law without anyone (theoretically) bound to keep it? 
As the earlier mentioned two-tiered tone in Rabbi Isserles’ responsum about the 
wedding on Friday evening showed, some responsa contain two distinct parts: the 
description of the case and legal decision on the one hand, and the halakhic technical legal 
                                                     
ShUT MaharShaL, §55. Hurwitz, Responsa of Solomon Luria, 73, translates the responsum as follows: “I 
shall send you this letter privately, in order not to disgrace you and cause you trouble in the place where you 
are now. But in case you ignore it, I shall send the next letter to Rabbi Jacob and Rabbi Leser, as suggested 
by your wife, and they will break your friendship with the scholars among whom you now reside. I have 
promised your wife under oath that I shall do everything in my power to bring you back home, in order to 
get her consent to send you this letter privately, and I shall keep my promise. Do not depend upon your fame 
and popularity. I shall not give in to you for that – a ban is waiting for you!” 
1037  See for instance, Babylonian Talmud tractate Bava kama 92a. 




discussion on the other.1038 The former was written in a specific tone to a broader audience 
– the legal community, the general community of religious Jews. The halakhic part was 
directed at the scholars and written in dense technical terminology. They were not 
circulated in separate sections, however, because both communities needed the reminder 
of the other’s existence. Those who were interested mainly in the halakhic argument would 
attach less weight to the reasoning were it not tied to a case with real halakhic 
consequences. For those readers interested in the actual case and the ruling but not in the 
reasoning, it was equally crucial to see the reasoning, for it provided the weight to the 
decision. The Rabbinic Republic of Letters was profoundly important to the legal 
community of halakhic Jews, but it was also crucial for the Rabbinic Republic to imagine 
a legal community to which their discourse applied. The two imagined communities not 
only overlapped and supported one another in myriad technical and practical ways; they 
also needed the idea of the other to imagine themselves. 
                                                     
1038 A good example of this is responsum §125 in Rabbi Isserles’ ShUT Rema, discussed in n626 of 
this chapter, in which he provides justification for performing a marriage on a Friday afternoon that ended 
up extending into the Sabbath. The opening and closing passages include many explicitly non-halakhic 
elements, such as a long, emotional narrative of the occurrence. The middle part of the letter included the 
halakhic technical discussion. 
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RESPONSA FROM SCHOLARLY ARCHIVE TO PUBLISHED BOOK: 
Rabbis, Their Archives, and the Virtues of Disorder 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter grounded responsa in the universe of early modern correspondence 
and investigated the intellectual and legal significance of these communications for the 
resulting community, and, vice versa, the importane of an existing community bound to 
Jewish law in lending weight to these epistolary discussions. The current chapter traces the 
life of the responsum following the initial stage of correspondence – the transition from 
instances of rabbinic communication to a published book that becomes part of the scholarly 
corpus. The previous chapter indicated that the initial sending of rabbinic epistles implied 
a semi-public readership, which means that the letter stage itself should be considered a 
form of publication. In the final phase, we encounter responsa in published book form. This 
chapter will analyze the published books of responsa for three sixteenth-century rabbis in 
Eastern Europe: Rabbi Shlomo Luria, Rabbi Yosef Katz, and Rabbi Moshe Isserles. 
Examining responsa in this “book stage” will facilitate reconstructing a prior phase 
that is often overlooked – the life of the responsum between the letter and the printed book. 
I approach this phase by studying responsa as part of the rabbi’s own archive, viewing this 
archive within the broader context of scholarly archival practices in early modern Europe. 
By archives, I am referring to a scholar’s own papers, which he collects, creates, and 
consults as part of his scholarly endeavors,1039 not to the repositories of states or 
                                                     
1039 For such a definition, see Peter N. Miller, Peiresc’s History of Provence: Antiquarianism and 
the Discovery of a Medieval Mediterranean (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2011), 14: 
“Archives, as we have come to understand them since the nineteenth century, are the residue of intention, the 
often accidental survival, in often accidental shape, of past life preserved in words. We tend not to view a 
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institutions. These archives and the practices related to them will be analyzed as they relate 
to publication – in print and in other ways. The emerging picture of this scholarly culture 
shows that, even as print technology was becoming better established, publication took 
many different forms. Although print offered numerous advantages, this chapter, in 
drawing attention to other publication practices, will indicate that print publication was not 
always the most self-evident option; the ensconced scholarly practices, often centering on 
manuscripts, afforded distinctive benefits that could not easily be matched or replaced by 
print technology. 
The issue of publication has repercussions for our understanding of the place of 
responsa within halakhic literature. The ubiquity of responsa throughout the history of 
halakha, going back to talmudic times, together with its relatively straightforward origin – 
a rabbi is asked in a letter about a concrete problem and renders his decision in writing – 
presents ShUT as an obvious, distinct, and consistent category of halakhic writing. 
Responsa have, indeed, been characterized in this vein by historians and other scholars of 
Jewish literature: Zacharias Frankel, in his Entwurf einer Geschichte der 
Nachtalmudsichen Reponsen, defines responsa as the form that religious norms assume 
when their discovery is prompted by a “real occurrence.”1040 Menahem Elon, who classifies 
                                                     
scholar’s working papers as the goal of his work, but rather as the preparatory material for it. But 
papyrologists, for example, take a different view. They use ‘archive’ in a self-conscious and distinctive way 
to include private materials, compiled by ordinary people, as well as public documents. ‘Archive’ refers 
explicitly to documentary, rather than literary materials – for these latter the term ‘library’ is reserved – and 
can include letters, notes, lists, and memoranda.” 
1040 Zacharias Frankel, Entwurf einer Geschichte der Literatur der nachtalmudsichen Responsen 
(Breslau: Grass, Barth & Comp., 1865), 6-7: “…oder es gibt eine häufig durch ein wirkliches Ereigniss 
hervorgerufene Anfrage den Anlass zur Auffindung der Norm. In diesem Falle kleidet sich die Norm in die 
Gestalt einer Antwort, eines Responsums.” 
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halakha using legal terminology, provides the following definition: “The term ‘responsa’ 
includes all of the recorded rulings and decisions rendered by the halakhic authorities in 
response to questions submitted in writing. This literary source includes the preponderance 
– both quantitative and qualitative – of mishpat ivri (Jewish law) in the post-Talmudic 
period.”1041 
In these definitions, legal decisions resulting from theoretical inquiry (sometimes 
called “psak”) are often juxtaposed to responsa’s everyday origins – the one representing 
scholarship, the other legal adjudication in “real life.”1042 ShUT, as the more spontaneous 
halakhic text, is celebrated for providing a glimpse into the “workshop” of the halakhic 
decision maker, to cite Yiẓḥak Zev Kahana, who contrasted ShUT, which he defined as the 
“finished products,” to other kinds of halakhic writing in his Meḥkarim be-sifrut ha-tshuvot 
(Studies in responsa-literature).1043 Scholars emphasize the immediacy of responsa and the 
circumstances that necessitated their writing; responsa are typified as representing the 
“quality of living law, which,” in Elon’s words, “is the essence of every responsum…”1044 
Those such as Elon, who approached halakha with a legal orientation, pointed to these 
characteristics in order to classify responsa as a distinct legal source. As such, the genre of 
responsa is often defined as “Jewish case law” or compared to common law, with a 
tendency to ascribe to responsa as a category a similar legal status as that of common 
                                                     
1041 See Menahem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. Bernard Auerbach and 
Melvin J. Sykes (Philadelphia: JPS, 1994), 3:1454. 
1042 Yiẓḥak Zev Kahana, “Ha-psak ve-ha-tshuva,” [The halakhic decision and the responsum] in 
Meḥkarim be-sifrut ha-tshuvot [Studies in responsa literature] (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1973), 97-
107. For responsa as taken from “real life,” see p. 99. 
1043 See Kahana, “Ha-psak,” 100. 
1044 See Menaḥem Elon, Jewish Law, 2:976. 
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law.1045 Whereas such legal definitions may hold true for many individual tshuvot, matters 
become infinitely more complicated when trying to define the legal significance of the 
responsum beyond its initial moment, as a genre and an intellectual or legal category. 
The definition of responsa as a genre generally derives by extension from the 
understanding of the individual responsum. Elon defines responsa as similar to “judge-
made law”; whereas the latter is recorded in the common law in the reports of judicial 
decisions, he explains, the post-talmudic Jewish law is reported in the compilations of 
responsa.1046 Kahana also takes this category as a given, devoting a chapter to the question 
of which genre rabbis preferred as a legal source – responsa or psakim. Yedidya Dinari 
similarly states that “it is important to determine whether” a certain work “is a sefer tshuvot 
or akin to a sefer psakim.”1047 Such categorical definitions seem inadequate, however, when 
we look at early modern sifrei ShUT, or books of responsa, as a whole. It becomes clear 
that one cannot automatically use responsa as an organizing principle for halakhic writings, 
much less attribute any single unified legal significance to responsa as a whole. 
Kahana’s paradigmatic inquiry attaches major legal importance to the different 
categories, but includes a footnote with the caveat that sometimes – strangely enough – 
halakhic scholars did not distinguish between responsa and other forms of rabbinic writing. 
His example in the footnote comes from sixteenth-century Ashkenaz – Rabbi Luria.1048 
                                                     
1045 See Elon, Jewish Law, 2:976. 
1046 Elon, Jewish Law, 3:1467. 
1047 Yedidya Dinari, Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz be-shilhei yemei ha-beinaim: Darkheihem ve-kitveihem ba-
halakha [The sages of Ashkenaz at the end of the Middle Ages: Their ways and their writings in halakha] 
(Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1984), 303n 223. 
1048 Kahana, “Ha-psak,” 100n18. Rabbi Luria referred to a responsum by Rabbi Meir Rothenburg 
as follows: “Rabbi Meir was asked … until here the words of the psak” (From MaharShaL’s bi’ur on the 
SMaG, cited in Kahana). 
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Elon wishes to equate “compilations of responsa” with the Law Reports of English law and 
the law reporter systems of American law.1049 The question of official versus unauthorized 
reports and the matter of selecting material are, however, crucial issues concerning these 
systems. Compilations of responsa, by contrast, are not particularly selective – on the 
contrary. Acknowledging this, Elon considers the lack of strict redaction of the works of 
responsa as one of their “problems,”1050 together with the “complete lack of system in the 
arrangement of the responsa,” something that, according to Elon, begins to improve only 
after the sixteenth century.1051 
This “problem,” which prevents works of responsa from fitting any clear paradigm, 
has confounded even experts on the genre. Indeed, the very notion of how a work of 
responsa should look is unclear. In the introduction to the multivolume bibliography of 
responsa that he edited, Shmuel Glick describes the difficulty of defining what qualifies as 
a true work of responsa: “And lest these things seem light in the eyes of the reader – we 
deliberated immensely regarding the definition of books that deserve to be called ‘works 
of responsa,’ and it is questionable if one can even arrive at a clear-cut definition of a ‘work 
of responsa,’” he writes.1052 Ultimately, Glick bemoans the fact that deciding what qualifies 
as a “work of ShUT” is, “in essence, a subjective decision.”1053 The strict generic 
                                                     
1049 Elon, Jewish Law, 3: 1467. 
1050 Elon, Jewish Law, 3: 1517-1521. 
1051 Elon, Jewish Law, 3: 1522. 
1052 See Shmuel Glick, “Introduction,” in Kuntres ha-tshuvot he-ḥadash: Oẓar bibliografi le-sifrut 
ha- she’elot ve-ha tshuvot mi-reishit ha-dfus ve-ad shnat 2000 [The new handbook of responsa: A 
bibliographic anthology for responsa literature from the beginning of print to the year 2000], 4 vols, ed. 
Shmuel Glick. (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan Law Library Press, 2006). Kuntres, 1: 82-83 ואל יהיו הדברים קלים בעיניך
משמעית מהו ספר  -רבות נתחבטנו בהגדרת הספרים הראויים להיקרא ״ספרי שו״ת״ וספק אם ניתן לתחום בהגדרה חד –הקורא 
.שו״ת ומהו ספר הכולל שו״ת  
1053 See Glick, “Introduction,” in Kuntres, 1: 82. 
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definitions that we often project onto earlier works – not to mention the intellectual, 
religious, or legal significance that we subsequently seek to assign to a genre –are, as Glick 
implies, a product of our conceptions of what such works should be. These assumptions 
are not a given; they are tied to the modes of textual organization in a certain time and 
place. 
The problematic issue for a contemporary bibliographer or scholar of mishpat ivri, 
can, however, be a great boon to a historian, especially a historian interested in scholarly 
culture. Precisely the subjective aspect of what qualifies as a work of responsa can help us 
understand how scholars in a certain period viewed the material that they were studying 
and creating. The conception of genre – what defines a certain type of literature – is not 
objective; it depends on time, place, the material and technological conditions of texts, the 
scholarly practices surrounding the literature, and the ideas underlying this form of writing. 
Embracing the instability of the work of responsa, can, in fact, provide a key to greater 
understanding of particular scholarly cultures and the halakhic world. 
Utilizing rabbinic scholarly practices related to responsa, I shall demonstrate that, 
far from being an epiphenomenal “problem,” the lack of organization in these compilations 
is, in fact, an essential characteristic of early modern responsa, pointing to archival forms 
of scholarship. Moreover, the question of organization (or lack thereof) is a key to a general 
understanding of ashkenazic halakha in this period, an era when the production of these 
texts faced such profound disruption that the very distinctions between halakhic categories 
were taking on new shapes. Examining the epistolary and post-epistolary life of halakhic 
responsa in early modern Europe thus will not only facilitate comprehension of this type 
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of halakhic text but also will permit us to rethink the categories of halakhic texts as they 
existed in this period. This revision, in turn, enables me in the concluding case study, which 
follows this current chapter, to contrast halakha as organized in responsa with halakha as 
organized in printed codes. This inquiry illuminates notions of textual flexibility and 
stability, of order and disorder, and of scholarship, that displays a dynamism extending 
beyond the restrictions of printed books. 
 
2. PARADIGMS AND PECULIARITIES 
a. Paradigm Problems 
 
If one were to designate a paradigm for works of responsa and attempt to find the 
embodiment of such a paradigm in the ashkenazic sphere, the best example would be 
Trumat ha-deshen. This book of responsa, authored by Rabbi Israel Isserlein in the fifteenth 
century, fits, more than any other ashkenazic candidate, the paradigm of a Sefer ShUT: 
Trumat ha-deshen contains only responsa; all the responsa are from one author; every entry 
contains a distinct question, clearly separated from the response; the work has a title 
(which, in itself, is exceptional) that includes a reference to the amount of responsa 
included, thus affording the book defined boundaries that match up with one consistent 
type of generic content. Moreover, the work is supremely organized; all the entries are 
ordered according to subject, and the table of contents thus doubles as a topical index. It is 
understandable why this was the first work of fifteenth-century ashkenazic responsa to be 
printed (Venice: Bomberg, 1519).1054 
                                                     
1054 See chapter two of this dissertation for more on this work, especially n217. 
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Paradigms, of course, have a strange relationship with reality. Not unlike platonic 
ideas, they are simultaneously theoretical and idealized while purporting to describe reality. 
Tellingly, there was a long tradition that Trumat ha-deshen was not an authentic work of 
responsa and that the questions were not taken from life, but, rather, composed by the 
author: As one seventeenth-century rabbi writes, “For it is known that the questions in 
Trumat ha-deshen were made by Rabbi Isserlein, the author of the responsa himself, and 
not that others asked him these....” 1055 Trumat ha-deshen was thus not considered a genuine 
work of responsa precisely because of its extraordinarily close resemblance to the paradigm 
of responsa, which implied heavy editing. The work was so paradigmatic as to become 
suspect. 
The practices of a scholarly culture, which include not only its accepted behaviors 
but also its technological possibilities, thus influenced conceptions about the “correct” 
appearance of a work of responsa. Moreover, these elements of scholarly culture also 
affected ideas about the halakhic value of responsa. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
conceptions related to responsa underwent change precisely in the sixteenth century, as 
print technology promoted new organizational paradigms. As a rule, rabbis had always 
preferred responsa as legal sources over more theoretical halakhic works, considering the 
former, in the words of a fifteenth-century rabbi, “…practical halakha, and we rely more 
on them than on the poskim which were not at the time of action.”1056 In the sixteenth 
                                                     
1055 Shabtai ha-Kohen, Siftei kohen on Yoreh de’ah §196:1. דהלא נודע שהשאלות שבתה״ד עשה מהרא״י 
.כתביו בפסקי כמו אחרים ששאלוהו ולא עצמו התשובות בעל  
See also: Siftei kohen on Yoreh de’ah §196:20; David ha-Levi, Turei zahav on Yoreh de’ah §328:2; 
Yoel Sirkis, Bait ḥadash on Yoreh de’ah §196. 
1056 Jacob Moellin, ShUT MaharYL (about the responsa of ROSh vs. his psakim, discussed in further 
detail a few passages later).  מדברי טפי מינייהו וילפינן הוו למעשה הלכה אדרבה, התשובה על לסמוך שאין שכתבת ומה
UNIT III, CHAPTER 6: RESPONSA FROM SCHOLARLY ARCHIVE TO PUBLISHED BOOK 
 
 503   
 
century, however, the possibilities for organizing and stabilizing halakhic texts were 
changing, enabling the creation of halakhic works that presented alternatives to collections 
of responsa, for example, halakhic codifications, whose structure, comprehensiveness, and 
stability made them appear more textually reliable. Accordingly, responsa began to lose 
their status as the most authoritative source for halakhic decision making in contrast to the 
value attached to codifications. One sees this most strongly in cases where a halakhic 
authority left behind both responsa and more edited, organized halakhic works. 
There were several collections of textual counterparts to Trumat ha-deshen that 
included writings attributed to the same author (although collected and copied by others). 
Organizationally, however, they were the exact opposite: inconsistent in content, in genre, 
in source, authorship, and in their level of editing. The most famous of these were Reb 
Yoizel Ostreicher’s Leket yosher and the anonymous Psakim u-ktavim, which was printed 
at the same time as Trumat ha-deshen.1057 Thus, counterintuitively – but understandably, 
if we consider the structure of the work and its reputation of using inauthentic questions – 
Trumat ha-deshen, the most paradigmatic work of responsa, took on the status of an 
“organized work” (ḥibur or psak), in contrast to its correlates, which represented authentic 
responsa, as they were less organized. This lack of organization was noticed by Moritz 
Güdemann, who describes the authograph manuscript of Leket yosher as: “Nach Inhalt und 
Formlosigkeit interessant für die Cultur – und Unculturgeschichte der deutschen Talmud 
                                                     
הוראה בשעת היו שלא הפוסקים . On the translation of the term “poskim,” we see it used as a noun both in the sense 
of a figure (a legal decisor) and in the sense of a book (a collection of legal decisions), for example in the 
words of Rabbi Shakhna, printed in Isserles, ShUT Rema, §25, about the fact that he often asked his father to 
make a collection of his halakhic decisions: פוסק שיעשה ממנו לומדים הרבה עם בקשתי  “I and many of his other 
students asked him to make a posek.” 
1057 For more on these works, see my discussion in chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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Hochschüler im XV J.” 1058 Its formlessness was, indeed, very telling of the cultural history 
of early modern ashkenazic halakhists. 
Throughout halakhic literature, most rabbis declared the unedited collections of 
Rabbi Isserlein’s responsa more reliable than their organized counterpart.1059 One 
sixteenth-century authority – perhaps the figure whose work, more than anyone else’s, 
embodies the printed and codified book of halakha – Rabbi Yosef Karo, disagreed: He 
notes a legal contradiction between Trumat ha-deshen and the other writings attributed to 
Rabbi Isserlein and concludes: “when it comes to halakha, it appears that we should rely 
on what he wrote in the book Trumat ha-deshen more than on what is in his writings 
(ktavim), because a person is more meticulous about that which he writes in a book than 
about that which he writes in his writings….”1060 Clearer proof that concepts of knowledge 
organization influence the legal standing of halakhic texts could hardly be found. 
An analogous pair of texts from an earlier period, namely, the thirteenth-century 
responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel as opposed to his psakim, his writings on the Talmud, 
encountered similar reactions. The author’s son instructed readers to disregard his father’s 
responsa when they contradict the psakim because the latter were written later in his career, 
thus reflecting his more recent opinions. Reactions to this rationale differed: Most telling 
                                                     
1058 Moritz Güdemann, Geschichte des Erziehungswesense und der Cultur der Juden in Frankreich 
und Deutschland von der Begründung der jüdischen Wissenschaft in diesen Ländern bis zur Vertreibung der 
Juden aus Frankreich (X.-XIV. Jahrhundert) (Wien: Hölder, 1880), 16. 
See also Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraïschen Handschriften der K. Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in 
München (Munich, 1895), 225. 
1059 This dilemma is discussed at length in the chapter entitled “Ha-psak ve-ha-tshuva” [The halakhic 
decision and the responsum] in Kahana, Meḥkarim, 97-107. Most of my examples here are taken from this 
piece. 
1060 Bet Yosef, Tur Oraḥ ḥayim, §263:16: 
 מדקדק יותר בספר כותב שאדם דמה בכתביו שכתב מה מעל יותר תה״ד בספר שכתב מה על לסמוך דיש נראה הלכה ולענין
.בכתביו שכותב ממה בו  
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is the reaction by Rabbi Yosef di Trani (1538-1639), who finds the idea that all the responsa 
date from before the other writings implausible. He uses both commonsensical reasons – 
“during all those years that the ROSh was writing his psakim, did he place a gatekeeper at 
the gate of the house of study, so that nobody ask him a halakhic question!?” – as well as 
reasons based on chronological textual proof to make his point.1061 Rabbi di Trani 
suggested that one should read the distinction between responsa and other halakhic writings 
in terms of organization: 
It makes sense to say that every rabbi and halakhic decision maker who made a 
comprehensive work (ḥibur kolel), whether he made this early in life or at the end, one 
should consider the words of the comprehensive work more important than the words of 
the responsum, because if it happened that he changed his mind, he would correct the issues 
in their place in his work while he is studying the responsum, because it stands to reason 
that he would not respond without studying the root of the issues from his work. Even if 
the words of Torah have aged in his mouth, he returns to look at them at the moment of 
action.1062 
 
The larger work, characterized here as a personal reference tool, is constantly 
updated, an activity facilitated by everything having its “place,” whereas responsa can 
boast no such thing. A student of Rabbi di Trani’s in the seventeenth century states this in 
even stronger terms: 
When a halakhic decision maker is busy with a responsum that he is answering to 
his supplicants, making a halakhic decision, he does not hesitate to consult his psakim and 
his laws how he decided. And if he decided differently from what he wrote in the 
responsum, he either erases what he wrote in the psakim or corrects his responsum. 
However, when a person is writing a work (ḥibur), he does not go back to all his responsa 
to see what he decided, because it is a great bother to search where he wrote this specific 
                                                     
1061 Yosef Di Trani, ShUT Morenu ha-Rav Yosef mi-Trani, I: Ḥoshen mishpat, §7:  
 דבר ממנו ישאלו שלא המדרש בית פתח על שוער העמיד ההלכות בפסקי עוסק הרא״ש שהיה השנים אותם כל ״דאטו
   ״.בפסקיו שכתב כתב תשובות ובכמה…?ההלכה
1062 Yosef Di Trani, ShUT Morenu ha-Rav Yosef mi-Trani, I: Ḥoshen mishpat, §7: 
 מדברי עיקר החיבור דברי לתפוס יש, בסוף בין ימיו בתחילת שעשאו בין כולל חיבור שעשה ופוסק רב דכל ״מסתברא
 עמד אא״כ משיב אינו דמסתמא, בתשובה מעיין שהוא בשעה בחיבורו במקומן הדברים לתקן ליה הוה ביה דהדר איתא שאם התשובה
״.מעשה בשעת בהם ומסתכל חוזר בפיו תורה דברי נזדקנו אם אפילו. חיבורו מתוך דברים של שרשן על  
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thing in his responsa, since they are not organized as in a work (ḥibur) that is 
important/thought-out (savur?) and prepared before him, and whenever he wants to see 
what his opinion is in a work (ḥibur), he opens the tractate where this law is mentioned.1063 
 
One cannot expect responsa to reflect an authority’s latest opinion, he claims, 
because they are not organized and thus difficult to update. A rabbi’s work (ḥibur), on the 
other hand, is a structured, comprehensive, and complete archive of his writings, leading 
to the expectation that its author will make sure constantly to consult it and update and 
correct when needed, rendering the latter work much more reliable than the responsa, 
precisely because of the responsa’s place in “real life.” The ability to retrieve, consult, and 
correct past writings in a consistent fashion is thus tied to their reliability, an area in which 
responsa were at a distinct disadvantage because of their lack of organization. The 
relevance of this aspect to the place of responsa in halakhic decision making will be 
discussed in greater depth towards the end of this chapter. 
In the eighteenth century, we likewise encounter the opinion that the 
comprehensive work is more reliable than a responsum, not because of organizational 
methods but because of the supposed circumstances surrounding the study and writing of 
these disparate forms of halakha: “It seems to me that his words in the work (kuntres)1064 
are more important than the responsum because these are his words that were written with 
                                                     
1063 Ḥayim Benvenisti (Turkey, 1603-1673), in ShUT Ba’ei ḥayei, 1: Ḥoshen mishpat, §61:   
 פסק ואם. פסק איך והלכותיו פסקיו אחר מלבקש נמנע אינו הלכה ופוסק לשואליו שמשיב בתשובה עוסק ״כשהפוסק
 תשובותיו אחר חוזר אינו, בחיבור עוסק כשאדם אבל. בתשובה חוזר או בהלכות שכתב מה מוחק או בתשובה שכתב ממה בהיפך
 זמן וכל לפניו ומוכן סבור שהוא בחבור כמו סדורות שאין - זה כתב היכן בתשובותיו לבקש לו הוא שטורח מפני פסק איך לראות
 ״.מוזכר זה דין שבה המסכתא פותח בחבור דעתו מה לראות רוצה שהוא
1064 The word “kuntres” means quire or booklet as a physical unit but also a treatise as an intellectual 
unit, (see chapter one, n106 in this dissertation), thus signifying a work with some degree of distinct borders, 
completeness, and unity. In this case, it refers to the kuntres agunot, a booklet on the laws of women whose 
husbands went missing, composed by Rabbi Ḥayim Shabtai (Salonica, 17th c.), as opposed to his responsa. 
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more quiet, relating to the roots of the laws, and there is no one rushing him to pick up the 
responsum, because sometimes a person cannot inquire properly due to his hurry to 
respond.…”1065 Juxtaposing the image of the rabbi calmly inquiring into the foundations 
of law in his quiet study with the harried circumstances of sending off a responsum, the 
author considered the former circumstances were more beneficial for the creation of 
reliable legal texts. Even later, the anxiety about responsa and the disorderly circumstances 
that stem from their immediacy prompts a nineteenth-century rabbi to instruct his sons 
never to publish his responsa, “…because one is not to rely so much on the responsum 
compared to something that was written when studying the same topic thoroughly.”1066 
Rabbi Naftali Ẓvi Yehuda Berlin’s reassurance to the sons that responsa are reliable, by 
invoking a special divine inspiration that rests upon a rabbi at moments of specific halakhic 
problems, shows just how profound anxieties about the reliability of responsa, once 
considered the most trustworthy type of halakhic document, had become.1067 
More than clarifying the legal status of responsa itself, ideas about the genre of 
responsa and its legal weight thus reveal the state of technological possibilities, of scholarly 
practices, indeed, of knowledge organization, for a given period. When a culture comes to 
                                                     
1065 Rabbi Yonah Navon (Jerusalem, 1713-1760), ShUT Neḥpah ba-kesef, Even ha-ezer, §27: 
 שיעמוס מי ואין הדינים בשרשי בישוב יותר שנכתבו דבריו שהם לפי מהתשובה עיקר יותר הם בקונטרס שדבריו ״נלע״ד
 עיקר עושים שאנו כיו״ב ומצינו. דבר שואלו להשיב המהירות מסיבת כראוי להעמיק יוכל לא האדם דלפעמים התשובה ליקח עליו
 ״…הכא הדין והוא. כידוע, אהדדי דסתרי במקום מהתשובות יותר הרא״ש מפסקי
1066 Rabbi David ha-Levi Bamberger, in the responsa of Rabbi Naftali Ẓvi Yehuda Berlin (1816-
1893), ShUT Meshiv davar, Oraḥ ḥayim, §24, cited in Kahana, Meḥkarim, 106. התשובה על כך כל לסמוך שאין 
.דבר לשואלו שבא בעת שמקיף ממה יותר בוריה על הענין את והקיף...ענין אותו לימוד בדרך שכתב מה על כמו  
1067 Hints of the idea that a special type of divine intervention applies when rabbis make practical 
legal decisions can likewise be observed as early as the Middle Ages, when divine intervention is also 
invoked where anxiety is expressed about mistaken legal interpretations entering the canon and becoming 
precedent. See, for instance, Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-kadmon, 3rd edition [The ancient 
Ashkenazic custom] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), 33. 
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put more faith in complete, ordered works than in spur-of-the-moment decision making, it 
is likely to view responsa as a less reliable category. Let us, then, investigate the works of 
responsa of sixteenth-century Eastern Europe, their organization, their paths to publication, 
and the attitudes that these works imply. 
b. The Responsa Of Rabbi Shlomo Luria 
The only two works of responsa printed in sixteenth-century Eastern Europe are the 
responsa of Rabbi Shlomo Luria (Lublin, 1574-5) and those of Rabbi Yosef Katz (Cracow, 
1590).1068 Responsa of Rabbi Shlomo Luria was printed by Klonimus, son of Mordekhai 
Yaffe in Lublin. The book contains roughly one hundred entries, many of which, indeed, 
fit the standard notion of responsa; but many other entries do not. Elhanan Reiner describes 
the work as follows: “As was accepted in sifrei ShUT of this period, it included materials 
that related to the different stages of the author’s life, and included texts and documents 
with a different character, of which only some respond to the definition ‘tshuva’ or ‘tshuvat 
she’ela,’ in the sense of correspondence about explicitly halakhic questions between two 
or more rabbis.”1069 Not all of the entries are even titled “she’ela” (question); many are 
simply called “siman,” section. Some of them were not prompted by outright letters, or 
even by questions: In §85, Rabbi Luria included a list of laws introduced without any 
                                                     
1068 This is according to the list in Glick, Kuntres, 1: 96-97. Possibly, the responsa of Rabbi Luria 
were being prepared during his lifetime, although the title page clearly shows that the printing was completed 
after his death. On the timing of the printing of ShUT MaharShaL, see Elhanan Reiner, “Yiḥus ve-hoẓaat 
shem ra: Maharal, mishpaḥat Beẓalel, u-parashat ha-Nadler” (Lineage and libel: Maharal, the Beẓalel family, 
and the Nadler affair,” in Maharal: Akdamot – pirkei ḥayim, mishnah, hashpa’ah [Maharal: Overtures – 
biography, doctrine, influence], ed. Elhanan Reiner (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2015), 101-127, 
especially page 115. 
1069 Reiner, “Yiḥus,” 110.  כמקובל בספרי שו"ת בני הזמן הוא כולל חומרים המתייחסים לתקופות שונות בחיי המחבר
 על התכתבות משמע,' שאלה תשובות' או' תשובה' של להגדרה בדיוק עונה חלקם שרק שונה אופי בעלי ותעודות טקסטים ומכיל
.יותר או רבנים שני בין מובהקות הלכתיות שאלות  
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question, simply as “The laws of Ḥanukah in short, from my big work called Yam shel 
Shlomo,” followed in the next entry by the laws of burning leavened bread before Passover. 
That entry is signed with his name and a remark that he invented a riddle, which is printed 
there, together with the explanation of the riddle’s solution.1070 
Many of the entries in the book do originate in correspondence, but they are not 
answers to legal questions, and definitely not “case law.” The case discussed by Reiner, 
§12 in the responsa, for instance, affirms the pure lineage of an esteemed rabbinic clan, 
which had been contested; §29 responds to a request about the chronology of sages; and 
§64 to a request to describe his received order of prayer. Other entries, which do concern 
legal cases are not, in fact, results of scholarly correspondence between rabbis, but are, 
rather, more akin to official court documents, such as  circular letters like those discussed 
in the previous chapter, which include testimonies, rabbinic opinions, and open letters 
proclaiming someone’s guilt or innocence, with rhymed openings addressed to no one in 
particular, 1071 for example, the entry in §33, which is also reproduced in Rabbi Isserles’ 
collection of responsa, alongside many similar letters and other documents about the same 
case.1072 
In terms of genre and content, the compilation deals with both halakha and custom. 
                                                     
1070 Regarding other kinds of halakha riddles, see chapter 5, n954 of this dissertation, which refers 
to literature on “katafot” or “kataves” – games and riddles that scholars presented to one another on halakhic 
topics, for instance, using numerical values of words or acronyms to refer to halakhic concepts and laws. 
They were often used for educational entertainment on holidays and other festive occasions. This entry in the 
responsa of Rabbi Luria at the end of §86 is such an example. 
1071 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §13 and Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §33. 
ShUT MaharShaL, §13 and the entries culminating in §101 can also be added to this list. 
1072 For more on this accusation of adultery, the other responsa and documents of which are printed 
in Isserles, ShUT Rema, §12-16, see chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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Indeed, a closer look at the work reveals the absence of a strong distinction between these 
fields. Mateh Moshe (Cracow: Prostiẓ, 1591), written by a student of Rabbi Luria named 
Moshe of Przemysl, also known as Moshe Mat (1540-1606), is known primarily as a book 
of customs (sefer minhagim). The book’s main claim to fame is the author’s proximity to 
Rabbi Luria, which enabled the author to observe his teacher and transmit his customs. The 
author himself highlights the element of his apprenticeship with Rabbi Luria in the 
introduction: “For who am I … I am a fool and do not know, but … because I served 
scholars, specifically the great rabbi, the light of the exile … Rabbi Shlomo Luria … I was 
among those who ate at his table, and saw, and I have specified his customs and rules, this 
alone will be for you an offering.”1073 Many of these customs were, indeed, witnessed and 
recounted by Rabbi Mat. Take, for instance, a typical passage: 
ROSh wrote at the end of the laws of fringes: “and he who fears the word of God 
checks his fringes before wrapping himself, lest he make a blessing in vain.’ ... And so I 
have also seen from my master and teacher, our master, the rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo [Luria], 
of blessed memory every time that they would call him up to the Torah, he would check 
his fringes before wrapping himself [in the tallit], and while checking one should separate 
the fringes, because this is why they are called ẓiẓit [fringes], after the strings that separate, 
and the sign for this is the acronym (ẓiẓit): ẓaddik (righteous) is he who separates ẓiẓit in 
all times.1074 
A closer look at these customs, however, shows that a significant amount of the material 
was not, in fact, witnessed in person, but, instead, copied from his rabbi’s writings, 
including the responsa. Take, for example, the section on prayer: 
The Kolbo writes … that one does not say the blessing in the morning when 
                                                     
1073 Moshe Mat, Mateh Moshe (Cracow, 1591), Introduction: 
 לאמור רעיוני והציקוני כליותי יעצוני אך אדע ולא בער ואני הזאת המלאכה אל לגשת לבי ערכה אשר חיי ומה אני מי כי 
 ישראל גאון תפארת הגולה מאור הגדול להרב בפרט ח”ת שמשתי כי רבך לדברי ישמעו לדבריך ישמעו לא כי אף נרדם לך מה קום
 יהיה לבד זה ודיניו מנהגיו ודקדקתי וראיתי שולחנו מאוכלי הייתי ולרבבות לאלפים תלמידים העמיד אשר א”לורי שלמה ר”מוהר
.למנחה לכם  
1074 Moshe Mat, Mateh Moshe, Hilkhot ẓiẓit u-tfilin ve-hanaḥatan (Laws of fringes and phylacteries 
and putting them on), §15. 
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washing hands … until coming to the synagogue … and so, too, my teacher, our master 
Rabbi Shlomo of blessed memory, and so he writes in a responsum: ‘when I get up from 
my bed and wash my hands as they have decreed ... but in any case, one does not recite the 
blessing, … until I come to the synagogue’… until here his words.1075 
 
This is indeed a quote from the responsa, §64: 
What you asked, my friend, about the issue of prayer, asking whether I have a 
tradition (received) from elders [regarding] its contents, know that I did not have the merit 
to receive from my grandfather … the rabbi, Rabbi Yiẓḥak of blessed memory, even as a 
dog who licks from the sea, because when I was young, I labored in Talmud and pilpul 
[casuistry] and not in the fine points of prayer, and woe for this loss, also his books burned 
due to our many sins in the great fire that was in Poznan and the holy books burned as well 
as his prayer book and I only remember a little bit, and though it is little, my soul shall 
survive by it1076 and here they are: … and I will tell you what I added and removed in my 
own prayer, when I stand up from my bed and wash my hands as they have decreed … I 
do not say the blessing … until I come to the synagogue….1077 
 
Moshe Mat thus frequently quotes from the responsa in his book of customs; 
perhaps he is the one who sent Rabbi Luria the original request. In certain places, he not 
only cites his rabbi’s responsa but also provides references to specific entries by section 
number. For example, under the rules of meals, he refers specifically to Rabbi Luria’s 
responsa by section number: “and my master, in his responsa §72 wrote that covering with 
a hand is considered a covering even for himself….”1078 Clearly, there was considerable 
                                                     
1075 Moshe Mat, Mateh Moshe, §4. 
 בירך ואם. הכנסת לבית בואו עד יצר ואשר י”ענ ידיו כשנוטל בבוקר מברך שאינו ם”הר בשם’ כ בסימן הכלבו כתב. ד
 ש”מהר מורי וכן ן”מולי י”מהר בשם האגור כתב וכן. ל”עכ שהניח במקום ותופס הכנסת לבית בבואו אחרת פעם מברך אינו לכן קודם
 מקום מכל אבל לאכילה כמו ורחיצה נטילה צריך שבבוקר האשירי שכתוב כמו כתקנו ידי ורוחץ ממטתי קם כשאני’ בתשוב ל”וז ל”ז
ל”עכ נתקנה ובעבורה מקומה שם כי להתפלל הכנסת לבית בואי עד אני מניח י”וענ יצר אשר א”כ מברך אינו  
1076 Genesis 19:20. 
1077 ShUT MaharShaL, §64. 
1078 Moshe Mat, Mateh Moshe, §274; Mateh Moshe,§ 365 refers to §97 in Luria and quotes the entire 
responsum (in fact, the entire section here is only the quote from Rabbi Luria’s responsa). 
Another example in which Mat refers to Rabbi Luria’s written responsa is Mateh Moshe, “Dinei 
hanhagot be-vet ha-kneset ve-dinei braḥot ve-psukei de-zimra” (Rules of behavior in the synagogue and rules 
of blessings and verses of praise), §47 and §58 (both refer again to the same responsum from ShUT 
MaharShal, §64). Mateh Moshe §60 mentions something that Rabbi Luria wrote in his glosses to the Tur, 
and in 419§, Mat mentions something concerning the Shabbat candles, in which he quotes from Yam shel 
Shlomo. A multitude of different points from ShUT MaharShal, §64 are mentioned time and again in Mateh 
Moshe, mainly in the second unit of Mateh Moshe (“Amud ha-avodah,” the pillar of divine service), 
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overlap between works of customs and works of responsa. In addition to attenuating any 
strict categorizations of custom as oral versus law as textual, this circumstance helps us 
deconstruct the idea of responsa as a unifying category for books: far from being a separate 
genre, responsa were cited in collections of custom, and questions of custom appeared in 
responsa. 
Having established the lack of unity in terms of contents, we can now turn to 
internal structure and the organization of the material in the book. The responsa in ShUT 
MaharShaL clearly do not follow a prescribed order. Discussions of laws of inheritance, 
holidays, and burial – to name a few examples – appear throughout the responsa in no 
particular order, with no attempt to place similar topics in proximity. The seven explicit 
dates are insufficient to establish a detailed chronology of the responsa. The earliest date 
(1546) comes first, the latest date (1572) comes last, and the intervening decades are 
generally in the correct order; the scarcity of dates, however, limits the effort to discern 
any temporal order.1079 Moreover, the work lacks a clear thematic organizational scheme, 
even a rudimentary one, such as, for instance, placing the questions in separate sections 
based on the four main divisions of Jewish law used by the Arba Turim and Shulḥan Arukh 
(civil law; ritual law; holidays and liturgy; family law). Certain responsa do sometimes 
                                                     
concerning prayer. In addition to the above examples, §331, §336, §338 in “Dinei birkat ha-mazon” (Rules 
of the grace after meals), and §758, on fasting on one’s father’s yahrzeit (anniversary of death) when it occurs 
on the eve of Shabbat, provide specific section numbers from ShUT MaharShal (§9). 
Moreover, other sections, such as Mateh Moshe §695, concerning using freshly milked milk on the 
Shavuot holiday, refer to Rabbi Luria’s responsa without providing a specific section number. 
1079 Some of these dates are mentioned in the documents that are copied into the responsa, but do 
not neccesarily reflect the dates of the day on which Rabbi Luria wrote that particular responsum: §4: 1546/7; 
§8: 1554; §12, Reiner dates to about 1546; §20: 1559; §24: 1551; §35: 1547; §96: 1569; §101: 1572. 
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follow one another when their contents are related.1080 Sections 81 and 82, for instance, 
both deal with the problematic window of time after the evening prayer but before actual 
nightfall. The typical halakhic divisions, however, would not have placed these two 
questions in the same category, as one of them deals with this window of time in relation 
to burial whereas the other examines issues of menstrual purity during that interval, topics 
that are unrelated in the usual divisions of halakhic material. Even if certain related 
responsa appear in a sequence, the succession is associative rather than thematic.1081 
Moreover, another section, §14, deals with a similar problematic window of time, and no 
effort was made to move it any closer to the other two questions.1082 Apparently, one can 
rule out any consistent attempt at chronological or thematic organization.1083 
This lack of organization becomes very clear when considering the work’s index: 
                                                     
1080 Two consecutive sections, §53 and §54, deal with the period of mourning over the destruction 
of the Temple in the months of Tamuz and Av, and sections §57 and §58 both deal with laws of matzah. 
Sections §60 and §61 both concern forms of cooking on the Shabbat; §31 and 32 both deal with the Ninth of 
Av; §86 and §87 are about leavened bread on the eve of Passover; and §94 and §95 both concern ritual hand 
washing laws. 
1081 On the issue of having to choose between thematic and topical organization, see Ann Blair, The 
Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
78. She notes that Bodin’s decision to organize his Theatrum in question and answer form solved this issue: 
“The dialogue form gives Bodin the flexibility to combine both.” 
1082 Even the topics mentioned here are sometimes discussed elsewhere in the work, with no 
proximity to the questions mentioned. For instance, if thematic connections were an issue, §53-54 could 
easily have been placed in proximity to §31-32, as they all deal with the mourning over the destruction of the 
Temple during the months of Tamuz and Av. The cluster of sections beginning with §84 and ending with 
§89 are all atypical responsa in form. They do not contain the typical question and answer format, but, instead, 
are different sdarim, lists of rules and laws, and even one list of laws in riddle form, with an explanation. 
Although this part of the responsa does share a common element of atypical form, which may point to some 
intentional organization, other such material is scattered throughout the responsa, with no proximity to this 
particular cluster. For example, §65 is a description of the Hagadah and the Passover Seder. 
1083 There are several clusters of questions that give the impression of having originally been part of 
the same letter or document; §66-67, for instance, and §70-71 and §49-50 each contain one formal opening 
statement in the first of the pair, followed by one question, without a formal closing or signature. The second 
of the pair does not contain a formal greeting or opening. Instead, it contains a question (sometimes with 
“and” preceding it), and the closing greeting and signature. These may have been one document originally, 
which either Rabbi Luria himself (when arranging his notebook or papers) or the editor of the printed work 
divided into two sections. 
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The index was printed together with the first edition. It organizes the responsa under several 
halakhic topical headings such as “Laws of Sabbath” or “Laws of mourning,” providing a 
short description of the halakha related topics with references to the section number of the 
responsum where it is discussed. The list is not complete, meaning that not every 
responsum is noted in the index.1084 Conversely the same responsum is frequently 
mentioned more than once, sometimes even within the same section if more than one 
relevant law appears in it; for example, §6 is mentioned twice under “Laws of menstrual 
impurity.”1085 
Although the index is not detailed enough to be used as a work in its own right, it 
does serve as a useful (if somewhat incomplete and inconsistent) finding aid. The 
descriptions in the index are sometimes reformulated from specific cases into more general 
halakhic issues: For example, the question of §77 in the responsum is, “I was asked by a 
blind person whether he must light the Ḥanukah candles,” whereas the description in the 
index is more wide-ranging, stating: “A blind person, if he makes the blessing on the moon 
and ‘he who creates the luminaries’ and whether he is commanded to light Ḥanukah 
candles.” In other cases, however, the description in the index remains very case specific 
and is formulated exactly as the actual responsum: The question posed in responsum §94, 
for example, focuses on a common practice in which travelers would wash their hands in 
the morning and then disregard ritual hand washing during the rest of the day. Instead of 
                                                     
1084 For instance, §29 is not mentioned, which is somewhat understandable because it concerns a 
non-halakhic topic (the chronology of the sages) and thus would not fit anywhere in the index; §18, however, 
would easily fit under the laws of the Shabbat, but does not appear in the index, nor do §45 and §56. 
1085 This reformulation in a more general vein makes the index similar to the shorashim (roots) that 
existed for Rabbi Kolon’s printed responsa, discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
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transforming this specific description into a more general halakhic theme, the index reads: 
“Travelers who are accustomed to be lenient regarding hand washing and wipe them on 
grass etc.” For the sake of comparison, the index in a more recent edition describes the 
question more universally: “Whether travelers are allowed to stipulate a condition in the 
morning so as not to wash their hands all day.”1086 
Some of the details in the index seem superfluous. For instance, the description of 
§14, placed under “Laws of marriage,” contains a three-line account of “one from our 
country who was married to a woman and went to the land of Togra (Turkey) and married 
again, and it became known to the sages who were there, and they decreed....,” when it 
could have been described in shorter, simpler terms, of less than a line, which was typical 
throughout the index. Another such example can be found under “Slander.”1087 The entry 
is described as “A person who has slandered a certain young man how he slept in one bed 
with his married sister and washed with her in one bathtub, §28.” The legal import of the 
case could have been described in less vivid terms, without all these details,1088 but perhaps 
the table of contents was designed to catch the potential customer’s interest, thus 
highlighting the more extreme and sensationalist elements.1089 
                                                     
1086 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL (Jerusalem: Oẓar ha-sfarim, 1969), 10.  אם מותר להולכי דרך להתנות על
.היום כל ידים ליטול שלא בשחרית הידים  
1087 The heading omits “Laws of,” which is somewhat appropriate; as these cases do not involve 
much legal deliberation, they usually use the authority of the rabbi to quell a rumor or an assault on someone’s 
reputation. 
1088 ShUT MaharShaL (Lublin, 1574-5), 4b:  אחד הוציא לעז על בחור אחד איך ששכב עם אחותו בעולת בעל
אחת באמבטי עמה ורחץ במטה . For example, it could have been described as: “a case of slander against siblings, 
and the brother claims that the stain on his reputation has impacted his livelihood, and the sister’s husband 
wants retribution for his wife’s shame.” 
1089 Beyond the goal of piquing the reader’s interest with titillating stories, it also emphasizes the 
fact that Rabbi Luria was trusted not only with intricate problems of scholarship but also with delicate 
questions of personal status (marriage, divorce, lineage) that could have very real and dire consequences on 
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In sum, the uneven nature of the index reflects the lack of organization, unity, and 
structural coherence of the work as a whole. In addition to certain omissions and 
disproportion, the index also includes outright mistakes. A description of a responsum 
regarding carrying on Sabbath, for instance, refers the reader to §46, which deals with a 
similar issue, but the correct reference should have been §51. Other mistakes are more 
blatant, as when the question “whether a sick person may ask magicians, §3” for instance, 
is placed under the heading “Laws of interest.”1090 For two entries of the index, the word 
“section” is provided, but the actual section number is missing.1091 
As a whole, the editing of this work is very uneven: Many questions use the typical 
generic names (Ploni, Almoni) or the names of the tribes (Reuven, Shimon) to replace 
personal names and list towns in Israel (Tiberias, Sepphoris) to replace place names.1092 
Several other sections, however, did mention personal names, place names, and other 
specific identifying information, for example: §14 mentions the community of Plevna; §19 
involves a Moshe, son of Eliezer; and §89 contains several full names.1093 The printer and 
                                                     
the most central aspects of a person’s life, such as whether and whom one was permitted to marry. On the 
serious issues of lineage at the time, see Reiner, “Yihus.” 
1090 That mistake may derive from the fact that in the Tur, Yoreh de’ah, the laws of interest are 
followed by the laws of “non-Jews and witchcraft.” It shows that someone involved in the index was using 
the organization of the Tur as a reference point to some extent, although this was not reflected in other aspects 
of the index, such as the order of the topics, which diverge from that of the topics in the Tur in small ways 
(e.g., which topic follows which) and bigger ways (e.g., the designation of the four separate books). 
1091 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL (Lublin, 1574-5), 2b:  -נוסח קידוש של שמיני עצרת תמצא בסוף סימן it should 
be §68. 
.- סימן לילה קודם עצרת שמיני בליל לקדש יש ואם  
1092 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §1, for example. 
1093 Other examples: §11 mentions Anshil/Hansel and Shimon Günzberg, as well as Miriam. The 
case is a very delicate personal one; §19 mentions a Moshe ben Eliezer, who calls into question a divorce 
document from Neustadt; §20 and 21 include official testimonies in Yiddish (with full names, etc.); §33 
includes full testimonies and names in a case of suspected adultery, replete with details; §59 about a 
scandalous thing a man said to a respected woman – all the names are included, as well as the full testimony 
containing a quote of the shocking things that were whispered; §69 contains full names in a case of regrets 
about a match; the responsum in §89 openly wonders why the letter writer hid the names of those involved, 
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editor, apparently, did not attempt to obscure or change the names of the people involved 
in these cases. Reiner has studied one case where it seems that a responsum regarding a 
questionable lineage, which included the names of a prominent rabbinical family, was 
censored after print; the quire including the problematic responsum was removed and 
replaced by an identical looking quire that skipped directly from the previous responsum 
to the subsequent one, leaving no trace of the omitted pages. The volume also includes 
countless minor mistakes and inconsistencies: for example, §16 is not numbered, §56 lacks 
the usual typographical distinction between the question and the answer, and so forth. 
Some material in the book seems to have no place in a work of responsa. In the first 
edition, the very last entry of the book (§101, which appears to be not a responsum but a 
copy of several court documents about a case of slander, opening with the formula: “in the 
presence of three, a court, which are as one…,”1094 together with a copy of the public 
condemnation of one of those involved; an attempt to clear the slandered woman’s name; 
and a rabbinic opinion on the case) concludes with a threefold repetition of the word “tam” 
(finis) alone, on one line  somewhere halfway down the page. Before the last reiteration of 
“tam,” however, two words – “simanei dinim” (signs of laws) – introduce, in a barely 
noticeable fashion, the following five and a half pages. 
These pages contain a list of short, one or two line passages, which appear to be 
very brief summaries of specific points of halakha, together with references for the sources 
                                                     
and §96 gives a full copy of the testimonial documents with full names concerning a person who asks for a 
‘prescription’ to repent for having been the indirect cause of someone else’s death, and so on. These are 
unedited documents meant for specialists, rabbis, and courts, who needed to know the pertinent information, 
and, perhaps, also for those involved who required proof to clear their names; there was no need to print such 
details in the book of responsa, however, and such elements were usually omitted in printed responsa. 
1094 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §101: במותב תלתא בי דינא כחדא הוינא. 
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being summarized in a range of works, such as Sefer ha-Mordekhai and Trumat ha-deshen. 
The reason for the appearance of the list or its relationship, if any, to the rest of the work 
of responsa is unclear. Some, but not many, of the laws summarized here, and their source, 
referenced in the summary, show up in some of the responsa (for example, the last lines on 
the first page of the list are mentioned in §11 of the responsa). In fact, this list is not 
explicitly mentioned anywhere, and the next seven editions, starting from the second in 
1599, simply omit it. Taken as a whole, the work thus appears more like a heterogeneous 
compilation including mainly – but not exclusively – correspondence and other documents, 
notes, and writings related to halakha or to other aspects of Rabbi Luria’s career as a scholar 
and religious community leader. It would be difficult to find any one classification that 
perfectly defines this work, but one thing is clear: it is not a compilation of case law. 
 
 
c. The Responsa of Rabbi Yosef Katz 
Rabbi Yosef Katz, born in ca. 1511, was a well-respected rabbi in Cracow, serving on the 
city’s rabbinical court together with Rabbi Moshe Isserles, who was his younger relative. 
His collection of responsa was the first printed in Ashkenaz in an author’s own lifetime.1095 
Glick does not list the work as having been printed in the author’s lifetime, but Rabbi 
Katz’s introduction clearly shows that he was involved in preparing the work for print. The 
                                                     
1095 Glick, Kuntres ha-tshuvot, 1: 96-97, 101.  וה' א-להא...ישביזנה מכל צרה ויחדש כנשר נעוריו יאריך ימי
 הארון ר"בהר יצחק הדפוס ממעל העומד המחוקק דברי כה הלא...תמימה' ה תורת יסוד סוד שיח בנועם לחוות תפארתו יקרת הדרת
.מפרוסטיץ  
Perhaps by the time the title page was being printed, he had already passed away, or perhaps this 
can only be found on certain copies of the first edition, where it was added later. (For more on inconsistencies 
among copies of this edition, see discussion below.) 
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title page of the work does add “of saintly and blessed memory” after Rabbi Katz’s name, 
but it also mentions that the printing began on the twelfth of the Hebrew month of  Shvat 
1590, a full year before Rabbi Katz’s death (on 2 Shvat of 1591). Moreover, the work 
concludes with a prayer by “the printer who is standing above the press, Yiẓḥak … Prostiẓ,” 
asking God to restore “like an eagle his youth” to Rabbi Katz, and lengthen his life, 
meaning that he was clearly alive at the time (perhaps he was sick, hence the prayer to 
restore his strength). 
The vast majority of the responsa in Rabbi Katz’s collection deal with issues related 
to monetary law, such as business, marriage, and divorce contracts, inheritances and wills, 
and other conflicts about contracts and finances; less than half of the responsa deal with 
laws related to kosher food, ritual purity, holidays, and the like. It is thus not by any means 
a complete collection of legal matters. The author introduced, endorsed, or described all 
entries, rather than having the original question copied in its entirety. Very few entries 
contain the full question, with the names of the people involved and their salutations.1096 
Rabbi Katz himself appears to have paraphrased and reported, or at least introduced with 
one line, all the entries, aside from a few exceptions. Almost every single entry is 
introduced by a variation on these formulas: “a question from the holy community 
                                                     
1096 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §36 is an exception (the letter was written by Rabbi Menaḥem Man 
Bacharach and is printed in full). In §41, the letter is also provided in full (it is signed by a Moshe ben Eliakim 
of Heilprun, who, after the signature, adds, אחד״ סניף שכחתיש כמעט״  – “I almost forgot one element…” and 
explains more details about the case). Likewise, §71 is an exception – it is parallel to the documents about 
the case in Rabbi Isserles’ responsa, §12-16. 
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of…,”1097 “I was asked…,”1098 “this is what I responded…,”1099 “a question from…,”1100 
“before us came…,”1101 “we were asked to judge…,”1102 “a thing that occurred….”1103 In 
one case, he describes a halakhic question and then concludes, “and I have been asked 
concerning this several times.”1104 Structurally, the responsa themselves thus demonstrate 
some level of consistency and unity. 
A glance at the book as a whole, however, shows the limits of this consistency. 
First, in terms of the overall organization of the responsa in the book, as in Rabbi Luria’s 
work, the collection does not display any clear order; for instance, the work contains 
numerous questions regarding the shtar ḥaẓi ḥelek zakhar, a document that allows 
daughters to inherit, but no effort is made to concentrate these in one place.1105 The first 
printed edition of ShUT she’erit Yosef contains several mistakes and inconsistencies. For 
example, two consecutive entries are labeled §32. In order to compensate, the table of 
contents (which is nothing more than a list of the responsa with a short description of the 
issues) simply lists §32 twice, adding the folio number after the section number. Thus, the 
first §32 reads: “§32, folio 44, regarding a testimony…,” whereas the next one says “§32, 
folio 47, two people who bought a stolen object….”1106 Elsewhere in the book, §68 is 
misnumbered as §71. In the table of contents, the line between §67 and §69, which should 
                                                     
1097 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, §3, 33, and many more. "שאלה מק"ק" 
1098 Ibid., §20, 22, and many more."נשאלתי "  
1099 Ibid., §24, 25, and many more. "זה השבתי ל" 
1100 Ibid., §26, 27, and many more. "...שאלה מ"  
1101 Ibid., §15, 16, 39, and many more. "...בפני... נתעצמו בפני...בפנינו" 
1102 Ibid., §38, 43, and many more. "...הובררנו לדון...זאת לדעת שבא לפנינו" 
1103 Ibid., §35, 23, and many more. "...מעשה" 
1104 Ibid., §74: "...שאלה...וכמה פעמים נשאלתי על זה" 
1105 Ibid., §1, 2, 8, 35, 37, 62, 67, 74. 
1106 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, Table of Contents, 2b: לב דף מ"ד בעדות...לב דף מ"ז שנים שקנו 
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have contained §68, is not listed by any section number. Instead, only the page and folio 
where that responsum is printed are provided.1107 As Yiẓḥak Rivkind has already pointed 
out, four responsa, apparently, were added at the last moment, after the book was already 
almost ready for publication.1108 These four responsa were printed with the table of 
contents, the first of them appearing immediately after the list of contents ended, on the 
same page. Although all the copies I have seen contain these responsa, Rivkind mentions 
copies of the same edition that do not contain them.1109 
The work’s haphazard organization and lack of unity becomes even clearer upon 
consideration of the printed book’s title-page: The responsa of Rabbi Yosef Katz, ShUT 
she’erit Yosef, as it is commonly called, is not, in fact, the work’s real title. The title page 
reads: “The responsa and explanations on the Mordekhai … and on the Tur … which were 
clarified and glossed by Rabbi Yosef Katz, also known as she’erit Yosef.1110 This much 
longer and more convoluted title reflects the varied contents of the work more accurately. 
The book contains about eighty responsa, followed by assorted glosses and explanations 
of the other two works mentioned on the title page. It is thus, not solely a collection of 
responsa, nor is it even a collection of responsa with some added writings appended at the 
end; a third of the book consists of these non-responsa items. The glosses themselves are 
                                                     
1107 This reference, to page 75d, is not entirely correct either: although the response does indeed start 
on the page referenced, but not on that quarto (it starts on 75a), the question that precedes the response starts 
one quarto before that. Perhaps in order not to draw attention to the blatant misnumbering of the question, 
they referred the reader to the page of the response where the wrong number is not visible. 
1108 Yiẓḥak Rivkind, “Dikdukei sfarim” [Bibliographical inquiries], in Alexander Marx Jubilee 
Volume: Hebrew Section, ed. Saul Lieberman (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), 
401-432. 
1109 Rivkind, “Dikdukei sfarim,” 422-423. 
1110 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, title-page: שאלות ותשובות וביאורי׳ על המרדכי...ועל טור חשן המשפט: אשר
״...יוסף שארית בשם ונקרא יצ״ו זצ״ל...הגאון ותקן וחקר אזן  
UNIT III, CHAPTER 6: RESPONSA FROM SCHOLARLY ARCHIVE TO PUBLISHED BOOK 
 
 522   
 
poorly organized, containing numerous awkward passages and redundancies.1111 For 
instance, in the middle of a series of glosses on the Mordekhai on one chapter of a tractate 
of the Talmud, Rabbi Katz suddenly starts his gloss by stating which chapter and tractate 
he is glossing, something that should be obvious from the sequence. In short, the work does 
not fit the paradigm of a work of responsa. How, then, do we explain the overall logic of 
this book? 
Rabbi Katz wrote an introduction to the work, replete with apologies, assuring the 
reader that he never intended to print this work. He then explains the book’s origins: Some 
of the writings were created in the course of his forty-nine years as a judge in the rabbinical 
court of Cracow; others were the result of the “questions that arose from all the praised 
communities of Israel, near and far.”1112 The explanations on the Mordekhai and Tur were 
written as he noticed apparent contradictions or mistakes while teaching and studying those 
works, which he elucidated and corrected. In other words, he does not elaborate an 
underlying logic unifying this book but merely describes the circumstances prompting the 
writings contained in it. In explaining the rationale for publishing the book as a whole, he 
writes the following: “And the omniscient witness can testify for me that I wrote this only 
                                                     
1111 Asher Siev, “Preface,” ShUT she’erit Yosef, ed. Asher Siev (New York: Yeshiva University 
Press, 1984), 36. 
 עם בלימדיו בהם שהשתמש הספרים דפי משולי העתיקן ההדפסה שלצורך נראה והטור המרדכי על רבינו לביאורי בנוגע
 הביאורים יתר אל ונתחברו נאספו ולבסוף בודדים גליונות על נכתבו והארות הערות שהרבה מסתבר אבל... קצרים הם שהרי, ידיותלמ
 במקום". משפט בחשן" במילים סימונו את מתחיל מ"ח ביאורי באמצע אחדים שבמקומות מוזרה תופעה נבין זה לפי. לדפוס שהוכנו
...שונים תרוצים ומתרץ קושיה אותה מקשה, פעמיים מ"שבח הדין אותו את מביא אחד  
He cites, for instance, a case in which Rabbi Katz adds, “meaning…” after a few words in 
Mordekhai’s quote of the Talmud, and then completes the sentence exactly as it appears in our Talmud. 
 מוטעת גירסא שהיתה להסיק אנו נאלצים. ללמדנו בא מה תמהים ועומדים בדבריו חדוש שום יםמוצא אין ולפעמים...
. הנכונה הגירסא את ולחזק לברר בא ולכן תלמידיו בהם שהשתמשו בספרים  
1112 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, introduction:  גם פרשתי כנפי על כל הבא לדרוש דבר ה׳ בשאלות עולות מכל
רחוק ממקום הן קרוב ממקום הן ישראל תהלות קהלות  
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to have it in my hands for the needs of my old age, out of fear of ‘guard yourself lest you 
forget….”1113 Anyone familiar with these tropes can guess the rest; his colleagues and 
children begged and prodded him to print these personal notes, which is how he explains 
the publication of the book. In other words, the work has no overarching logic other than 
the fact that Rabbi Katz had amassed these writings throughout his rabbinical career. 
d. Rabbi Moshe Isserles and ShUT Rema 
In sum, the two works of responsa by sixteenth-century ashkenazic rabbis that were printed 
in Ashkenaz in that century do not fit the ideal paradigm of responsa. Moreover, the 
circumstances surrounding their printing suggest that the authors had not planned to 
publish these works in any organized fashion. Indeed, this unplanned approach seems 
characteristic of much of print publication in the sixteenth century of works by authors who 
were still active. We will now consider the third and last figure, Rabbi Moshe Isserles, also 
known by his acronym Rema, whose book of responsa was not printed until 1640, several 
decades after his early death in 1572. The responsa, published at the press of Menaḥem 
Naḥum Meisels in Cracow, were brought to print by a nephew named Moshe, the son of 
Elazar, Rabbi Isserles’ brother, and financed by a Yacov Eliezer, who was married to Rabbi 
Isserles’ granddaughter. 
Rabbi Isserles’ nephew introduces the book by first praising the author, then 
quickly mentioning the responsa, after which he moves on to Rabbi Isserles’ other works: 
“These are the responsa that were secreted under the throne of glory[/seat of honor] of the 
                                                     
1113 Katz, ShUT she’erit Yosef, introduction:  ונאמן עלי היודע ועד שלא כתבתי זאת רק להיות בידי לצורכי
...וגומר תשכח פן לך השמר יראת מפני לזקנתי  
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author, our master the rabbi, Rabbi Moshe, he of the Mapah which is spread over all of 
life, they are the glosses on the Shulḥan Arukh…”1114 The statement that the responsa were 
“secreted under the throne of glory” of Rabbi Isserles, as well as a similar description in 
the opening poem mentioning “the beloved responsa that were hidden until now, you can 
see them with your eyes…”1115 imply that the letters were taken from some cache of his 
writings, perhaps in a study.1116 
Other than this one line mentioning the book that it was introducing, however, the 
rest of the introduction discusses primarily the publisher’s hope of printing Darkhei Moshe, 
Rabbi Isserles’ larger work, which he had begun writing even before the Mapah, but which 
had not yet been printed at that time. In what is ostensibly an introduction to a collection 
of responsa, the only titles mentioned are Shulḥan Arukh and Darkhei Moshe; the latter is 
mentioned twice more and printed in larger, bolder letters. Additional expressions such as: 
“If he who awakens to help sees that he desires the Torah of Moshe, he should shed from 
his money and expenditures to lead you also in the ways of Moshe (Darkhei Moshe)…”1117 
                                                     
1114 Isserles, ShUT Rema, introduction: אלו התשובות שהיו גנוזות מתחת כסא כבוד. המחבר הגאון מהר״ר משה 
.הש״ע הגהות ה״ה החיים כל על הפרושה המפה בעל  
1115 Isserles, ShUT Rema, opening poem (emphasis in original):  התשובות החביבות שהיו גנוזות עד הנה
. בארחותם לילך משה ובדרכי ה׳ בנועם לחזות תוכל כן. לשתותם המתוקים ומימיהם לאכול מפרים. לראותם בעיניך  
The poem praises Rabbi Isserles’ leadership and Torah prowess. The first words of every stanza, 
taken together, read ישראל״ בני לפני משה שם אשר התורה וזאת״  (“And this is the Torah that Moshe placed before 
the Sons of Israel,” Deuteronomy 4:44.) from the top down, and the last words read מורשה משה לנו צוה תורה״ 
יעקב״ קהלת  (“Moshe has commanded upon us the Torah, a inheritance from the community of Yacov,” 
Deuteronomy 33:4.) from the top down. 
1116 Aron Prostiẓ of Cracow, the printer of some tractates of the Babylonian Talmud that included 
Rabbi Isserles’ glosses on Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s Talmudic commentaries called “the Asheri” (Cracow: 
Prostiẓ, 1602), mentions having these glosses from Rabbi Isserles’ actual handwriting, ידו״ מכתיבת ממש״  as 
the title page proclaims. See Ḥayim Dov Friedberg, Toldot ha-dfus ha-ivri be-Polania (History of Hebrew 
typography in Poland), 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv: Baruch Friedberg, 1950), 21. 
1117 Isserles, ShUT Rema, introduction (emphasis in original): 
 הגאון שכת׳ וכמו וברוך ארוך חיים מים מקור מקורו. ערוך השולחן לכל עיני כסות שהוא משה דרכי הגדול ספרו ה״ה 
. ידו ימלא החפץ...פאר יכהן כחתן. אחריה רבה מצוה גוררת מצוה להיות ממנו אנכי גם אבנה אולי: ל״ה סי׳ בתשובה עצמו המחבר
 יזיל משה לעזור כי חפצי׳ בתור׳?] [המעיר בראות. לידייכו ראתא מן ויביא יבוא ה׳ מבקש כל והיה. קמייכו אמטי דאתקין קמא מקמ׳
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suggest that this nephew was using the responsa to attract investors to print Darkhei Moshe. 
Although it was printed at a later date than the other works, and at a longer interval 
after the author’s death, this collection, similarly, was not conceived as a strong unit, as a 
number of elements show. The book contains about 130 sections on a wide variety of 
topics. Many are clearly based on actual letters, such as §48, a responsum sent by Rabbi 
Isserles to Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen of Padua (ca. 1482-1564), which even includes the 
latter’s agreement with Rabbi Isserles’ decision at the bottom. Other entries seem more 
akin to a judge’s notes or diary entries, such as §29: “The aforementioned rabbis disagreed 
on one more thing regarding the sukah…,”1118 or §30, which is introduced as “something 
that occurred in Cracow … and the aforementioned came before me to demand….”1119 
Moreover, almost a third of the ShuT Rema was not penned by Rabbi Isserles himself.1120 
Although the responsa do not follow a specific organizational pattern, some 
correspondence is arranged in associated clusters, as, for instance, §3-9, which all belong 
to Rabbi Isserles’ correspondence with Rabbi Luria, or §12-16, in which all the material 
forms a discrete unit. The earliest responsum that can be dated precisely stems from 1550; 
the latest dated one was written in 1571, close to Rabbi Isserles’ death.1121 The earliest 
responsum is among the first ten responsa of the book, while the latest responsum is the 
final entry in ShUT Rema. No real attempt was made, however, to organize the responsa, 
                                                     
 כי. באורחותיו נלכה מדרכיו יורנו ה׳ באור נלכה לאמר יאמרו ה׳ יראי ישראל בית) משה בדרכי( גם אתכם להדריך  מוצאו כסף
 זלחהעה״ב המחבר הגאון אחי אלעזר כמהר״ר א״א בן משה הצעיר נאם. פשתותיו מדבבות ה׳ ודבר תורה תצא הזה הגדול מצי״ון
.יסודו תהילת אשבח. הודו לכבוד ובכן. דודו להיותו. בכבודו מכובד  
1118 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §29: ...עוד אחרת נפל בין החכמי׳ הנ״ל בעשיית הסוכה. 
1119 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §30: ...מעשה היה פה ק״ק קראקא באחד שמו אברם...והנה זה אברם הנ״ל בא לפני. 
1120 Roughly 40 out of the 132 entries were written by rabbis other than Rabbi Isserles. 
1121 Asher Siev, “Introduction” in Isserles, ShUT Rema, ed. Asher Siev (New York: Yeshiva 
University Press, 1971), 29. 
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whether chronologically, topically, or by correspondent. The work contains many other 
instances of correspondence between Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Luria in addition to the first 
cluster of seven responsa with Rabbi Luria, but they are not placed with that cluster. 
Although several topics recur throughout the responsa, they are not positioned near one 
another. For instance, two responsa about the very same issue are separated by one 
unrelated responsum, but, rather than moving them together, the editor points out in the 
table of contents that §26 is “some more about the issue of the shtuki (a person of unknown 
lineage) from above, which is in §24,”1122; he does not move §25 out of the way or explain 
its awkward location. In another example of editorial carelessness, §25 itself was neither 
composed by Rabbi Isserles nor addressed to him; it was probably found among his letters 
and included accidentally. In another such mistake, §62 was neither from nor addressed to 
Rabbi Isserles.1123 The topic of the shtuki, discussed in §24 and 26, is addressed yet again, 
in §69 – the question is even prefaced by the remark that “this responsum is related to 
responsum §24 above, which also discusses this issue”1124 – but, clearly, placing the two 
together was not a priority.1125 The book displays many such simple signs of 
disorganization: the answers given in responsum §95, for instance, are replies to questions 
provided only in §113, and so forth. 
                                                     
1122 Isserles, ShUT Rema, Table of Contents, 64:2b כו – עוד על ענין השתוקי הנ״ל שבסי׳ כ״ד. 
1123 See Siev, “Introduction,” in Isserles, ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 30-32. It was written by Rabbi Israel 
Shakhna to a Rabbi Moshe ben Meshulam from Italy. See also, Isserles, ShUT Rema, §25, ed. Siev, 147n*. 
Those who published the book saw that it was addressed to a “Rabbi Moshe” and assumed this was Rabbi 
Isserles, thus placing the responsum in the collection, although the mistake could be discovered quite easily. 
1124 Isserles, ShUT Rema, 1st ed., §69.  .סט תשובה זו יש לה שייכות לתשובה כ"ד לעיל המדברת ג"כ מענין זה
...סט  
1125 In the table of contents, at §24, it mentions that the topic is discussed in §69, but under §26, 
which also deals with this topic, only §24 is mentioned, omitting §69. Under §69, it is mentioned that this 
topic is also discussed elsewhere, but an incorrect reference (to §28) is provided. 
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We can conclude that structurally this book most resembles a roughly chronological 
letter collection, in which units of correspondence – not topics, or even addressees – 
constitute the organizing principle. Probably, the letters were kept more or less in the order 
of arrival and then published that way, without much rearranging. As Rabbi Efraim 
Margaliot of Brodt (1762-1828), the author of genealogical and hagiographical works 
about Rabbi Isserles and his circle, wrote: “most likely, the responsa were sent to Rema 
and kept among his writings and they [the printers] thought that it is from Rema and printed 
it … and so too the responsa from §55 to §60, they were also laying among the writings 
and were printed….”1126 
The responsa printed in §5-7 in ShUT Rema, which represent part of the 
correspondence between Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Luria, have been discussed in the 
previous chapter. The intense acrimony of these letters and their esoteric subject, on the 
one hand, and the publication of only part of the correspondence, on the other, suggest that 
the collection of responsa was published by Rabbi Isserles’ descendants without giving the 
details of the project too much thought. The letters are almost incomprehensible, both 
because of the private hints and insinuations and because of the topics that were broached. 
The insults that flew between the rabbis are especially stinging and strongly worded; yet, 
they were oddly enough published without any editing to temper these halakhically 
irrelevant personal altercations. Rabbi Luria clearly also possessed copies of the 
correspondence, as he cites both his own and Rabbi Isserles’ earlier letters in later ones, 
                                                     
1126 Efraim Zalman Margaliot of Brod, Ma’alot ha-yuḥasin (Lemberg: Rohatyn, 1900), 2: 
וכפי הנראה נשלחו ...א רק הוא גדול אחד מארץ לועז"ל אינו הרמ"י ז"ה משה שנזכר כאן שהשיב לו מהר"כי הגאון מו
' ה עד סי"נ' א מן סי"הרמ' ה שנדפסה בתשוא וכן התשוב"להרמ' א ונשארו בין כתביו והיו סבורים שהוא תשו"אלו ליד הרמ' תשו
...א ונדפסו"מונחים בין כתבי הרמ' כ הי"ר ג"סמך בענין הגט מפראג שהיה בשנת שיו  
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but he chose not to include them in his printed work. If we speculate that publishing these 
letters was a conscious editorial decision, rather than an oversight, for instance, because 
the publishers of ShUT Rema decided after the death of both correspondents that these 
letters could be published, a different question arises: Why did they not print the missing 
letters that preceded the printed exchange, which could have clarified the topic under 
discussion? It is likely that the publishers of the work simply printed whatever they could 
find. 
There are two strong editorial elements in ShUT Rema – the remarks that were 
added in parentheses in cursive font (so-called “RaShY script”),1127 usually to provide more 
precise references to sources in other works, and the table of contents at the end of the 
work. Some references added clarifications1128 and others provided cross-referencing 
within the work.1129 Both of these contributions, however, contain many inconsistencies 
and countless mistakes. Some remarks are rendered in the first person, for example, §7 
says, “In any event, my proofs are not rejected,” and, in parentheses after “proofs,” is added 
“(those that I wrote at first),” creating the impression that Rabbi Isserles himself wrote 
these remarks, possibly at a later point, in the margins of his copy of the responsa.1130 Other 
                                                     
1127 On why the sfardic semi-cursive typeface in printed books gained the name “RaShY 
script,” see Mordechai Glatzer, “Early Hebrew Printing” in A Sign and a Witness: 2000 
Years of Hebrew books and illuminated manuscripts, ed. Leonard Singer Gold (NY: 
NYPL and Oxford University Press, 1988), 89. 
1128 For instance, in ShUT Rema, §17, which discusses testimony about adultery. Throughout the 
discussion, the relevant sentences from the Yiddish testimonies are repeated in parentheses. Another example 
is ShUT Rema, §6, on page 15a in the first edition. 
1129 For instance, in ShUT Rema, §26, Rabbi Isserles writes that he himself has already “answered 
my part in this” ( בזה חלקי עניתי וכבר בזה קולמוסים כמה ונשברו דיואות הרבה נשפכו כבר...השתוקי דבר ועל( . In other 
words, he already wrote a responsum regarding such an issue. In parentheses, the reference to the responsum 
in which Rabbi Isserles dealt with the issue (§24) is provided. 
1130 ShUT Rema, §7. 
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first person remarks, however, seem to be an editorial voice, such as the comment before 
§5: “This responsum was already printed in ShUT MaharShaL … therefore I shortened the 
responsum itself … only [I included some of it] to append to them the ending, which was 
not printed there.”1131 It is not clear who created these references. Perhaps it was the same 
anonymous person who did so for Rabbi Isserles’ Mapah, which first appeared with such 
references (similarly in parentheses and cursive font) in 1607, printed by Prostiẓ.1132 The 
press of Meisels replaced Prostiẓ’s print shop in Cracow around 1630 and took over much 
of their typographic material and employees.1133 Possibly, they also “inherited” access to 
Rabbi Isserles’ manuscripts or copies thereof, which included these references in the 
margins, or the same editors who added the references in the Mapah did so for the responsa. 
The printing press was located in Cracow, where Rabbi Isserles had lived, and near many 
of his colleagues and relatives who no doubt possessed manuscripts from him or copies 
thereof, so it is not difficult to imagine how the material was collected. While such 
references could indicate a strong editorial vision; they are riddled with so many 
inconsistencies, omissions, and errors, that they provide little structure or unity to the 
                                                     
1131 ShUT Rema, §5:  תשובה זו כבר נדפסה בתשובת מהרש״ל...ולכך קצרתי עצמות התשובה...רק להסמיך אליהם
.סוף דבריו שלא נדפס שם  
1132 It is not known who wrote these references, but Rabbi Isserles’ own introduction to his Mapah 
mentions that he does not provide exact references, meaning that they must have been added later. In fact, 
the introduction by the printers of the 1607 Mapah clearly mentions that they created these references for 
that edition (much later, scholars assumed that these references came from Rabbi Isserles and, at times, 
erroneously used them as the basis for halakhic interpretations). 
Some historians believed that they were created by Rabbi Shimon, son of Pinḥas Horowitz, but he 
was actually involved in a later edition, after 1607. See Shulḥan Arukh Friedman Edition, Oraḥ ḥayim 
(Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1994), 1: 35-36. See also Ḥayim Shlomo Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in 
Moshe Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-shalem [The complete Darkhei Moshe], ed. Ḥayim Shlomo Rosenthal 
(Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1979), vol. Ḥoshen mishpat, 19-34. See also, Siev, “Introduction” in ShUT 
Rema, ed. Siev, 18-20. 
1133 See Friedberg, Toldot ha-dfus ha-ivri be-Polania, 27. 
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work.1134 In terms of finding aids, there is no topical index, and the table of contents at the 
end of the book simply provides a list of the sections with a short description of each. As 
this addition, too, is filled with errors, it can serve only for a very cursory overview of the 
contents. 
Another explicit editorial intervention was the decision not to print those responsa 
that had a parallel in the printed ShUT MaharShaL. The responsa in question were omitted, 
but, curiously, the section number and sometimes the description remained, followed by a 
note informing the reader where to find the responsum in question in Rabbi Luria’s book. 
It is puzzling that they decided to leave the section number from ShUT Rema’s absent 
responsum in place rather than simply removing it. For instance, in §60 of ShUT Rema, all 
one can see are two lines, proclaiming: “60 already printed in the responsa of Rabbi Luria 
§50….”1135 Next, §61 likewise only mentions that this responsum was already printed in 
Rabbi Luria’s collection and sends the reader not only to the relevant responsum in that 
work but also to a related responsum in ShUT Rema itself. It would have made more sense 
to place the whole remark next to that responsum, which was printed, rather than in an 
empty entry dozens of sections later!1136 
The references regarding the omitted entries in ShUT Rema and their location in 
ShUT MaharShaL were provided both in the body of ShUT Rema, next to the section 
number where they would have appeared, and under the corresponding section number in 
                                                     
1134 See also Siev, “Introduction,” in ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 20. 
1135 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §60: ע כבר נדפס בתשובת מהרש"ל סימן נ' עד ומההיא דפ' אלמנה ניזונת. 
1136 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §61: עא נדפס בתשובת מהרש"ל סי' מ"ט וע"ל בסי' א׳. 
To add to the confusion, the reference to the entry in ShUT Rema is wrong – it should be §3, 4 not 
§1. 
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the table of contents. Some inconsistencies between references to the same responsum in 
the table of contents and the book itself are among the many editorial errors.1137 For 
instance, §18 is about women beginning their preparations to use the ritual bath during the 
daytime; it was omitted because “it is printed in the responsa of Rabbi Luria, §11.”1138 
Rabbi Isserles’ contribution to this topic can be found in §21, which is described, rather 
confusingly, as “response to the gaon, the author, about dipping in the ritual bath … which 
is in the responsa of Rabbi Luria §6, and it was not printed there.”1139 The description in 
§21 of the body of ShUT Rema is clearer: “The topic of this question is written in the 
responsa of Rabbi Luria §6, but this responsum [§21] is not printed there.”1140 The 
publishers seem to have conceived of the responsa collection not as a work onto itself but 
as part of a larger body of correspondence and therefore saw no need to print those parts 
of the correspondence that had already been printed in Rabbi Luria’s collection. Perhaps 
they assumed that the audience for both works of responsa was identical. 
In short, the responsa of Rabbi Isserles were printed as a loose collection of letters, 
with barely any attempt at structuring the work or determining an organizing principle for 
the unit as a whole. This is very revealing about the conditions in which responsa were kept 
and published, even several decades into the seventeenth century. Most important for our 
                                                     
1137 For instance, §4 is omitted, because it appears in ShUT MaharShaL, §49. The table of contents, 
under §4, provides the correct reference, but the body of the work sends the reader to ShUT MaharShaL, §91. 
1138 Isserles, ShUT Rema, Table of Contents, 64:2b.  יח על ענין הטבילה והחפיפה ביום ונדפסה בתשובת
י״א סי׳ מהרש״ל  
According to Siev’s notes in his edition of ShUT Rema, 128n9, the table of contents sends the reader 
to Rabbi Luria’s responsum “above” (הנ״ל), but I have not found this. 
1139 Isserles, ShUT Rema, Table of Contents, 64:2b. כא תשוב׳ להגאון המחבר בענין האבילה והחפיפה
.שם נדפסה ולא ו סי׳ מהרש״ל שבתשובת  
1140 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §21: ענין שאלה הזו היא כתובה בתשובות מהרש״ל סי׳ ו׳ אך תשובה זו לא נדפסה  
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inquiry is the fact that, although Rabbi Isserles was perhaps the figure most sensitive to the 
impact of print in Ashkenaz – as can be seen from his introduction to Torat ḥatat,1141 where 
he explains his choice to follow the printed edition of a work that most people possessed, 
or, indeed, from his project to associate his glosses with the Shulḥan Arukh as a whole – 
he did not plan to print his responsa. The responsa make an occasional appearance in his 
glosses to Shulḥan Arukh,1142 but, unlike the many works that he did publish in his lifetime, 
and unlike Darkhei Moshe, which he clearly hoped to print one day, no such mention is 
made of the responsa. Perhaps this is related to his death in his early forties; responsa were, 
as we saw from the two other sixteenth-century examples, material that one would print 
toward the end of one’s life (more on this near the end of this chapter). The responsa 
remained in his archive, to be printed more or less as they were found, only in 1640. 
In summary, of the three main ashkenazic works of responsa from this era, one was 
not printed until the seventeenth century, and even then, it was printed with very minimal 
editorial intervention, barely curated, and not in a unified structure. The two works of 
responsa that were printed in sixteenth-century Ashkenaz were similarly unstructured and 
disorganized. Although they contained a serious amount of responsa, the works were 
riddled with so many peculiarities and exceptions that they hardly seem like “real works of 
                                                     
1141 The manuscripts of Sha’arei Dura are divided into about 30 to 40 sections; the second printed 
edition (Venice, 1547-8) is the first to use sections that start with the first “gate” and run straight through to 
the end (not beginning a new count after the end of the ten “gates”), 96 sections altogether [plus 32 on nidah]. 
Rema used this division of the printed edition, consciously devised to complement the printed Sha’arei Dura. 
We also know from several remarks that he used the Venice 1548 edition. See Dvileiẓky, “Introduction,” 
Sha’arei Dura, ed. Dvileiẓky 22n124. In Torat ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles streamlined, unified, and summarized 
Sha’arei Dura. Realizing that most people now had the printed edition of Sha’arei Dura and would continue 
to utilize it, in his own work, Rabbi Isserles therefore followed the order and division of sections as found in 
the printed Sha’arei Dura, starting with the Venice edition of the work. 
1142 For instance, Isserles, Mapah on Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ ḥayim, §339:4 refers to the same case as 
§125 in the responsa. 
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responsa” according to the classical paradigm. I would like to suggest, however, that they 
were perhaps not all that peculiar. If we abandon the assumption of generic paradigms, but, 
instead consider their production in the context of scholarly practices and their material 
composition and creation, we can see that these works were, in fact, paradigmatic – not 
only of the concept of a work of halakha in this specific time and place but also for an early 
modern scholarly work tout court. 
 
3. ARCHIVAL PRACTICES 
a. Archives And Letter Books 
 
As the discussion in the introduction suggested, the idea of how a certain work is supposed 
to look is closely related to the scholarly culture, practices, and technologies of an 
intellectual milieu. Instead of starting from a paradigm of works of responsa, let us, instead, 
begin from the context in which these rabbis were working, from the material conditions 
of their writing, and their scholarly culture and its practices. In most cases, responsa started 
out as letters. The usual practice was to send one copy of a letter (usually the neater and 
more legible copy rather than the messier original) to the recipient and to keep one copy 
for one’s own records. A variety of practices – material and scholarly –existed for the 
storing of these letters. Peter Stallybrass’ “reading” of the portrait of the Antwerpian 
merchant Jan Snoeck surrounded by his paperwork has helped us visualize how documents 
were organized, filed, and kept. Early modern merchants would often file and organize 
their correspondence by pinning or stringing it together and sometimes hanging it on the 
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wall. 1143 In Ginsburg’s collection of Jewish correspondence from the sixteenth century, 
one letter contains a plea to the addressee: “Therefore, my beloved friend, do not act in the 
way that people do, to read the letter and then pin the writing on the wall and leave it.” 1144 
Clearly, Jews were using similar filing systems for their correspondence. 
Another practice for filing these letters can be gleaned from remarks in the 
exchanges between Rabbi Luria and Rabbi Isserles. At some point, Rabbi Luria refers to 
an earlier statement by Rabbi Isserles (not printed in the responsa collection), in which the 
latter objected to the use of esoteric matters in a letter. Rabbi Isserles expressed his 
reservations using a talmudic reference, a statement about not writing God’s name on 
secular documents such as loan contracts because of the risk that once the debt is paid, 
“God’s name will be thrown in the trash.”1145 Rabbi Luria took offense at the remark and 
its implication that his letters wound up in the trash. He answered cynically: “Perhaps this 
is your habit of treating my writings, but your writings are like a crown of gold to me.”1146 
Rabbi Isserles, who of course meant nothing of the sort (he was using this reference from 
the Talmud merely to allude to the fact that holy matters should not circulate in such a 
quotidian medium), answers with the requisite shock, adding that, when it came to Rabbi 
Luria’s letters, “I keep them inside my other sacred books, as is appropriate for them, 
                                                     
1143 See Peter Stallybrass on filing: Peter Stallybrass, “String, Pins, Thread, Wire, Laces and Folds, 
lecture with Powerpoint, The Gathered Text, Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK, September 3, 2010, in which 
Stallybrass analyzes the different kinds of filing methods on the basis of archival material and by studying 
Jan Gossaert’s painting of Jan Snoeck, a merchant from Antwerp surrounded by his paperwork. I thank 
Professor Stallybrass for sharing the Powerpoint file of this lecture with me. 
1144 Ginsberg, “Private Yiddishe,” 331, letter II, also mentioned in Carlebach, “Letter into Text,” 
118. כ דוקרים הכתב בקיר ויניחנו אלא אדרבא אבקש ממך ”לכן אהובי ורעי אל תעשה כאופן שעושים בני אדם שקורין הכתב ואח
 ...שיהיה לך
1145 Scroll of Ta’anit, chapter 7: למחר זה פורע את חובו...ונמצא שם שמים מוטל באשפה 
1146 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §6. (emphasis added) אפשר שכן ההרגל אצלך כתיבתי אבל כתביך הם לי לעטרת פז 
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because all their words are words of Torah.” 1147 Keeping responsa within sacred books 
may have been a common practice. Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen of Padua faced some 
difficulties when trying to collect responsa from his predecessor Rabbi Yehuda Mintz for 
publication. In the introduction to that collection of responsa, Rabbi Meir writes that his 
brother-in-law, the grandson of the responsa’s author, “...checked in his books here and 
there and found a few booklets [kuntresim] hidden inside the books spread here and 
there,1148 until he assembled sixteen psakim [adjudications] and brought them to me....” 1149 
Perhaps the grandson was keeping his grandfather’s responsa inside books, or maybe he 
had inherited some books from his grandfather that already contained these responsa 
between their pages. 
In sum, there were many ways of preserving correspondence in the early modern 
world, such as in loose pages, in bound notebooks, or by running a thread (“fil”- hence 
“filing”) through related letters and hanging them on the wall for easy reference. Letters 
were copied into letter books, bound or strung together, or kept in other ways for Jewish 
and non-Jewish correspondence alike. Sometimes, a record of the letter would be kept in a 
specifically designated “letter book”; at other times, a précis or a fuller copy would be 
noted in a kind of commonplace book, which were notebooks arranged according to 
                                                     
1147 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §7. אדוני, אומר שכל דברים אלו גורם מיעוט אמונת מעלתו בי ושאין כ”ת דן אותי לכף
דברי נגד אדוני כאין נחשבו כמו שמדומה לי מכל דברי מעלתו על כן כתבתי דרך  שלא חשבתי למלעתו על זאת כי לדעתי...זכות 
כי כל דבריהם תורה, רק אני גונזם תוך שאר ספרי קודש כראוי להם...שפלות . 
1148 Possibly, the responsa were copied into a notebook that had belonged to Rabbi Mintz and that 
contained many other matters, or it was a part of a bound miscellany of his notes, which is why they were 
“hidden inside the books spread here and there.” 
1149 Mintz and Katzenelbogen, ShUT MahaRY Mintz u-MaharaM Padua, Introduction: 
קצת ’ איך בדק בספריו אנה ואנה ומצ’ ץ בן בנו ואמ”ל י”ל ז”מינץ סררי ”אמנם עתה בזמן קרוב בא אלי גיסי האלוף מהר
אלי’ ו פסקים והביא”גנוזים בתוך הספרים אחת הנה ואחת הנה עד שקבץ יחד י’ קונטרסי  
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“commonplaces,” thematic or topical headings under which a scholar would copy relevant 
texts. Often, the letters would be copied in their entirety and filed in bundles, cabinets, or 
chests. Secretaries often filed copies of outgoing letters by folding them, adding an 
endorsement with a short description on the back (literally “en dos”) and bundling them 
with other letters by date or correspondent. A similar system could be used to bundle and 
keep incoming mail.1150 Many of the one-line descriptions that introduce responsa in Rabbi 
Katz’s collection, for instance, are akin to such endorsements, which function as a short 
introduction to the letter.1151 
These accounts contextualize rabbinic responsa more robustly in the accepted 
practices of preserving early modern correspondence. We can imagine a figure such as 
Rabbi Isserles in Cracow, having his correspondence copied by a scribe, signing, and 
sending the scribe’s copy while filing his own writing with the corresponding incoming 
letters, together with other halakhic notes related to his scholarly and judicial activities, by 
pinning or stringing them together in bundles, hanging them on his wall or filing them in 
cabinets, as his contemporaries did. We can envision preservation of these papers together 
with scholarly notes and rabbinical court papers such as official testimonies and copies of 
contracts and divorce documents and how parts of these archives would be copied and once 
again circulate via letters, print, or other means, to other scholars, students, and rabbis. 
b. Letter Books and Their Uses 
Let us proceed from the materiality of keeping letters to the “logic” of these practices by 
                                                     
1150 Daybell points out that if a letter has two sets of folds, it was likely folded once when it was 
mailed and then folded again in another way when it was filed. See Daybell, The Material Letter, 218. 
1151 See above, notes 1093-1102 for examples of such descriptions as they appear in Katz, ShUT 
she’erit Yosef, §3, 15, 16, 20, 22-27, 33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 74, and many others. 
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considering who kept such collections: Letter books were kept by legal professionals, 
administrators, monasteries, diplomats, churchmen, institutions, merchants, scholars, 
students, and university men. As several of these functions resemble those of a rabbi, as a 
religious leader, legal professional, and scholar, it is likely that rabbis also kept collections 
comparable to letter books. The practice clearly reflects an administrative purpose – a need 
simply to preserve a record of communications for later reference. The recipient, in turn, 
was also expected to keep the letters, in order to permit the conversation to continue 
smoothly across time and space. Rabbi Isserles tells his student: “…know, my dear, that all 
your questions from the day you parted from me, as well as my responses to them, are 
copied with me, connected to my responses. ... And for this reason, everything is before 
my eyes when I write to your highness. And so, you, too, should do [the same], so that the 
things will be tied to one another, every statement to where it fits.”1152 Note the use of verbs 
like “meḥubarim” (connected, bundled) and “kshurim” (tied), which denote the thematic 
connections among the letters but also refer to physically attaching relevant letters. 
Additional administrative or record keeping reasons for retaining correspondence 
include the need to show it to a colleague for feedback or have it available for reference in 
case a decision is contested. 1153 The phenomenon of letter books was not, however, 
                                                     
1152 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §40.  וראיתי שחזר מעלתך על הראשונות שכבר השבתי עליהם והגיע התשובה למעלתך
 על מעלתך שהקשה מה על להשיב רק שנית תשובתי להעתיק אצטרך לא ולכן. באחרונה כתבת אשר כתבך מתוך לי ניכר כאשר
 תשובתי עם מחוברות אצלי מועתקים הם עליהם תשובתי וכן מעמי פרידתך מיום שאילתך שכל אהובי דע, אומר אני ותחלה. תשובתי
 ובדרך. אופניו על דבור דבר בזה זה קשורים הדברים שיהיו כדי תעשה וכן, למעלתך בכתבי עיני לנגד הוא הכל ולכן. ’מעל ידע אשר
עליו אנו אשר הענין בקצרה לכתוב אלא הראשונים הדברים תמיד לחזור צריכין אני אין זה . 
The expression אופניו על דבור דבר  comes from Proverbs 25:11: “Like apples of gold in settings of 
silver is a word spoken fitly.” Here, the author removes the words דבור דבר  from the meaning of speech and 
uses them as things or statements in general, which should be physically organized and filed in the right 
place. 
1153 Rabbi Yehuda Mintz introduces a responsum as follows: “I said, I shall tell this law so that the 
later generation shall know for what reason I permitted...” (Mintz, ShUT MaharY Mintz, §4, emphasis 
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restricted to administrative purposes, as can be deduced from the variety in the types of 
letter books that existed. Consider the following summary by James Daybell, who studied 
the material letter in early modern England: “The habit of keeping letter-books varied 
widely, ranging from the official deskbound folio for regularly entering outgoing and 
incoming correspondence to the student notebook, improvised out of several single sheets 
of paper stitched together, where letters were recorded in ad hoc fashion among exercises 
and erotica.”1154 The varieties of ways to preserve letters point to at least as many purposes 
for preserving them. These practices and purposes of preserving letters ring true for early 
modern rabbis as well. 
Technically, one can distinguish between letter books, which are devoted 
exclusively to letters, on the one hand, and more general manuscript miscellanies, which 
are meant to be records of a variety of things, including incoming and outgoing 
correspondence, on the other. As these books were often hybrids, there is not much point 
in distinguishing between these too sharply. Letter books could serve, initially, as a form 
of news and, later, as a form of history or memorialization, as in cases where students of 
famous humanists would posthumously publish their teachers’ letters. The responsa of 
Rabbi Luria were printed in Lublin shortly after his death, and the title page addresses this 
fact. After praising Rabbi Luria, announcing that he had died, and adding a long blessing 
for the dead,1155 the title page exhorts potential readers “…not to guard those coins, which 
                                                     
added). The responsa are thus copied as a personal record in the interest of posterity, while also providing 
Rabbi Mintz the material needed to defend his decisions should they be contested. 
1154 Daybell, The Material Letter, 72. 
1155 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, title-page: הלא הוא הגאון המופלג עלה לישיבה שבשמים. מהר"ר שלמה בן מהר"ר
. ן'אמ החיים בצרור צרורה נפשו תהא ל"ז א"לורי יחיאל  
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are round. Like the cycle that repeats in the world, they roll. And take, in their stead this 
most precious book….” In the following sentence, the title page addresses a specific group 
of potential purchasers: “And especially the students of his honor … who will find in it 
many useful things.”1156 A poem by the printers on the next page ties the publication of the 
book to Rabbi Luria’s death: “…his responsa declare the immense wisdom of our master. 
Who left us and went to his honored resting place.... In order to show his greatness to the 
world ... we made up in our hearts. To print these questions and his responsa, which we 
decided to bring to our labor of print.”1157 One more aspect of this book relates it closely 
to a posthumous publication of their rabbi’s nachlass: some of the copies of the book were 
bound together with poems about Rabbi Luria, which were arranged on the page in circular 
form and typed using type very similar to the book itself. One of these copies was even 
bound with a eulogy of Rabbi Luria.1158 We can thus assume that the circumstances 
surrounding the printing of this work were closely connected to the author’s death and 
consider its publication as a form of memorialization. 
Letter keeping can, however, serve more far-ranging goals: the previous chapter 
mentioned Sefer igrot shlomim (Book of familiar letters), the letter manual published as 
early as 1534 in Augsburg by the Shaḥor press. The book’s introduction links the 
succession of letters into one narrative: “I began with the matter of a request, because this 
                                                     
1156 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL , title-page: לכן אל תחוסו על הזוזים אשר המה עגולות. כגלגל שחוזר בעולם
 לו המה אשר הרבה דברים בו ימצאו כי. עצלות בלי יחוסו המה דמר תלמידי ובפרט. סגולות מכל יקר ספר במחיריהן וקחו. מגלגלות
...מועילות  
1157 Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, title-page (folio b): .המה יעידון יגידון רוב חכמתו. שאלות ותשובות של מורינו...
 להדפיס. בלבינו אמרנו זה את בראותינו. גדולתו העמים את להראות. עוונתינו גרמו כי לכו נא אוי. מנוחתו לכבוד והלכך מאתנו שנפרד
. דפוסינו במלאכת להביא ראינו. ותשובותו שאלות  (Every other line rhymes: ABABAB). 
1158 The copies in question are the copy from JTS and the copy of the Bodleian Library, which 
Elhanan Reiner photographed and showed me. 
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is the way of the world, a person asking his friend, and I connected to it an issue of refusal, 
because this is the way of the world, that a person sometimes refuses his friend’s request. 
Then I added one on anger and a threat, as the way of the world is to be angry at the person 
who refuses him….”1159 The decision to connect the letters in this way, reminiscent of the 
later genre of epistolary novels, points to yet another form of reading correspondence – as 
fictional entertainment. More generally, Daybell posits letter books “as a form of ‘self-
writing,’ a way of textualizing a life (or aspects of a life) in an enduring letter form.” 1160 
He provides examples showing that letter books were closely tied to the construction of 
self in the early modern period and thus present a form of life writing. 1161 In sum, people 
kept correspondence without necessarily specifying a particular purpose. In Daybell’s 
words: 
…what marks early modern manuscript letter books is their remarkable variety in 
form, appropriated by individuals in a highly idiosyncratic and personalized manner. While 
many employed special volumes solely for the purpose of copying correspondence, other 
writers recorded letters less systematically in a series of hybrid manuscripts…. Individual 
manuscript books performed multiple functions, and letters were copied variously into 
muster books, journals of voyages, accounts, commonplace books and almanacs. 1162  
 
The early modern letter book is thus a useful way of conceptualizing responsa as 
they were kept by rabbinical scholars, not only in terms of their narrower definition, but 
especially in terms of their hybrid nature. 
                                                     
1159 Anonymous, Igrot shlomim (Augsburg, 1534). התחלתי בעניין המבקש כי כן דרך העולם לבקש אדם
כי כן דרך , כעס והתראה וחברתי אחריו ענין. וחיברתי אחריו עניין מיאון כי כן דרך העולם שממאן אדם בשאילת חבירו, מחבירו
...העולם לכעוס על מי שממאן בבקשתו . 
1160 Daybell, The Material Letter, 179. 
1161 Daybell, The Material Letter, 188. “Throughout the early modern period ... letter books were 
intimately connected with the construction of self, and a strong argument can be made for considering the 
genre as a form of life writing....” The connection between such life writing and record keeping, between an 
intimate diary and a personal record of communications and transactions, can be especially useful for our 
framing of pre-Rousseauian notions of biography. 
1162 Daybell, The Material Letter, 180. 
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 c. Archives and Reference Tools 
“Although often administrative in impulse, connected to office, letter books were also 
compiled by a wide range of letter writers for individual, spiritual and creative purposes,” 
as Daybell puts it.1163 For rabbis, situated on the intersection of the administrative, the 
intellectual, and the creative, one of these purposes was for use as a reference tool for study 
or in order to include certain elements in a later publication. Rabbi Luria’s magnum opus, 
his work on the Talmud called Yam shel Shlomo, contains many places where sections from 
his responsa are copied into the work in the relevant location 1164 or vice versa. One 
example of copying from Yam shel Shlomo to his responsa was mentioned above, where 
§85 was introduced as: “The laws of Ḥanukah in short, from my big work called Yam shel 
Shlomo.” Inversely, in Yam shel Shlomo we often find statements such as “and behold here 
the responsum, which I already wrote,” after which parts of a relevant responsum from his 
ShUT are inserted.1165 The papers and writings in the rabbi’s study were thus a part of his 
reference material, a dynamic archive that functioned as his working tool in generating new 
writings. 
Such personal tools of reference and scholarship often included letters, and there is 
clearly some overlap between the letter book and the commonplace book, as they both were 
forms of manuscript record keeping that could range from the mundane to the intellectual. 
                                                     
1163 Daybell, The Material Letter, 179. 
1164 See, for example, Luria, ShUT MaharShaL, §43, §73, §33, and many more. Meir Rafeld 
mentions this in his dissertation on Luria. Meir Rafeld, “Ha-MaharShaL ve-ha Yam shel Shlomo” (PhD diss., 
Bar Ilan University, 1991), 96-97. 
1165 Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, tractate Beiẓah 1:§1. Other examples of this can be found in ibid., 3:§5, 
and in Yam shel Shlomo, tractate Yevamot 6:§41, “and here you have a responsum that I wrote in my youth…” 
(this refers to ShUT MaharShaL, §14). See also Yam shel Shlomo, tractate Kidushin, 1:§40, 2:§19, and 3:§2. 
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Just as letters were preserved in commonplace books, letter books, too, contained other 
commonplace material. The creation of idiosyncratic reference tools out of one’s own 
notes, as well as the presence of letters in these collections, is well documented among 
many of the humanist scholars of the early modern period. In the words of Ann Blair: 
“Commonplace books served as storehouses and clearinghouses for all the questions, 
tropes, examples, and general information that supplied copiousness of both words and 
things…. The commonplace book was a crucial, although often unacknowledged, tool of 
scholarship in all fields.”1166 Conrad Gesner’s (1516-1565) famous reference work, the 
Bibliotheca universalis, started as his own collection,1167 comprising many excerpts and 
copies, including letters, which he organized by topic, often by simply pasting the piece of 
paper in the correct place.1168 Gesner writes as follows in a letter:  
I regret that two of my letters to you have disappeared. I don't remember what I 
                                                     
 1166 Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature, 70. “Closer scrutiny of the Methodus, long admired for some 
modern-sounding precepts of historical research, has led Anthony Grafton to conclude that even seemingly 
“organic” texts, presumed to have grown out of the author’s original insight, stem from “the cobbling together 
of bits of material from the most disparate sources, unacknowledged at the time, and difficult to discover 
now.” 
 1167 Gesner’s great Bibliotheca started as the scholar’s own reference tool (and included letters), as 
did Aldrovandi’s. See Paul Nelles, “Reading and Memory in the Universal Library: Conrad Gessner and the 
Renaissance Book,” in Mind and Memory in Renaissance Culture, ed. Donald Beecher and Grant Williams 
(Toronto: Center for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2009), 147-169. 
 “He advised that notes were to be written out during the course of one’s reading on a sheet of good 
quality paper, and on one side only. After this was done, the sheet could be cut up – with sharp scissors – 
‘and then you divide the cut slips in the desired order, first into larger parts, then subdivide again and again, 
however many times this is needed.’ The slips could then be arranged on a table or in small boxes. Once 
placed in order, the whole thing might be copied out or, if legibly transcribed, the slips could be mounted 
directly onto additional sheets of paper. All of this signals a very porous boundary between print and 
manuscript. Indeed, Gessner suggested that even printed books could be cut up in a similar manner. For this 
two copies of the text would be needed as after cutting up one page, the other side could no longer be used. 
He raved that huge savings in labour could be gained in this way. Such a practice could not have been all that 
uncommon, and in all of this Gessner is surely describing the methods he himself employed in compiling the 
Bibliotheca universalis.” See Nelles, “Reading and Memory,” 165. 
1168 See Fabian Kraemer and Helmut Zedelmaier, “Instruments of Invention in Renaissance Europe: 
The cases of Conrad Gesner and Ulisse Aldrovandi,” Intellectual History Review 24, no. 3 (2014): 321-341. 
See also Ann Blair, “Note Taking as an Art of Transmission,” Critical Inquiry 31, no. 1 (Autumn 
2004): 85-107. 
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wrote in them, nor can I find your letters to which you wish me once more to respond. 
After responding to letters, I am accustomed to put them into my piles of paper – even to 
cut them up – and distribute them among my papers according to their subject. Hence it 
would be convenient if you could repeat, in a few words, what you wanted to ask me.1169 
 
The natural historian Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522-1605) first created his Pandechion 
epistemonicon for his own use, by copying copious information from his reading and study 
onto scraps of paper, which he kept and only much later pasted into a book and ultimately 
published.1170 Doctors, such as Adriaan van der Spiegel (1578-1625),1171 likewise created 
such reference works, and Robert Boyle’s archive, which he consulted and organized, 
included many letters.1172 
In light of these practices, we might infer that Rabbi Katz’s responsa were kept 
together with notes about halakhic books that he was teaching and studying. Similarly, 
                                                     
1169 The citation is from a letter to Johann Bauhin, as cited in Brian W. Ogilvie, The Science of 
Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006), 180: 
“…Renaissance naturalists also took copious notes on what they had observed and read. Gessner, Spiegel, 
and their contemporaries preferred the humanist format of the commonplace book. In his Isagoge, Adriaan 
van de Spiegel set out detailed rules for how to make a botanical commonplace book, or as he termed it, a 
florilegium. By dividing the book up properly … the more advanced scholar could control a great amount of 
material and have a useful resource for writing his own books on the subject. Conrad Gessner used such a 
method of commonplaces to keep track of the vast amount of information contained in his numerous 
publications. His usual practice, at least late in life, was to keep files according to commonplaces, and to 
divide up his notes and correspondence into these files. By so doing, he established a comprehensive system, 
but at the cost of quick recall of any particular element….” 
1170 See Kraemer and Zedelmaier, “Instruments of invention,” 328: “Ulisse Aldrovandi described 
the steps up to the finished Pandechion as follows: he continuously took notes on diverse topics on slips of 
paper, thereby only writing onto one side of them. These paper slips were at first stored in a disorderly 
fashion. In a second step he would sort them into bags made of linen. He would have one bag for each letter 
of the alphabet. Inside these bags the scraps of paper were at this stage still “confusim et mixtim.” In a final 
step, they were pasted into the volumes of his Pandechion in a strictly alphabetical order. It was only at this 
moment that the notes were brought into their final order. The Pandechion....” 
1171 Volker Hess and J. Andrew Mendelsohn, “Fallgeschichte, Historia, Klassifikation: François 
Boissier de Sauvages bei der Schreibarbeit,” NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik 
und Medizin 21 (2013): 61-92, and Volker Hess and J. Andrew Mendelsohn, “Case and Series. Medical 
Knowledge and Paper Technology, 1600–1900,” History of Science 48, no. 3/4 (2010): 287–314. 
1172 See Michael Hunter, “Mapping the Mind of Robert Boyle: The Evidence of the Boyle Papers” 
in Archives of the Scientific Revolution: The Formation and Exchange of Ideas in Seventeenth-Century 
Europe, ed. Michael Hunter (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1998), 121-136. 
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Rabbi Luria kept his halakhic correspondence with other related documents, which were 
likely followed by a list of notes and summaries from various halakhic works, hence the 
inexplicable list at the end of the first edition of his responsa. Rabbi Isserles mentioned to 
a student that he had a book that served as the basis for his glosses on Shulḥan Arukh: “It 
is true, so I wrote in Shulḥan Arukh, which was printed recently … and the rationale I 
wrote … in my book [Darkhei Moshe],1173 according to which I compiled the laws in 
Shulḥan Arukh.”1174 Thus, rabbis, much like humanist scholars, created their own reference 
tools, which combined notes, glosses, letters, and printed works in idiosyncratic ways. 
It may be more fruitful to compare rabbinic collections that included responsa to 
adversaria than to commonplace books. The latter were systematic compilations in which 
excerpts were organized by “common place” or theme, often aimed at aiding 
memorization,1175 whereas adversaria1176 were more disordered, possessing, in the words 
of Elisabeth Décultot, “a fundamentally aleatory composition.”1177 In adversaria, notes 
were taken down chronologically, as the scholar’s intellectual activity progressed, and, “as 
they were less tuned towards the conservation and faithful reproduction of the text being 
                                                     
1173 The book’s title was added in parentheses in the first edition. 
1174 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §131: אמת כן יסדתי בש״ע הנדפס מחדש...והטעם כתבתי בס״ד בספרי, אשר ע״פ אותו
 הספר חברתי הדינים בשלחן ערוך
1175 See Marie Joan Lechner, Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces (New York: Pageant 
Press, 1962); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Early Modern Thought 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
1176 Ogilvie, The Science of Describing, 180: “Other writers suggested keeping two notebooks or 
files; in the first of these, the adversaria, one should jot down interesting thoughts or provocative literary 
passages in chronological order; in the second, the observations from the first should be copied according to 
commonplaces. By so doing, one was less likely to forget or be unable to find one's thoughts.” 
1177 Elisabeth Décultot, “Introduction: L’art de l’extrait: définition, évolution, enjeux,” in Lire, 
copier, écrire: les bibliothèques manuscrites et leurs usages au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Elisabeth Décultot (Paris: 
CNRS Éditions, 2003), 9: “Quant aux collections d’adversaria … elles obéissent au contraire à une 
composition fondamentalement aléatoire.” 
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read and more toward confronting its contents, they already testify to critical activity, a 
prelude to hermeneutic work.”1178 This “de-structured order,”1179 as Décultot calls it, which 
flourished after the popularity of the commonplace book waned, represented, in the 
humanist context, freedom from the topical tradition of the commonplaces. 
The adversaria’s order, in reflecting not the material but the chronological 
progression of the scholar’s own intellectual activities, was perfect for collecting a 
multitude of variegated material as it presented itself, prior to imposing any strict order. In 
their mode of organization, rabbinic books of responsa taken as a whole, including their 
incongruous insertions and additions, bring to mind fragments from commonplace books 
and their more personal and less organized siblings, the adversaria. These “paper-
archives,”1180 as historians sometimes call them, were the product of reading, studying, 
writing, and reflecting. Simultaneously, the archives provided the raw material for the 
scholar to continue his activity. Viewed through this lens of scholarly practices, rather than 
via an abstract paradigm of books of responsa, the peculiarities in printed sifrei ShUT of 
this period are more understandable. 
 
4. PATHS TO PUBLICATION 
                                                     
1178 Décultot, “Introduction,” 9: “Moins tournés vers la conservation et la reproduction fidèle du 
texte lu que vers la confrontation avec son contenu, ils témoignent déjà d’une activité critique, préludent à 
un travail herméneutique.” For an example of such an archive from seventeenth-century Ashkenaz, in which 
the author even mentions that the notes were assembled in the course of his life and thus not chronological, 
see my discussion of Rabbi Yair Bacharach in the epilogue of this dissertation. 
1179 Décultot, “Introduction,” 11. 
1180 For instance, Fabian Krämer, “Ein papiernes Archiv für alles jemals Geschriebene: Ulisse 
Aldrovandis Pandechion epistemonicon und die Naturgeschichte der Renaissance,” NTM Zeitschrift für 
Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 21 (2013): 11-36. Taking this expression further, 
some historians speak of scholarly use of these archives as a “paper-technology.” See Volker Hess and 
Andrew J. Mendelssohn, “Paper Technology und Wissensgeschichte,” NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der 
Naturwissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 21 (2013): 1-10. 
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a. Personal/Public Reference Tools 
 
These personal reference tools were, in the first place, used by the scholars who collected 
them. Simultaneously, however, they possessed a more public character. Students, 
colleagues, and relatives would consult these collections in manuscript form and 
sometimes copy from them. This copying could be done in person or by means of 
correspondence. Nicholas de Peiresc’s (1580-1637) extensive archives included not only 
his own correspondence but also material assembled by means of letters, as colleagues 
would send him copies of documents.1181 The naturalist Caspar Bauhin (1560-1624) 
developed his herbarium by collecting samples and descriptions that people shared with 
him via letters.1182 We thus see evidence of the overlap between the letter and the archive: 
on the one hand, letters were stored in archives, and, on the other hand, correspondence 
served as the format for conveying the textual contents of archives to others. As one 
historian explained, Bauhin’s herbarium turned from “personal memoranda, a living 
commonplace book,” into a veritable “documentation center,” which others could also 
consult.1183 
The scholar’s archive was thus not only his personal reference tool; whether 
consulted in person or by means of letters, it was also accessed by others. This 
phenomenon, in which scholarship, letter writing, and the sharing and storage of 
information overlap, can also be observed in rabbinic scholarly culture. In a responsum to 
his former student, Rabbi Isserles mentions recently having taught a certain halakhic work 
                                                     
1181 See Miller, Peiresc’s History of Provence. 
1182 Ogilvie, The Science of Describing, 212. 
1183 Ogilvie, The Science of Describing, 212. 
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that they had previously studied together, providing information should his correspondent 
wish to copy the new interpretations from current students who would let him consult their 
notes.1184 
Elsewhere, Rabbi Isserles alludes to a type of archive where manuscript copies of 
Rabbi Luria’s writings were kept and updated. In a question to Rabbi Isserles, a student 
included a copy of Rabbi Luria’s writing on a separate piece of paper. Rabbi Isserles 
concludes his reply by thanking the student for sending the copy, and declaring: “And I 
shall save your copy together with all the other copies of his words that can be found in our 
town....”1185 Rabbi Luria, indeed, expected others to consult his writings: He attacked 
Rabbi Isserles for criticizing him without consulting his glosses on isur ve-heter or the Yam 
shel Shlomo on the relevant topic,1186 although neither of the above-mentioned writings 
had been printed at the time that Rabbi Isserles published said critique.1187 Similarly, 
students were evidently copying Rabbi Isserles’ glosses from the margins of his print copy 
of the Shulḥan Arukh before the glosses were published in print: Responding to a letter 
from a student who inquired about an apparent contradiction in Rabbi Isserles’ glosses on 
                                                     
1184 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §38  וכן מצאתי כתוב במרדכי שלי שכתבתי הפירוש אצל העמוד בחורף שעבר. ואל תתמה
כי ידעתי , ר מרדכי מפוזנא ותמצאנו שם"ועיין בספר המרדכי של מהר...שונה פרקו שלא פירשתי לכם כן בהיותכם עמי כי אין דומה
 שכתבו במרדכי שלו
1185 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §132.1: מה שאתה מעתיק אלי דבריו בזה ביריעה קטנה ... גם העתקתך תהיה שמורה
וכל שנה ] מבוא, דביליצקי כרך ב' שערי דורא מהדראה  –כחברו [אצלי עם שאר העתקות הנמצאים מדבריו בעירנו ואין אחד כדבורו 
 In ShUT Rema, ed. Siev, 515n34 – Siev thinks that this is the source of the .ושנה הענין משתנה ואין הדעות שוות
major dispute between the two rabbis. 
1186 Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, tractate Ḥulin, chapter 1, §29. 
ם השיג עלי בספר תורת חטאת שלו...והנה אמרו לי תלמידיו להדיא ”הדברים אלו הוגד לי איך שמהר אחרי 
ה ”שעלי היה השגתו, ונתגלגל הדבר בראות פנים והודה לי, ושאלתי את פיו איך עלה על דעתך להשיג עלי ולא עיינת בהגהתי באו
ריק דחולין ולא ידעת שורש דב”שלי גם לא ראית בספרי הגדול בפ ...” 
See also Luria, Mekhonot Shlomo/Amudei Shlomo on Sha’arei Dura, gate 4§8. 
’ ם להשיב עלי בספר תורת חטאת שלו לאסור לא נמלח גבי מולייתא דגבי”ח. ]דיני מולייתא[ שוב ראיתי במה שרצה מהר 
ולא ראה יה והארכתי בספרי בפרק ’ ציץ מן החרכיחוץ לכבודו לא עיין בהגהתי ולא בספרי אלא שה’ וכתב להוציא מלבו של חכם כו
ק דחולין ושם הראיתי לך טעותיו עיין שם”פ . 
1187 Yam shel Shlomo on tractate Ḥulin was first printed in Cracow, 1733-5. 
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the Shulḥan Arukh, Rabbi Isserles reassured the student that the printed work does not 
contain the confusing formulation “as it is written before you, which you copied from my 
Shulḥan Arukh.”1188 Speculating on the source of the formulation, Rabbi Isserles adds, 
“…and I do not know if this came from God, or if I corrected it at the time of printing.”1189 
In other words, he is not sure whether this was purely a mistake in the student’s own notes, 
or whether the student had copied correctly at the time, but, in the meantime, Rabbi Isserles 
had already corrected it for print. These archives were, thus, in constant flux. 
Rabbi Luria’s own archive, including his glosses and marginalia, appears to have 
been accessible to scholars who wished to copy from his writings, even after his death. In 
the introduction to Ḥokhmat Shlomo, the publisher writes: “If he who is studying this has 
trouble with any issue regarding halakha that he cannot understand in full depth, … he can 
send a messenger or come himself, as is the habit that everyone comes to the fair of Lublin, 
and there he can see it in the volumes of the Talmud of the gaon of blessed memory 
themselves, which are in the hands of his son….”1190 Rabbi Eliezer Altschul, who was 
involved in printing Rabbi Luria’s Yam shel Shlomo in 1616, describes copying the work 
from the rabbi’s archive more than a decade earlier, as a young man who traveled for his 
studies. He thanks God for leading him to Lublin, to the study room of his rabbi, whom he 
followed in order to be a student there, and “to harvest in the bundles … and when things 
were distributed, I collected … and I did not hold myself back from copying some books, 
                                                     
1188 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §132: ...כאשר כתוב לפניך אשר העתקת משלחן ערוך שלי 
1189 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §132: ולא ידעתי אם מה׳ היתה זאת או אם תקנתי הענין בשעת ההדפסה 
1190 Rabbi Shmuel of Böhm, Ḥokhmat Shlomo, first ed. 
אם המעיין מתקשה באיזה עניין בדבר הלכה שלא יוכל לירד לעומקו הן מחמת שגיאה או חומר העניין יוכל לשלוח על ידי 
ל אשר הם ”ושמה יוכל לראות בגוף הגמרות של הגאון ז, ותדיר שנוסעים ליריד לובליןאיש מוקדם או הוא בעצמו כאשר הוא מורגל 
או יכתוב לבנו דבר הקשה והוא ישיב לו תשובה, ו”ר יחיאל יצ”ביד בנו האלוף הר ... 
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old and new, … from the books of the great geonim … including the great work Yam shel 
Shlomo … and God is my witness … that the copying of the book from the handwriting of 
the author himself came to me legitimately.”1191 According to Altshul, Rabbi Luria’s 
writings on sixteen tractates were available at the time, many of which were eventually 
lost.1192 Rabbi Isserles’ writings were similarly accessible to scholars. In the introduction 
to his kabalistic work Aderet Eliyahu, Rabbi Eliyahu Loenz (1555-1636) presents a brief 
overview of his life. In the course of his travels and studies, he came to Cracow, where he 
studied with some of the important rabbis, but also consults and copies from manuscripts:  
…there I also found a strength, more precious to me than any fortune, because 
through an occurrence, I laid my hands on Darkhei Moshe, the copying of which was 
difficult for me, because it was a first draft/edition, as the righteous author passed on and 
went to the next world … before he could remove from it the mistakes and stumbling 
blocks, and many things were written between the lines and on the margins (on the pages), 
and I copied it late at night and I was the first to copy it.1193 
A rabbi’s papers thus were not simply his own reference tool; they were in some 
sense public, with the expectation that they would be accessible for consultation even 
before publication. Rabbi Katz’s declaration from ShUT she’erit Yosef’s introduction that 
                                                     
1191 Eliezer Altshul, “Epilogue and apology of the copyist and proofreader,” in Shlomo Luria, Yam 
shel Shlomo, Bava kama (Prague, 1616):  והלכתי אחריו להיות זנב לאריו״ת וללקוט בעמרים לק״ט שכ״חה ופ״אה ושאבתי
מספרי הגאונים ...לא מנעתי מלהעתיק כמה ספרים ישנים וחדשים...ובשעת פזר כנסתי תוש״יה...גם מי״ם בששון ממעי״ני הישועה
וסהדי במרומים ועידי בשחק שהעתקת הספר מכתיבת ...ה על מסכת בבא קמאובכללם גם החיבור הגדול י״ם ש״ל שלמ״...הגדולים
...ידו להמחבר עצמו בא לידי בהיתרא . 
I thank Professor Reiner for sharing his transcription of the epilogue with me. 
1192 See Elhanan Reiner, “A Biography of an Agent of Culture: Eleazar Altschul of Prague and his 
Literary Activity,” in Schöpferische Momente des europäischen Judentums in der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Michael 
Graetz (Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 2002), 236-237: “In 1591-1592, Altshul was in Lublin … In 1592, as he 
tells us, he copied the book Yam shel Shlomo on the tractate Bava kama, the first volume of a gigantic work 
that, as Altschul informs us in his introduction, ‘comprised sixteen parts.’ This is mentioned in Altschul’s 
‘Epilogue and apology of the copyist and proofreader’ in Shlomo Luria, Yam shel Shlomo, Bava kama 
(Prague, 1616). 
1193 Eliyahu Loenẓ, Aderet Eliyahu, ed. Shetland (Jerusalem: Sha’arei Ziv, 1998), iv. 
 מימי שאבתי ושם בשעריה נודעת קראקא ק״ק היא ולומדיה התורה וידעי, וסופרים חכמים של גדולה עיר אל הביאני עד..
 מהדורא היה כי, קשה היתה עלי העתקתי אשר, משה דרכי לידי בא סבה ע״י כי, הון מכל עלי חביב און לי מצאתי שם גם...התורה באר
 רבים ודברים, והקמשונים הטעיות ממנו הסיר בטרם...מעלה של בישיבה נתבקש כי, ועבר חלף והלך לעולמו, כי הצדיק המחבר קמא
.הראשון המעתיק הייתי ואני באישון לילה והעתקתיו הגליונים ועל חטי ביני כתובים  
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“I only wrote this in order to be in my possession as I grow old…” now seems a cliché that, 
nevertheless, contains much truth: These writings were his own notes, which he used as a 
reference tool, and which students and colleagues could consult and copy.1194 It was part 
of the scholarly culture, both by virtue of the material situation and the cultural 
expectations, that the scholar’s archive, which often included letters, was public and could 
be consulted, during the author’s lifetime and after his death. This publication practice 
permitted continuous and repeated referencing, correcting, and consulting, as well as 
sharing and adaptation in multidirectional and dynamic ways. These archives were flexible 
and could include very diverse contents in disparate states of completion and organization. 
There was no need to wait for the finished, printed book to have a scholarly conversation; 
writings were open and could be emended and adapted by author and reader alike. The 
existence of these halakhic texts in open-ended archival form thus enabled the 
consultations, flexibility, and variety that fueled this scholarly culture. 
b. From Reference Tools To Printed Books 
These letters, together with the many other writings and notes that constituted the scholar’s 
archive, did eventually make it into print, but in ways that often resembled their archival 
predecessors rather than as paradigmatic “works of responsa.” In the sixteenth century, 
Hebrew printing in Poland was still in its infancy. The first Hebrew book was printed in 
1534; the responsa treated in this chapter date from a few decades later. I thus contend that 
the remaining archive-like qualities of these early printed collections are related to the 
transition from an earlier, more dynamic form of publication to the more stable print 
                                                     
1194 Siev, “Preface,” ShUT she’erit Yosef, 33. 
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publication. This is not merely a question of the practical adaptation to a new technology; 
it is an issue of cultural adaptation: more specifically, it concerns the scholarly culture 
regarding texts in this period. 
The continuities between early modern scholarly archives and the published work 
are more obvious once we look at the formation and publication process of some of these 
works. Ann Blair traces the idiosyncrasies of Jean Bodin’s Theatrum to the origins of the 
work as a commonplace book, which was a storehouse for both personal notes and 
knowledge taken from printed books.1195 Angelo Poliziano’s collected Greek and Latin 
works were published by Aldus Manutius (1498), together with 251 letters from his 
correspondence.1196 Brian Oglivie showed how Bauhin’s use of letters to collect 
information for his personal commonplace book of thousands of plants affected the 
descriptions in his published Pinax theatri botanici (Basel, 1623).1197 Pierre Bayle 
assembled the excerpts for what would eventually become the Dictionnaire by collecting, 
copying, and inserting excerpts from his writings, including some letters, which he 
sometimes simply sent straight to the printer with typographic remarks on the letter itself 
for inclusion in his work.1198 
                                                     
1195 Blair, The Theater of Nature, 67: “When their personal commonplace books lacked the needed 
range and quality, authors of all kinds resorted to these printed cribs…. The use of commonplace books, both 
printed and personal, has thus been clearly identified in the works of minor and major figures, from 
Shakespeare and Montaigne to Thomas Browne….” 
1196 Shane Butler’s comparison of Angelo Poliziano’s actual correspondence to his collection of 
epistles printed by Manutius shows that Poliziano had corrected and edited not only his own letters, but also 
the letters addressed to him, in preparation for publication. Angelo Poliziano, Letters, ed. Shane Butler 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 1: 292-293. 
1197 Ogilvie, The Science of Describing, 212. 
1198 See Elizabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle: Héterodoxie et Rigorisme (Den Haag: Springer, 1964), 
2: 48n97: “…chaque fois que la chose était possible, en effet, Bayle s’épargnait la peine de recopier: l’original 
de plusieurs lettres qu’il a reçues et citées dans le Dictionnaire porte des indications destinées au typographe.” 
UNIT III, CHAPTER 6: RESPONSA FROM SCHOLARLY ARCHIVE TO PUBLISHED BOOK 
 
 552   
 
Similar processes affected the nature of rabbinic open scholarly reference archives 
when they were printed. For example, Rabbi Katz noted his glosses on Sefer ha-Mordekhai 
and Tur on the margins of those works and on separate strips of paper, which were stuck 
between its pages. As Rabbi Asher Siev, who edited a recent version of the responsa, has 
remarked, this led to unfortunate results once his insights and corrections were removed 
from their context and printed.1199 As these scholarly archives included letters, the 
published letter collections, likewise, included other remainders of these archives, which 
found their way into print. 
c. Printing Archives in a Transitioning Culture 
In his book on printing in Renaissance Venice, Martin Lowry describes the “violent shock” 
that printing brought to the world of manuscript scholarship, not only in terms of the new 
roles of editor and printer but also in terms of the authors themselves, who suddenly were 
faced with the option of printing their work in their lifetime. The printer Aldus Manutius 
encountered many difficulties precisely when trying to print works of living authors: 
“Passing a work to the press … scared a number of literary men into delays, perpetual 
revisions, and evasiveness….”1200 In the realm of Hebrew printing, Glick’s bibliography 
of responsa similarly mentions the “resistance among respondents to bring their responsa 
                                                     
1199 Siev, “Preface,” ShUT she’erit Yosef, 22-23. 
ביחוד במרדכי היו שגיאות רבות בכתבי ...אמנם שם מובנת תופעה זו. גם ביאורי רבינו על הטור והמרדכי קצרים עד מאד
כ רשם בשולי הספר את "ואח, את זה עשה רבינו בבהירות ובקיצור נמרץ. והיה צורך ללבנו ולהסבירו לתלמידים. ...היד ובמודפס
אבל נראה . ולבסוף כשהסכים מתוך הלחץ להוציא לאור את חדושיו אסף גם רשימות אלה וסדרן להדפסה, הבאור הנכון לדין המסויים
שהיו לו גם הערות רשומות על פתקאות בודדות שלבסוף נאספו והוכנסו למקומן הראוי שהרי ישנם מקומות באמצע הערותיו לטור 
שלא לצורך" מ"בח"מ שבהם מתחיל הקטע בסימון "ח . 
1200 Martin Lowry, The World of Aldus Manutius: Business and Scholarship in Renaissance Venice 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 218-219. Ernst Philip Goldschmidt already remarked on the 
commercial incentives behind what should be printed first, and pointed out that, after the invention of print, 
older works were overwhelmingly the ones printed first. See Ernst Philip Goldschmidt, Medieval texts and 
Their First Appearance in Print (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 13, 23. 
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to print.”1201 Even in those early days of print, scholars were familiar with printed books – 
by the sixteenth century, numerous books had, after all, been printed – why these 
hesitations? 
Hebrew print was well underway in the sixteenth century. A survey of the output 
of printing presses such as Venice or Cremona, and definitely those of Prague, Augsburg, 
or Cracow until the 1570s, when the responsa of Rabbi Katz and Rabbi Luria appeared, 
reveals, however, that the presses were publishing very few works by living authors. The 
works being printed were overwhelmingly canonical books such as the Pentateuch or 
Talmud and books in popular demand such as the liturgy for holidays (maḥzor), the 
Hagadah for Passover, and prayer books. Some individual responsa were printed, but these 
should be considered ephemera, in a category with almanacs and broadsides intended for 
immediate, practical, and often temporary consumption.1202 The overwhelming majority of 
the authors of other works – in biblical commentary, in halakha in general, and definitely 
in responsa specifically were deceased.1203 
                                                     
1201 Glick, Kuntres, 1: 91. 
1202 For instance, the Psakim shel rabanei Italyah [Halakhic decisions of the rabbis of Italy] (Venice: 
Bomberg, 1519), regarding a controversy that took place at the time, or the Psukim printed by Heliẓ, discussed 
in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Practical manuals for slaughter, such as Rabbi Yacov Weil’s 
Shḥitot u-bdikot (Prague, ca. 1530) are also in the category of practical manuals. 
 1203 The responsa of Rabbi Shlomo ben Adret, and the responsa attributed to RaShY and 
Naḥmanides, for instance, as well as the works of responsa by 15th-century ashkenazic rabbis discussed in 
chapter two of this dissertation. 
Regarding this situation and its importance for Rabbi Yosef Karo’s enterprise, for instance, see Tirẓa 
Kelman, “Ktuvot be-et barzel u-ve oferet be-dfus: Mahapekhat ha-dfus ve-yeẓirat ha-ḥibur Bet Yosef” 
[Written in a metal pen and lead in print: The print revolution and the creation of the work Bet Yosef] 
Pe’amim 148 (2016): 20. I am not considering here the category of mystical and philosophical works, nor of 
grammar, but these, too, were usually by authors who were already deceased or based upon a prior work that 
dictated its structure. 
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Models for printing these non-responsa works were often self evident. The 
boundaries and structure of canonical books were defined by tradition. The form and 
contents of more ephemeral and practical works were dictated by need and use. There was 
no predetermined model, however, for printing a collection of responsa. The works of 
responsa that had been printed all belonged to deceased authors, and their contents, as well 
as their basically nonexistent structure, were determined by what was available.1204 It was 
not clear with regard to living authors and their dynamic, constantly fluctuating, hybrid 
archives how to go from archive to published printed work. 
 
5. CONCEPTIONS OF BOOKS 
a. Printing In One’s Lifetime: Challenges 
 
The culture of archival textual organization thus buttressed a mode of publication that was 
much less clear-cut, rigid, or unidirectional than print. We can better understand the 
“violent shock” of printing, as Lowry calls it, and also the lack of organization of early 
modern books of responsa, if we take into consideration that, in the scholarly culture of the 
sixteenth century, writings were often published before being printed and were more 
personal, piecemeal and less set in form. No preconceived notions dictated how one should 
                                                     
 1204 The two main exceptions to this statement are Trumat ha-deshen (Venice, 1519) and ShUT 
MaharY Kolon (Venice, 1519). See the second chapter of this dissertation for a discussion of these. 
Regarding the main categories of Hebrew books that were printed until 1500, see Israel Mehlman, 
“Bikurei ha-dfus ha-ivri” [The first fruits of Hebrew printing] Areshet 5 (1972): 455. Other than Bibles, 
Talmuds, prayer books, and ephemera, one can also add some mystical works and philosophical treatises, 
and some works on grammar. The halakhic texts being printed were mainly codes, some small practical 
works, and responsa, almost exclusively the works of deceased rabbis. 
 If we compare ashkenazic halakhic works printed between 1470 and 1599 generally to works of 
responsa, other halakhic books were printed almost three times more often than works of responsa. See Glick, 
Kuntres, 1:70. 
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organize and prepare a rabbi’s archive for print.1205 The variety of types of documents, 
genres, and stylistic and editorial inconsistencies of these early printed collections 
correspond to a world of archives in which it suddenly became possible to publish one’s 
writings in fundamentally new ways. If publishing by means of manuscript copy and 
publishing by means of print copy are very far removed at the technological level, they are 
even more profoundly different when considering the scholarly culture in which 
manuscript copying was embedded and the practices of transmission that it made possible. 
As a result of this cultural clash, these practices found little to no continuity. 
b. Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Karo: Print Projects and False Starts 
The two sixteenth-century figures who changed the organization of halakha more than any 
others were Rabbi Yosef Karo, who wrote the Shulḥan Arukh, and Rabbi Isserles, whose 
gloss on this code, named Mapah, permitted application of the code for the ashkenazic 
realm. Both rabbis successfully published printed works of halakha in their lifetime. The 
latter first published non-halakhic works, a commentary on the Book of Esther,1206 and a 
mystical-philosophical work.1207 His first halakhic work, Torat ḥatat (Cracow, 1570), very 
consciously used the structure of Sha’arei Dura, because that work had already appeared 
                                                     
1205 From 1470 to 1570, the period preceding the printing of the responsa discussed in this chapter, 
only three works of responsa had been printed in their authors’ lifetime, of which none were in the 
geographical sphere of Ashkenaz: 1. ShUT Binyamin Zev (Venice, 1538): the author lived in Greece; 2. ShUT 
MaharY bar Lev (Salonica, 1557-1598): only partially printed during the lifetime of the author, Rabbi Yosef 
ben David ibn Lev, who died in 1580; 3. Divrei rivot (Salonica, 1562): the author, Rabbi Yiẓḥak Adrabi, died 
in 1585. The only ashkenazic figure who printed responsa in his lifetime prior to the 1570s was Rabbi Meir 
Katzenelbogen of Padua (Venice, 1553), who did so as an appendix to the responsa of his predecessor, Rabbi 
Yehuda Mintz, who was no longer alive. In the introduction, he apologized profusely for adding his own 
responsa, and claimed that he did so in order to print a greater volume of material, fearing that his rabbi’s 
responsa were too few and would be lost. For more on this work, see chapter 2 in this dissertation. 
1206 Meḥir yayin (Cremona, 1559). 
1207 Torat ha-olah (Prague, 1570).  
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in print at the time, as chapter three mentioned. Mapah was preceded by Darkhei Moshe. 
This work, published as a gloss on Rabbi Karo’s Bet Yosef, served as a basis for Mapah, 
but was printed much later.1208 Moreover, Darkhei Moshe was originally intended as a 
gloss on Arba Turim. Only later did the author alter the work into a gloss on Bet Yosef. 
Darkhei Moshe is, thus, a work with two false starts: first, a gloss on Arba Turim 
transformed into a gloss on Bet Yosef; second, a gloss on the Bet Yosef cast aside in favor 
of Mapah, its shorter, more codified alternate, a gloss on the Shulḥan Arukh. These false 
starts are very telling of the world of halakhic printing in the middle of the sixteenth 
century, when the first volume of Bet Yosef was published in Venice.1209 
In the introduction to Darkhei Moshe, Rabbi Isserles describes himself as a halakhic 
decision maker whose practice included consulting both rabbinic and textual authorities: 
“in all my teaching, I made for myself a rabbi … so that I take only one chip from the 
beam…. And I always held before my eyes the words of the ancient authorities.”1210 The 
authorities mentioned consist of the basic canon of halakha, which he lists 
chronologically:1211 
…the words of the Talmud, the geonim, Alfasi, the Tosafists, Maimonides, the 
poskim rishonim [first decision-makers].1212 And the Mordekhai, the Asheri, and the Tur, 
these are the aḥaronim [last ones] because they penetrated [the halakha] to its very core 
                                                     
1208 Darkhei Moshe Yoreh de’ah (Sulzbach, 1692), Darkhei Moshe Oraḥ ḥayim (Fjorda, 1760). The 
other two volumes were not printed in full. An abridged version of all four volumes was printed in Berlin, 
1702-3. Shulḥan Arukh with Mapah (partially in Cracow, 1570; then fully in Cracow, 1578). 
1209 Tur Oraḥ ḥayim with Bet Yosef (Venice, 1550). The other three volumes were printed in 1551, 
1553, and 1558. 
1210 See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 7b and RaShY there. When a case was submitted 
to R. Huna, he used to summon and gather ten schoolmen, in order, as he put it, that each of them might carry 
a chip from the beam (translation from Soncino Talmud). 
1211 He described these authorities as those who “came into the innermost sanctum, and they are 
counted at the head of all the compositors (ibid). כי הם באו לפני ולפנים  מה נמניםובראש כל המחברים ה ,  
1212 Poskim are halakhic decision makers; “rishonim” literally means “the first,” but here it denotes 
the earlier generation of post-ge’onic halakhic decisors of the Middle Ages. 
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and are considered foremost among all the authors, and also because they are the poskim 
whose decisions have spread throughout the diaspora.1213 
 
This modus operandi is interrupted when others confronted him with additional 
material. Rabbi Isserles describes arriving at an impasse, not knowing how to incorporate 
the sheer amount and scale of this additional material into his halakhic writing: 
…and I had no ruse to rescue myself, when I looked at all their words which were 
as long as from ‘aẓel’ to ‘aẓel’1214 and as the labor is great and the days are few and I, the 
laborer, am lazy,1215 and even if I skim them [wear out my eyes?] and look at them 
[/forget]1216 them quickly ‘like from the sea to the frying pan,’1217 and, behold, their 
teachings are absent.1218 
 
Seeing as these writings were voluminous and “their teachings are absent,” meaning, 
perhaps, that the writings were difficult to summarize and distill, Rabbi Isserles sought a 
way of assimilating these authorities into his own halakhic enterprise. He began by 
                                                     
1213 Moshe Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rabbi Ḥaim Shlomo Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Makhon 
Yerushalaim, 1979), 35. ם הפוסקים ”ף והתוספות והרמב”ורי, והגאונים’ דברי הגמ, ולעולם שויתי נגד עיני דברי הקדמונים 
.נמניםכי המה באו לפני ולפנים ובראש כל המחברים המה , י והטור המה אחרונים”והמרדכי והאשר, ראשונים  
  First, he begins with the Talmud and the Babylonian authorities from the early medieval 
period. Then, he proceeds to the central halakhic authorities of the high Middle Ages: Isaac Alfasi, the 
Tosafists, and Maimonides, who he calls “rishonim,” or the first halakhic decisors. Subsequently, Rabbi 
Isserles adds the “aḥaronim,” in other words, the latter authorities, namely Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel’s 
compilation, Sefer ha-Mordekhai, Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel’s summary and commentary on the Talmud, and 
his son Rabbi Yacov’s Arba Turim, which compiled and summarized the halakha across four distinct fields, 
incorporating his father’s halakhic opinion. 
1214 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Psaḥim 62b: “Mar Zutra said: between ‘Aẓel’ and ‘Aẓel,’ they were 
laden with four hundred camel loads of exegetical interpretations!” This refers to the verses in I Chronicles 
8: 38-44 that begin with “And Aẓel had six sons...” and end with “...these were the sons of Aẓel.” Mar Zutra 
is making the point that many interpretations were given for the verses between these two mentions of ‘Aẓel.’ 
Rabbi Isserles uses this to refer to the many “loads” of halakhic writings that he was attempting to somehow 
summarize and fit into his work. 
1215 Mishna, tractate Avot 2:15. 
1216 In Aramaic אשכם is “to see them,” but in Hebrew, it is close to “to forget them.” In this case, the 
continuation כמימא לטינרא is in Aramaic. This would perhaps mean that the Aramaic “to see” is a better 
meaning, but, as the context in the Talmud where the expression כמימא לטינרא is used, in fact, deals with 
memory, perhaps “forget” makes more sense here. 
1217 This expression, “like a fish from the sea to the frying pan,” denotes something that happens 
very quickly. See, for instance, Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kidushin 44a. 
1218 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35. 
וכי המלאכה מרובה בימים מועאטים ואני הפועל  ,בעיון כל דבריהם שארכו כמאצל לאצל ,ולא היה לי תחבולה להנצל
 ושמועתן איננה ,ואף אם הטעיף בהם עיני ואשכחם כמימא לטיגנא,עצל
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summarizing the writings. In the course of this undertaking, Rabbi Isserles explained, he 
decided to collect all these synopses on the margins of one work: “…and as I was doing 
this, my ideas said to me, and the vision of an intelligent thing came before my eyes, to 
collect all the novel interpretations of the poskim together, so that they would be in my 
hands like one,1219 and to write them for my memory on the margins of one posek.”1220 He 
thus describes collecting summaries to aid his own memory and choosing the Arba Turim 
as the most appropriate work to use for his marginalia, as it had the clearest and most useful 
organizational scheme: 
…and I saw that none were more fitting than the Turim, because their words are 
organized in a beautiful order, and one can easily find in it what one seeks, any of the 
explanations, be they old or new, and thereby all the things were preserved and saved in 
my heart, and immediately I girded my loins, and from my slumber I shook myself, and 
from the help of He who is enthroned upon praises,1221 I was aided, that my plans I began 
and almost concluded.1222 
 
While he was preparing these glosses, when he “had almost concluded,” Rabbi 
Isserles heard about Rabbi Karo’s Bet Yosef, which was similar in enterprise but, unlike his 
own work, was already finished. He therefore decided to adapt his work and publish it as 
a gloss on Bet Yosef, rather than as an independent gloss on the Arba Turim, as he had 
originally intended. The project motivating Rabbi Karo’s work is, indeed, remarkably 
                                                     
1219 Ezekiel 37:17: “Join them together into one stick so that they may become one in your hand.” 
1220 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35 (emphasis added): 
ולכותבן  ואגב גררא אמרו לי רעיוני וחזיון דבר חכמה לנגד עיני ללקוא כל חדושי הפוסקים ביחד כדי שיהיו בידי כאחד
בצד איזה פוסקלזכרון   – “posek” here denotes a type of work, not the person who makes halakhic decisions, but, 
rather, a work of halakhic decisions; in this case, he ends up choosing the Arba Turim. (Compare to the 
responsum §25 in Rabbi Isserles’ responsa, where he cites the son of Rabbi Shalom Shakhna’s [d. 1558], 
who explained that they begged of his father “to make a posek,” which he refused. בקשתי עם הרבה לומדים  
שיעשה פוסק ...ממנו  
1221 Psalms 22:4. 
1222 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35. וראיתי שאין טוב מזו אלא ספר הטורים, כי דבריהם בסדר נאה מסודרים 
ומיד את מתני , י זה היו הדברים בלתי צפונים ושמורים"אף א מהמבוערים הן זקנים הן נערים וע, ובקל אפשר למצוא בו מבוקשו
...ישמחשבותי התחלתי וכמעט גמרת, ומעזר יושב תהלו נעזרתי, ומשנת תרדמתי ננערתי, נאזרתי  
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similar to that of Rabbi Isserles, as can be seen in the introduction to Bet Yosef. Rabbi Karo 
introduces his book by explaining that, because of the duration of the diaspora, the halakha 
had been transmitted, or “emptied from vessel to vessel,”1223 so often as to result in a 
situation where “the Torah is not only turned into two Torahs, but into a multitude of Torahs 
because of the many books in existence that explain its laws and rules.”1224 He mentions 
the phenomenon of halakhic compilations and their transmission as one of the sources of 
this multiplication and expansiveness of halakhic textual material: “And even though their 
intention … was to illuminate our darkness, this good light that we enjoyed from them … 
had as its consequence much doubt and confusion, as everyone compiles a book for himself 
and repeats that which his predecessor already wrote and compiled, or contradicts that 
which his peer wrote.”1225 
Similarly to Rabbi Isserles, he also mentions the vastness of the textual material 
and the impossible task of incorporating it all: “And if a man will decide with regard to 
every law that he needs to inquire into its roots and origins in the Talmud and the 
interpreters and the poskim, all of them, this will weigh very heavily on him.”1226 In the 
introduction, Rabbi Karo also explained why earlier halakhic compilations were 
problematic sources: they were often incomplete, partially incoherent, and badly 
                                                     
1223 Karo, Bet Yosef, introduction: הורקנו מכלי אל כלי  
1224 Karo, Bet Yosef, introduction:  כי לא נעשית התורה כב' תורות אלא כתורות אין מספר לסבת רוב הספרים
 .הנמצאים בביאור משפטיה ודיניה
1225 I translate חיבר here specifically as compiled, as it is used in addition to כתב or wrote. 
Ibid, continued (emphasis mine): ה כוונתם היתה להטיר מחשכנו נמשך לנו מתוך האור הטוב שנהינינו "וגם כי הם ע
י שקודמו או כותב הדין בהיפך מה שכתבו מכתב וחיבר  בהיות כל אחד מחבר ספר לעצמו וכופל מה שכבר, ה ספק ומבוכה רבה"מהם ע
 חבירו
1226 Ibid, continued:  ואם יאמר אדם בכל דין שיצטרך לחקור שרשו ומוצאו בדברי הגמרא והמפרשם והפוסקים כולם
 .יכבד הדבר עליו מאד
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copied.1227 His description of the canon of authorities also resembles that of Rabbi Isserles, 
from the list of earlier authorities to the conclusion that the task is impossible: “...and then 
[he will have to] inquire into the words of Alfasi and the ROSh and the RaN and the 
Mordekhai, and then Maimonides, and the other poskim ... and it is very clear that this is a 
thing that has no measure.”1228 
“Because of all this,” Karo exclaims, “I, the insignificant, Yosef ... came to be 
zealous for the Lord ... to compile a book that includes all the laws....”1229 Rabbi Karo, 
likewise, chooses the structure of the Arba Turim as a basis for his work, briefly explaining 
that the structure of this work serves his purposes better than Maimonides’ code does 
because the latter merely mentions the laws, without presenting their sources, whereas the 
Tur includes sources, thus providing the necessary scaffolding for adding glosses and 
summaries.1230 Both figures thus understood, perhaps more clearly than any other rabbis at 
the time, that the challenge they were facing was one of organization. Both Rabbi Isserles 
and Rabbi Karo decided that the solution would be a printed codification based on Arba 
Turim. 
                                                     
1227 Ibid, continued: ואם יאמר אדם לבחור בספרי הקוצרים כסמ"ק והאגור והכלבו, באמת שזו דרך קצרה וארוכה כי
ובפרט בספר האגור כי בהרבה מקומות מביא לשון הטור כהוייתו והלשון ההוא צריך נגר ובר , מעולם לא יוכל לדעת שום דין כהלכתו
גם במקומות מביא פוסק אחד להתיר בלי שום חולק במקום שכל גדולי ישראל חולקים . ל מעתיק כמן שמצאו"נגר דיפרקוניה והוא ז
ל כתב רק דברי ההיתר ולא זכר דברי הגמגום הנזכר "והוא ז, ההוא שמביא אותו הדין להתיר כתב שיש לגמגם בו ואוסרים וגם הפוסק
.בדברי הפוסק ההוא  
1228 Ibid, continued:  ואח"כ לעיין בדברי הרי"ף והרא"ש והר"ן והמרדכי ואח"כ לעיין בהרמב"ם ושאר פוסקים וגם
אם הדין ההוא מוסכם מהכל או אם יש בו מחלוקת וכמה מחלוקות בדבר ובדברי מי בדברי תשובות הגדולים הנמצאות אצלו לדעת 
...וזה דבר מבואר בעצמו שהוא דבר שאין לו קצבה. ראוי להכריע .  
1229 Ibid, continued: על כן אני הדל באלפי' יוסף...קנאתי לה' צבאות ונערתי חצני לסקל המסילה והסכמתי לחבר ספר
...כולל כל הדינים  
1230 Ibid, continued: ולכן הסכמתי לסמכו לא' מהפוסקים המפורסמים ועלה בדעתי לסמכו לספר הרמב"ם ז"ל...וחזרתי
ולכן הסכמתי לסמכו לספר ארבעה . והייתי צריך להאריך ולכתוב סברות שאר הפוסקים וטעמם' בי מפני שאינו מביא אלא סברא א
.כולל רוב דעות הפוסקיםל כי הוא "ש ז"טורים שחבר הרב רבינו יעקב בן הרא  
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Notwithstanding this insight, however, their undertakings did encounter problems. 
Both hoped to publish their larger scholarly archives but ended up with a shorter, more 
popular project. They both used their archives to create shorter, more unified, and 
comprehensive codes. Rabbi Karo created Shulḥan Arukh, which was based on his 
“storehouse,” Bet Yosef, named after the biblical Yosef’s storehouses,1231 but significantly 
abridged and codified. Although Rabbi Karo himself considered the latter work less 
important, he attained wide fame for it. His tombstone called him the creator of the Shulḥan 
Arukh.1232 Rabbi Isserles, in a responsum, explains Darkhei Moshe in similar terms, as a 
larger book from which he took material for his glosses.1233 The first work of halakha that 
Rabbi Isserles printed, Torat ḥatat, was likewise created using the material from Darkhei 
Moshe as an archive.1234 In his introduction to the Mapah, he expresses his sincere hope of 
                                                     
1231 Genesis 41. 
 1232 The current plaque lists Bet Yosef as well, but older images show that the text on the tombstone 
was ערוך שולחן הבעל, זצל קארו יוסף רבי הרב ציון.   
See R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, Joseph Karo: Lawyer and Mystic (Philadelphia: JPS, 1980), 2n1; 3, 
plate 1. Werblowsky remarks that the inscription “most probably dates from a later period when the Sh. A. 
was already well established as Karo’s main claim to popular fame.” 
1233 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §35: וכן כתבתי בעצמי בחיבורי דרכי משה אשר ממנו סדרתי את השלחן ערוך...; 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, §131. 
 1234 Although Torat ḥatat was printed before Darkhei Moshe, Galinsky has shown that Rabbi Isserles 
wrote the former work based on the latter. This is in line with our understanding that Darkhei Moshe was, 
first, a form of manuscript archive from which Rabbi Isserles extracted material for his writing. Galinsky 
considers it obvious that Rabbi Isserles used Darkhei Moshe to write Torat ḥatat. He proves this as follows: 
in the order of the Arba Turim (which is also the structure of Darkhei Moshe), the laws of the heart appear 
before those of the liver. In the order of the Sha’arei Dura (which is also the structure of Torat ḥatat), on the 
other hand, the laws of the liver precede those of the heart.  
 In Torat ḥatat, Rabbi Isserles mentions a case in which the laws of the heart and liver are identical. 
He opens this by paraphrasing Sha’arei Dura, but rather than paraphrasing in the correct order, mentioning 
the opinions first about the liver, then about the heart, he references the opinions on the heart first, and then 
simply states that these laws are the same for the liver. 
Why reference the later section and say that the earlier is identical, rather than referencing the earlier 
section and stating that the next one is identical? Galinsky explains that this is because he was using his notes 
on the Tur (Darkhei Moshe) as a basis, where they were reversed (heart first, then liver), with all the 
references from the relevant literature. Thus, as he used his Darkhei Moshe to create Torat ḥatat, he copied 
it from Darkhei Moshe in that collection’s order. See, Eliezer Galinsky, “Introduction” to Moshe Isserles, 
Torat ḥatat, ed. Eliezer Galinsky (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 2015), 23-24. 
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publishing Darkhei Moshe : “…and I hope to God that also my longer writings will spread 
in Israel, and there you can find bundles and bundles, piles and piles of proofs and 
reasoning and my justifications and reasoning for every item as much as I could 
attain….”1235 Rabbi Isserles, whose gloss made him the most important ashkenazic 
authority in the history of early modern halakha, died before realizing his wish to see his 
longer work Darkhei Moshe in print. These attempts and failures, circumnavigations and 
unexpected turns derive from a situation in which both authors were adapting their archives 
of summaries, notes, and glosses – originally intended as a method of information 
management – to a world of textual publication that was coming into its own at that time. 
Even scholars who were highly sensitive to the emerging changes and eager to adapt could 
not anticipate precisely the transformations in this world of archives, manuscripts, and 
compilations. 
 c. Books of Responsa in Early Modern Scholarly Culture 
Rabbi Isserles thus succeeded in publishing his halakhic writings in the form of glosses 
structured as part of a larger codification by Rabbi Karo, a sfardic figure with a more 
universalist approach to halakha. In the ashkenazic realm, Rabbi Isserles was not the only 
one working on a grandiose, structured oeuvre of halakhic text, with hopes for publication. 
Rabbi Shlomo Luria had been working on his magnum opus, Yam shel Shlomo. Rabbi 
                                                     
1235 Isserles, Shulḥan Arukh, Mapah, introduction:  בספרו הגדול בית יוסף, מכל מקום הלכתי בדרכו לכתוב...
ואקוה ...כי מעט מזער הוספתי מדעתי...ואם לא ימצאהו בספרו ידקדק בדברי האחרונים אשר נתפשטו במדינות אלו...הדברים סתמא 
ל ראיות וטעמים ונימוקי וטעמי בכל דבר להשם יתברך שגם דברי הארוכים יתפשטו בישראל ושם אגודות אגודות חבילות חבילות ש
״...לפי השגת ידי  
“In any case I went in his path [Rabbi Yosef Karo] to write everything plainly, because in general 
my opinions can also be found in his book … and if it cannot be found in his book, check the words of the 
later scholars who have spread in our lands … because very little of what I added is from my own opinion” 
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Isserles’ plans regarding his archive had not come to fruition: Darkhei Moshe was never 
printed in full. Rabbi Luria’s work was likewise not printed in his lifetime. By the time his 
Yam shel Shlomo was printed, an innumerable amount of his writings, which spanned about 
sixteen tractates, had been lost. Paradoxically, Rabbi Luria’s responsa, which were 
negligible compared to Yam shel Shlomo, were printed close to his lifetime, while his larger 
project never made it into print in its entirety.1236 
This paradox reflects the challenges of adapting scholarly archives from a 
manuscript culture into printed works. The more structured, complete, and comprehensive 
a work, the more feasible it would seem to publish it in print in theory – although, in 
practice, it was not always easy to carry out. Responsa, however, had no such blueprint; as 
independent units that belonged to a rabbi’s general archive, there was no overarching 
structure to these writings, no organizational logic, not even a clear principle for selecting 
and delineating the contents. The lack of a predetermined blueprint made it easier to publish 
responsa “as is,” without imposing any structure or seeking a unifying concept of the work. 
This could be done most conveniently once the author died, when the living archive became 
a “nachlass,” thus ensuring that the work was complete in the simplest sense of the word, 
although not in any other sense. 
Living scholars thus found it more compelling to conceive of unified and structured 
codifications rather than a coherent collection of responsa as suitable for the printing press. 
It is telling that both Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles, who harnessed the power of print so 
consciously for their codes, did not publish their responsa or even prepare them for eventual 
                                                     
1236 See chapter 3 in this dissertation for more on Rabbi Luria’s methods and literay projects. 
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publication. Rabbi Isserles’ responsa, as we have seen, were printed after his death, without 
organization or structure. The very first collection of Rabbi Karo’s responsa was similarly 
printed after the author’s death. In his will, he asked, in the words of his son, Rabbi Yehuda 
“that all his responsa to questions be collected, and all his writings, and that they be 
arranged to be printed”1237 – note the conflation of responsa and “all his writings,” yet 
another testament to the place of responsa alongside other notes. The son printed ShUT 
avkat rokhel (The spices of the merchant)1238 in Salonica in 1597-8, and he decided to 
organize the responsa according to the four volumes of the Tur, which also formed the 
pillars of his father’s famous works. Only one part of the responsa, however, was printed: 
… as they were scattered, one here and one there, so that even one responsum from 
those that were not organized into a book immediately could not be found in its entirety on 
one paper, rather, half of it was on one paper and, for the other half, I had to wait until I 
could find its continuation, and sometimes it was in three or four smaller papers, depending 
on the dimensions of the issue, and sometimes I would find the middle of the issue without 
the beginning and the end, and this was the case for the majority of them….1239 
 
In other words, unlike Rabbi Karo’s supremely organized code, the responsa 
material was not ordered; even simply assembling the responsa and organizing them into 
four categories was too difficult.1240 
The transition from a manuscript scholarly culture to a world of print publication is 
not merely technological; it concerns modes of organization and a concept of knowledge. 
                                                     
 1237 See Yosef Karo, introduction to Avkat rokhel (Salonica: 1597-8) שיקובצו כל תשובות שאלותיו וכל 
ויותן סדר להדפיסם, כתובותיו . 
 1238 Song of Songs 3:6. 
 1239 Karo, introduction to Avkat rokhel. 
שאפילו תשובה אחת מאותן שלא היו מסודרות מיד על ספר לא היתה שלמה , ומה גם בהיותן מפוזרות אחת הנה ואחחת הנה
קטנים [!] ולפעמים בשלשה או בארבעה ניירים , הייתי צריך להמתין עד שימצא שאריתה, בנייר זה וחציה אחר אלא חצייה', בנייר א
."וזה היה ברובו כמו כולו, וגם בהמצא אמצעית הענין בלי סוף וראש, כפי גודל הענין ההוא  
 1240 Those relating to the volume Even ha-ezer, dealing with family law. 
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As recent scholars have correctly pointed out, manuscript culture and print culture 
coexisted in the sixteenth century.1241 This becomes especially clear when scholarly culture 
and practices are examined: a culture can be using printed books while simultaneously 
working with texts in ways that defy print technology. The world of halakhic texts in this 
period provides such an example, and the fate of responsa demonstrates the impact of this 
change. Ultimately, the paradigm of codification dominated the age of print – but responsa 
were almost impossible to codify. The printed works of responsa lacked an overall structure 
or unifying organization, while precisely those figures who printed structured codifications 
could not find a suitable scheme for their responsa, leaving them in disarray in manuscript. 
Taking as our starting point an early modern learned world in which writings of all 
kinds were assembled as creative reference tools, which were not only used privately by 
the scholar but also consulted and copied by peers, it becomes easier to understand that the 
very notion of printing one’s work was – although not exactly foreign – somewhat difficult 
to conceptualize in practice because scholars were immersed in the current scholarly 
practices that defied the dynamics of print publication. Print technology did not fill a void; 
it replaced an earlier world with methods of copying that subsumed specific learned 
practices and expectations, not all of which were smoothly translatable to print. What did 
this earlier world look like? As Peter Miller explains, contemplating Peiresc’s archive made 
it possible for him to glimpse a different form of scholarship and study, “one organized 
around research rather than writing.”1242 This more dynamic world of scholarship helps us 
                                                     
 1241 See, for instance, Jeffrey Todd Knight, “From compilatio to compilation” in Johnston and Van 
Dussen, The Manuscript Book, 81-84. 
1242 Miller, Peiresc’s History of Provence, 6. 
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understand responsa’s resistance to codification. The notion not of a defined, structured, 
unified book, but, rather, of a scholarly archive with a “de-structured” approach to order, 
as Décultot defines the essence of the adversaria, represents this ashkenazic culture and its 
important epistemological significance.1243 
d. Responsa in Manuscript, Responsa in Print 
As cited earlier, Rabbi Isserles, in his introduction to Darkhei Moshe, presents the body of 
texts on which he based his halakhic decision making. Others, however, disrupted this 
process by introducing an additional category of halakhic text into this canon: 
And although these are the decisors (poskim) that have spread in the entire diaspora, 
and these are the laws of the olah-offering,1244 which were in my heart at the start, to 
instruct according to their words to the innumerable nation;1245 and as I adjudicated from 
them sometimes clear things, others came with megilot starim (hidden scrolls)….1246 
 
Although Rabbi Isserles seems to have been willing to decide solely according to 
the earlier canon, “others” came with “hidden scrolls,” and he was forced to abort his 
project. As the rest of the passage, which lists the new material, makes abundantly clear, 
these texts contain none other than responsa: 
… others came with megilot starim (hidden scrolls) and showed from the responsa 
of the sages after whom we follow, the generals and the noblemen, such as the responsa of 
ROSh (Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel), RaShBA (Rabbi Shlomo ben Adret), and MahaRY Kolon 
(Rabbi Yiẓḥak Kolon), and RibaSh (Rabbi Yiẓḥak bar Sheshet) and MaharaI (Rabbi Israel 
Isserlein), who are the great authorities… 1247 
 
                                                     
1243 Décultot, “Introduction,” 11. 
1244 Leviticus 6:2, also wordplay and a reference to Rabbi Isserles’ kabalistic-metaphysical work on 
the measurements of the Temple, Torat ha-olah. 
1245 Numbers 23:10, מי מנה עפר יעקב. The expression עדת מי מנה is known from the piyut “Ḥasal sidur 
Pesaḥ,” by R. Yosef Tov-Elem, which is part of the Passover Hagadah. 
1246 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35. 
וכאשר  ,להורות אחר דבריהם לעדת מי מנה ,על לבי בראשונה ,וזאת תורת העולה ,ואף כי הם הפוסקים שפשטו בכל הגולה
.פסקתי מהם לפעמים דברים ברורים  באו אחרים עם מגילות סתרים ,
1247 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35.  
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In this list, Rabbi Isserles enumerated several famous works of responsa, asserting 
that he would have been perfectly content making halakhic decisions without taking these 
“hidden scrolls” – the responsa – into consideration. This seems unfathomable from a 
contemporary perspective. In a footnote of his bibliography of responsa, Glick mentions 
this paragraph and exclaims, “And we stand in shock and wonder, could it be that it 
occurred to Rema, the rabbi of the ashkenazic diaspora, to compose a book of halakhic 
decisions without taking the responsa into consideration?! At the moment, we have not 
found someone who can solve this riddle.”1248 Rabbi Isserles called the additional canon 
that appeared and challenged his earlier form of halakhic decision making “hidden 
scrolls.” The reference to “scrolls,” as opposed to books (sfarim), writings (ktavim), or 
compositions (ḥiburim), to name but a few, points to their physical state: they had been in 
manuscript. Likewise, the word “hidden ”may relate to their status as works that circulated 
in personal, semi-private circles, as opposed to the more universal canon mentioned 
earlier.1249 Perhaps the answer to Glick’s riddle lies in the shift from “hidden scrolls” to 
printed responsa. 
                                                     
1248 Glick, Kuntres, 1: 9, note 333:  ואנו עומדים תוהים ותמהים, הייתכן שעלה על דעת הרמ״א, רבם של בני גולת
.זו חידה על שיעמוד מי מצאנו לא שעה לפי?! השו״ת בספרות להתחשב מבלי פסקים ספר לחבר, אשכנז  
1249 See chapter 2.2 for my discussion of the source of the expression in the Talmud, and of a similar 
use of “hidden scrolls” in the early modern period in the first printed edition of Mordekhai ben Hillel’s 
Hilkhot shḥita u-bedika [Laws of slaughter and checking] (Venice, ca. 1550). Yochanan Treves, who edited 
the first printed Hilkhot shḥita u-bedika, describes publication in his time as follows: “everyone who has in 
his hands megilot starim brings them out to the printers and they are a light to all.” “Megilot starim” literally 
means “hidden scrolls,” but here it is used to denote personal manuscripts. As use of the term “hidden scrolls” 
implies, the Ashkenazic halakhic texts were not simply in manuscript in the material sense (denoted here by 
the use of “scrolls” rather than “books”); in addition, these manuscript compilations were personal 
(“hidden”), and, consequently, not always an obvious candidate for print publication. This status accorded to 
“hidden scrolls” is not only because they were copied by hand rather than printed, but also because the source 
of responsa is correspondence – letters –a genre that in its personal correspondence aspect is more closely 
related to manuscript than other works are (as opposed to, for example, a treatise, which may be reproduced 
by hand but follows the logic of a printed text – stable, public, etc., rather than that of a personal letter). Many 
of these earlier works of responsa maintained a certain “manuscript-status” in their logic and authority even 
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The works of responsa listed by Rabbi Isserles, which are both ashkenazic and 
sfardic in origin, were all, by the mid-sixteenth century, available in print.1250 To those 
works of responsa, Rabbi Isserles adds, “also the words of Our Master Rabbi Yacov Weil, 
and our Master Rabbi Yacov Moellin, and our Master Rabbi Israel Bruna, those are the 
masters, with the swords of precautions and customs they are stringent...”1251 These three 
authorities are mentioned separately because the former were the more general authorities, 
whereas the latter three represented a more specific ashkenazic world, with its customs and 
its added stringencies. Two out of these three works were also printed around that time.1252 
As a result of this alternative trove of authorities shown to him, Rabbi Isserles 
explains, he found himself in a problematic situation: “and by means of this, my words on 
the basis of the earlier authorities were broken, and I was thought amongst my peers as 
                                                     
after they were printed. The process of bringing ashkenazic halakhic manuscripts to print was, evidently, not 
just a technical step; it was part of a web of changes that affected the practices of halakhic study in highly 
significant ways. By being printed, the manuscripts entered a more public realm of readership. 
1250 The responsa of Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel (Constantinople, 1517 and Venice, 1552-3); several 
parts of the responsa of Rashba (Rome, 1470; Constantinople, 1516; Venice, 1519); the responsa of Rabbi 
Yosef Kolon (Venice, 1519); the responsa of Rabbi Israel Isserlein: Trumat ha-deshen (Venice, 1519); the 
responsa of Ribash (Constantinople, 1546-7 and Riva di Trento, 1549). 
About a handful of works of sfardic responsa were published in addition to the ones mentioned here: 
ShUT Binyamin Zev (Venice, 1538), ShUT Rabbi David ha-Kohen (Constantinople, 1537-8), ha-Ran (the 
Responsa of Rabbi Nissim Gerondi) (Rome, ca. 1546-7), Tshuvot ve-igrot ha-Rambam (Responsa and letters 
of Maimonides) (Constantinople, 1514). 
When it comes to the Ashkenazic works, however, this brief list covers all the works of responsa 
that were published before 1550. As Rabbi Isserles mentioned later in the introduction that, in the process of 
writing his work, he heard about Rabbi Yosef Karo’s parallel work, Bet Yosef, the first volume of which was 
published in Venice in 1550, this introduction was probably written not long after that time. 
1251 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35: 
להורות אחר דבריהם לעדת מי מנה, וכאשר פסקתי  ואף כי הם הפוסקים שפשטו בכל הגולה, וזאת תורת העולה, על לבי בראשונה,
מהם לפעמים דברים ברורים, באו אחרים עם מגילות סתרים, והראו מתוך תשובת החכמים אשר אחריהם אנחנו נגררים, הסגנים 
אנשים י שהמה האורים הגדולים אשר עיני האנשים מאירים, ולבות ה”ש ומהרא”ק וריב”א ומהרי”ש והרשב”והחורים, כתשובת הרא
 מתרדמתן מעירים, ואם המה בני אנשים אנחנו נגדם כחמורים.
ב שהמה המורים, בחרבות סייגות ומנהגות מחמירים”ל ומהרי”ו ומהרי”גם דברי מהרי  
1252 The responsa of Rabbi Weil in Venice, 1549 and those of Rabbi Moellin in Cremona, 1556. 
Although the collection of Rabbi Bruna’s responsa was not printed until much later, many individual responsa 
of his appeared in printed works such as Psakim u-ktavim (Venice, 1519). 
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someone senseless.” 1253 At the earlier point in time upon which Rabbi Isserles is reflecting 
in his narrative, when it was “in his heart at the start, to instruct according to their words,” 
this may well have been the case. However, as he was writing this introduction to Darkhei 
Moshe, sometime around 1550, these works were already beginning to be available in print, 
no longer “hidden scrolls.” 
In his introduction to Bet Yosef, Rabbi Karo terms the responsa that a scholar would 
consult the “responsa that can be found with him,”1254 once again indicating that, unlike 
the other works he mentions, responsa were circulating in a less complete and universal 
manner than other works – everyone possessed different collections of responsa. Another 
remark, a few paragraphs later, regarding the works of responsa that he did include is also 
quite telling: “...and the responsa of the ROSh and the Rashba and Rabbi Yiẓḥak bar 
Sheshet, and Rabbi Shimon bar Ẓemaḥ, and Rabbi Yiẓḥak Kolon and Trumat ha-deshen ... 
and, see, I have also received some responsa from the RaShbA written with a pen of iron 
and lead in print....”1255 Thus, he is clearly first taking printed responsa into consideration. 
All but one1256 of these works were available in print before 1520. Moreover, he reveals 
his sensitivity to print publication regarding responsa elsewhere in the introduction. 
                                                     
1253 Darkhei Moshe, ed. Rosenthal, 35: וע”י זה דברי על פי הקדמונים היו שבורים, ונחשבתי עם חבירי כבוערים 
(“as someone senseless,” Psalms 94:8: “take notice, you senseless ones among the people” בני בוערים) 
1254 Karo, Bet Yosef, introduction: ואח"כ לעיין בדברי...וגם בדברי תשובות הגדולים הנמצאים אצלו 
1255 Ibid.:  ותשובות הרא"ש והרשב"א והר"י בר' ששת והר"ר שמשון בר צמח ומהר"י קולון ותרומת הדשן...והנה בא...
תשובות ן וכשאני כותב מאותן "ט ברזל ועופרת בדפוס וכתוב בתחלתן שהם תשובות הרמב"א כתובות בע"לידי קצת תשובות הרשב
לפי שספרי הדפוס מצויים ביד כל אדם ומי שירצה לעיין ' ן"כתוב בתשובות להרבמ'א אנ יכותב "תשובות הרשב' פ שאני יודע שה"אע
.בלשון התשובה עצמה יכול לעמוד עליה  
See also Tirẓa Kelman’s MA thesis, which deals in depth with the sources used by Rabbi Karo in 
one subsection of the Shulḥan Arukh and uses this as a test case to explore the fact that the only two 
ashkenazic works of responsa mentioned in this introduction were also the only ones available in print before 
1520. Between 1520 and 1559, when Bet Yosef was printed, a few more works of responsa were printed (the 
ones mentioned in Rabbi Isserles’ introduction), but Rabbi Karo did not seem to be using them. 
1256 The responsa of Rabbi Shimon b. Tzemach Duran (Amsterdam, 1738). 
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Mentioning that the printed edition of one of the collections of RaShbA’s responsa were 
mistakenly attributed to Naḥmanides, he explains that he will continue to refer to them by 
their wrong attribution because “the printed books are found with every man,” and that is 
the title under which it was printed, thus permitting readers to know which title to 
consult.1257 
The works of responsa that, according to Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles, needed to 
be included in their codifications were printed. Responsa that did not circulate in print form 
seem exempt from this expectation. Seventeenth-century scholars would display a similar 
understanding: Unlike many of his fifteenth-century colleagues, whose works were printed 
in the following century, the responsa of Rabbi Moshe Mintz (ca. 1415-1480) were not 
printed until the seventeenth century.1258 In the introduction to his printed responsa, the 
consequences of having remained in manuscript for so long become very apparent. Rabbi 
                                                     
1257 See my discussion in chapter 2 of Ḥiya Meir ben David, who edited the Venice, 1519 edition of 
these responsa attributed to Naḥmanides and clearly knew that this was a mistake, as he mentions it on the 
title page. 
1258 The responsa of Rabbi Moshe Mintz are much longer than those of his masters and colleagues 
Rabbi Isserlein and Rabbi Weil; attempting to make the reader’s life easier, the editor wrote: “...I have raised 
on the publication signs which will be of great use to those who consult/study this book.” It seems that the 
editor wanted to include the subsections and conclusions [u-bo yevo’ar parts] that exist in the table of contents 
into the body of the text itself. See Moshe Mintz, ShUT MaharaM Mintz, ed. Yonathan Shraga Domb 
(Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1991), 30-31. Barring a few inconsistencies here and there (see the list in 
the Makhon Yerushalaim edition 2: 645-646), the order of the simanim is preserved in the printed version as 
it was in Rabbi Moshe Mintz’s own list of simanim. This was most likely based on his own pinkas, in which 
the responsa were entered chronologically, with a few responsa stuck into earlier pages later on, so that the 
order is largely chronological, with a few responsa added where they fit in terms of theme or addressee, even 
though they do not fit chronologically. The order was not edited in any significant way, and, in spite of good 
intentions, the decision to add the small conclusions from the table of contents into the body of the work was 
not carried through beyond the first three responsa. There was no attempt to remove personal names, 
greetings, or place names in any consistent manner. The editor did, however, add numbering for every 
conclusion for the entire book, which may have made it easier to use in terms of referencing specific passages 
(for instance, when writing a responsum and including MahaRaM Mintz as a source). This numbering was 
reproduced in later printed versions. 
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Meshulam Feibush, the rabbi of Cracow, mentions in his introduction to the printed edition 
that “...this aforementioned [collection of] responsa was not to be found, because it was 
closed and sealed and hidden....”1259 The introduction seems eager to impress upon the 
reader that Rabbi Mintz is just as great as his peers who were much better known, as their 
responsa had already been in print in the sixteenth century: 
 The responsa of … Rabbi Moshe Mintz SeGaL, he is our master and rabbi Moshe 
Mintz, who was the most important rabbi in Mainz in 1468 in the same generation as the 
great latter geonim from whose wellsprings we drink and after whose rules and decisions 
we, the sons/inhabitants of Ashkenaz, follow, our master and rabbi Isserl’, author of Trumat 
ha-deshen of blessed memory and our master and rabbi Weil of blessed memory, and our 
master and rabbi Israel Bruna of blessed memory, and our master and rabbi Yehuda Mintz 
of blessed memory, and our master and rabbi Yosef Kolon, and the rest of the world level 
geonim who lived in those days, as the reader in these questions and responsa can see, and 
that he [Rabbi Moshe Mintz] was as big in his generation as they were....” 1260 
 
 Rabbi Mintz’s long absence from the world of printed responsa meant that he was 
less known to readers than other rabbis from his period. 1261 Not only less learned readers 
                                                     
1259 ShUT MaharaM Mintz (Cracow, 1616), Introduction: ולא היה בנמצא תשוב׳ הנ״ל כי היה סתום וחתום
, וחסרים ובלואים קרועים רק, ובמילואו בשלימותו הספר בידם היה לא, זה גם ואף, לעצמן אותו גנזו אשר סגול׳ יחידי איזהו ביד וגנוז
...לידי הספר זה שבא הש״י שיזכני עד  
1260 Ibid: תשובות מהר״ר משה מינץ סג״ל הוא מהר״ר משה מינץ, אשר הי׳ רב המובהק במענץ רכ״ח לפרט בדורותם
ו שותים ובתר דיניהם ופסקיהם אנחנו בני אשכנז נגררים, מהר״ר איסרל בעל תרומת הדשן של גאוני עולם בתראי אשר מימיהם אנחנ
ז״ל ומהרר״ו ז״ל ומהררו״י ברונה ז״ל ומהר״ר יודא מינץ ז״ל ומהרר״י קולון, ושאר גאוני עולם אשר היו בימים ההם, כאשר יראה 
 הרואה מתוך שאלות ותשובות האלו, ושהוא היה גדול בדורו כמוהם
Rabbi Bruna is also mentioned as part of this list even though his responsa had not been published 
in print at that point, perhaps because Rabbi Bruna appears frequently in the printed responsa of Rabbi 
Isserlein and Rabbi Weil. 
Rabbi Yacov Berlin (1708-1750), the author of Be’er Yacov (Fürth, 1767), was shocked that 
authorities such as Rabbi Isserles and David ha-Levi SeGaL (author of the gloss on the Shulḥan Arukh named 
Turei zahav, or TaZ) did not mention Rabbi Moshe Mintz, and Rabbi Ḥayim Yosef David ha-Levi Azulay 
(ḤYDA) set Rabbi Berlin straight by mentioning that this omission was simply because ShUT MaharaM 
Mintz had not been printed yet. See “Introduction,” in ShUT MaharaM Mintz, ed. Yonathan Shraga Domb 
(Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1991), 24n139. 
1261 The parts from Rabbi Moshe Mintz’s writings that were copied most often in manuscript (prior 
to printing) are the seder nisu’in (order/arrangement of marriage) and seder ktuva (order/arrangement of 
marriage contract), as well as the rules of the orphan’s kadish prayer, and parts of individual responsa relating 
to the spelling of names for gitin (divorce documents). The list of simanim that Rabbi Moshe Mintz himself 
created also seems to have been circulating, and some rabbis refer to the list independently as a source. שיירי ( 
.)ודין זה נמצא רק במפתח ולא בתשובה –״כתוב בתשו׳ מהר״ם מינץ סי׳ ק״ו ע״יש : כנה״ג ביו״ד סי׳ שמ״ה הג״ה ט׳ אות ד׳   
Other than that, his works were not used very much before they were printed. 
UNIT III, CHAPTER 6: RESPONSA FROM SCHOLARLY ARCHIVE TO PUBLISHED BOOK 
 
 572   
 
but also rabbis seemed to have had limited exposure to Rabbi Mintz’ work. 1262 In the 
seventeenth-century work Naḥalat shiva, a collection of laws, responsa, and templates for 
religious documents and contracts attributed to Shmuel ha-Levi, the author explains that in 
the Mapah, Rabbi Isserles never mentions Rabbi Mintz “...because the responsa of our 
master Rabbi Moshe Mintz were not yet published by means of print, only in the year 1617, 
and a few years prior … Rabbi Moshe Isserles was already called up to the yeshiva of 
heaven, so that he, Rabbi Moshe Isserles, did not hear the statements of our master Rabbi 
Moshe Mintz....”1263 
 In the last entry of his Avodat ha-Gershuni, a collection of responsa from the 
seventeenth century, the author, Rabbi Gershon Ashkenazi (1618-1693), even suggests that 
if the opinions of Rabbi Mintz contradict those of a later authority, such as, in that particular 
case, Rabbi Yosef Katz, the principle of hilkheta ke-batrai (the law is like the later 
authorities), does not hold. The aforementioned principle is based on the assumption that 
any later authority knew the opinions of his predecessors and thus knowingly disagreed 
with them, whereas the earlier authority may have agreed with the later one had he been 
exposed to their ideas. However, Rabbi Mintz’s responsa, Rabbi Ashkenazi claimed, were 
exempt from this principle: 
If it is the case that there is a disagreement between … Rabbi Moshe Mintz and 
                                                     
1262 The later print publication of Rabbi Moshe Mintz’s responsa also led to an extended period of 
confusion and disarray regarding his authorship of responsa. (Many responsa written by Rabbi Moshe Mintz 
were, in fact, known, but they were attributed to other rabbis with similar initials, such as Rabbi Menaḥem 
of Metz [the “Me’il żedek”], Rabbi Moshe Isserles, or Rabbi Meir Katzenelbogen of Padua.) 
1263 Shmuel ha-Levi, Naḥalat Shiva (Amsterdam, 1667), §31:  וכן יש להוכיח בודאי שנעלם מרמ"א דברי
י "ו מהר"ק מהרי"שולחן ערוך והם תרומת הדשן מהרי' א בהגהות לד"ם מינץ הביא רמ"כל גדולי זמנו רוהא ראיה ש, ם מינץ"מהר
, ז"ם מינץ על ידי הדפוס רק בשנת שע"גם כי לא נתפרסם תשובת מהר, ם מינץ לא הביא שום פעם"י מינץ ולהגדול הזה מהר"ברין ר
ואי הוי ידע הוי , ם מינץ"ל דברי מהר"א ז"הרי דלא שמע הרב רמ, מעלהל בישיבה של "א ז"וכמה שנים קודם זמן זה נתבקש הרב רמ
.ק"מודה ליה כדעת מהרי  
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Rabbi Yosef Katz, we must hold on to the gist of our master Rabbi Moshe Mintz’s 
statements, who precedes him [Rabbi Katz] in time ... and it is not fitting to say that 
‘hilkheta ke-batrai,…’ because the responsa of our master Rabbi Moshe Mintz were not 
published and printed in the days of Rabbi Yosef Katz, so we can say that, had Rabbi Katz 
seen the statements of our master Rabbi Moshe Mintz, he would have given in to him….1264 
 
In other words, by the standards of seventeenth-century ashkenazic scholarly 
culture, a sixteenth-century rabbi was not expected to make halakhic decisions based on 
every single responsum in circulation. The expectation that a rabbi had seen the responsa 
of his predecessors could safely be made only regarding the body of printed responsa. 
Responsa were, of course, circulating among scholars in manuscript prior to their being 
printed, but not, it appears, to a degree to which a seventeenth-century rabbi could 
confidently apply hilkheta ke-batrai, which is based on the assumption that the later 
authorities were exposed to earlier opinions. 
To return to Glick’s shock that Rabbi Isserles would have dared adjudicate without 
using responsa, I suggest the following: Glick’s expectation that every responsum on a 
matter be consulted before making a legal decision represents a post-print perspective. 
Rabbi Isserles, of course, considered responsa as a crucial halakhic source. His introduction 
did not attribute his neglect of these sources to his rejection of their authority; he simply 
did not have access to all of them. At first, Rabbi Isserles expresses little concern about 
viewing all the responsa; he had considered it entirely legitimate to make halakhic 
decisions without doing so. Responsa were not approached dismissively, they were simply 
approach as part of a manuscript culture of scholarship rather than a print culture, that is to 
                                                     
1264 Gershon Ashkenazi, ShUT Avodat ha-Gershuni (Frankfurt am Main, 1699), 124: ואם כן הוא שיש
ואין שייך לומר שהלכתא ...פשר גם במעלהמחלוקו׳ בין מהרר״מ ור״י כ״ץ יש לנו לטפוס עיקר דברי מהרר״ממ שהוא קודם לו בזמן וא
אלו ראה מהרר״יך דברי , כין שאין תשוב׳ מהרר״ממ היו מפורסמו׳ ונדפסי׳ בימי מהררי״ך איכא למימר, כבתראי מן אביי ורבא ואילך
...מהררמ״מ היה מודה לו  
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say, they were not approached as systematically. As described in the earlier sections of this 
chapter, the responsa were collected in miscellaneous personal reference works, consulted 
in person, and copied in manuscript according to personal networks, opportunity, and a fair 
amount of chance; expectations of a scholar’s exposure to the totality of these writings 
were similarly flexible. 
Glick is applying hilkheta ke-batrai to Rabbi Isserles in ways that a seventeenth-
century rabbi could have explained to him was anachronistic. As long as responsa were not 
printed, halakhic scholarship could proceed with a more selective, less comprehensive 
approach to such sources; it was unavoidable that some responsa were successfully 
transmitted but others were not. No realistic standard could define a body of responsa that 
had to be known. Subsequently, print came to define that standard, which, in turn, fueled 
the desire to standardize responsa by inserting their conclusions into halakhic codes.  
A similar development takes place in early modern England. As common law 
materials were more frequently printed, these printed collections became the reliable 
material of choice to use for court arguments. Though technically accessible to all, 
manuscript material was more difficult to obtain and, it could, thus, not be assumed to be 
known by all lawyers. John Donne preached a sermon in 1628 stating an expression that 
was, apparently, already known at the time: “Absurdum est disputare ex manuscriptis,” 
explaining, “it is an unjust thing…to press arguments out of manuscrips that cannot be seen 
by every man.”1265 Print affected the assumptions of what was available to lawyers, which 
                                                     
1265 The Sermons of John Donne, 10 vols., ed. George R Potter and Evelyn M Simpson (Berkeley, 
University of California Press: 1953-62), VIII:348. Cited in Ian Williams, “‘He Creditted More the Printed 
Booke;’ Common Lawyers’ Receptivity to Print, c. 1550-1640.” Law and History Review 28(1) (February 
2010): 66. 
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influenced the expectations of what fellow lawyers and judges were expected to know, and, 
in turn, changed the ideas of acceptable arguments. A similar dynamic was perhaps in play 
when it came to responsa, which led to Rabbi Isserles’ change of heart regarding the need 
to include all earlier responsa in his deliberations. It was the gradual emergence of responsa 
in print, rather than their discovery, that made it unacceptable to determine halakha without 
consulting all of them. The changed circumstances required Rabbi Isserles to plan his work 
anew, now including the halakhic opinions from printed responsa into his codification. 
 
6. CONCLUSION:  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESPONSA FOR HALAKHIC ORGANIZATION 
 
This chapter has let responsa lead us to the rabbinic archive; by considering the reasons for 
the variegated and disorganized state of early modern works of responsa, we have revealed 
a scholarly culture in which not printed books, but manuscript archives continued to 
determine the organization of knowledge, even in a world where print was gaining 
dominance. These scholarly collections were highly personal, flexible, and contained 
halakhic material of all kinds and genres in barely systematic fashion – letters, glosses, 
notes, and copies from other collections and from printed works. As such, they can be 
considered the successors of the manuscript likutim that determined not only the 
organization of halakhic material in late medieval Ashkenaz, but also their approach to 
halakhic knowledge. Works of responsa from the period discussed in this dissertation were 
often printed in much the same way as likutim were structured, including a host of material 
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whose only resemblance to responsa was their near-unclassifiable nature: lists of psakim 
(rulings), testimonies of customs, sidrei get (arrangements of divorces) and sidrei ḥaliẓa 
(arrangement of ḥaliẓa ceremonies, to refuse a levirate marriage) compilations of laws, and 
other uncategorizeable texts. Some of these kinds of writing were subsumed into the 
printed codes, others continued to be circulated as independent printed units, and others 
fell into disuse. Responsa and collections of customs (minhagim) would eventually develop 
into independent genres. As a result of the crystallization of a logic of codified law distinct 
from the logic of custom, discussed in chapter three, these two genres came to signify 
distinct fields, and custom was no longer located in the field of halakha. 
The authors of the Shulḥan Arukh and the Mapah were perhaps the first who 
attempted to include the halakhic opinions from all printed responsa in their codes, which 
required extracting their conclusions from the responsum as a whole. They were not, 
however, the last. With the dominance of Shulḥan Arukh as an organizational paradigm for 
halakha, scholars would increasingly write their own glosses based on its structure, and 
any additional material that they considered important was, thus, inserted into its order. In 
the nineteenth century, Rabbi Avraham Ẓvi Eisenstadt created a finding aid for the Shulḥan 
Arukh called Pitḥei tshuva (Openings of responsa). This work inserted the halakhic 
conclusions of almost two hundred works of responsa into their correct location in the code. 
With regard to works of responsa created after the Shulḥan Arukh, Elon remarks, to his 
relief, that after the Shulḥan Arukh was published, “a substantial change for the better in 
the organization of compilations of responsa occurred…. From then on, collections of 
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responsa were usually organized according to the order of these … codes.”1266 This timing 
is not a coincidence; although the basic structure of the Shulḥan Arukh already existed in 
the fourteenth century in the form of the Arba Turim, it became the dominant organizational 
paradigm only after the appearance of the Shulḥan Arukh in the sixteenth. Unlike the earlier 
pattern of the publications discussed here, printed collections of responsa would eventually 
increasingly follow a unifying principle by, for instance, including only writings from one 
author and excluding non-responsa material.  
This discussion, about the world replaced by print technology, has hopefully 
enhanced the awareness of this earlier world of texts and scholarship, with its own virtues, 
such as dynamism, multi-directionality, flexibility, heterogeneity – and, yes – disorder. 
Elon is justified in having found some source of relief in the works of responsa from the 
seventeenth century.1267 The organization of works of responsa according to the four main 
                                                     
1266 Elon, Jewish Law, 3:1522-1523. The original quote mentions the publication of the Turim 
alongside the Shulḥan Arukh. He clearly means the printing of these works, not their manuscript publication, 
which, for the Turim, written in the 14th century, preceded the early modern practice of organizing responsa 
by volume that Elon is discussing, and, for the Shulḥan Arukh, could only mean print, as it was immediately 
printed. As Elon is referring to the organizational structure of the two works (the four volumes), which 
Shulḥan Arukh adopted from the Turim, this statement is really about the printing of Shulḥan Arukh, not the 
manuscript publication of the Turim. 
1267 Rabbi Yoel Sirkis’ ShUT ha-BaḤ (Frankfurt am Main, 1687) was not organized in this manner, 
nor was Avodat ha-Gershuni (Frankfurt am Main, 1669) – they do contain an index of topics, starting with 
the laws on Shabbat, holidays, and so on, similar to the responsa of Rabbi Luria (but not identical) and 
roughly resembling codes such as Maimonides’ Mishne Torah or the Tur, merely because similar topics are 
grouped near each other. In this sense, they resemble the index of Trumat ha-deshen, except that in Trumat 
ha-deshen the entire work is ordered in this fashion, and all the responsa are mentioned in the index. The 
organization of the topics in ShUT ha-BaḤ and Avodat ha-Gershuni was intuitive, not consciously mimicking 
a specific legal codification. None of the names of the four volumes of the Tur are provided for reference. 
Rabbi Yair Ḥayim Bacharach’s ShUT Ḥavot Yair (likewise Frankfurt am Main, 1699), is the first 
such work of responsa in Ashkenaz to include an index using the four orders of the Tur. The author introduces 
this index as follows:  ם ודל "ב יתו"ואין מספר הויות קטנות עם גדולות שם עניות דעתי יהלך לזה הים גדול ורחב ידים שם רמז
אערכה לפניך מעיינינה ומקוריה . מ להקל על מעייניה"ומ. ולשארו בלתי הדורות. לא ידעתי ספורות. אשר עלה במצודתו. יקריב מנחתו
ן כל צמא למים ימצא מבוקשו מהר בקשתות חלקי הטורים גם סוגיות ושאר דברים תורניים פרטים למע' פ ד"לפי סדר התשובות ע
.בים לפניך ונחרטים"רין נקו"י קוצר מזכרת מיין דזכ"ע. טים"ברה  
The first work of responsa organized according to the four volumes of the Tur was that of Rabbi 
Shmuel de Medina (1506-1589), whose responsa were published in separate volumes between 1594 and 1597 
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categories of halakha, represented by the four pillars of the Arba Turim (civil law; ritual 
law; holidays and liturgy; family law), did lend these works some structure. Responsa, in 
essence, however, remain resistant to codification. The division into four categories is 
rudimentary, and even works of responsa based on this code-inspired structure are far from 
comprehensive or complete. Responsa are formulated as analyses of real cases, requiring 
the respondent to pull together variegated halakhic source-material that relates to the 
particular question. Moreover, the primary value of a responsum is in its presentation of a 
scholar’s specific interpretation and point of view. While the components of a responsum 
and the different halakhic conclusions of the author can, technically, be taken apart and 
codified, this undoes much of their purpose. Every responsum is structured as a holistic 
unit, opposed at its core to the abstraction, division, and systematization that takes place 
when legal material is codified. As such, this genre remains the embodiment of all that is 
fundamentally individual and disorganized – non-organizable, even – about Jewish law; 
something that was taken for granted, even embraced, in early modern Ashkenaz, but that 
would provoke resistance and anxiety in a culture as taken by the notion of order as ours. 
*** 
Let us end with a legend. A collection named Ma’a lot ha-yuḥasin, written by Rabbi Efraim 
Margaliot contains many myths and tales about Rabbi Isserles and others. One of these 
concerns Rabbi Isserles’ writings: 
I heard from my lord, my father … who heard in his childhood from truthful people 
how, because of some reason, Rema sat for some time in a village near Cracow, and 
                                                     
in Salonica, according to the four volumes of the Tur. The next one to include an index that used the divisions 
of the Tur was Rabbi Moshe Benbenishti (1608-1677), whose responsa, Pnei Moshe, were likewise printed 
in several volumes, in Constantinople (1669-1971). The responsa of Rabbi Mordekhai ben Yehuda ha-Levi 
of Egypt, Darkhei Noam (Venice, 1697) similarly included an index that used the four volumes of the Tur. 
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because of this reason, many of his writings remained there and were brought to the 
treasury of that village’s official. And ever since Rema sat there, that official rose very 
much, and he went and rose higher, and he held on to these writings and refused to give 
them to anyone, and he commanded his heirs to treat them respectfully, and every year they 
spread them out in the fresh air and the daylight, to prevent them from rotting and 
deteriorating – I think that this was told from the mouth of a man who was witnessing the 
event when they were taking them out and spreading them out in the sunlight, and who 
knows, perhaps they are still in existence there to this very day.1268 
 
In this account, Rabbi Isserles’ archive is imbued with amulet-like powers; it is not 
appreciated as an intellectual contribution but as a powerful object unto itself. In this 
chapter, I have (perhaps not entirely similarly), also suggested treating the rabbi’s archive 
as a material entity onto itself – not with magical powers to protect us from harm, but with 
the power to evoke forgotten approaches to knowledge that are difficult for us to access. 
  
                                                     
1268 Efraim Zalman Margaliot of Brod, Ma’alot ha-yuḥasin (Lemberg, 1900), 23: שמעתי מא״א המאוה״ג
, לקראקא סמוך אחד בכפר מה זמן הרמ״א ישב אחרת סיבה מחמת או ר״ל דבר שמחמת איך אמת אנשי מפי בילדותו ששמע ז״ל
 והיה מאוד השר נתעלה שם הרמ״א שישב ומאז. הנ״ל השר של גנזיו לבית והובאו שלו כתבים הרבה שם נשארו הנ״ל הסיבה ומחמת
 לאויר אותם שוטחים שנה ובכל, כבוד בהם לנהוג אחריו וציוה ליורשיו, רצה למסרם לשום אדם ולא אלו בכתביו והחזיק וגדול הלוך
 עודם כזאת לעת אם יודע ומי לשמש ושטחום שהוציאום בעת שראה איש מפי לי שאמר וכמדומה ויתעפשו ירקבו שלא היום ורוח
.שמה קיימים  
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Two slightly different variations of 
the title page of ShUT MaharShaL 
 (Lublin, 1574-5).  
A detail from the last responsum in 
the book, with the words “tam” 
(finis) and the list of “simanei dinim” 
(signs of laws) that follows. 
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IMAGE 17  
Title page of ShUT She’erit Yosef 
(Cracow,1590) and detail of one of 
the resposa added right after the 
table of contents. 
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RESPONSA VERSUS PRINTED CODES 
Codification, Disorder, and Scholarship 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to deny that textual material is much more predictably and rationally 
accessible to the reader in systematically codified works. In sixteenth-century Ashkenaz 
the paradigm of the Shulḥan Arukh, the technology of print, and the communal disruption 
that would combine to make codifications of halakha dominant, had not fully superseded 
the existing scholarly culture. Adaptation took some time, prior modes of dealing with 
knowledge persisted, and early collections of responsa were still quite disorganized as a 
result. Ultimately, however, the possibility to organize all halakhic material into 
codifications became more of a reality, and the classic likutim, while still canonical in their 
legal authority, were no longer paradigmatic for the fashioning of halakhic works. 
Responsa can be incorporated into codifications, but the responsum as a whole cannot be 
codified in this manner. Although the substantive outcome is in many ways identical, there 
are essential aspects of reasoning in responsa that get lost in this reorganization.  
 In order to explore this difference, the current case study will compare responsa to 
codes. The halakhic conclusions of responsa can be modified to fit into codifications, of 
course. However, the nature of the individual responsum as a holistic unit – that is, a 
finished work the value of which derives from the selection and ways in which the 
particular source material within it are combined, rather than the halakhic knowledge that 
can be extracted – means that, once abstracted into units that can be integrated within the 
system of the Shulḥan Arukh, responsa lose some of the essence of what defines them. 
What emerges from this comparison is the insight that responsa present an entirely different 
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mode of communicating about law. This mode of communication corresponds not with the 
stable, finished, defined book, but, rather, with the dynamic, open, flexible archive. It 
represents scholarship as active research rather than finished products. 
a. Introduction: Responsa and Codes, Scholarship and Books 
The following case study will conclude this final unit of the dissertation, which studied the 
development of responsa as a genre in early modern Ashkenaz. The past two chapters 
examined this genre by spanning the life of early modern responsa from their initial form, 
as letters, to their publication in printed books of responsa. The chapters discussed the 
scholarly culture in which these responsa were created, in terms of the intellectual 
community that these epistles brought into being, and as pieces of halakhic writing at the 
core of scholarly inquiry, during a period of fundamental change for knowledge 
organization. This case study will analyze the significance of these changes for halakhic 
knowledge by comparing responsa from Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles concerning a 
question of inheritance to its equivalent laws as discussed by the same two figures, but in 
the codes and their glosses.  
As will be shown, the legal discussion is entirely different depending on whether it 
is presented in a responsum or organized in a code. The two aspects of responsa that were 
discussed in the two previous chapters will each be compared here: responsa as letters 
versus printed books, and collections of responsa that resemble miscellaneous, personal, 
and flexible archives versus organized codes. These twin aspects of responsa; its mode of 
intellectual exchange and its organizational proclivities, will prove to be connected. 
Moreover, the insights that emerge make it possible to understand the significance of the 
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reorganization and codification of Jewish law that took place in the sixteenth century, and 
the crucial role of responsa in this upheaval as archetypal of genres that resists total 
codification and thus preserve aspects of scholarship at risk of being obscured. 
b. Responsa as Epistles: Orality 
The term “letters” in the humanist Republic of Letters referred to philology in particular 
and learning in general. In the case of the rabbinic community, the term Republic of Letters 
is particularly appropriate, as “letters,” or instances of epistolary correspondence, were so 
crucial to this network. As the above discussion in chapter five has shown, correspondence 
was a very distinctive feature of rabbinic communication. Epistles were not only 
quantitatively but also qualitatively different from other aspects of rabbinic 
communication, as they constituted the very texture of this community. The only 
technology of communication that comes close to correspondence in its importance for 
early modern networks, perhaps even surpassing it, is the printed book. 
Books, with their ability to reproduce almost identical texts quickly and cheaply, 
created an easily shared textual canon. By circulating information and unifying the textual 
canon, the printed book created a heightened sense of community, contributing to the 
Rabbinic Republic in innumerable ways. Books and letters are not mutually exclusive in 
importance; as one study put it, they functioned together within a single information order 
as complementary media.1269 Printed works facilitated correspondence about texts, and 
letters served to compare editions and share glosses, thus eliminating discrepancies. Each 
                                                     
1269 Daniel Stolzenberg, “A Spanner and His Works: Books, Letters, and Scholarly Communication 
Networks in Early Modern Europe,” in For the Sake of Learning: Essays in Honor of Anthony Grafton, 2 
vols., ed. Ann Blair and Anja-Silvia Goeing (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 2: 159. 
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of these communication technologies, however, played a distinct role, and they each had a 
unique function in the formation of the Rabbinic Republic. In this case study, I analyze the 
contribution of epistolarity in comparison to books by linking the discursive role of 
responsa with Walter Ong’s notion of oral logic versus written logic.1270 Letters make a 
unique contribution to the imagined community because of their proximity to oral 
discourse, as opposed to books, which lack the oral and discursive elements that the letter 
maintains. 
The case study considers a responsum written by Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles’ 
responsum reacting to the former. The case concern a man who, on his deathbed, pledged 
part of his inheritance to the poor of the land of Israel. The man died in Ashkenaz, but the 
local rabbis deferred to Rabbi Karo in Safed and implemented his decision, another proof 
of the importance of responsa for transnational rabbinic cooperation: “Therefore, we have 
agreed here and we have forced the [heir] to send one hundred Polish Guldens, which are 
equivalent to sixty Venetian Ducats [to the poor], just as the responsum of his honor 
adjudicated.” 1271 Rabbi Isserles declares his humility before Rabbi Karo, who was his 
senior, explaining that he by no means came to overturn the actual decision. Nevertheless, 
Rabbi Isserles writes, “the words of this responsum are Torah, and I am obligated to study 
                                                     
1270 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (New York: Routledge, 1988). 
1271 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48,  ,ובכן הסכמנו פה והכרחנו האיש לשלוח מאה זהובים פו' שהם נגד ס' דוקט"י וונזיא"ה
 for the sake of reference, for 60 ducats in the mid-16th  century,  you could rent a house – כפי פסק תשובתו דמר.
in Venice for a year, see Paul F Grendler, The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press 1540-1605, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 20 (“In 1566 Gasparo Bindoni in San Salvatore enjoyed an 
annual income of  95 ducats from the rental of a house in Venice (60 ducats) and the income of his wife’s 
dowry, which, which consisted of 3 small houses in Venice and 10 fields.”) . 
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it, and I cannot properly comprehend it unless we negotiate about it.” 1272 The particular 
form of negotiation that takes place is central to what makes responsa unique. 
Walter Ong, in his now paradigmatic sociological study Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word draws a general (and, one might add, quite generalized) image 
of the evolution of society from an oral to a textual culture.1273 The shift in technology from 
orality to writing had profound social and cultural consequences, and, he claims, 
immeasurably influenced the consciousness of these societies. The earlier rhetorical, 
dialogical logic, with its linear structure and oral/aural essence gave way to more 
formalistic, schematic, and visually arranged thinking.1274 The distinction was not always 
absolute: Ong positions the manuscript somewhere between orality and literacy. Writing, 
too, was sometimes used to enhance or support orality, resulting in “written speech,” such 
as rhetoric, where the written is structured in the form of an oral address, meant to be read 
and heard.1275  Letters are usually distinguished by their manuscript form and maintain 
roots in rhetoric, situating them perfectly in this category of “written speech,” preserving 
orality in writing. 
 
 
                                                     
1272 Isserles, ShUT Rema 48 
.עליה אם לא בשנשא וניתן על זהולא אוכל לעמוד , אך אמנם דברי התשובה תורה הם וללמוד אני צריך  
1273 Ong, Orality and Literacy. 
1274 See Ong Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004. new ed. with foreword by Adrian Johns). 
1275 An additional example of “written speech” is the list, something studied at length by John 
Goody. Lists are inherently non-oral in the sense that they are all about organizing words and ideas visually 
in space. On the other hand, a list was meant to be read out loud, and thus can be considered a kind of writing 
meant to support the oral.  
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c. Responsa and Archives:  Linear Logic  
As chapter six has shown, responsa inhabit the culture of the archive; a dynamic scholarly 
culture that allowed for expansive research and personal note-taking, permitting 
continuous consultation, repeated adaptation, structural flexibility, and thematic variety, 
and multiplicity of contents. It represents a living world of research rather than focusing 
scholarly culture upon one example of its output, the book. Our conception of the book as 
a defined, stable, and internally coherent unit is a paradigm strongly related to print. Ong 
viewed printed books as a development that brought the transition from the linear world of 
sound to the visual world of space to an entirely new level. Print technology made possible 
not only new ways of securing words in space but also of fixing their place on the page in 
a way that was easily reproducible and thus unprecedentedly stable. This technology thus 
further removed “the orality still residual in writing and early print culture.” 1276 This 
distinction between the discursive orality that is preserved in responsa, originally written 
in manuscript letters (albeit eventually printed), and the schematic logic of the printed text, 
represented by halakhic codes, which were created for print in this period, will guide our 
case study.  
The collections of responsa that had been printed by their authors in the sixteenth 
century were few, and displayed characteristics that were opposed to the paradigm that we 
have of a printed book; they were not comprehensive, disorganized, incomplete, unstable, 
and lacking any internal order. This, I argued, was precisely because the type of order 
required by finished books opposed the very essence of early modern scholarly culture, 
                                                     
1276 See Ong Orality and Literacy, 117 
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which was driven by the dynamics of manuscript. As a result, the few books of responsa 
that were printed by their authors were not fully conceived as books; they were merely 
printed excerpts from a scholarly archive, and not particularly selective excerpts at that. In 
this case study, the halakhic discourse of responsa is opposed to the halakhic discourse in 
the codes, which represent the most structured organizational paradigm that was gradually 
dominating the world of halakhic texts.  
 
2. THE CASE STUDY 
a. The Case in the Responsa 
 
The man who pledged some of his money to charity did so using a “deathbed will,”1277 an 
exceptional legal structure applicable only to people on their deathbed, allowing for the 
allocation of gifts without many formal requirements. In this case, however, the deathbed 
will was poorly executed because the document included the formulation “like a regular 
gift,” calling the deathbed will into question. Perhaps this was no longer a deathbed will, 
and, therefore, the standard laws of inheritance with the usual strict formalities ought to be 
applied? Because these formal requirements were lacking, the entire will, including the 
pledge to the poor, was now questionable. Rabbi Karo claimed that, regardless of any 
glitches with the document’s formulation, the sum pledged to the poor must be donated, 
because any vow pledging money to charity – whether in the context of a will or not – 
applies at the moment it is uttered. The sum thus belonged to the poor when it was promised 
to them, and it cannot be retracted. 
                                                     
1277 The halakhic discussion has been simplified for the sake of this discussion. For a more in-depth 
study of these laws as they apply in the responsa in question, see the appendix to this chapter. 
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Rabbi Karo’s responsum1278 describes the case as “simple,”1279 but Rabbi Isserles, 
did not share his opinion.1280 He considered it a case of wills, unrelated to charity. A 
promise in a will to give money to the poor was, in his opinion, not a vow to charity, but a 
regular gift. All gifts must be given according to specific formal requirements of 
transaction, lifted only for deathbed wills. Since this deathbed will was not carried out 
correctly, Rabbi Isserles argued, it lost its exceptional status; thus, the gift was never legally 
transacted and the heirs owe nothing to the poor. At most, he recommended that the heirs 
fulfill any outstanding promises of the deceased, because this is considered a praiseworthy 
deed. Legally, however, he insisted that the inheritance is entirely theirs and none of it 
                                                     
1278 The very first collection of Rabbi Karo’s responsa was not printed by the author himself but 
after his death. The first volume, Avkat rokhel (The spices of the merchant), (Salonica, 1597-8), contained 
only the responsa concerning family law (this corresponds to Even ha-ezer [The stone of help]of the Arba 
turim [Four columns]). The other three sections of Jewish law were printed for the first time in Salonika in 
1791, including the volume on monetary law, which contains the responsum of this case study. Rabbi Karo’s 
responsum was included in the collection of Rabbi Isserles’ responsa more than a century before it was 
printed in Rabbi Karo’s own collection, in Rabbi Isserles’ ShUT Rema (Cracow, 1640), §47. 
The question of classifying this responsum (monetary law, laws of inheritance, laws of charity, or laws of 
vows) will become very crucial, as discussed in the concluding case study. The one line description of the 
case in the Salonica, 1791 edition reads: §83 י"א על ענין מי שהקדיש נכסיו לעניי – “on the issue of someone who 
has consecrated his property to the poor of the Land of Israel.” The decision to describe the case as such, 
emphasizing the pledge to the poor rather than focusing on the heirs, is also highly significant and represents 
Rabbi Karo’s perspective on the case, as opposed to Rabbi Isserles’ (whose volume of printed responsa, in 
contrast, describes the case as regarding an inheritance – closer to the latter’s interpretation).  
The classification supports Rabbi Karo’s perspective as it is printed in his collection of responsa and 
Rabbi Isserles’ approach as it is printed in the latter’s collection. As neither were involved in the editing and 
publication of their volumes, we cannot draw any conclusions about a conscious classification of the question 
in any particular category in order to strengthen either one’s case. Perhaps Rabbi Karo himself wrote the one 
line description on the responsum, or perhaps his son did, but maybe the editors were simply inclined to 
describe the responsum using notions of charity because Rabbi Karo’s responsum convincingly answered the 
question in these terms. 
1279 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §47. וכל מי שהנכסים הנזכרים בידו חייב לשלחם לעניי א"י. ועם היות הדברים פשוטים...
.נאום הצעיר יוסף קארו. נדרשתי לאשר שאלוני  
1280 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48. “However, now, my opinion is nullified against the opinion of his 
beautiful highness and Torah honor, and it is on him that one should rely regarding [strict] Torah prohibitions, 
and all the more so regarding lighter monetary issues.” 
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belongs to the poor. Rabbi Isserles signed off, begging Rabbi Karo “not to cast me behind 
his back without answering my question.”1281 
Notwithstanding this plea, we have no indication that Rabbi Karo responded, or 
that the letter even reached him,1282 and thus no way of ascertaining whether the 
conversation continued. We do have, however, another kind of text from the same two 
scholars about the same laws: Rabbi Karo’s Bet Yosef and Rabbi Isserles’ Darkhei Moshe, 
which are their glosses on the fourteenth-century Arba Turim; and the Shulḥan Arukh, 
Rabbi Karo’s code based on the Arba Turim, with Rabbi Isserles’ glosses on Rabbi Karo’s 
code named the Mapah. Their treatment of wills and charity in those works allows us 
further to investigate their opinions. More importantly, it provides an opportunity to reflect 
on the differences between halakhic arguments in responsa and in printed books. 
b. The Case in the Codes 
In the codes, surprisingly, this entire disagreement can barely be detected: Both Tur and 
Shulḥan Arukh are divided into four volumes, each dealing with different fields in halakha 
[see table]. The volume of the Tur, Ḥoshen mishpat (breastplate of judgment), which deals 
                                                     
1281 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48.  אך אבקש שלא ישליכני מר אחר גוו לבלתי השיבני על שאלתי כי מונע בר יקבוהו
...לאום  
1282 Rabbi Isserles did, however, receive feedback from elsewhere, as he showed his responsum to 
someone other than the addressee. He sent his response to Rabbi Meir of Padua, who was his relative and the 
oldest living rabbi in his circles, and it seems that the response was well received by his elder. Beyond 
halakhic praise, Rabbi Isserles also received some instructions on responsa writing conventions and 
technique: Someone of Rabbi Karo’s intellectual stature, Rabbi Katzenelbogen explained, would not need 
such lengthy arguments. Moreover, the instinct to preemptively raise all the possible objections together with 
arguments against these counter-arguments (“in the manner of ‘and one should not say’…”) was an 
understandable but faulty strategy, because it provided the other side with more material for their own 
opinion. He added a concrete example of Rabbi Isserles’ tendency to use such preemptive counter-arguments 
with an explanation of why this was unnecessary: “However, you went into too much length, and in some 
places wrote unnecessarily in the form of ‘and one should not say,’ because for a personality like him it is 
sufficient to write spare words and only hints; on the contrary, these things provide him with material to 
counter you” (Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48). This is a clear example of how epistolary literacy, especially of the 
kind needed for participation in scholarly conversation, had to be taught. 
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with monetary law, discusses the formal requirements for legal gifts, acquisitions, and 
wills. It introduces the institution of the deathbed will as an exception to regular gifts, 
stating that gifts must satisfy a series of formal requirements unless they are deathbed wills. 
Rabbi Karo agrees with this. Rabbi Isserles, in his gloss, points out the implication of this 
formulation: a deathbed will that accidentally uses the term “regular gift” will revert to the 
usual requirements.1283 This remark by Rabbi Isserles implies that the law supports his 
view, but it is, at best, an implication. 
Rabbi Isserles links this implication to a more explicit case later in the same section, 
when the Tur deals with a series of ambiguous deathbed wills. One of these concerns a 
person who gives away all of his property (implying that he is on his deathbed) but specifies 
that he is allocating it “effective immediately” (implying that it is a regular gift).1284 In that 
case, the will loses its deathbed status and all the regular formalities are required. Here, 
Rabbi Isserles links his gloss to the above implication, writing: “...from this we can also 
learn about the law I discussed at the beginning of this section.”1285 He specifically 
connects this to the responsum, explaining “…this is simple according to my opinion, but 
I wrote it only because I saw the responsum of the rabbi, the author of Bet Yosef who wrote 
about this, that in such a case, the acquisition would work [in favor of the poor] …” [see 
table]. This would have been the obvious place for Rabbi Karo’s opposite opinion to 
                                                     
1283 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:1. 
1284 In the equivalent discussion in Shulḥan Arukh, Rabbi Isserles adds the term “like a regular gift” 
alongside the term “effective immediately,” thus specifically inserting the term that invalidated the deathbed 
will in our responsum as an example where the term will disallow the deathbed will. This point is central to 
their disagreement in the responsa, but here it appears as if Rabbi Isserles is merely providing an additional 
example. See Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:9 and Mapah, there. 
1285 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:9. 
UNIT III, CASE STUDY AND CONCLUSION: RESPONSA VERSUS PRINTED CODES 
592 
 
appear. His gloss on this law, however, merely provides more references in favor of this 
view and, far from disagreeing, even comments that these laws are obvious.1286 Rabbi 
Isserles’ comment here also provides a reference to a later section – “and see later, §253 
for more on this”1287 [see table]. 
This reference leads to a discussion a few sections later in the Tur, which describes 
another ambiguous case: a deathbed situation where the wrong term for “inheritance” is 
used. Rabbi Karo’s gloss, in this instance, states that if it is clearly a deathbed situation, the 
use of a slightly ambiguous term calling this into question can be disregarded, and the will 
retains deathbed status.1288 It is only here that Rabbi Isserles explicitly disagrees: “and his 
words seem wrong to me … and [Rabbi Karo] wrote in a responsum to uphold a [deathbed] 
gift using this reasoning, and I contradicted him with clear proofs and Rabbi Meir of Padua 
agreed with me!”1289 [see table]. This is the only instance where Rabbi Isserles voices overt 
disagreement.  
Thus, the halakhic disagreement barely finds expression in the legal code.1290 The 
only junctures at which any outright dispute can be found are the two places where Rabbi 
                                                     
1286 “And these are simple things” (Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:9 (15)). 'בפר' ח
זכיה ודברים פשוטים הם' מהל . See table. 
1287 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:9 (15). והוא פשוט לדעתי, ולא כתבתי כן רק
לדברי ' ל והסכי"ז' ם מפדו"לפני מור' ואני השבתי לו בזה ובאו דברי שניה... ג "בה שקנה בכה' י שכת"שראיתי תשובת הרב בעל ב
.ג עוד מזה"רנ' ל סי"על זה וע' בתשבה הנכתבי] שמבואר מהראיות[דלא קנה כמו   
1288 Bet Yosef on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §253: “and even if it is clear to us that she said [the 
problematic formulation] in the very same words as they wrote it on the document, … it is clear that she is 
leaving this [as a deathbed will], but she simply did not use the specific correct term.”  ואפילו אם ברור לנו
 שאמרה היא באותו
לשון ממש שכתוב בצוואה כיון דקיימא לן דאין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה סתמא דמילתא שהיא המנחת אלא שלא דקדקה 
.בלשונה   
1289 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §253: ואין דבריו נראין במה שכתב....וכתב בית יוסף
 .בתשובה לקיים המתנה מטעמים הנ״ל ואני כתבתי עליו וסתרתי דבריו בראיות ברורות והסכים לדברי מהר״ם פאדוואה ז״ל
1290 Several other such ambiguous scenarios are mentioned, some of them involving charity. In one 
case, a dying person pledged all of his possessions to charity, implying that this was a deathbed will that 
would be voided if he recovered. One opinion claimed that the charity would hold even if he recovered, 
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Isserles mentions the responsum. Most places where one would expect conflict contain, at 
most, indirect disagreement and references to other subsections which, eventually, lead to 
those same two references to the responsum [see table]. These roundabout implications and 
allusions are the only way in which the legal controversy – so prominent in the responsa – 
appears in the codes, and then, too, invoking the responsa, rather than as independent 
halakhic opinions in their own right. Even in those places, Rabbi Karo rarely stated 
anything to the contrary. In all of the laws of gifts and wills located in this volume of the 
codes, he simply does not mention the issue that occupied the heart of his argument in the 
responsum.  
The laws of charity and vows are located in volume Yoreh de’ah (Teaches 
knowledge) of the codes, which deals with ritual law or isur ve-heter (prohibition and 
permission). The location of charity in a field that mainly discusses forbidden foods derives 
from the source of vows in the concept of hekdesh, consecration to the Temple. Anything 
that is vowed to the Temple is considered hekdesh, property of the Temple, as soon as the 
vow is made, and partaking of these consecrated items is me’ilah, akin to stealing from 
God. The term hekdesh is often also used for the communal charity fund, which is why 
vows to charity are discussed alongside vows to give gifts to the Temple. It is in this volume 
of the codes that Rabbi Karo’s strong stance on charity finds expression, and he provides 
many sources and opinions to support the idea that charity belongs to the poor as soon it is 
promised to them, and that such a promise cannot be retracted. Rabbi Isserles, once again, 
                                                     
whereas the other held that the pledge would return to the owner, as he may have intended to give everything 
away only if he died. Rabbi Karo agrees with the second opinion, which resembles that of his opponent, 
Rabbi Isserles, in the responsum. He even criticizes the opinion that the promise to charity must be upheld, 
calling it “perplexing.” See Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250. 
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relates this to the laws of wills without a single argument or discussion. Simply by adding 
a gloss to Rabbi Karo’s discussion: “and see in Ḥoshen mishpat §250,” he thus directs the 
conversation back to the volume on monetary law rather than the volume on forbidden 
consumption1291 and back to his disagreement with Rabbi Karo in the responsa, where 
charity and inheritances intersect.1292 
c. Responsa versus Codes: Linear versus Schematic Logic 
The categorization of a case as inheritance and thus monetary law, on the one hand, or 
charity and prohibited consumption, on the other, is critical for the current case. This issue 
emerges in the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bava batra (Final gate), where the different 
ways of understanding the intentions behind ambiguous gifts are examined. The talmudic 
discussion concerns a person on his deathbed who declares all his possessions ownerless, 
consecrates them to the Temple, or dedicates all his possessions to charity. 1293 The 
                                                     
1291 This same dynamic is repeated in the Shulḥan Arukh, whose structure and division into volumes 
mirrors that of the Arba Turim. Whereas Rabbi Karo’s summary reads: “He who has money in his hands and 
is in doubt if they are for charity, he must give them to charity,” Rabbi Isserles adds: “But, he who pledged 
something in a formulation that leaves doubt and then died, so that one cannot know his intention, the heirs 
are considered to have the presumption of ownership and the consecration fund [hekdesh] is considered those 
who come to take it from them [and thus have the burden of proof]. See Karo, Shulḥan Arukh Yoreh de’ah, 
§259:5 and Isserles, Mapah, there. 
1292 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48. Rabbi Isserles is aware that the issue hinges on this distinction 
between monetary law and laws of charity. In his responsum, he phrases his reasoning in the following 
wordsas follows: “Even if he recovers, he cannot retract, because it is a doubt concerning isura (prohibitions) 
and we proceed stringently.” Thus, it is the designation of the case as belonging to isura, prohibited 
consumption, which would result in the stringent decision favoring the poor. Similarly, in his gloss on the 
laws of deathbed wills, Rabbi Isserles explains that, whereas some opinions favor the heirs in ambiguous 
cases, others oppose this and “adjudicate … that in the case of hekdesh … which is isura, one goes according 
to the stringent option,” to the advantage of the poor. See Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat, §250:5. 
1293 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava batra 148b 
איבעיא להו הקדיש כל נכסיו ועמד מהו מי אמרינן כל לגבי הקדש גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני 
הפקיר כל נכסיו מהו מי אמרינן כיון דאף לעניים כעשירים גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני חילק כל נכסיו לעניים 
מאי מי אמרינן צדקה ודאי מגמר גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני תיקו (ל"א הקדיש כל נכסיו מהו הפקיר כל נכסיו 
 מהו חילק כל נכסיו לעניים מהו תיקו)
 Translation from Soncino: “The question was raised: [If a dying man] consecrated all his 
possessions and [subsequently] recovered, what [is the law]? Is it assumed that whenever it is a case of 
consecrated objects the transfer of possession made is unqualified [meaning that he intended for the gift to 
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question arises: if the person recovers, will the gift remain or do we say that, since the 
person gave away everything and did not leave him or herself any source of sustenance, it 
was clearly only meant in the event of his or her demise, and therefore it can be reneged? 
The Talmud explains both rationales: On the one hand, one might argue that “charity, he 
certainly meant to give unqualified,” meaning that, since charity is righteous, this person 
clearly had the full intention to give everything away, even if he left nothing for himself. 
Therefore, the gift is considered binding and the giver cannot renege. This is countered by 
the argument that “when it comes to his own well-being, he would not give it away 
unqualified,” a person would not neglect his or her own wellbeing to such an extreme 
degree, even for charity. Considering the fact that the giver left nothing behind for his or 
her own use, they could not possibly really have intended to give everything to charity 
without qualification. Therefore, if the giver does recover, the gift can return to the giver. 
The Talmud does not decide among these two rationales, rendering this case is teku, 
literally “let it stand,” a doubt that cannot be solved.  The Tur thus summarizes that the law 
“is not specified.”1294  
                                                     
take effect even if he recovers] or, perhaps, when it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer 
unqualified possession? [If the answer is in the affirmative, the question arises] what [is the law in the case 
where] he renounced the ownership of all his property?  Is it assumed that since [ownerless property may be 
seized] by the poor as well as by the rich, he transfers [therefore] unqualified possession or, perhaps, 
whenever it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer unqualified possession? [If the answer is in 
the negative,] what, [it may be asked. is the law where] he distributed all his possessions among the poor? Is 
it assumed [that in a matter of] charity he has undoubtedly transferred unqualified possession or, perhaps, 
wherever it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer unqualified possession? — This is 
undecided.  Some versions do not present these three options (consecration, ownerlessness, charity) as three 
separate questions but, rather, bundle them all into one. The distinction may have relevance in the case of 
ownerlessness, but not in our own case, which concerns charity. 
1294 This is called b’aya de-lo ifhsatei, see for instance in Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Brakhot 51a-
b  הואיל וראשונים איבעיא להו : אמר רב אשי? שמאל מהו שתסייע לימין: ראשונים שאלו, אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן
אנן נעבד לחומרא, שט להוולא איפ . Thus, there where the Talmud does not make a specific decision between two 
options, we always go according to the more stringent option, even if it is only a rabbinic prohibition (whereas 
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The principle of adjudication in such unresolved case is to favor the more stringent 
adjudication, meaning one in which there is less risk of transgression. 1295 The definition of 
“less risk of transgression” depends, however, on the category of law. In monetary law, it 
is considered more cautious to refrain from actively taking money from whoever currently 
possesses it. Thus, in monetary decisions, uncertainty will always favor the person who 
currently has the presumption of possessing the money. In the case of prohibitions of 
consumption, on the other hand, the risk-avoidant decision is to abstain from anything that 
might be consecrated, for fear of committing the transgression of me’ilah. Therefore, 
classifying the case in the responsum as a question of inheritance favors the heirs, because 
it places the case in the realm of monetary law. Classifying the case as a question of isur 
ve-heter, on the other hand, will favor the charity fund. 
The main crux of the disagreement, so vivid in the responsa, is almost neutralized 
in the codes. Paradoxically, it is in the Shulḥan Arukh, where the two authorities are 
visually intertwined on the page, that they are actually less engaged in dialogue because of 
the codificatory nature of the text. The de-structured logic of the responsum renders the 
actual halakhic dialogue more perceptible. This may not necessarily mean that 
(cor)respondents are, in fact, engaged in a live argument through these letters – as we have 
seen, the responsum in question may never have reached Rabbi Karo – but, rather, that 
                                                     
usually the principle applies that a doubt concerning a biblical prohibition is decided stringently, but a doubt 
concerning a rabbinic prohibition is decided leniently). 
1295 The principles of how to resolve indeterminacies are based on a number of factors and 
combinations of factors: is the indeterminacy one of fact, of intention, of legal opinion, of interpretation, etc.? 
Is the halakhic issue at hand biblical or merely rabbinic?  Is there a presumption in place where we can 
assume that the indeterminacy will resemble the presumption, and what kind of presumption is it (statistical 
majority, likelihood, quantitative, local, psychological, legal)? 
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responsa encourage this type of discourse by implying dialogical communication. This 
points us to the unique role of correspondence: because epistolarity invites the logic of a 
conversation, it builds the imagined discursive community so necessary for a legitimation 
of law in ways that codes cannot. Moreover, the linear logic employed in responsa is 
difficult to express in codifications, the structure of which encourage a more schematic 
logic. 
 
3. CONCLUSION: ORGANIZATION AND JEWISH LAW 
As the case study shows, the disagreement between Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles was 
practically undetectable in the codes. In the responsa, however, the dispute takes center 
stage, and it is here that the crucial role of letters and their dialogical nature for halakhic 
scholarly culture becomes clear. Most questions of halakha, especially those based on real, 
complex cases, hinge on issues of classification. The crux of these questions is not simply 
how to apply the law, but, rather, how to analyze, interpret, and categorize the case. For 
this, it is useful to turn to Ong’s description of the transition from oral culture to textual 
culture, which situates the manuscript in the middle of the spectrum, citing its dynamism, 
uniqueness, and connection to its creator, to argue for its relative resemblance to speech.1296 
In contrast to the manuscript, print technology places the word squarely in the impersonal 
and stable and realm of the textual. In this sense, the letter maintains a much stronger 
connection to oral discourse. Ong distinguishes between the visual order of print and its 
schematic logic on the one hand and the more oral/aural logic of manuscript and its linear 
                                                     
1296 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 117-128. 
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logic. Legal codes are schematic in logic and a perfect fit for print, whereas letters, 
primarily linked to manuscript, perpetuate oral conversation, especially if we relate the 
discipline of letter writing to the ars rhetorica. As a paradigm for organizing halakhic texts, 
we can say, following Peter Miller, that archives represent the more discursive aspect of 
scholarship – the research – as opposed to the printed book, which is a finished product.1297 
The different forms of presenting and organizing legal texts, represented by printed 
codes versus manuscript responsa, result in distinct kinds of reasoning. Disagreements 
concerning categorization are not noticeable in codes because the form of classification 
appears as a given, and laws are arranged in their respective categories. In reality, of course, 
organization is neither obvious nor transparent, but those choices are difficult to question 
from within the schematic order itself. Opinions can diverge in much more explicit ways 
in texts that are organized in a linear manner, which allow opposing opinions to be 
presented according to their own logic. Issues of categorization are thus much easier to 
debate in responsa. This helps explain why the turning points of this case of a deathbed 
will were hardly visible in the schematic organization of the codes and were hidden in 
footnotes and references, whereas, in the more direct argumentation and linear logic of 
responsa, the central disagreement stands out more clearly. 
When discussing the Shulḥan Arukh, Isadore Twersky described Rabbi Isserles’ 
interventions as “… very radical, but low-keyed and disarmingly calm...,” an aspect that 
Twersky tied to the genre of the code: “It is only the harmonious literary form that avoided 
                                                     
1297 Peter N. Miller, Peiresc’s History of Provence: Antiquarianism and the Discovery of a Medieval 
Mediterranean (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2011), 6. 
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an overt struggle for Halachik hegemony such as occurred in other periods....”1298 Indeed, 
the “harmonious literary form” is one great advantage of the code, permitting the adjacent 
placement of different opinions regarding the same topic and, ultimately, the 
universalization of halakha into one general system. This fusion was primarily formal, but 
form, of course, is no small matter. The possibilities of codes extend beyond the apparent 
avoidance of confrontation; opinions placed side by side can be viewed in conjunction; 
laws that are classified and placed in their respective locations are easy to find; and the 
code’s complete and comprehensive structure provides a schematic basis for additional 
material. 
This more schematic logic, however, requires abstracting cases into concepts and 
dividing complex solutions into their modular components. In the process of creating this 
more schematic organization, an element of real adjudication is lost. In the dialogical 
arguments of the responsa, on the other hand, the logic is not conveyed schematically and 
it is impossible to survey visually. Rather, the argument unfolds linearly, like an oral 
explanation that has been written down. There is a greater risk of losing the larger scheme 
while entering into the responsum’s line of reasoning, and it is more difficult to weigh one 
argument against the line of reasoning of the other. The sense of having an overview of the 
law often seems tenuous. This linear sequential argument, however, is often precisely the 
essence of the disagreement. These points come into focus with particular force in the 
                                                     
1298 Isadore Twersky, “The Shulchan Arukh: Enduring Code of Jewish Law,” in The Jewish 
Expression, ed. Judah Goldin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 341n29. 
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dialogical text, and it is this intensity and the head-on nature of articulating an argument as 
a conversation that brings halakha to life. 
The spatial logic crucial for abstract representations of halakha is perfectly suited 
to the printed code, but responsa, with their often-confusing linear logic, are irreplaceable 
for the adjudication of empirical cases and for resolving disagreements about 
categorization. While conceiving of halakha as a neatly codifiable abstract legal system is 
attractive, this is not how it exists in all its applications and textual sources. Non-codified 
law is constantly channeled into the schematic system of codes, and vice versa, material 
from codes are often re-inserted into enter less schematic discussions. Rabbi Karo included 
much responsa material in Bet Yosef, thus introducing cases into the code, for which he had 
to summarize and edit the responsa. Even while codifying, however, Rabbi Karo also 
participates in writing responsa, a testament to the complexity and irreducibility of the 
halakhic conversation.  
While printed books may be more effective tools for circulating quantitatively 
greater information in stable form, its organizational requirements are essentially opposed 
to the residual orality in the logic of responsa. This dynamism is captured more accurately 
in correspondence, which maintains the nature of a “conversation between absent friends,” 
in Erasmus’ words. A code may be a more accurate, lucid, and surveyable rendering of the 
law, but the life and action of law as existing in an imagined community is expressed more 
strongly in the meandering and untidy linear argumentation of dialogic correspondence. 
The sense of dialogic argumentation necessary to imagine a real discursive forum, a 
Rabbinic Republic that exists in one’s own time and space could not be created without 
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responsa, and their essence is only preserved so long as their organizational integrity is 
intact. Thus, the case study shows the unique contribution of responsa for a discursive, 
argumentative conception of halakha, while printed codes contribute to a more unified, 
universalized, and stable image of law.  
These distinctions have major significance for the foundation of Jewish legal 
authority. Printed books, while excellent for communicating information and circulating it 
more broadly and quickly than letters, do not evoke the immediacy and dialogical 
impression of discourse. The letter’s oral discursive quality is crucial, for only with the 
idea of argumentation can one conceive of a discursive scholarly community, which also 
lends it a particular type of legal authority. This brings us back to Dworkin’s notion of law, 
discussed in chapter five, which claimed that any conceptualization of law must include a 
sense of its argumentative, dialogical nature in order to be valid. The argumentative logic 
is a crucial element of this very definition of law and the discursive forum in which such 
arguments take place functions as a justification for halakha’s authority. Responsa, with 
their epistolary roots and their dialogical essence are thus crucial to undergird legitimate 
authority to halakha. Even when these letters are printed in disordered responsa collections, 
their particular logic is preserved in ways that codification of their contents would obscure.  
Of course, other approaches to legal authority exist as well, and Nils Jansen’s study 
of non-legislative codifications (arguably the best non-Jewish parallel for halakhic 
codifications), such as Gratian’s Decretum and the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
presents an interesting case for codification as a source of authority. According to this 
approach, the elements of codification itself – order, structure, consistency, 
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comprehensiveness, completeness, and so on – serve as the source of legal authority.1299 
The question remains which of these types of authority; one based on discourse or one 
based on order; best represents the authority of Jewish law. My suggestion would be that 
the answer to this question is different for different religious legal cultures and subcultures, 
and depends strongly on their most profound understanding of the meaning of law and 
religion. For the early modern ashkenazic culture that this dissertation studied, these 
conceptions were in the very process of radical change.  
                                                     
1299 Nils Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority: Non-Legislative Codifications in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). His use of non-legislative 
codifications (as opposed to those backed by state power) is intriguing for investigations into the sources of 




APPENDIX A: TABLE FOR CASE STUDY 
As the table shows, outright disagreement, evident in most of the responsum from Rabbi Isserles to Rabbi Karo about deathbed wills in 
this chapter, is almost absent from the discussion of deathbed wills in the codes. For the sake of the example, if one were to highlight 
the responsa in different colors, they would appear almost entirely in red. 
In the codes, on the other hand, Rabbis Karo and Isserles seem mostly to agree, and even if Rabbi Isserles implies some 
disagreement that is relevant to the case of our responsa, it is only implied and not directly opposed to anything Rabbi Karo wrote in the 
code at that location. The only places in the codes where any outright disagreement between Rabbis Karo and Isserles can be detected 
are those places where the responsa are mentioned. Any other hints at disagreement are indicated in three ways; either by means of 
referring from one subsection to another within the same section; or from one section to another within the same volume; or from one 
section to another in another volume. The first two will ultimately lead back to the mention of the responsa within the volume, thus 
pointing very indirectly to the disagreement. The only other form of disagreeing is by referring from one volume to another, thus bringing 
together the two categories – monetary law vs. prohibitions – that drive the interpretation of the legal case in the responsum. 
 
responsum is mentioned in codes 
Volume on monetary law (Ḥoshen mishpat) 
Volume on prohibition and permission (Yoreh 
de’ah) 
Outright disagreement between Rabbis Isserles 
and Karo 
Implied disagreement between Rabbis Isserles 
and Karo 
Agreement between Isserles and Karo 
Reference to other place within volume (*) -> 
Reference leads here -> (*) 
Reference to volume on monetary law (*) 








Moshe             
    
 מפה Bet Yosef Mapah   בית יוסף Tur   טור
 
 שולחן ערוך 
Shulḥan Arukh 
  חושן משפט
MONETARY LAW 
and the idea that 
for a poor 
person it 
becomes like a 
vow, this is only 
specifically 
when the money 
was in his 
possession as he 
vowed, but if     
not ... 
someone who gives a 
gift to his fellow … can 
renege so long as it did 
not reach the receiver, 
and if the receiver is 
poor, he cannot renege, 
because promising “on 
high” (consecrating) is 
like giving to a regular 
person… 
and on that which he 
wrote, and if the 
receiver is poor, he 
cannot renege … the 
words of our rabbi do 
not make sense, because 
“promising it to God is 
like giving it to a regular 
person” is only said 
about hekdesh … but a 
poor person is 
considered a regular 
person 
<-(6*)  





 and if the 
receiver is poor, 
he cannot renege 






…and he wrote 
that there are 
those who 
disagree with 
them, and see 
there §253 
about this law… 
…he who gives a gift 
… and says “after you, 
so-and-so should 
inherit” … when the 
first one dies, the 
second one acquires it; 
this is when the first 
one is not a legal heir, 
but if he is a legal heir 
by Torah, he cannot 
lose the inheritance 
and it goes to his own 
heirs after him 
 
…and so it says in … 
that these things only 
apply to a deathbed will, 
but not for a healthy 
individual… 








“However, if he 




does require a 
formal kinyan, 
because if he 
sells it in his 
life, it does not 
work orally, 







above at the 
end of §248 
…when does this apply 
that a gift requires a 
formal kinyan? To a 
regular gift, but a 
deathbed gift does not 
need any formalities, 
since our rabbis 
instituted an ordinance 
that the words of a 
deathbed individual are 
as though they were 
written and handed 
over whether he wrote 
or said, my property is 
for so-and-so…even 
without a formal 
kinyan… 
…and that which he 
wrote, whether he wrote 
or said: my property is 
for so-and-so … this 
implies that also in 
places where it is said 
orally without writing, it 
is also considered a 
deathbed will, and 
valid… 




give it right after 




…a deathbed gift 
needs no formal 
kinyan in any 
way, because the 
words of a dying 
individual, it is as 
if they were 
written and 
handed over… 
  הלכות מתנות שכיב מרע





…it seems to me 
that we can 
learn from this 
that a dying 
individual who 
gave a gift and 
added that his 
 
…and if he recovers, 
the gift immediately 
returns, even if he did 
perform a kinyan, and 
there is no need to 
specifically cancel it 





… as soon as he 
recovers, the gift is 
immediately canceled 
even without saying a 
 
…and even if he 
made a 
condition while 
giving the gift 
that he cannot 
cancel it, if he 
recovers it is 
an individual on 
his deathbed who 
wrote all his 
property to others 
and did not leave 
anything behind, 
even if a kinyan 






gifts should be 
like regular gifts 
but did not 
perform a 
formal kinyan 
on it, the gift is 
canceled, since 
he wished to 
give it as a 
regular gift, so it 
requires a 
formal kinyan 
and since there 
was no kinyan 
the gift is 
canceled, 
and so it 
also seems 
from that which 
I wrote above in 
this section … 
for a deathbed 
gift where they 
wrote ‘effective 
immediately,’ 





seen many wills 
rather as soon as he 
recovers, the gift is 
immediately cancelled 
even without saying a 
word… 
word … and even if he 
specifically said that he 
wants the gift to remain 
even in the event of his 
recovery unless he 
specifically cancels it, 
this statement is 
meaningless, since 
deathbed wills are 
rabbinically ordinated 
and deathbed gifts were 
made valid only so that 
the dying person should 
not be upset. Thus, as 
soon as he recovers, this 
rabbinic ordinance no 
longer holds and his 
gifts are completely 
canceled, and it is as 
though he ordered to 
give these gifts after his 
death while in good 
health … which is 
worthless… 
canceled, unless 
he performed a 
kinyan  








that scribes have 
botched by 
writing ‘like a 
regular gift’ in 
order to make 
the document 
better with a 
will that had no 
kinyan and thus, 




the force of 




even if the poor 
already took 
possession of it, 
we remove it 
from them, and 
see there, but … 
decided like 




which is an 
isura, we decide 
and if he consecrated 
his property ... or gave 
it to the poor, it is 
unknown, is it like a 
gift that returns when 
the dying person 
recovers or no, and it is 
an aporia … and since 
it is an aporia, the gift 
returns … and my lord, 
my father the ROSh of 
blessed memory wrote, 
since it is an aporia, we 
do not cancel the 
…and if he consecrated 
his property … or gave 
it to the poor, it is 
unknown … an aporia, 
these are the words of 
Maimonides … a dying 
individual who 
consecrated all his 
property … or 
distributed it to the poor, 
if he recovers, it all 
returns – the reason for 
this is simple, because, 
since it is an aporia, we 
And even if the 
poor took 
possession of it, 
we remove it 
from them … 
and not like 
those who say 
otherwise. 
Similarly, the 
law of hekdesh 
is like that of a 
gift, that he can 
take it back like 
a gift. 
and if he 
consecrated all 
his property and 
left nothing … or 
distributed it to 
the poor, if he 
recovers, 
everything is 














to those who 
disagree with 
ROSh, …and 
this also seems 
to be the opinion 
of Rabbi Karo. 
consecration … and 
the distribution to the 
poor, since we are 
coming to cancel his 
actions based on an 
assumption, and we 
cannot cancel his 
actions unless we are 
sure about the 
assumption.  
take it from him only 
with very strong 
proofs…and that which 
he wrote in the name of 
ROSh that we do not 
cancel the gift … these 
are strange things to me 
… since it is a doubt, we 
do not take it from him. 
      
-*)<3(  
*)4(-<  
from this we can 
also learn about 
that which I 
wrote above in 
this section, that 
if he wrote in a 
deathbed will 
that he gives it 




the gift is 
 
And similarly, if he 
wrote about all his 
property and adds 
“effective 
immediately” and 
transfers it in his 
lifetime, this is like 
other regular gifts, if 
the document is given 
to the recipient, or if 
the buyer bought it 
directly from the giver, 
everything transfers 







Maimonides wrote: “… 
this is for regular 
deathbed wills, but if he 
gave some of his 
property and specifies 
that it is as a deathbed 
will which only transfers 
after death, it does not 
need a kinyan and if he 
 
Similarly, if he 
wrote that “this 
document be in 
any way that is 
effective,” that 
is like writing 
that he means to 
strengthen the 
deathbed will 





The gift of a 
dying individual, 
always if he gives 
it with a formal 
kinyan, it does 
not transfer, even 
if he dies. And 
even if he wrote it 
in a document 
and handed over 
the document in 
his lifetime, it 











wrote that if he 
writes that he is 
giving it as the 
gift of a healthy 
individual, it is 
treated like a 
regular gift, and 
this is simple to 
me; but I just 
wrote this 
because I saw in 
the responsa of 
the Rabbi 
Karo that he 
wrote that 
something 
in this manner 
does transfer 
because we 
attribute it [the 
wrong 
formulation] to 
a scribal error, 
and I answered 
him concerning 
this, and the 
words of both of 
us came before 
Rabbi Meir of 
recovers, it returns, etc. 
… and similarly, if he 
wrote about all of his 
property and specifies 
that he gives everything, 
effective immediately 
etc., everything 
transfers, and he cannot 
renege…” and these are 
simple matters. 
he meant to sell it 
only with a 
kinyan, and there 
is no kinyan after 
death. But if he 
specifies that he 










Padua, and he 
agreed with my 
words that it 
does not 
transfer, as 
it is clearly 
explained in 
the proofs 
of the responsa 
written on this, 
and see there in 




this is attributed 
to a scribal 
error…, in 
Rabbi Karo’s 
words. And his 
words do not 
seem right to me 




wills where a 
formal kinyan is 
performed, and 
there we do not 
say that 
and a dying individual 
who said “I leave this 
to so-and-so,” my 
master and father 
wrote in his responsum 
that this is a 
formulation for gifts ... 
and if he says …, this is 
a formulation for 
inheritance, and if he 
says … it is a doubtful 
formulation that was 
not decided, therefore 
the gift does not 
transfer. 
but if she commanded, 
saying “leave this,” … 
and it could be that all 
this makes it clear that it 
is but an error of the 
scribe of the will, … and 
even if it is clear to us 
that she said it exactly as 
it is written in the will, 
since we assume that “a 
person does not cancel 
his/her own words,” we 
can presume that she 
meant to leave it but 
simply was not careful 
with her words 









says is to 
strengthen the 
will and that 
which he writes 
does not seem 
correct … and 





where the will 
said that he is 
giving it as a 
regular gift and 






uphold the gift 
for reasons such 
as these here, 
and I wrote on it 
and 
contradicted 
































Rabbi Meir of 
Padua agreed 





  דרכי משה
Darkhei Moshe 
    טור
Tur 
   בית יוסף









…and so the halakhic 
decisors of blessed 
memory have agreed, 
and not like the 
RaShbA who wrote 
… that promising 
orally ‘on high’ (to 
God), it is like giving 
for regular 
people” applies 
only to actual 
hekdesh   
…promising orally 
“on high” (to 
God), it is like 





…because it says, 
“In your mouth, that 
is charity,” he is 
obligated as soon as 
he says it orally, and 
this is to contradict 
those who say that if 
he promised 
something to the 
poor orally and 
wishes to renege, he 
can…. 
…  
if he said to give his 
friend a gift and the 
friend is poor, it is like 
pledging it to charity 
and he is not permitted 








 … [quotes RaShbA]: 
“and I am unsure 
about the hekdesh 
itself … and if there 
is any doubt 
concerning this, we 
go to the advantage 
of the heir, because 
the money is in the 
presumptive 
possession of the 
owners, who are the 
… but for the 
synagogue, we do 
accept it even in 
the first place, and 
that is if he says ‘I 
set it aside 
according to 
Jewish beliefs’… 
and that is if he says 
‘I set it aside …’…. 
[quotes Or zarua] “I 
can learn from this 
that this is the law: 
doubtful charity is 
charity, because 
these are all gifts to 
the poor … 
therefore, I the 
author [of Or zarua] 
say, he who has in 
<-(5*)  
But he who consecrated 
something using a 
doubtful formulation and 
dies, and we cannot 
know his intentions, the 
heirs are considered to be 
the presumptive owners 
and if the hekdesh comes 
to take it from them, the 
latter must provide 
proof, and so long as no 
 
Whoever has money in 
his hands and he is not 
sure if the money is 
charity, he must give 











heirs, and the poor 
who say that the 
condition was upheld 
[and they deserve the 
money], the burden 
of proof is on them.” 
And so, too, Rabbi 
Isserlein adjudicated, 
that the money is 
kept in the hands of 
those with 
presumptive 





money and is not 
sure if they belong to 
charity or not, he 
must give them to 
charity.” 
proof is brought, the 
property is in the 
presumptive ownership 
of the heirs…  







APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL SOURCES AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS FOR CASE 
STUDY 
a. In the Responsa: 
 
The responsa discuss the inheritance of a man who, on his deathbed, pledged part of his 
inheritance to the poor of the land of Israel. The legal order of the heirs and the amount 
they inherit is determined by Jewish law.1300 If someone wishes to bequeath property in 
any other way, it must be established legally before death by giving it as a gift.1301 In order 
to take effect, such a gift must be accompanied by a symbolic action to effect transference 
of ownership called a kinyan.1302 For deathbed wills, a halakhic category called ẓava’at 
shkhiv mara was established. Based on the understanding that a person close to death may 
wish to allocate his possessions suddenly, this category is more flexible than regular wills 
and acquisitions, which have stricter legal standards and formal requirements, such as an 
official designation of the witnesses and, in the case of bequeathing a gift, the symbolic 
kinyan. Given the risk inherent in the lax legal standards of deathbed wills, such a deathbed 
will is annulled at any sign of distance between the will and the actual death. If, for 
example, the person on his deathbed recovers, then becomes sick again, and dies as a result, 
the earlier deathbed declaration may not be acceptable. 
On his deathbed, the deceased in this responsum made his declaration that some of 
his inheritance should go to charity and proclaimed it to be a ẓava’at shkhiv mara, a 
deathbed will. The written document that was drawn up at the time, however, declared the 
gift to be a matanat bari, a present given by an individual in good health, thus contradicting 
the gift’s status as a deathbed declaration and thrusting the will into a stricter formal 
category. In this stricter category, a transaction must satisfy additional requirements; for 
example, a kinyan has to accompany the donation. The heirs claimed that the deathbed 
pledge to charity was contradicted by the use of the term matanat bari in the document, 
thus reverting the will to the regular requirements. As no kinyan was performed, the pledge 
to charity did not fulfill the requirements of a regular gift, and the heirs were the only ones 
entitled to the inheritance. 
Rabbi Yosef Karo disagreed with the claim of the heirs, as the deceased was, in 
fact, on his deathbed when he pledged the money, meaning that the formal requirements of 
gifts should not apply. Rabbi Karo does not see a serious problem with the contradiction 
inherent in considering the gift a deathbed will even though the formulation matanat bari 
appeared in the document. He assumes that this was simply a mistake on the part of the 
                                                     
1300 See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot yerusha, ch 1:1-3, for example. 
1301 For instance, if a man would want his daughter to inherit part of his property, he would have to 
give it to her as a legal gift before his death, as she is not automatically a legal heir. 
1302 In early modern Ashkenaz, it was common to create a legal document that allowed daughters to 
inherit. This was called a shtar ḥaẓi ḥelek zakhar. It was often given to the daughter as a dowry for her 
husband. For more on this see Yosef Rivlin, “Shtar ḥaẓi zakhar,” (The “half of a male” document) Diné Israel 




deceased1303or the scribe,1304 who did not realize that using such terminology would raise 
the bar on the formal requirements.1305 
Moreover, Rabbi Karo validates the donation independently of the category of 
deathbed wills: The heirs are wrong, he explains, because this gift is unlike others, which, 
without a kinyan, would be null and void:1306 “…even without a kinyan, this gift would be 
valid; because it is charity.”1307 Placing the endowment within the context of charity 
completely changes the requirements for a successful transfer of ownership. Rabbi Karo 
cites a law that an oral pledge to charity obligates the pledger to fulfill this promise as soon 
as it leaves his lips.1308 He supports this by citing the Talmud, “In your mouth – that is 
charity,”1309 meaning that charity is binding even by oral declaration alone and cannot be 
retracted. Rabbi Karo clarifies his approach by quoting the words of Maimonides: “The 
category of charity falls within the principle of vows; therefore, if a person says ‘I obligate 
myself to give a sela to charity,’ or ‘this sela is for charity,’ one is immediately obligated 
to give it to the poor.”1310 Rabbi Karo concludes,1311 “the poor of the Land of Israel have 
                                                     
1303 Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83 אין בטענת היורשים ממש, שמאחר שהיה ש"מ כשצוה אין ספק שמה שצוה
שחשב לייפות ] המצווה: א"ת רמ"שו[ש שהוא נותנם במתנת בריא אפשר שהוא טעות נמצא "ומ, מ היה"י במתנת ש"לתת לעניים שבא
...כחם באומרו שהיא מתנת בריא  
1304 Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83 או הסופר טעה וכתב מתנת בריא מדעתו  ולפי האמת היא מתנת ש"מ שבאמירה
]א"ת רמ"לא נדפס בשו" נקנית...ולפי האמת"מ. [היא נקנית  
1305 Thus, this misplaced formality could easily be explained away. This focus on the dying man’s 
intentions rather than his actions is not without basis. Maimonides in Mishne Torah, Hilkhot zekhiyah u-
matana ch 8:12 writes that if a man on his deathbed requests a document to be written to bequeath his 
possessions to someone else but he dies before the document can be written, his request is not fulfilled 
because the dying man did not perform it as a deathbed will, but, rather, as a regular acquisition with a 
document, and that document is now incomplete (and one cannot write it in his name after his death).  
However, in the next section (8:13), Maimonides writes that if the dying man meant to give a 
deathbed gift and just added “and write a document” in order to strengthen the rights of the recipient, the 
document may be written after his death and the possessions given to the recipient.  ואם אמר כתבו כדי ליפות כח
 .המקבל כגון שאמר תנו מנה לפלוני ואמר ואף כתבו ותנו לו הרי אלו כותבין וחותמין ונותנין לאחר מיתה
1306 Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83  וכל זה הוא כי יהבו להו ליורשים כל טעותייהו, שסוברים דמתנה זו כשאר
.מתנות בריא שאם אין בה קנין בטלה היא  
1307 Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83 האמת נ"ל אפילו תהיה מתנת בריא ממש אע"ג דלית בה קנין, הרי היא קיימת
...משום דצדקה היא  
1308 Some say that it theoretically applies even with an unspoken intention of the heart, although that 
is unenforceable. See the compilation of Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel (German lands, 13th century. 
Mordekhai, Tractate Bava Batra, ch 1 [§487]). 
1309 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate ROSh Hashana 6a. 
אלמא בדיבורא מחייב, בפיך זו צדקה  
1310 Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot matanat ani’im ch 8:1. 
1311 After backing up his conclusions with alternate suggestions; he emphasizes that, even if some 
of the details and assumptions were weaker, he would still have a strong case. In this manner, he suggests 
that one could consider any people of standing who are typically present at the deathbed to be representatives 
of the poor, entitled to collect money for them, and he advances the possibility that a person could even 
pledge money not currently in his possession to the poor, provided that nobody disputes his claim on the 
money. See Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83 For the first claim: ירוחם דאדם חשוב או טובי העיר ' שהרי כתב ר, ועוד
...ל יד עניים"וכשעושים צואה דרך להמצא שם אנשים חשובים וה...הוו יד עניים  For the second claim: שאפילו לא היה , ועוד
ק "ף בפ"ואפילו לא היו הנכסים ברשותו אלא מופקדים ביד אחרים זכו בהם העניים שהרי כתב הרי, בשם שום גבאי ולא אדם חשו
אבל היכא דאית ליה פקדון, מ דיכול להוציאו בדיינים"ה, אינו קדוש...דמציאה   




acquired it [the inheritance] and whoever is currently holding said possessions is obligated 
to send them to the poor of the Land of Israel.”1312 
Rabbi Isserles disagrees with almost every part of this argument,1313 especially with 
Rabbi Karo’s suggestion that the poor legally acquired the sum as soon as the dying man 
uttered his decision to donate the money. The source for his counterattack is a medieval 
responsum1314 concerning a childless widow who, on her deathbed, commanded the 
community to take money from her room and give it to the poor after her death,1315 but 
later told her brother (the legal heir) to take everything for himself. The conclusion was 
that the poor did not have the right to her possessions because she changed her mind before 
death. This should not be considered a vow to charity, he explained, “…because this is not 
the language of vows, since she said ‘give this amount after my death.’”1316 
                                                     
1312 Karo, ShUT Avkat Rokhel, §83  נמצא דבנדון דידן זכו עניי א"י במה שצוה לתת לעניי א"י במתנת בריא, אפילו
ואפילו אם לא היה שם בשעת הצואה לא גבאי ולא שום אחד מחשובי הקהל לא . אם היו הנכסים בשעת מתנה מופקדים ביד אחרים
וכל מי שהנכסים הנזכרים בידו , י"ש זה שלא חזר בו שזכו בהם עניי א"כ. ואם היה חוזר בו לא היה ממש בחזרתו. היה יכול לחזור בו
נאם הצעיר יוסף קארו.] ועם היות הדברים פשוטים נדרשתי לאשר שאלוני. [י"חייב לשלחם לעניי א  
The letter, as it is printed in ShUT Rema, contains the following ending, where he signs off, writing 
“and seeing as the matter is simple, I have responded to those who requested it of me. So writes the youth 
Yosef Karo.” In the printed edition of Rabbi Karo’s responsa collection, only the name from the signature is 
included. 
1313 He first critiques Rabbi Karo’s explanation that, as the dying man’s intention was clearly to 
create a deathbed will, the problematic formulation in the document can be disregarded, as it was merely 
added by mistake. Rabbi Isserles brings up various examples where one could have made the same 
assumption that the document contains mistakes, but, nevertheless, that is not considered sufficient basis to 
disregard the written document. He analyzes these examples, invokes several laws about who is 
disadvantaged when a document contains errors, suggests arguments in Rabbi Karo’s favor, and then rejects 
those, too. Rabbi Isserles rejects Rabbi Karo’s claim that the principle ‘he who holds the document is at a 
disadvantage’ applies only if the document as a whole can be upheld under an interpretation that 
disadvantages the holder. If however, the interpretation disadvantaging the holder annuls the entire document 
altogether, Karo claims, we cannot accept such an interpretation. Rabbi Isserles considers this exception to 
the principle to be very problematic: “If so, no document can ever be declared invalid, if the principle ‘he 
who holds the document is at a disadvantage’ is disregarded every time it turns out that it will invalidate the 
whole document, what is the point of having the principle?!” 
1314 First, Rabbi Isserles claims, as the will included both a pledge to charity and a regular 
inheritance, and the mistaken formulation invalidated the regular inheritance, it makes no sense to assume 
that the charity would nonetheless remain valid. This is based on a responsum of RaShbA (Rabbi Shlomo 
ben Aderet, 13th c. Spain), who ruled that if a person tries to buy or give something based on an asmakhta 
(an unlikely assumption), it will not work for regular transactions but, for pledges to charity, it would work. 
However, if he is trying to buy or perform a regular transaction together with a pledge for charity, and he 
bases this on an asmakhta, it will not work for the charity either, as they are together in the same transaction. 
א דאסמכתא קניא בהקדש לחוד "ג דדעת הרשב"אע, אופסק דהואיל והוי אסמכתא לגבי הדיוט הוי אסמכתא לגבי הקדש ולא קני
 כדמשמע באותה תשובה
1315 From the responsa of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg (c. 1215 –1293). The responsum, as it is used 
by Rabbi Isserles here, comes from the Mordekhai, a compilation of different medieval ashkenazic sources 
arranged according to the order of the talmudic tractates and attributed to Rabbi Mordekhai ben Hillel. When 
one looks at the full responsum in ShUT Rabbi Meir Rothenburg (Prague, 1608), §998, the question actually 
mentions that the heir, in this case, was a poor man himself.  עשה 'מ הכא בדין זה דלא פירשה כלום אלא אמרה "מ
ועוד דקרוביה הראויות ליורשה עניים הן ואיכא תרתי ענייך . ליורשה' הראוי' לא נעשה פירוש לפירושה ויתננו ליורשי' המוטב
'...קודמי  
1316 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48 ופסק שם מוהר"ם דמכח מתנת שכיב מרע לא קנה ההקדש, דהא חזרה בה קודם מותה
דאין לשון זה לשון נדר שהרי אמרה כך תתנו לאחר מיתה , וכתב שם ואין לומר תתחייב לתת ממונה כך וכך לצדקה מטעם נדר' וכו




He must harmonize his view with a talmudic text in tractate Bava kama that 
contradicts this approach: It tells of a person who pledged money and immediately tried to 
retract it, only to be told that it can no longer be retracted, because the sage Rabbi Yosef 
was present when he pledged, and, as a representative of the poor, Rabbi Yosef acquired 
the money for them.1317 The statement that the man could no longer retract his pledge was 
a problem for Rabbi Isserles, who wished to claim that a pledge can still be retracted after 
uttering it.1318 He explains that, in the talmudic case, the pledger was present when the vow 
took effect, which is why he was held to it. In the case of the deathbed pledge, however, 
such a vow only takes effect after the person is dead, “and thus free of all the 
                                                     
still retract it, because it is a vow concerning something that takes effect only after death and, unlike wills 
and inheritances, which the heirs are obligated to fulfill, personal vows need not be enforced after the person 
who vowed has passed away. 
1317 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava kama 36b, has a case in which a person learned that he was 
entitled to a small amount of money as repayment for damages incurred when another man beat him. As this 
amount seemed negligible, he decided then and there to pledge it to charity. Immediately, he changed his 
mind. Rabbi Yosef, who was among the rabbis who had ruled that he is owed this reparation money, told the 
man that he could no longer change his mind, because “The poor have already acquired it, and even though 
there were no poor people present here, I am the [extension of] the hand of the poor [and I acquired it for 
them].” 
1318 This case is also problematic for Rabbi Karo’s interpretation, because it implies that Rabbi 
Yosef’s presence was needed to acquire the charity for the poor. Thus, as long as nobody took possession of 
the pledge in the name of the poor, the benefactor would still have been able to change his mind. He resolves 
this contradiction in several ways. This case, Rabbi Karo concedes, implies that the poor do not acquire 
ownership of anything pledged to them simply by declaration. Rather, the presence of a representative who 
could acquire it for them at the moment at which it was pledged is what sealed the deal, allowing no return. 
Had Rabbi Yosef not been there to claim the money for the poor, it seems that the man would have been able 
to change his mind. This contradicts the idea that, as soon as charity is pledged, it cannot be reneged. 
There are different explanations for this contradiction: The tosafists and Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel 
both explain that, in the case in the Talmud, the money was not yet in the possession of the man himself at 
the time that he promised it to the poor (it was merely a debt owed to him by the one who beat him). Because 
the money was not yet in his possession, it was less concrete, which is why it could not pass immediately to 
the poor people upon his word, leaving him the chance to change his mind had Rabbi Yosef not acquired the 
right to the money on the spot. Had the actual money been in his possession already, however, it would have 
passed to the poor instantaneously upon his oral declaration, without the need for anyone to acquire it, and 
the man could not have taken it back no matter what, even if no one took possession of it yet. It seems that 
Rabbi Karo uses this interpretation, since he writes regarding our case that “even though the collector was 
not there, the poor have acquired the right to this money, since that very money was in his possession [at the 
time of the pledge].” 
מאחר שאותה הסלע היתה ברשותו ,פ שלא היה שם הגבאי זכו בה העניים"דכיון שאמר סלע זו לצדקה אע  
Another explanation claimed that the man did not wish completely to retract his promise. Rather 
than deciding to take back the money entirely, he merely wished to keep it for a while, invest it with profit, 
and then give the same amount that he originally promised to the poor. He was denied this desire because of 
Rabbi Yosef, who intervened before he changed his mind and accepted ownership of the money in the name 
of the poor. Had Rabbi Yosef been absent, the man could have kept the money for longer, but he would not 
be released from his pledge indefinitely. Thus, one explanation is based on the fact that the ownership of the 
man was not good enough to give his charity away, whereas the second explanation limits the scope of how 
far the man can take back his word (he can push it off but he cannot undo the vow as a whole). 
This leads him to another argument regarding the exact moment at which the poor can be said to 




commandments.”1319 Vows can no longer be enforced once the “vower” is dead, and the 
heirs have no strict obligation to honor mere vows of the deceased.1320 Thus, Rabbi Isserles 
explains, in the case at hand, “… as his only obligation to uphold this [charity] is from the 
force of a vow, one should not force the heirs to fulfill his vow.”1321 Maimonides in Mishne 
Torah,1322 writes that any gift given to charity will apply even there where regular gifts 
would not.1323 This is a strong source against Rabbi Isserles, who counters it by pointing 
                                                     
1319 Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48  אבל גבי שכיב מרע בעידנא דהוי לנדריה למיחל ולקיים אותו כבר מת ונעשה חפשי
 מן המצוות
1320 For this, Rabbi Isserles cites a Mishna, “He who vows and dies, the heirs are not obligated to 
pay.” Mishna Erkhin 5: 1 משקלי עלי, האומר...  Although Rabbi Isserles refers to this chapter in the Mishna in 
his support, paraphrasing it as  הנודר ומת אין היורשין חייבין לשלם it actually does not support his view. Rabbi 
Akiva Eiger (1837-1761) already pointed out this discrepancy. See Eiger, ShUT Rabbi Akiva Eiger, 1st ed., 
הא אדרבא באותה משנה מבואר בסיפא דמיו , א שהיא משנה שלימה הנודר ומת אין הנודר חייב לשלם"ש הרמ"עג גם מ"וצל 150§
דאין , א בשם המרדכי דמקדש לאחר מיתה לא מהני"ש הרמ"למ' אלא דכוונתי הי, ..., של פלוני ומת הנודר חייבים היורשים לשלם
.י"בעזה, הקדש לאחר מיתה והארכתי בזה במקום אחר  
The sentences that follow this citation, which deal with Rabbi Rothenburg’s interpretation of this 
Mishna, calling into question Rabbi Isserles’ perspective, as well as his defense of this reading, are printed 
in parentheses and in a different font in the first printed edition. Possibly, these comments were added by an 
editor or by Rabbi Isserles himself while glossing his own papers in preparation for potential publication or 
simply in the process of study. 
1321 Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48  וה"ה בנד"ד מאחר דהוא אינו חייב לקיומיה אלא מכח נדר, אין לכוף ליתומים לקיים
.נדרו  Rabbi Isserles then strengthens his claim, emphasizing that even the poor themselves cannot acquire an 
amount promised to them at the moment of the utterance if the time specified by the pledger lies in the future. 
Moreover, even if someone was present to acquire the rights of the charity in the name of the poor at the 
moment that the dying person made the declaration, as was the case with the widow who declared this in 
front of the community members, they could not acquire the money when she uttered the statement, as her 
statement was not to give the money to charity then and there, but, rather at a later point in time (after her 
death). Therefore, she had every right to change her mind between the original declaration and her death. If 
she changed her mind and promised her brother the money as a deathbed will, the only thing that remained 
from the original vow to charity would, at most, have been a vow, not a deathbed will. She could no longer 
be held to her vow, however, as she was dead, and the heir, while encouraged to fulfill any wishes that the 
dead may have expressed, was not entirely obligated to fulfill her vows The principle of: מצוה לקיים דברי המת, 
“it is a commandment to fulfill the words of the dead” and pay their debts (see Babylonian Talmud, Tractate 
Bava batra 157a), for instance, is merely a positive thing to do, but it is not legally binding like a will, which 
effectively reassigns ownership based on the wishes of the deceased upon death. 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48 דלא גרע משאר חוב דמצוה לפרוע כמו שאיתא בכתובות  ,אף אם היה חל הנדר על אביהם
. אבל מיהא אין כופין על זה, פרק מי שהיה נשוי ופרק מי שמת  
1322 Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot mekhira, ch. 22, which concerns the sale of something that 
is not yet in existence (davar she-lo ba la-’olam), such as the future fruit of a tree. Such items cannot be sold 
before they come into existence, unless specific clauses are added and legal mechanisms are used. 
Maimonides, however, adds in laws 15-17 in this chapter that for pledges to the Temple and charity, 
transactions work even for something not yet in existence. 
1323 Maimonides considers cases of acquisition where there is a time lag between the statement and 
the actual possibility to acquire the object being sold: In general, one cannot sell or give away something that 
is not in existence at that moment. However, if it is charity, the rules are stricter: “The law of consecrating to 
the Temple and the law of the poor and the law of vows are not like the law of regular acquisitions, for … 
even if it does not become consecrated because it is not in existence yet, the person is obligated to fulfill his 
promise, as it is said ‘he must do as everything that comes out of his mouth.’ Therefore, if a person 
commanded on his deathbed and said, ‘Everything that this tree yields should be for the poor’ … the poor 




out that Maimonides is a minority opinion1324 and can thus be disregarded.1325 Rabbi 
Isserles ends this argument with a flourish, referring to Rabbi Karo’s famous (and oft-
criticized) principles of halakhic adjudication always to follow the majority from among 
the three main authorities he uses in his code: “It is obvious that one will go according to 
[the majority] as his honor himself has stated in principle in the beginning of his 
book....”1326 
Rabbi Isserles’ central critique touches on Rabbi Karo’s use of principles from 
charity to adjudicate a case of inheritance law: “One should be perplexed…how did he 
                                                     
דין ההקדש ודין העניים ודין הנדרים אינו כדין ההדיוט בקנייתו שאילו אמר אדם כל מה שתלד בהמתי יהיה הקדש לבדק 
הבית או יהיה אסור עלי או אתננו לצדקה אע"פ שאינו מתקדש לפי שאינו בעולם הרי זה חייב לקיים דברו שנאמר ככל היוצא מפיו 
 יעשה
והואיל והדבר כן אם צוה אדם כשהוא שכיב מרע ואמר כל מה שיוציא אילן זה לעניים או כל שכר בית זה לעניים זכו בהן 
 .העניים.
1324 Maimonides himself states this quite openly in Mishne Torah, Hilkhot mekhira 22:17: “and they 
say that the poor can only acquire that which regular people can and therefore they [the poor] would not 
acquire something that is not yet existent in the world….” Maimonides, for his part, sticks to his own 
interpretation and concludes that promises to charity should function like vows and consecrations and not 
like regular sales: “My opinion does not tend to that, since a person does not command to sell, rather, he 
commands to fulfill his wishes in charity or in consecrating to the Temple just as he commands to fulfill his 
vows….”  יש גאונים שחולקין על דבר זה ואומרים שאין העניים זוכין אלא בדברים שהדיוט קונה בהן ולפיכך לא יזכו בדבר שלא
יו בצדקה או בהקדש כמו שהוא מצווה לקיים בא לעולם ואין דעתי נוטה לדברים אלו שאין אדם מצווה להקנות והוא מצווה לקיים דבר
 .הנדר כמו שביארנו בערכין
1325 Especially since “…the Rabbi Alfasi and the tosafists and Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel all wrote that 
the poor cannot acquire it and it is merely a vow, and therefore in the case of a deathbed will, the poor did 
not acquire it” (Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48). 
וכתב שיש גאונים חולקים בזה אך שדעתו אינו מסכמת עמהן ומשמע דזכו בו העניים  ולא מטעם נדר ולכן השיגו שם 
י כתבו "תוספות והאשירף וה"והרי, ם חולק אין לסמוך עליו בזו מאחר דיחיד הוא בדרך זה"מ יש לשאול דאף אם הרמב"מ....ד"הראב
כ במתנת שכיב מרע לא קנו מאחר דלא חל הנדר עליו לקיים"וא, כולן דלא זכו בו עניים אלא מטעם נדר  
1326 Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48. 
ש "כ. ש מסכימים נקטינן כוותיהו"ף והרא"דכל מקום דהרי, פשיטא דאזלינן בתרייהו כמו שכלל מר בריש ספרו בית יוסף
,כ לדעת זו"ד והתוספות מסכימים ג"כאן דהראב  
Moreover, Rabbi Isserles adds, even Maimonides, in other places in Mishne Torah seems to argue 
to the contrary, that promises to charity cannot be forced after death. This apparent contradiction can be 
solved by looking more closely at Maimonides’ formulation in the laws of sale. He writes that if the dying 
person promises something that is not yet in existence to the poor, “the person is obligated to fulfill his 
promise, as it is said ‘he must do as everything that comes out of his mouth.’ And because this is so, if a 
person commanded on his deathbed and said … the poor have right to it.” 
 One can explain the formulation “obligated to fulfill his promise” as entirely different from a law 
that the poor immediately acquire it. Rather, the person cannot take back his promise and is held to it once 
the tree grows fruit. However, if the person who made the promise is dead, it is merely a requirement for the 
heirs to fulfill his promises, but the poor do not automatically have legal ownership of the promised amount 
(Magid Mishne, Rabbi Vidal of Tolosa, 14th c takes this approach in his glosses on Maimonides). 
1326While vows to charity take effect as soon as they are uttered, promises made as part of an 
inheritance take effect only when the person dies. The idea that charity passes into the possession of the poor 
at the moment of utterance is irrelevant for this case, Rabbi Isserles claims, because “all that is because of its 
being a vow, and that is not relevant at all to issues of deathbed wills … nobody disagrees concerning this, 
that one is not obligated to fulfill the deathbed will as a vow, rather, … because ‘it is a commandment to 
fulfill the words of the dead” (Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48). 
דכל זה הוא מטעם נדר ולא שייך , ד ממה דצדקה נקנית באמירה בבריא"איך הביא ראיה לנד, פ יש לתמוה אדברי מר"ועכ
מטעם דמצוה ...אלא, מ לא צריך לקיים מטעם נדר"דהרי ליכא חולק על זה דבשכ. כלל לדברי שכיב מרע לקיים צואתו לאחר מותו




bring proof to the current case from the fact that charity is acquired by an utterance…?!”1327 
To Rabbi Isserles, a deathbed pledge to charity is not owned by the poor at the moment of 
the pledge. After the pledger’s death, the vow should be kept to respect the wishes of the 
deceased, which is desirable, but it is not a legal requirement. Rabbi Isserles’ responsum 
concludes: “From all the above it seems that one should proclaim the heirs to be in the 
right, and that is the best possible thing that one can do with the possessions … ‘the best 
thing’ is to give it to the heirs and not to the hekdesh (consecrated fund).”1328 He did not 
consider the case at hand to involve any vows at all. It was simply a case of a mismanaged 
inheritance. Rabbi Karo, on the other hand, interpreted it as a case of charity, in which 
pledges are considered vows. This disparity about the categorization of the case is the crux 
of the disagreement.1329 
 
b. in the Codes: 
Given their fundamental disagreement, it is surprising that Rabbi Karo’s and Rabbi 
Isserles’ opinions as they appear in the codes do not seem all that different from each other. 
In the Shulḥan Arukh, Rabbi Karo specifically writes: “If he consecrated all of his gifts and 
left nothing behind … or gave it to the poor, if he recovers from his illness, it is 
canceled.”1330 The Arba Turim (or Tur)1331 introduces the sections on laws of deathbed 
wills after a more general discussion of the laws of gifts and acquisitions. Most deathbed 
gifts are automatically canceled when a person recovers, but some – including charity – are 
uncertain,1332 as the code states: “And if he consecrated his property … or gave it to the 
poor, it is a question whether the law should be like someone who gave and it returns if he 
recovers, or not, and it is not specified….”1333 This law is based on a discussion in the 
Talmud that examines ambiguous gifts. If a person on his deathbed consecrates all his 
                                                     
1327 Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48 
1328 Isserles, ShUT Rema, § 48 אך אבקש שלא ישליכני מר אחר גוו לבלתי השיבני על שאלתי כי מונע בר יקבוהו
ם והיא בתשובה במרדכי פרק מי "ל היה נראה לזכות היורשים והוא הטוב שאשפר לעשות בנכסים כמו שכתב מוהר"מכל הנ...לאום
.על אשה שצותה לעשות הטוב בנכסיה ופסק דהטוב הוא לתת ליורשים ולא להקדש שמת  
The woman in question is actually the same widow from this responsum (ShUT MaharaM 
Rothenburg, §998). She had left a separate sum in another person’s hands and told him to do “whatever is 
best” with the money. Rabbi Rothenburg concluded that “whatever is best” was to give the money to the 
heirs, not charity – but one of his arguments for this is that the heirs were also poor. מ הכא בדין זה דלא פירשה "מ
ועוד דקרוביה הראויות ליורשה עניים הן . ליורשה' הראוי' לא נעשה פירוש לפירושה ויתננו ליורשי' עשה המוטב'כלום אלא אמרה 
'...ואיכא תרתי ענייך קודמי  
1329 Having removed the case from the realm of vows and charity, Rabbi Isserles continues to 
dismantle some of the secondary points, such as Rabbi Karo’s claim that any community representative can 
be considered a representative of the poor; the assumption that such community leaders are typically present 
at a deathbed; and Rabbi Karo’s final point, that a person can successfully consecrate even money not 
currently in his or her possession, so long as it is easily recoverable. 
1330 Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen mishpat §250  הקדיש כל נכסיו ולא שייר כלום או הפקירם או חלקם לעניים אם עמד
 נתבטל הכל כדין נותן מתנה
1331 Rabbi Yacov ben Asher’s code on which Bet Yosef and Darkhei Moshe are both based. 
1332 For instance, if the person confesses on his deathbed that some of his property, in fact, belongs 
to someone else, it does not revert to the dying individual in the wake of recovery. Instead, it goes to the 
rightful owners. 
1333 Yacov ben Asher, Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:3  ואם הקדיש נכסיו או הפקירן או נתנן לעניים מיבעיא אי




possessions to the Temple, or dedicates them to charity,1334 and then recovers, will the gift 
remain or do we say that, as the person gave away everything without providing a source 
of sustenance for himself, it was clearly only meant in the event of his demise, and therefore 
the gift can be reneged? The Talmud does not decide, rendering this case as teku, (“let it 
stand”), a doubt that cannot be solved.1335 
The Tur summarizes that the law “is not specified.”1336 In principle, if earlier 
authorities considered something an aporia and did not specify how to adjudicate, one 
should rule according to the strictest interpretation. Having determined that an ambiguous 
gift to charity is such a case, the Tur goes on to summarize the medieval opinions on this 
issue: “[Maimonides] and the RaMaH [Rabbi Meir Halevi Abulafia, 13th c Spain] wrote 
that, as it is not specified, he can renege … but my master and father the ROSh [Rabbi 
Asher] wrote that as it is not specified, we do not undo the hekdesh [consecration fund] … 
and the handout that he gave to the poor....”1337 One opinion is that, as the issue is in doubt, 
we should allow the gift to return to the owner, while the other opinion states that, as the 
issue is in doubt, we should not undo the gift. The same reasoning leads them to opposite 
conclusions! 
                                                     
1334 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava batra 148b. 
איבעיא להו הקדיש כל נכסיו ועמד מהו מי אמרינן כל לגבי הקדש גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני 
הפקיר כל נכסיו מהו מי אמרינן כיון דאף לעניים כעשירים גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני חילק כל נכסיו לעניים 
מאי מי אמרינן צדקה ודאי מגמר גמר ומקני או דלמא כל לגבי נפשיה לא גמר ומקני תיקו (ל"א הקדיש כל נכסיו מהו הפקיר כל נכסיו 
 מהו חילק כל נכסיו לעניים מהו תיקו)
Translation from Soncino: “The question was raised:[If a dying man] consecrated all his possessions 
and [subsequently] recovered, what [is the law]? Is it assumed that whenever it is a case of consecrated 
objects the transfer of possession made is unqualified [meaning that he intended for the gift to take effect 
even if he recovers –T.M-E.] or, perhaps, when it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer 
unqualified possession? [If the answer is in the affirmative, the question arises] what [is the law in the case 
where] he renounced the ownership of all his property? Is it assumed that since [ownerless property may be 
seized] by the poor as well as by the rich, he transfers [therefore] unqualified possession or, perhaps, 
whenever it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer unqualified possession? [If the answer is in 
the negative,] what, [it may be asked. is the law where] he distributed all his possessions among the poor? Is 
it assumed [that in a matter of] charity he has undoubtedly transferred unqualified possession or, perhaps, 
wherever it is a matter of personal interests one does not transfer unqualified possession? — This is 
undecided. Some versions do not present these three options (consecration, ownerlessness, charity) as three 
separate questions but, rather, bundle them all into one. The distinction may have relevance in the case of 
ownerlessness, but not in our own case, which concerns charity.” 
1335 The Talmud explains both rationales: On the one hand, one might argue that, as charity is 
righteous, this person clearly had the full intention to give everything away, even if he left nothing for himself. 
Therefore, the gift is considered binding and the donor cannot renege. This is countered by the argument that 
a person would not neglect his or her own wellbeing to such an extreme degree, even for charity. Considering 
the fact that the giver left nothing behind for his or her own use, they could not possibly really have intended 
to give everything to charity without qualification. Therefore, if the giver does recover, the gift can return to 
the giver. 
1336 This is called b’aya de-lo ifhsatei; see, for instance, in Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Brakhot 
51a-b  הואיל וראשונים איבעיא : אמר רב אשי? שמאל מהו שתסייע לימין: ראשונים שאלו, אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן
אנן נעבד לחומרא, להו ולא איפשט להו . Thus, there where the Talmud does not make a specific decision between 
two options, we always go according to the more stringent option, even if it is only a rabbinic prohibition 
(whereas usually the principle applies that a doubt concerning a biblical prohibition is decided stringently, 
but a doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition is decided leniently). 
1337 Yacov ben Asher, Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:3  ואם הקדיש נכסיו או הפקירן או נתנן לעניים מיבעיא אי




Rabbi Karo analyzes both opinions: On the one hand, the conclusion of 
Maimonides that, as the case is uncertain, the gift should return, and the opposing idea of 
Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, on the other, that, because the case is uncertain, we should not 
undo the gift to charity. Based on our familiarity with his responsum on the inheritance, 
we would expect Rabbi Karo to side with Rabbi Asher and determine that a gift to charity, 
once promised, cannot be reneged. However, Rabbi Karo criticizes Rabbi Asher’s opinion, 
considering it “perplexing” that the charity would not return to the owner.1338 Rabbi 
Isserles, in his gloss, hastens to point out that Rabbi Karo’s remark here counters the notion 
that promises regarding charity are immediately and irrevocably binding. According to the 
codes and their glosses, then, Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles agree on this principle. 
The codes show us other points of agreement that the responsa would not. An 
important prooftext that Rabbi Isserles used against Rabbi Karo was known to Rabbi Karo, 
and he even considered it relevant to deathbed will cases. Although he does not mention it 
anywhere in the responsum, Rabbi Karo does cite this text in his glosses on the law of 
deathbed wills.1339 Additionally, in the responsum, Rabbi Isserles rejected the claim that 
the problematic formulation in the document was a scribal error. However, in the codes, he 
glosses as follows: “… I have seen many wills that the scribes have botched and wrote ‘as 
the gift of a healthy person’ ….”1340 In the responsa, it would weaken Rabbi Isserles’ 
argument to mention that such mistakes happen, but, in reality, he agreed with Rabbi Karo 
that scribes often made precisely this mistake. The codes thus show us that the two 
authorities can agree about the sources, about the principles, even about facts on the 
ground. Where is the disagreement? 
 
c. Responsa, Codes, Organization, and Adjudication 
The disagreement between Rabbi Isserles and Rabbi Karo, so explicit in the 
responsa, is much harder to detect in the codes. The laws of deathbed wills in the Arba 
Turim opens with a formulation implying that deathbed wills are an exception to regular 
gifts and acquisitions: “Concerning the statement that gifts require a kinyan … this is 
regarding gifts given by a healthy individual, but gifts given in a deathbed will do not 
require any of this….”1341 This description of deathbed wills as a less stringent 
manifestation of regular gifts provides Rabbi Isserles the opportunity to support his own 
view that calling the charity pledge a “gift given by a healthy individual” in the will turned 
the deathbed will into a regular gift and thus raised the bar on the legal requirements for it 
to be valid. Rabbi Isserles explains that Rabbi Karo’s code implies “that a person on his 
                                                     
1338 Rabbi Karo writes: “And that which is written in the name of the ROSh [Rabbi Asher] … these 
are perplexing things to me, as here we clearly have basis to assume [that the donor did not mean it] as a 
person would not give away all his possession and be required to beg at the doors…” (Karo, Bet Yosef on 
Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250). On the words ש אין מבטלין"ש בשם הרא"ומ  
ודברים תמוהים הם בעיני דהכא ודאי איכא אומדנא ברורה דלא עביד איניש דיהיב כל נכסיו לאחריני והוא יחזר על הפתחים 
ל וכן דעת "ה ז"ם והרמ"מידו וכדברי הרמב אלא דמשום דלדבר מצוה נינה מספקא לן דילמא גמר ומקני הילכך מספיקא אין מוציאין
ס"ש בסימן ק"הריב  
1339 The prooftext in question is the responsum of Rabbi Rothenburg. It is cited in Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur 
Ḥoshen mishpat 250:3 עיין במרדכי ...אלמנה שהיתה חולה...  
1340 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:2 (*א). 
1341 Karo, Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:1  במה דברים אמורים שמתנה צריכה קנין או אחד מדרכי ההקנאות במתנת




deathbed who gave a gift and added … that the gift should be considered ‘like the gift of a 
healthy individual’ but neglected to make a kinyan, his gift is null and void….”1342 Here, 
he is merely pointing out an implication, but no outright conflict can be detected. 
In Darkhei Moshe, Rabbi Isserles’ gloss on Bet Yosef,1343 he revisits this point 
several paragraphs later,1344 when the discussion turns to ambiguous deathbed gifts. 1345 
Maimonides is cited for a list of ambiguous scenarios, including one regarding a person 
who gives away all his property on his deathbed, but does so in a manner resembling a 
regular gift. Rabbi Karo’s conclusion is that “this is like any other gift given by a healthy 
individual,”1346 meaning that the usual formal requirements of gifts and acquisitions, such 
as a contract and a kinyan, are required. In this subcase, among a long list of ambiguous 
cases of gifts, Rabbi Isserles openly expressed his disagreement with Rabbi Karo. Even so, 
it does not take place in any obvious way. Rather than disagreeing with the opinion that a 
deathbed pledge can be reneged, in his gloss, Rabbi Karo merely provides the reference for 
Maimonides’ opinions1347 and even adds that these laws are obvious.1348 
                                                     
1342 This quote can be found in the glosses of Darkhei Moshe in the standard printed Tur Ḥoshen 
mishpat §250.Where possible, I have quoted from the so-called “long” Darkhei Moshe (the longer version of 
Rabbi Isserles’ gloss, which was not printed with Bet Yosef). See Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-arokh, vol. 2, 
ed. Shlomo Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Makhon Yerushalaim, 1978).  ונראה לי ללמוד מזה דשכיב מרע שנתן מתנה והתנה
שיהיו מתנותיו כמתנת בריא ולא קבל קנין עליה דמתנתו בטילה דמאחר שחפץ ליתן במתנת בריא צריך קנין ומאחר דלא קנה המתנה 
 בטילה
1343 The longer version of Darkhei Moshe was not printed until much later for some volumes: Yoreh 
de’ah (Sulzbach, 1692), Oraḥ ḥayim (Fjorda, 1760), and the other two volumes had to wait until the 20th 
century to be printed in full. 
1344 The first comment is in Darkhei Moshe, §250:1-2; the second comment is in §250:9. 
1345 In the Talmudic discussion in Bava Batra, one of the important factors to determine this 
distinction was whether the person instructed to give away all of his possessions or if he made sure to leave 
some property for himself. If a person left something for himself, it cannot be considered a deathbed will, as 
he clear expected to continue living. Such a gift would thus have to fulfill all the formal requirements of 
regular gift giving. If the person was on his deathbed and gave only part of his property away, the situation 
is unclear. As he made sure to retain some of his property, can it still be considered a deathbed will, or is it a 
regular acquisition, meaning that all the formal legal requirements of acquisitions apply? The situation 
becomes even more complicated when the laws of deathbed wills and regular acquisitions are combined: 
Consider the case of a person who gives away some of his property on his deathbed, but makes sure to do so 
according to all the formal legal requirements of an acquisition. If he recovers, can we assume that the formal 
sale can be disregarded, as he probably fulfilled the formal requirements only in order to strengthen the 
deathbed will? If this is the correct interpretation, then it is still a deathbed will that we are dealing with, and, 
as he recovered, the entire acquisition returns, as deathbed wills do. On, the other hand, we might assume 
that the acquisition was made independently of the person’s deathbed status and therefore it should stand, 
given that it conforms to all the necessary legal requirements for a normal acquisition. How should one treat 
the instructions of people when it is not definite whether they are on their deathbed or not? For instance, 
someone who is not on his deathbed due to illness, but nevertheless close to death in other ways, such as a 
person about to be judged by a ruler and executed. 
1346 Yacov ben Asher, Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:9,  וכן אם כתב כל נכסיו ומפרש שנותן הכל מעכשיו ומקנה
:קבל או שקנה מיד הנותן קנה הכל ואין יכול לחזור בו עד כאןלו מחיים הוא כשאר מתנת בריא שאם הגיע השטר ליד מ  
1347 Maimonides, Hilkhot zekhiya u-matana Ch 8:18 אל תטעה בשכיב מרע שכתב כל נכסיו ופירש שנתן הכל
תן מעכשיו והקנה מחיים שאין זה מתנת שכיב מרע אלא כשאר כל מתנות הבריאים שאם הגיע השטר ליד המקבל או שקנו מיד הנו
 .קנה הכל ואין יכול לחזור בו
1348 “And these are simple things.” Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:9 (15)  'בפר' ח' מהל




Rabbi Isserles pounces on this opportunity: On Rabbi Karo’s statement that “these 
are simple things,” Rabbi Isserles writes: “And from this, one can also learn concerning 
the law that I mention at the beginning of the section, that if someone writes in a deathbed 
will that he gives it ‘like the gift of a healthy individual’ but neglects to perform a kinyan, 
his gift is invalid.”1349 He finally brings the responsum into the conversation: “…and this 
is simple according to my opinion, but I only wrote it because I saw the responsum of the 
rabbi, the author of Bet Yosef, who wrote about this that in such a case the acquisition would 
work … and I responded to him….” He then inserts one more point in his favor: “and the 
words of both came before our master Rabbi Meir of Padua of blessed memory, and he 
agreed to my words, that such a will does not acquire [for the poor] as is clear from the 
proofs of the responsa written on this….1350”1351 The dispute from the responsa is thus 
located at this almost unnoticeable juncture.1352 The disagreement is hidden in Rabbi 
                                                     
Maimonides is not about charity per se, simply about a person who is on his deathbed but giving away his 
property in the manner of a regular gift. 
1349 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-kaẓar on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:9 (15) or, Darkhei Moshe ha-
arokh, ed. Rosenthal, 121on the words: ] ריש סימן[ס "כ לדין שכתבתי ר"ומזה יש ללמוד ג...":הרי הוא כשאר מתנות בריא"
ם דאם כתב דנותן לו במתנות בריא יש "הרמב' דהרי כתבטילה ' במתנת בריא ואין בו קנין דמתנת' מ שמתנ"בצוואת ש' דאם כת, זה
 לו דין מתנות בריא
1350 At the end of this reference to the responsa controversy, Rabbi Isserles refers the reader to §253, 
for “more on this.” In that section, the long version of the gloss Darkhei Moshe ha-arokh (not printed in the 
standard version of Bet Yosef), refers us to §252, where Bet Yosef discusses a responsum of the RYTbA 
(Rabbi Yom-Tov ben Ashvili, 13th-14th c, Spain) regarding ambiguous formulations before death. There, a 
man commands that something should be “given” to his daughters. The daughters would receive the money 
but, according to some opinions, not by virtue of its being a gift. 
Rabbi Isserles paraphrases this in his gloss, writing “and Bet Yosef in §252 wrote in the name of 
RYTbA … that these formulations ‘do not contain a formulation of gifts’ and this requires closer inquiry, if 
he said ‘give,’ how is that not a formulation of gifts?!” Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-arokh on Tur Ḥoshen 
mishpat §250:3, 129 – this remark does not appear in the standard printed gloss (punctuation added). 
ל אין "הנ' א האומר לאפטרופס שמינה שיתן לבנות בנו או שיחזיקו בעדן כל הנשאר בנכסי"ב בשם הריטב"ס רנ"י ס"וכב
?!מתנה' ע אם אמר ליתן אמאי אין ל"וצ, ל"מתנה עכ' בלשונות אלו ל  It is not entirely clear why Rabbi Isserles thinks 
that this relates to the responsa controversy. Following this web of references, it does, however, point to what 
seems to be a basic underlying disagreement between him and Rabbi Karo: Whereas Rabbi Karo considered 
the larger context of the case of the deathbed will to trump any specific formulations in the document, 
dismissing the words “as the gift of a healthy individual” as a negligible mistake, Rabbi Isserles could not 
get past these words in the document, no matter how much contextual evidence pointed to the fact that the 
dying man had in mind to bequeath his money as a deathbed will. Here, too, we see that Rabbi Isserles 
thought it unfathomable that someone using the words “give” could be considered to do anything other than 
giving a gift. Thus, once again, Rabbi Karo is open to considering the nonverbal context of the situation as a 
whole, whereas Rabbi Isserles considers specific formulations to determine the nature of the transaction in 
incontrovertible ways. 
1351 Isserles, Darkhei Moshe ha-kaẓar on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:9 (15) or Darkhei Moshe ha-
arokh, 121. 
טעות [ס "ג משום דתלינן בט"בה שקנה בכה' י שכת"ולא כתבתי כן רק שראיתי תשובת הרב בעל ב, והוא פשוט לדעתי
' בתשבה הנכתבי] שמבואר מהראיות[לדברי דלא קנה כמו ' ל והסכי"ז' ם מפדו"י מורלפנ' ואני השבתי לו בזה ובאו דברי שניה] סופר
.ג עוד מזה"רנ' ל סי"על זה וע  
1352 By inserting a reference from this particular ambiguous subcase into the introduction of the 
section, Rabbi Isserles can cleverly make his point because he has linked ambiguous cases that are ultimately 
considered regular acquisitions to Maimonides’ statement concerning a document that includes the words 




Isserles’ reference to another section in his gloss, where Rabbi Karo’s own gloss does not 
say anything to the contrary. This roundabout act of internal reference, from a gloss that 
was ultimately not even printed to a gloss earlier in the code, is the only way for Rabbi 
Isserles to insert a reference to their responsa controversy into the codes.1353 Rabbi Karo 
simply does not mention it anywhere among these laws. 
Where, then, can we find Rabbi Karo’s opposing view, benefiting the poor – the 
one that is so strongly stated in his responsum? Although Rabbi Karo’s tone is subdued in 
the laws of deathbed wills, he takes a much stronger position in favor of the poor in the 
laws of charity. The Arba Turim clearly states “charity is like a vow … therefore if a person 
says ‘I obligate myself to give this sum to charity or ‘this sum is for charity,’ he must give 
it to the poor immediately.”1354 Rabbi Karo’s gloss clarifies, as his responsum did, that this 
flows from the concept “in your mouth, that is charity,” meaning that one is obligated as 
soon as the charity is pledged orally.1355 These sections of the laws of charity contain long 
glosses by Rabbi Karo with many sources relating to the immutability of promises to 
charity.1356 Why did Rabbi Karo’s stance, which was not so pronounced in the laws of 
acquisition, become so strong in the laws of charity? 
                                                     
is simple according to my opinion, but I only wrote it because I saw the responsum of the rabbi, the author 
of Bet Yosef,” after which Rabbi Isserles also added that Rabbi Meir agreed with him. 
1353 In fact, Maimonides does not even specify such a case exactly, but Rabbi Isserles inserts his 
case against Rabbi Karo here as it is the most appropriate place that he can find. He lists one case where 
everything is given away, thus resembling a deathbed situation, but a regular contract of acquisition is written. 
On the other hand, he lists a case where some property is spared, but the person specifies that this is a deathbed 
will. However, there is no mention of a case where everything is given away, the document is a will (not a 
contract of acquisition), but it contains the words “like the gift of a healthy individual.” On the contrary, the 
formulation used by Maimonides actually seems to raise a point in Rabbi Karo’s favor: Maimonides accepts 
the option that sometimes elements from a regular acquisition were added to a deathbed will not to change 
the status of the deathbed will to that of a regular acquisition, but simply “to strengthen the deathbed will” 
(Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:9 [14]). ואף אם יש בה קנין אינו קונה אלא כמיפה את כחו In such a case, Maimonides 
thinks that the elements of acquisition can be disregarded. In the responsa, Rabbi Karo uses this idea that 
problematic words in the will were added merely “to strengthen the deathbed will” in support of the poor. 
1354 Yacov ben Asher, Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:2, or: “a person’s oral declaration that something is 
pledged ‘on high,’ it is as though he gave it to another person. Therefore, he who pledges charity cannot 
retract it” (Yacov ben Asher, Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:6). 
.לפיכך מי שנודר צדקה אי אפשר לו לחזור בו. כמסירתו להדיוט אמירת אדם לגבוה  
1355 Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:6  (he points out that Rabbi Alfasi thinks so, and most 
others agree, although some disagree). 
...בפיך זו צדקה אלמא בדיבור מחוייב הוא.) וה "ר(דהא אמרינן :) ק יח"ב' (וה' פ שור שנגח ד"ף בר"כן העלה הרי   
A possible exception is made for something that is pledged to the poor but is not in the pledger’s 
possession at the time when he makes the promise (Yacov ben Asher, Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:8). Rabbi Karo 
mentions that this does not include cases where the money can easily be recovered legally. He uses this 
argument in the responsum. He adds that, even if the pledge is made regarding an abstract sum, such as if 
someone pledges to donate a debt owed to him which he had not yet recovered, “if he says so in front of the 
charity collector and the debtor, the charity collector acquired it, and it is charity and one cannot retract it, 
and it is prohibited to change it, just as though the charity collector already owns it” (Yacov ben Asher, Tur 
Yoreh de’ah §258:8). אם אומר כן בפני הגבאי ובפני בעל חוב זכה בו הגבאי , ואפילו האומר חוב יש לי ביד פלוני יהיה לצדקה 
.והרי הוא צדקה ואי אפשר לחזור בו ואסור לשנותו כאילו כבר בא ליד גבאי  
1356 He mentions, for instance, an opinion that if a person promises his friend a gift, he can usually 
retract the promise, “but to a poor person it is a vow, meaning that it is as through he pledged it to charity 
and cannot retract” (Karo, Bet Yosef on Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:12). ה מרובה אמר ליתן לחבירו מתנ...כתב המרדכי




The advantage of the poor is based on comparing them to a hekdesh, 1357 and this 
comparison is the key to understanding Rabbi Karo’s stance. The term hekdesh [literally 
“consecrated”] signifies the fund for collecting, safeguarding, and distributing any 
consecrated money, sacrifices, and objects that have been promised to the Temple and also 
functions as a designation for the legal status of such consecrated objects; a sheep, for 
instance can be “hekdesh.” The improper use of something that was consecrated, for 
instance, the act of slaughtering a consecrated sheep for personal consumption is called 
me’ilah, a form of stealing from God.1358 Like so much of the language and concepts of 
sanctity relating to the Temple, the notion of hekdesh, too, was used more broadly in the 
post-Temple context. Hekdesh could connote any sacred funds, such as a community’s 
fund for charity or other religious uses. The idea that the charity fund is like the Temple 
                                                     
In cases where someone pledges to donate a debt owed to him that he has not yet recovered, he 
similarly rules in favor of the poor. Mordekhai limits this somewhat, as he is of the opinion that if the promise 
was made about something not in the person’s possession, he can retract even if the recipient is poor, but 
Rabbi Karo counters this option, stating:  “that … if a person promises that a specific object is pledged, if 
this object is chattel and he does not have it at the moment ... it is as though he said nothing.... But if he 
vowed to give such-and-such a sum to charity, even if at the moment of the vow, he has nothing in his 
possession, he is obligated to give it, and as I have written in the name of the halakhic authorities of blessed 
memory” (Karo, Bet Yosef Tur Yoreh de’ah §258:12). 
Rabbi Karo’s stance gains even more force in questions of doubtful charity, such as when it is 
unclear whether a sum was set apart for charity or not. He cites from the laws of charity in the compilation 
Or zarua (Rabbi Yiẓḥak ben Moshe of Vienna, d. ca. 1250): “He who has money in his possession and is not 
certain whether they are for charity or not, he must give them to charity” (Karo, Bet Yosef Tur Yoreh de’ah 
§259:4:5) – in this compilation, the laws of charity occupy their own section at the very beginning of the 
work. 
דצדקה היינו מתנה הילכך אומר אני המחבר מי שיש בידו מעות ומספקא , הכי נמי איכא למימר הצדיקהו בצדקה...כתב עוד
)צדקה סי יח' הל(ק "ל אז"הם של צדקה או לאו חייב ליתן אותם לצדקה עכליה אם   
1357 RaShY’s explanation provides a clue: In this medieval commentary on the Talmud, the above-
mentioned dilemma concerning someone who promised every last possession to the poor is explained in a 
strange and somewhat asymmetrical manner. As we have seen, the Talmud weighs the giver’s intentions: 
Can we say that, as it is for charity, he fully meant to give it away, even though he now has nothing left for 
himself; or can we assume that nobody would neglect his own well-being to such a degree, and he obviously 
meant to qualify the donation to exclude a case in which he survives and is in need of sustenance? RaShY’s 
commentary on the opinion that considers the pledge not binding accords with the Talmud’s argument 
interpreting the pledger’s intentions; RaShY’s commentary on the opinion that considers the pledge binding, 
however, diverges: he does not present an argument about the pledger’s intentions, but, rather, he argues that 
“the ‘hand’ [the power of acquisition] of the poor is like the ‘hand’ [the power of acquisition] of the hekdesh.” 
Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava batra 148b, see RaShY’s commentary on חילק נכסיו לעניים מהו 
תיקו, מי לימא יד עניים כיד הקדש ואם עמד אינו חוזר או לא  
The basic interpretation of the plain meaning of the Talmud צדקה מיגמר ומקני, “it is charity, therefore 
he intends fully to sell it” is closer to trying to determine the giver’s intention. RaShY’s take on the Talmud’s 
statement that צדקה מיגמר ומקני does not deal with intention but with the validity of the rights of acquisition in 
various kinds of acquisition. He suggests that charity has a strong power to acquire funds, even funds that 
were pledged lacking the perfect form of the intention to give. This interpretation of the meaning of  צדקה
 takes us deeper into legal principles of acquisition and further away from psychological questions מיגמר ומקני
of intention, as the plain meaning of the Talmud suggests. 
1358 The word signifies simultaneously stealing, trespass, and unfaithfulness (it is also used about an 





hekdesh, i.e., that promises to charity could be considered to “become hekdesh” and leave 
the owner’s possession as soon as he uttered his intentions, forms the basis for this view. 
The concept of hekdesh also explains why the intense dispute between Rabbi Karo 
and Rabbi Isserles in the responsa can hardly be detected in the codes. The organizational 
model of the Arba Turim, the code of halakha that was used as the basis of most other 
halakhic writings, is divided into four distinct volumes that relate to separate categories of 
Jewish law.1359 The main points of disagreement between Rabbi Karo and Rabbi Isserles 
in the case of deathbed promises to charity are spread across two separate volumes in the 
legal codes: The issue of deathbed gifts is part of the laws of acquisition and thus belongs 
to the volume Ḥoshen mishpat, which deals with monetary law. The laws of promises to 
charity, on the other hand, are in the volume Yoreh de’ah, which deals not with monetary 
laws but with the field of “isur ve-heter” or permissions and prohibitions, which 
overwhelmingly deal with prohibited foods, but also include laws of oaths and pledges. 
The strange placement of laws of pledges to charity in a volume on prohibited consumption 
can be understood more readily when considering the original concept of hekdesh, where 
the consecration of something (often animals or foods for sacrifices) renders it prohibited 
for consumption because it “belongs to God.” Similarly, the charity fund is off limits for 
any other consumption as soon as one designates something as belonging to this fund. 
Thus, wills and vows, the two most important categories for the case disputed in the 
responsa, are located in separate volumes. 
The categorization of a case as monetary law, on the one hand, or prohibited 
consumption, on the other, is critical for the current case. As we have mentioned, the 
question of funds consecrated to charity on one’s deathbed is declared a teku, an unresolved 
case, and the principle of adjudication in such undetermined cases1360 is to favor a more 
stringent adjudication, meaning one in which there is less risk of transgression. However, 
the definition of “less risk of transgression” depends on the category of law. In monetary 
law, it is considered more cautious to refrain from actively taking money from whoever 
currently possesses it. Thus, in monetary decisions, uncertainty will always favor the 
person who currently has the presumption of possessing the money, placing the higher 
burden of proof on the person who comes to claim it from the one currently in its 
possession. Because the rabbis consider the more stringent stance to be risk avoidance, not 
actively removing money from someone who is holding on to it is the correct approach. In 
the case of prohibitions of consumption, on the other hand, the risk-avoidant, more 
stringent decision is to abstain from anything that might be consecrated, for fear of 
committing the transgression of me’ilah. Therefore, classifying the case in the responsum 
as a question of inheritance favors the heirs, as it places the case in the realm of monetary 
law. Classifying the case as a question of isur ve-heter, on the other hand, will favor the 
charity fund. Because these categories are not adjacent or even in the same volume of the 
codes, cases of conflict between the two kinds of law have no clear location. 
                                                     
1359 Ritual law, family law, monetary law, and isur ve-heter. 
1360 These principles of calculating indeterminacies are based on a number of factors and 
combinations of factors; is the indeterminacy one of fact, of intention, of legal opinion, of interpretation etc., 
is the halakhic issue at hand biblical or merely rabbinic, is there a presumption in place where we can assume 
that the indeterminacy will resemble the presumption, and what kind of presumption is it (statistical majority, 




In the codes, Rabbi Isserles’ divergent opinion can be detected only between the 
lines, or rather, between the glosses: When Rabbi Karo’s glosses cite the laws of charity: 
“He who has money in his possession and is not certain if they are for charity or not, he 
must give them to charity,”1361 Rabbi Karo was dealing only with the issue at hand in that 
volume of the code, namely charity. 1362 Rabbi Isserles, in his glosses on Rabbi Karo’s 
code, directs this issue back from charity to the inheritance cases in the volume on monetary 
laws. He does so without a single argument or discussion, but simply by adding a footnote 
to Rabbi Karo’s discussion: “and see in Ḥoshen mishpat §250,” thus pointing the 
conversation back to the laws of gifts and acquisition in the volume on monetary law, rather 
than the volume on forbidden consumption.1363 This roundabout gloss leads the reader back 
into the domain of his direct disagreement with Rabbi Karo in the responsa, where charity 
and inheritances intersect.1364 
                                                     
1361 Karo, Bet Yosef Tur on Yoreh de’ah §259:4:5 – in this compilation the laws of charity occupy 
their own section at the very beginning of the work דצדקה היינו מתנה , הכי נמי איכא למימר הצדיקהו בצדקה...כתב עוד
סי  צדקה' הל(ק "ל אז"הילכך אומר אני המחבר מי שיש בידו מעות ומספקא ליה אם הם של צדקה או לאו חייב ליתן אותם לצדקה עכ
)יח  
1362 Rabbi Isserles intervenes by quoting a responsum in which a case of charity versus inheritance 
concludes as follows: “and if there is a doubt in the case, we go leniently in favor of the heir, because the 
money is in the presumptive possession of the owners, which is the heir, thus, the burden of proof is on the 
poor...” (the responsum is from RashbA [Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet 1235-1310], as quoted in Isserles, 
Darkhei Moshe on Tur Yoreh de’ah §259:4:5). 
שהממון בחזקת בעליו שהוא היורש ממילא והעניים שאמרו נתקיים ואם יש ספק בדבר הולכין בו להקל אצל היורש לפי 
...ל"התנאי עליהם להביא ראיה עכ  
1363 This same dynamic is repeated in the Shulḥan Arukh, seeing as its structure and division into 
volumes mirrors that of the Arba Turim. Whereas Rabbi Karo’s summary reads: “He who has money in his 
hands and is in doubt if they are for charity, he must give them to charity.” Rabbi Isserles adds: “But, he who 
pledged something in a formulation that leaves doubt and then died, so that one cannot know his intention, 
the heirs are considered to have the presumption of ownership and the consecration fund [hekdesh] is 
considered those who come to take it from them [and thus have the burden of proof]” (Karo, Shulḥan Arukh 
Yoreh de’ah §259:5). 
. צדקה חייב ליתן אותם לצדקהמי שיש בידו מעות והוא מסופק אם הם של   
אבל מי שהקדיש דבר בלשון שמסופקים בו ומת שאין לידע כוונתו נקראו היורשים מוחזקים וההקדש שבא להוציא : הגה
ג' ן סעי"ר' ועיין בחושן משפט סי...) א"רשב(מהם עליו הראיה וכן זמן שאינו מביא ראיה הנכסים בחזקת היורשים   
1364 Rabbi Isserles is aware of the fact that the issue hinges on this distinction between monetary law 
and laws of charity. In his responsum, he weighs the opinion of Rabbi Asher, who stated that if someone 
pledged all his belongings to charity and subsequently recovered, the pledge cannot be retracted. Rabbi 
Isserles phrases this reasoning as follows: “Even if he recovers, he cannot retract, because it is a doubt 
concerning isura (prohibitions), and we proceed stringently.” 
Isserles, ShUT Rema, §48. 
זכייה לעניין מתנת ' ט מהל"ם פ"כמו שפסק הרמב, זוז מדבריהם להוציא ממון מן היורשים מוחזקים אף נגד ענייםדאין ל... 
ש והמרדכי פרק מי שמת פסקו דאם עמד אינו "ג דהרא"ואע. ה"ן בשם הרמ"ר' מ סי"וכן פסק הטור ח, מ להקדש אם עמד חוזר"שכ
י בר ששת "ה כמו שפסקו בתראי ר"ם והרמ"מ לענין זה נקטינן כדברי הרמב"מ, הואיל וספיקא דאיסורא הוא ואזלינן לחומרא,חוזר
ודברים "נ "מ סי ר"בית יוסף ח. [וכן נראה דעתו דמר בספרו' ה בתשובותיו סימן נ"ם פדוא"ס בתשובותיו ושאירי הגאן מהר"ק' סי
לאחריני והוא יחזר על הפתחים אלא משום דלדבר ' תמוהים הם בעיני דהכא ודאי איכא אומדנא ברורה דלא עביד איניש דיהיב כל נכסי
י בפסקיו "ט ומהרא"תפ' א בתשובותיו סי"וכן פסק הרשב] מצוה נינהו מספקא לן דילמא גמר ומקני הילכך מספיקא אין מוציאין מידו 
?!רבים ובתראיד דאפילו ספקא לא הוי אלא יחיד נגד "ואיך נוציא ממון בנד. ג דיורשים נקראים מוחזקים נגד הקדש"סימן ע  
Thus, it is the designation of the case as belonging to isura, prohibited consumption, which would 





                                                     
Similarly, in his gloss in the laws of deathbed wills, Rabbi Isserles explains that, while some 
opinions favor the heirs in ambiguous cases, others oppose this and “adjudicate  that in the case of hekdesh 
… which is isura, one goes according to the stringent option” to the advantage of the poor (Isserles, Darkhei 
Moshe on Tur Ḥoshen mishpat §250:5). 
ש דבהקדש והפקר "פסק כדברי הרא...אבל במרדכי. ש"ש עוד שם דאפילו תפסו העניין מוציאין מידם ועיי"וכתב ריב
 לעניין דהוה איסורא אזלינן לחומרא
Rabbi Karo also shows that he understands this to be the main issue –  do we treat this as a case of 
monetary law or prohibitions (or, is a pledge to charity in one’s inheritance like a hekdesh or not), as do many 
glossators .He himself disagrees with the latter perspective, and he is quick to present all the authorities in 
favor of the heirs, concluding that the opinions in favor of the heirs are both greater in number and more 
recent, placing his opinion at an advantage, but he nonetheless lays out his opponents’ structure very clearly: 
The designation of charity as hekdesh, and placing that in the category of isura, that is, belonging to the realm 
of isur-ve-heter, provides support to the view that the stringent approach favors the poor over the heirs. 
This concept, of hilkheta ke-batra’i, or, “the law follows the later authorities,” has been discussed 
at length: see Meir Rafeld, "The Halakha follows the Later Sages,” Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic 
Literature. (1992) 119-140; Israel Ta-Shma. "Hilkheta ke-batra’I (The Law is like the later authorities): 
Historical Aspects of a Legal Rule,” Shnaton ha-mishpat ha-ivri (1979): 405-423; Israel I. Yuval, "Rishonim 
and Aharonim, Antiqui et Moderni: Periodization and Self-Awareness in Ashkenaz,” Zion 57, no.4 (1992): 
369-394, and many others. 





GLEANINGS: AN EPILOGUE 
Three Early Modern Rabbis and Printers on Halakhic Organization. 
 
1. 
This study has examined the first stages in the transformation of halakhic culture in 
Ashkenaz from a world of fluid textual and oral transmission and loose compilations to the 
more systematic universe of printed codifications. The meaning of Ashkenaz is, in many 
ways, constantly in flux, and this dissertation deals with some of these fluctuations of the 
cultural, scholarly and religious significance of Ashkenaz. In the most general terms, 
Ashkenaz can be defined, geographically, as the communities with roots in the German 
lands, linguistically, as the Yiddish-speaking sphere or, halakhically, as the early modern 
communities following Rabbi Moshe Isserles’ glosses of the Shulḥan Arukh.1365 This last 
definition is a product of the sixteenth century and lies at the center of the early modern 
transformation of Ashkenaz. I have described the combination of factors that 
revolutionized the organization of halakhic texts in Ashkenaz: a new technology of 
dissemination, the rise of competing organizational paradigms, and the disruption of 
scholarly culture due to communal migration and subsequent breakdown of the legal 
tradition. This reorganization, in turn, favored certain types of halakhic reasoning while 
precluding others – traditional forms of working with halakha that were more in line with 
older ashkenazic models of transmission. I related this older, personalized form of 
organization to the rabbinic archive, with its flexible, unsystematic mode of assembling 
                                                     
1365 Ashkenaz is, of course, no monolith. See, for instance, chapter 3 in this dissertation for 
distinctions within Ashkenaz depending on the trajectory of particular communities, chapter 4 for 
chronological differences in ashkenazic their modes of transmission and attitudes to their past. 




material, in general, and with responsa and their dynamic and un-categorizable nature, in 
particular. Unsystematic modes of knowledge organization, I suggested, have their own 
virtues when it comes to halakhic scholarship, not least the potential to represent a more 
dialogic and multifarious idea of religious law. 
This epilogue portrays three ashkenazic figures who were involved in printing and 
organizing their own halakhic writings – one in the sixteenth century, Rabbi Yeḥiel Mekhel 
Morapchik, one in the seventeenth, Rabbi Yair Ḥayim Bacharach, and one in the 
eighteenth, Rabbi Yacov Emden. The experience of the first, who lived and worked in 
sixteenth-century Lublin and Cracow, testifies to the essential clash between print 
technology and ashkenazic transmission. Ashkenazic halakhic culture was never truly oral, 
as text was always a central aspect, but the likut, or manuscript compilation, with its 
unsystematic structure and fluid transmission, perfectly embodied this culture’s 
relationship to text. Although such compilations could, technically, be printed, the 
stabilization that print technology invited was inherently alien to this world. The second 
figure, a rabbi in seventeenth-century Worms who printed his responsa at the end of his 
life, represents the type of scholar who collects all his texts in a personal archive similar to 
those we posited as the organizational origins of sixteenth-century printed responsa. His 
archival practices, as well as his efforts to publish parts of this collection, illustrate, 
simultaneously, the establishment of the paradigms that the sixteenth century inaugurates 
and the persistence of some of its challenges. The final example, from the eighteenth 
century, depicts an effort by an ashkenazic rabbi in Altona to make a case for the 
impossibility of organizing halakha in any perfect way. His attack on Maimonides’ Mishne 




Torah, the most successful attempt at a perfect halakhic code, reveals a theological 
worldview that considers disorder an essential aspect of divine law. 
2. 
As the first chapter of the dissertation pointed out, the Hebrew word for compilations, 
likutim, is derived from the verb le-laket, to harvest or glean, collecting bundles and stalks 
from the field. Rabbis often allude to this original meaning when describing their works. 
Rabbi Yosef Karo collected all the halakhic material in his storehouse Bet Yosef, just as his 
biblical namesake did with the harvest in Egypt during the years of bounty. Rabbi Karo, 
however, did not merely store this harvest. He processed his harvest, preparing food and 
arranging the resulting dishes on the Shulḥan Arukh, the set, or ordered, table. In another 
example, Rabbi Isserles, in the colophon of the first edition of Mapah (tablecloth, Cracow, 
1570), his glosses to Oraḥ ḥayim (Way of life), the first volume of this prepared table, 
proclaimed his gratitude to God who “brought me here, to finish gleaning (li-lkot) from the 
volume Oraḥ ḥayim, compiling the gleanings, forgotten bundles, and neglected corners, 
which the great sage and gaon our master and teacher Rabbi Yosef Karo left behind….”1366 
The expression “collecting the gleanings, forgotten bundles, and neglected corners” (mi-
likutei leket shikhḥa u-pe’ah) refers to the leftovers of the crops that, according to halakha, 
may be collected freely by the poor.1367 
Rabbi Isserles cites a mishna that harvesting is permitted to all when the weakest 
of the poor have come and gone. He explains that gleaning in such a situation is considered 
                                                     
1366 Moshe Isserles, Mapah on Shulḥan Arukh (Cracow: Prostiẓ, 1570), colophon: 
אמר משה איסרלש מקראקא ברוך ה' אלקי ישראל אשר הביאני עד הלום ללקוט ולגמור ספר אורח חיים מלקוטי לקט 
ן מהרר יוסף קארו ש"ן.שכחה ופיאה אשר הניח החכם הכולל הגאו  
1367 Leviticus 19: 9-10; Deuteronomy 24: 19-22. 




“likutei betar likutei,” gleaning-post-gleaning, and thus allowed. Having secured his 
permission to glean the laws and insights his predecessor omitted, Rabbi Isserles invites 
others, in turn, to “harvest and search after me” for the stalks that he himself had 
overlooked.1368 Although he uses the vocabulary of the likut, Rabbi Isserles is bringing his 
harvest to the Shulḥan Arukh, incorporating his glosses into its structure. The haphazardly 
harvested bundles are thus brought to Rabbi Karo’s table, incorporated into his meal, added 
to his processed dishes and served at his ordered table. The result was no longer a likut. 
Another figure who was printing books in Cracow at the same time, however, 
similarly used the vocabulary of harvest – but in order to print a real likut. This was Rabbi 
Yeḥiel Morapchik, a relatively minor rabbinical figure who had published two books, 
Minḥa ḥadasha (New offering, Cracow, 1576), and a work called Seder Brakhot (Order of 
blessings, Cracow, 1582). Both works were compilations aimed at a popular audience: the 
former was a collection of interpretations on Pirkei avot, the ethics of the fathers, 
assembling selections of different commentaries to this mishnaic tractate, but also 
including seemingly unrelated texts, such as discussions of current polemics about rabbinic 
authority and halakhic innovation, in which Morapchik took a decidedly conservative 
position.1369 The latter was a halakhic compilation of laws, customs, behaviors, and general 
tidbits of knowledge related to blessings upon consuming food and other occasions. 
                                                     
1368 This attitude aligns with general early modern approaches to authorship, originality, and 
compilation. Isserles, Mapah, colophon: 
הנמושות והם לקוטי בתר ליקוטי ומעתה גם כן הרשות ואמרו ריש פרק ח דפיאה מאימתי כל אדם מותרי' בלקט משילכו 
 נתונה לכל אדם ללקוט ולחפש אחרי...
Mishna, Tractate Pe’ah 1: 8. 
1369 For more on this polemic, see Moishe-Duvid Chechik, Shalosh maḥlokot (Three disputes), 
forthcoming, as well as Chechik’s M.A. thesis on Rabbi Yosef Katz and the traditionalist ashkenazic attitude 
in the 16th century (likewise forthcoming). I thank Moishe-Duvid for sharing his ideas and drafts with me. 




In the introduction to both works, Morapchik compares their organization to 
another, yet unpublished work, which was, likewise, a compilation. The name of that work 
was Leket shikhḥa u-pe’ah (Gleanings, bundles, and corners). In the introduction to Seder 
brakhot, he mentions this larger compilation of halakha: “…and I came … to make a likut 
after the likut, as I arranged the formulation of the blessings in the book Leket shikhḥa u-
pe’ah…”1370 His introduction to the compilation of commentaries on the Ethics of our 
fathers, likewise, explains that the work is compiled from many sources, “…and like the 
appearance of this work, I have written a book Leket shikheḥa u-pe’ah as a keepsake for 
me and my house, in an easy language….”1371 The book is mentioned in several places 
throughout Morapchik’s published works. A section on avoiding superfluous blessings 
mentions that, “in the lowly1372 book, called the book Shikheḥa u-pe’ah leket, I wrote about 
this at length.”1373 Seder brakhot’s introduction concludes as follows: “Therefore, assemble 
and listen, sons of Avraham, Yiẓḥak and Yacov…. I set a table before you, and on it are 
many blessings….” Notwithstanding his invocation of a set table, this book does not 
resemble the Shulḥan Arukh. It is organized as a compilation, combining laws and customs, 
raising a mixture of topics and genres that is surprisingly varied for a work that presents 
itself as being limited to the laws of blessings, ranging from the correct order of reciting 
                                                     
1370 Yeḥiel Morapchik, Seder Brakhot (Jerusalem: Zikhron Aharon, 2013), 12: 
בתר לקוטי כאשר סדרתי נוסח הברכות בספר לקט שכחה ופאה...ובאתי העראה מועטת לקוטי   
1371 Yeḥiel Morapchik, Pirkei Avot: Minḥa ḥadasha (Cracow, 1576), introduction: 
וזאת תורת המנחה ויקח כל אחד מן הבא בידו...ומעין זה המראה ספר לקט שכחה ופיאה כתבתי למשמרת לי ולביתי בלישנא 
וישמע חכם ויוסיף לקח תכלית זה כדי לעשות רצונו ברוך הוא.קלילא קצרה וארוכה   
1372 He uses lowly = shefel, a wordplay on the acronym of the book’s title, albeit arranged in a 
different order: Sh.p/f.l. 
1373 Morapchik, Seder Brakhot, 12:ובספר שפ"ל הנקרא ספר דכחה פיאה לקט הארכתי ביותר וכאן יש מקום לקצר  
Similar mention on p. 14, blessings when entering and exiting a town (where he changes the order 
again to L./Sh./P), and on p. 16, blessings regarding ritual fringes. 




blessings on different foods through the intentions one should have during sexual 
intercourse, to the importance of Torah study. 
In addition to presenting it as a compilation or likut, Morapchik also introduces the 
work as a personal transmission of law, tied to his family, “a keepsake for me and my 
house,” stemming from local ashkenazic origins. Using almost the same formulation as he 
did in Minḥa ḥadasha, he explains in Seder brakhot that the work was compiled for his 
personal consultation and intended for personal transmission within his family: “…and I 
wrote this as a keepsake for me and my house after me, to keep God’s ways day in day 
out…”1374 He also mentions the personal transmission at the basis of this work in another 
place: “I wrote at greater length in my book Leket shikhḥa u-pe’ah about a multitude of 
issues as I received them from the house of my ancestors, the citizens of Regensburg.”1375 
This truly ashkenazic compilation, conveying the personal laws and traditions of a local 
ashkenazic clan, collected by a conservative figure who understood the largely personal 
nature of transmitting rabbinic authority and halakhic tradition, was supposed to be printed 
under the title Leket shikhḥa u-pe’ah. Literally, these are “collected gleanings, forgotten 
bundles, and corners of the field,” but it can also imply “compilation of the forgotten and 
neglected,” which fits the fate of the traditional forms of transmission that this work 
represented. Ultimately, it was never printed. 
3. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the first generation of rabbis who wrote and published 
                                                     
1374 Morapchik, Seder Brakhot, introduction: 
 וכתבתי זאת למשמרת לי ולביתי אחרי לשמור דרך ה' דבר יום ביומו. 
1375 Morapchik, Seder Brakhot, 28 (distancing oneself from impurity and menstruating women): 
 הארכתי ביותר בספר לקט שכחה פאה בהרבה עניינים כמו שקבלתי מבית אבותי תושבי רעגנשפורג.




halakhic writings during this time of change were no longer alive. In Salonica, the first few 
works of responsa ordered according to the basic division of the volumes of the Shulḥan 
Arukh had been printed.1376 In Ashkenaz, it would take until the end of the seventeenth 
century before such a work was published. Rabbi Yair Ḥayim Bacharach’s collection of 
responsa, Ḥavot Yair (Villages of Yair) was the first work of responsa completed and 
brought to print by its own author in Ashkenaz. Alluding in the third unit of this dissertation 
to the somewhat peculiar makeup of sixteenth-century collections of responsa, I noted that, 
similarly to their humanist counterparts, rabbis kept their responsa in personal archives of 
notes. In the case of Rabbi Bacharach, there is an actual remnant of such an archive, 
including the finding aid created for navigating its contents. 
The author of Ḥavot Yair maintained an extensive archive of notes; glosses; 
thoughts; halakhic interpretations; sermons; copies of manuscript material; copies of his 
ancestors’ writings; ideas; calculations; experiences; poems; letters; responsa; and other 
matters, “all these,” as the historian David Kaufmann described, “in an absolutely 
unsystematic succession, just as they presented themselves to him and were safely secured 
by his ever active pen.”1377 Rabbi Bacharach himself explains that the reader should not be 
surprised “that I wrote these things in a jumble without order whatsoever,”1378 noting that 
these writings were a result of his studies, correspondence, teaching, and general musings 
                                                     
1376 The responsa of Rabbi Shmuel di Medina, in Salonica between 1594-1597, and the first volume 
of Rabbi Yosef Karo’s responsa, published by his son, which included only responsa corresponding to the 
first volume of the Shulḥan Arukh, with plans to print three other volumes for the remaining sections. 
1377 David Kaufmann, “Jair Chayim Bacharach (Concluded)” JQR 3, no.3 (1891): 485-536. This 
citation, p. 505. 
1378 David Kaufmann, R Jair Chayim Bacharach und seine Ahnen (Trier: Sigmund Mayer, 1894), 
121. 
בעיני המעיין שכתבתי הדברים בערבוביא בלי סדר כללגם אל יפלא   




and insights as they arose. For instance, he clarifies, sometimes inspiration would strike at 
night or on the road. At other times, he thought of additional explanations related to issues 
that he had already discussed but was unable to find the earlier discussion (or sometimes, 
he found the discussion but discovered that there was no more room on that page), which 
led to some repetitions. Moreover, he taught several classes a day on various topics. Rather 
than listing every topic in full, the writings contain partial discussions of every topic every 
day, depending on what he taught. At times, he would fall ill and the class would continue 
its studies without him, resulting in gaps in Rabbi Bacharach’s notes on the topic being 
taught; once he rejoined them, the notes would resume at the place where the group had 
arrived.1379 This personal reference work counted about seven volumes of his own notes 
but dozens more volumes in which his own writings were mixed with manuscripts, copies, 
and archives that he collected or inherited from his ancestors. 
Rabbi Bacharach created a finding aid for this archive, itself a large volume titled 
Yair netiv (Illuminator of the path),1380 which gave a short description of every entry per 
volume, in its order of appearance, together with a short classification of genre (“Talmud,” 
“ethics,” “Bible,” “general inquiry,” and so forth) and a page number.1381 He had planned 
to print two books; one was a gloss on the first volume of the Shulḥan Arukh, which, he 
claims, had been ready for print twenty years earlier. His plans were delayed and finally 
                                                     
1379 Kaufmann, R Jair Chayim Bacharach und seine Ahnen, 121-124. 
1380 A short introduction to this finding aid (whose very existence shows that this was, like the 
scholarly archives of chapter six in this book, both a private reference work and a corpus that would be 
consulted by other scholars) relates the title of the index to a concordance by the same name. It was thus, 
clearly, conceived as a finding aid by its author. This introduction was published as an appendix in Kaufmann, 
R Jair Chayim Bacharach und seine Ahnen, 123-124. 
1381 This volume is now at the National Library of Israel in Jerusalem, NLI Ms. Heb. 5220=38. 




thwarted, when he discovered that two Polish rabbis, Rabbi David Ha-Levi (1586-1667) 
and Rabbi Avraham Gombiner (1633-1683), had both published glosses with many 
similarities to his own, thus prompting Rabbi Bacharach to revise his notes yet again. The 
other book, Mar kashisha (Old man) was to be a type of dictionary of talmudic terms for 
which he already had prepared an introduction. He continued to emend and enhance his 
notes for both books throughout his life, and the right time to print them never presented 
itself. The challenge of publishing a large, comprehensive, coherent and complete work in 
one’s lifetime was still very real. Rabbi Bacharach was doomed to wander and be displaced 
often, due to wars and other calamities. He grew old, his eyesight deteriorated, and he still 
had not printed any of these works. 
Echoing the fate of the two works of responsa discussed in chapter six, the only 
work that Rabbi Bacharach ultimately succeeded in bringing to print was a selection of his 
responsa. Ḥavot Yair was printed in Frankfurt am Main, 1699. Yair nativ, the table of 
contents to his manuscript archive, shows that Rabbi Bacharach selected responsa from his 
archive and had them copied and prepared for print. The table of contents in Yair nativ 
includes the word “printed” after entries that had been published in the book, together with 
the section-number in the printed work where this entry could be found. Yair nativ even 
makes note of the amanuenses in publishing the responsa, writing that those entries in the 
table of contents marked “b.d.g.,” which stands for be-dapim gdolim (in large pages) were 
copied by a Rabbi Hirsch Frankel onto quarto pages, the entries marked with three 
perpendicular lines in the table of contents were copied by a Rabbi Elisha, while four dots 




indicate that a Rabbi Hirsch copied that entry.1382 Although the plan, at first, was to include 
635 responsa, corresponding to the numerical value of the book’s title, this did not come 
to fruition, and only about 240 responsa were printed. In the introduction, he manages to 
make something of this numerical value as well. The plan was to print an additional volume 
(indeed, the title page of the first edition reads “volume one”), but the second volume was 
never printed. Thus, although in 1699 a clear notion of the paradigm of responsa books 
already existed, implementing it was harder than expected. 
Moreover, the index for this collection of responsa indicates that new 
organizational paradigms had already taken hold. The manuscript table of contents in Rabbi 
Bacharach’s archive noted not only the existence and location of a particular entry in the 
work of responsa but it also pointed to the volume and section of Shulḥan Arukh to which 
the responsum relates. This information could then be used in Ḥavot Yair, for the first index 
of an ashkenazic responsa collection according to the four volumes of the codifications. 
Clearly, Rabbi Bacharach and those helping him prepare the responsa for print were 
already thinking in terms of a printed collection of responsa and dividing it according to 
sections of the Shulḥan Arukh. In the printed book, this index is preceded by a short 
introduction: 
This is the great and wide sea in which are innumerable hints and existences, small 
and large; there my humble opinion travels, my abandoned poor heart will sacrifice the 
offerings that it has caught in its net. So much is unknown to me. And they remained 
unordered. In any case, to ease the load for those looking through it, I will arrange before 
you its wellsprings and sources by the order of the responsa according to the four sections 
of the Turim, also the sugyot and other such Torah-related things and interpretations, so 
that all who are thirsty may find what they seek quickly, in the watering troughs and the 
                                                     
1382 Kaufmann, “Jair Chayim Bacharach (Concluded),” 528. 




gullies,1383 by the quick suggestion of the indicative waters, hollowed out1384 and etched 
before you.1385 
 
This introduction is followed by a ten-page, almost exhaustive index according to 
the Shulḥan Arukh. As promised, there is indeed an index according to “the sugyot,” the 
talmudic discussions. This second list, by contrast, is barely one page long, containing less 
than thirty references in contrast to the hundreds of the previous list. More instructive yet, 
for our purposes, is the title of this second index: “sugyot and questions in the Talmud and 
tosafists and poskim that do not have a legal consequence.”1386 All the halakhic matters, all 
the material that is legal, was indexed according to the codifications; the only responsa that 
remained unclassified were those without legal application. The world of halakha was now 
clearly defined: Jewish law consisted of whatever could be ordered by the Shulḥan Arukh. 
Only non-legal material remained to be indexed by means of the Talmud’s structure. 
4. 
As many of the case studies in this dissertation have shown, organization has a profound 
effect on law. We do not have an explicit formulation of the implications of ashkenazic 
disorder for its approach to religious law. A parenthetical remark from a rabbi printer in 
the eighteenth century, however, provides us with some thoughts on this matter. Rabbi 
Yacov Ẓvi Emden (1698-1776), also known by his acronym Yaveẓ, was a rabbi who wrote 
                                                     
1383 Genesis 30: 38. 
1384 This is a reference to the “male waters,” or מים דוכרין, a mystical concept from Sefer yeẓirah and 
its “female” counterpart, the מים נוקבים. 
1385 Yair Ḥayim Bacharach, Ḥavot Yair (Frankfurt am Main: Johannes Wüst, 1699), 250a: 
דולות שם עניות דעתי יהלך ל"ב יתו"ם ודל יקריב מנחתו. זה הים הגדול ורחב ידים שם רמז ואין מספר הויות קטנות עם ג
אשר עלה במצודתו. לא ידעתי ספורות. ונשארו בלתי סדורות. ומ"מ להקל על מעייניה. אערכה לפניך מעייניה ומקוריה לפי סדר 
הר בשקתות ברה"טים. התשובות ע"פ ד' חלקי הטורים גם סוגיות ושאר דברים תורניים פרשים למען כל צמא למים ימצא מבוקשו מ
 ע"י קוצר מזכרת מיין דוכרין נקובים לפניך ונחרטים.
1386 Bacharach, Ḥavot Yair, 255a:סוגיות וקושיות בש"ס ותו' ופוסקים דלית בהו נ"מ לדינא  




extensively on halakha, Bible, kabbalah, and other issues. He is best known for his 
responsa, Sheilat Yaveẓ, and for his ideological battles against those he suspected of 
heterodoxy. In Yaveẓ’s eighteenth-century Ashkenaz, the Shulḥan Arukh had long been 
accepted as the central organizational structure for halakhic writing, and Yaveẓ, too, wrote 
glosses on its four volumes. Print had become the undisputed technology for publishing 
and circulating halakhic works, and Yaveẓ himself, in fact, established a printing press in 
his home in Altona to publish his own writings. One such printed work was Igeret bikoret 
(letter of criticism). 
 Igeret bikoret, is, in fact, a responsum (or rather, four responsa, including three of 
his own), which Yaveẓ himself printed twice, once in 1736 and then again in 1765, 
concerning a halakhic medical case of a married man whose testicle was removed. The 
final responsum contains a striking digression that touches upon halakhic organization. At 
a particular point in the responsum, Yaveẓ notes that one of the halakhic arguments of his 
opponents neglects a source from the Jerusalem Talmud, the earlier counterpart of the 
Babylonian Talmud stemming from the Holy Land. Such an omission is legitimate as long 
as the more authoritative Babylonian Talmud, which he calls “our Talmud,” does not 
explicitly endorse that very point.1387 He explains that although the main textual basis for 
halakha is the Babylonian Talmud, the Jerusalem Talmud and many other less authoritative 
                                                     
1387 Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, Yaveẓ explains that it is definitely acceptable to disregard 
a statement from the Jerusalem Talmud when the Babylonian Talmud explicitly opposes it; however, he 
advises much more caution when approaching a law from the Jerusalem Talmud that the Babylonian Talmud 
does not mention at all. Yaveẓ makes sure to emphasize that the attention for the Jerusalem source is not 
because the lack of mention in the Babylonian Talmud implies that those sages were uninformed about the 
Jerusalem source. Such a claim would be problematic for the authority of the Babylonian Talmud as a whole, 
and Rabbi Emden specifically precludes this possibility, explaining that the sages of the Babylonian Talmud 
knew all the contents of its counterpart but did not select to keep everything in their own Talmud. 




halakhic sources should be included within a halakhic decision wherever possible because 
these, too, contain divine truths. He elaborates a complex hierarchy of halakhic decision 
making. At the basic level is the definitive authoritative corpus, which may under no 
circumstances be ignored or contradicted (the Babylonian Talmud). In addition, there exists 
a multitude of texts that are not as authoritative but nonetheless important.1388 The 
remaining texts are described as gleanings of the harvest left behind by the sages of the 
Talmud: “Ravina and Rav Ashi, who are considered the final word … have passed over all 
the mishnaic sources and … have left behind these gleanings (leket), and left them in the 
corner (pe’ah). Even so, some halakhic decisors have still chosen to collect them in like 
grain on the threshing floor,1389 and made from it fruit of the grain.”1390 It is legitimate to 
disregard these additional sources when making a halakhic decision, but such neglect 
involves the loss of a deeper truth that could have been expressed had the source been taken 
into consideration. This added level of truth is related to the esoteric level of 
                                                     
1388 Not only the Jerusalem Talmud deserves special consideration; Yaveẓ additionally includes the 
tosefta, sources from the mishnaic period that were not selected to become part of the talmudic canon and 
proclaims that “all the holy books need each other.” Later, he even adds the apocrypha sfarim hiẓonim (lit.: 
external books, some of which the Talmud prohibits reading) to this list. He emphasizes that there is nothing 
wrong with including other unexpected sources in one’s halakhic decision if those sources contain truth. He 
mentions that countless important halakhic decisors have done so. Emden explains that if someone looks to 
the external books in order to quench his thirst and understand an issue in cases where the Talmud could not 
satisfy him, “do not jeer at the thief. Because he is stealing to fill his soul, as he is hungry not for bread, but 
rather, to hear the words of God.” The words of God can, apparently, be found in forbidden books as well. 
Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
 בידיהם הבא מן סיוע ומקבצים נעזרים חיצונים ספרים מתוך שאפילו מאוחרים למחברים מצאנו מזו וגדולה ראינו הלום גם
 הוי חכמים אמרו שכך בדין וכן. צמאונם להרוות התלמוד דבש ת"בצפח רוח נחת כף מלא ידם השיגה שלא במקום. עמל חפנים מלא
. בקריאתם העונש שהפליגו החמורים החיצונים מספרי אפילו להשתמש רז״ל ג״כ התירו אדם...ולכן מכל למד . 
1389 Micah 4: 12 – “But they know not the thoughts of the Lord, neither understand they his counsel: 
for he shall gather them as the sheaves of grain into the granary.” Note the relevance of the beginning of this 
verse to Yaveẓ‘s thrust in this passage. 
1390 Yacov Emden, Igeret bikoret (Altona, 1736), 16a: וכ”ש אחר שגם רבינא ור”א סוף הוראה. שעברו על
 פרי ממנו ועשו גרנה ר”כאמי הלכות פוסקי קבצוהו כ”אעפ. לפאה והניחוהו הלקט אותו עזבו. שכלם בכברת וניפום הברייתות כל
תלמודנו מבטן  הנשמטים הירושלמי חידושי בענין שאמרנו כדרך ל”וצ. תבואה . 





Yaveẓ’s preferred method, which does not establish a clear hierarchy of what must 
be taken into consideration and what safely can be ignored, creates a very confusing textual 
canon. Rather than attempting to organize these texts or apologizing for the lack of 
structure, Yaveẓ declares that Torah study is supposed to be structured precisely that way: 
“For the paths of Torah are meandering ones, its trails twist and can be known only after 
hard searching and toil....”1392 The circuitous and indeterminate path, is, in his opinion, 
superior, for reasons that relate to the secret truth of halakha. Yaveẓ’s two-tiered structure 
views halakha, at one level, as a practical system of legal adjudication, but at a deeper level, 
as an expression of divine truth. Humans cannot grasp this truth in its entirety, but it can 
be found – scattered and hidden – in Jewish texts and sometimes even in other bodies of 
knowledge inasmuch as they contain ancient Jewish truths. The aim of determining halakha 
is, in his eyes, not merely the presentation of an acceptable legal solution, but the 
incorporation of a larger truth, the precise meaning of which the scholar cannot fully 
comprehend, because this truth is beyond the human plane. 
Because it is divine, this larger truth can be transmitted only in mysterious and 
circuitous ways. Yaveẓ views favorably the impenetrable configuration of these 
convoluted texts, regarding it as a direct consequence of the complex and ineffable truths 
                                                     
1391 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
כי בדברים הסתומים. אין להשליך את הירו׳ אדרבה, הרבה טרחו המחברים ראשי המדברים בכל מקום בעלי התו׳ והפוסקים 
שנויים בתלמודינו. או לא דיבר בו במספיק. והירו׳ לפעמים בכלל. לבררו ולסלתו וללקוט מתוכו שושנים ששונים בני א״י ואינם 
הרחיב לנו הביאור וגולה דין פרטים סתומים וחילוקים נעלמים. אשר לא נודעו עקבות משפטיהם בים התלמוד שלנו. (כידוע לרוב 
פתא.מתוך ספרי הפסק למאן דעייל ונפק) וכן נוהגים הפוסקים למלאות חסרונם ולהביא די סיפוקה מן התוס  
1392  Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
ופשפוש דק בעיון יגעת אם אלא תמצא ולא. וחפוש הטורח אחר אם כי תדע לא מעגלותיה נעו. תורה של שביליה מטולטלים . 
מעגלותיה נעו  (her ways are movable, that thou canst not know them) is taken from Proverbs 5: 5, 
where it refers to the evil “strange woman.” 




beneath their surface. He interprets the history of the organization of halakhic texts in 
accord with this idea: 
 …there never has been made a general collection nor has there been a 
compilation structured from the halakhic foundations to their secondary consequences, and 
the results that emerge from the details that branch out of it are not organized in a logical 
progression. As it is said specifically, “there is no order to the mishna” because of a 
mysterious reason and a hidden secret in the connections between the issues and their 
relation to one another, in their inner meanings and secrets, beyond their revealed 
aspects.1393 
 
 The choice of the word for “structured,” medoragim, comes from the word “steps” 
or madregot, which calls to mind Rabbi Ḥaim ben Beẓalel’s accusation, cited in chapter 
three, that the codifiers seek to make halakha into “madregot,”1394 many little steps, which 
permitted the halakhic calculus exemplified by Rabbi Isserles.1395 Yaveẓ’s discussion 
articulates why such restructuring is so threatening to the idea of religious law. He 
introduces the principle that “there is no order to the Mishna”1396 as an essential 
characteristic of halakha, directly related to its divine nature, and he considers the failure 
to create a completely and comprehensively ordered code as proof of the halakha’s divine 
                                                     
1393 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
תעפים ולא נעשה בהם קובץ כולל ולא חיבור מודרג מהנחת יסודות ראשונות ותולדות שניות ותוצאות חלקי הפרטים המס
ש ביחוד אין סדר למשנה לטעם נעלם וסוד נכמס בקשר הענינים והתלותם זה בזה בתוכיותם "כמ. לא באו מסודרים בקדימה ואיחור
 ומצפוניהם מלבד נגליהם
1394  Ḥayim ben Beẓalel of Friedberg, Vikuaḥ mayim ḥayim (Dispute of the living waters) 
(Amsterdam, 1712), introduction. §12. .ויש מורים זחוחי דעת שרוצים לעשות מדרגות מדרגות בדיני איסור והיתר    
1395 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
Yaveẓ uses a similar adjective derived from madrega a few lines down, when he explains that God’s 
wisdom does not keep “the legal division and gradation – hadraga” להית שלא תגדר בשמירת החלוקה -החכמה הא
 המשפטית והדרגה...
1396 This maxim appears in the Babylonian Talmud (for instance, in tractates Bava kama 102a and 
Avoda zara 7a). At the basic level, it expresses the fact that the order in which different mishnaic opinions 
concerning the same issue are quoted is irrelevant. In those cases, it is usually employed to contest a rival 
talmudic interpretation that is based on the specific order of a succession of mishnaic statements. Emden is 
using this passage in an unexpected manner and employs it to mean that there is no comprehensive, logical 
order in the way in which the oral law is studied. 




source. The apparent lack of order in halakhic texts reflects its divine essence, and, 
therefore, any attempt to change this order and suggest a better one is, in a sense, a loss of 
the divine organizational scheme. 
Codes such as Shulḥan Arukh, while providing an ordered way of collecting 
halakhic texts, do not pose the greatest threat to Yaveẓ’s worldview. As the discussion in 
chapter one of this dissertation pointed out, Shulḥan Arukh is complete and comprehensive, 
and its imposition of an overall structure requires uniformity of all the sources; however, 
the code lists the legal conclusions along with references to the sources of the law, thus 
enabling the scholar to return to the original locations of the halakha in its prior order. As 
Elhanan Reiner has pointed out, this attribute eventually neutralized the definitive character 
of the Shulḥan Arukh, as it invited new layers of glosses that questioned the legal 
conclusions by revisiting the sources.1397 The Shulḥan Arukh thus left open the option that 
it was not the last word on Jewish law, thereby softening its monopoly. 
The Shulḥan Arukh, likewise, does not pose the greatest threat in its theological 
implications, as its overall organizational scheme does not suggest an alternative system. 
The logic driving the succession of laws and topics in the Shulḥan Arukh is largely 
associative and intuitive, but it does not, as a scheme, imply a theological statement about 
Jewish law. At most, it is a practical configuration of halakha; at worst, for Yaveẓ, it is a 
shallow and limited work, whose results are similar to interpretations of the law based 
solely on the required authoritative sources, without including the fuller, richer array of 
                                                     
1397 Elhanan Reiner, “The Ashkenazi élite at the beginning of the modern era: Manuscript versus 
printed text,” Polin 10 (1997), 97-98. 




halakhic texts. In the words of Yaveẓ, the Shulḥan Arukh is not a serious threat because it 
does not list the laws “from the halakhic foundations to their secondary consequences” but 
simply provides conclusions that are “not organized in a logical progression.” The structure 
is merely functional, reflecting a practical view of halakha as a legal system, and it is clear 
that the work could have been structured differently.1398 
 Yaveẓ posits a world in which the disorder of halakhic texts does not reflect a lack 
of intellectual or scholarly resources or an insufficiently methodological approach but, 
rather, provides the very proof of its divine essence. Having dismissed the Shulḥan Arukh 
to some extent, he has one remaining problem: Maimonides’ Mishne Torah, the medieval 
work of Jewish law, which my introductory chapter placed at the very furthest codification-
end of the compilation-codification spectrum. Mishne Torah does precisely what Yaveẓ 
describes as impossible and undesirable; it organizes laws at the talmudic textual level of 
the sources in a manner that is geared towards the final halakhic decision while leaving out 
any source references. Maimonides thus made it difficult to retrace his steps and critique 
his conclusion and enabled him to present the organization as self-evident.1399 Most 
disturbingly, Maimonides’ organization departs radically from the heterogeneous, 
associative, flexible order of the Talmud: he thus presents an alternative philosophy of 
                                                     
1398 Menachem Elon characterizes Arba Turim as the “middle way” between the extremely 
codificatory Mishne Torah, on the one hand, and the expansive and inconclusive Talmud, on the other. See 
Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. Bernard Auerbach and Melvin J. Sykes 
(Philadelphia: JPS, 1994), 3:1286. 
1399 This critique was aimed at Maimonides’ work from its inception. See, for instance, Moshe 
Halbertal, “Sefer ha-miẓvot la-Rambam: ha-arkhitektura shel ha-halakha ve-ha teoria ha-parshanit shela” 
(Maimonides’ Book of Commandments: The architecture of the halakhah and its theory of interpretation) 
Tarbiẓ  59: 3-4 (1990): 457-480. 




halakha, beginning with “the foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all wisdom,”1400 
the recognition of a monotheistic God, and progressing from there to a system of laws 
according to which the code is arranged. As such, Mishne Torah is the ideal code. Yaveẓ’s 
attack on this code, hidden in the parentheses of a responsum (regarding, of all things, a 
man missing one testicle) reveals the source of his resistance and a formulation of the value 
of disorder in halakha.1401 
 Yaveẓ relates to Maimonides’ Mishne Torah in an aside that he places in 
parentheses. The length of this remark – the passage is almost an entire column long – as 
well as its intensity – it includes a section of short and rhetorically very strong rhymed 
sentences – however, belies the impression that this is a mere aside. In this remark, Yaveẓ 
grudgingly admits that Maimonides has indeed “been wise”1402 and has somehow 
succeeded in composing an organized codification; he uses the ambivalent “hitḥakhem” 
which is more akin to “outsmarting.” Yaveẓ qualifies this even further, bestowing the 
halfhearted benediction “may he, too, be blessed” on Maimonides, the words used by Isaac 
to add a blessing for Esau after already having given away the genuine birthright to 
                                                     
1400 These are the first words of the first law in Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Sefer ha-mada (Book 
of knowledge/science): Hilkhot yesodei ha-Torah (Laws of the foundations of Torah), §1. 
1401 On Yaveẓ problematic stance towards Maimonides as a rationalist philosopher, including the 
attempt to claim that Maimonides was not the author of the philosophical work Guide for the Perplexed and 
the historical context of the Guide’s surge in popularity in the 18th century, such as the printing of a new 
edition in 1742 for the first time in almost two centuries, see Jacob J Schacter, Rabbi Jacob Emden: Life and 
Major Works (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 545-570. 
On the scientific and medical context of Igeret bikoret, see Maoz Kahana, “Ha-mahapekha ha-
mada’it ve-kidud mekorot ha-yeda: Refua, halakha, ve-alkhimia, Hamburg-Altona, 1736” (The scientific 
revolution and the codification of sources of knowledge: Medicine, halakha and alchemy, Hamburg-Altona, 
1736) Tarbiẓ 22, no. 1 (2014): 165-212. 
1402 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
יכה לכך... גם ברוך יהיה לזכר עולם יהיה...ואחריו ואע״פ שהתחכם הרמב״ם ז״ל ...לא שהלכה כן אלא הוראת שעה הצר
  לעשות כמעשהו כי נורא הוא ומי יכילנו.  לא קם כמוהו




Jacob.1403 He explains that Mishne Torah was written as a hora’at sha’a, a temporary 
breach of the law that is permitted in a state of emergency.1404 The success of Maimonides’ 
project, Yaveẓ explains, is nothing short of a miracle: “it is great and terrible, who can 
abide it,”1405 and nobody after Maimonides, he promises, would ever be capable of 
producing anything similar.1406 
 Having explained the truly exceptional and irreproducible nature of Maimonides’ 
codification, Yaveẓ notes that even this near perfect code had its defects: Maimonides’ 
structure does not cover every halakhic item perfectly. Yaveẓ points to the Magid Mishne 
(Rabbi Vidal de Toulouse, ca. 1350), a commentator of Mishne Torah, who, in his 
introduction to one of Maimonides’ chapters, commented on some of the potential pitfalls 
of Maimonides’ choice of organization. In the beginning of the Magid Mishne’s gloss of 
Maimonides’ laws of the Sabbath, he writes that Maimonides: 
 …in his eagerness to preserve the order had to change in some places a few laws 
so that they could be introduced into different issues according to the straight order in 
which his writings were divided and arranged ... and I already saw some who were 
proficient in his books and did not sense this … meaning, that the inquirer would look at a 
law in one place, finding it discussed in an incomplete manner, without its complementary 
parts and was confused by this….1407 
                                                     
1403 Genesis 27:33. ...גם ברוך יהיה לזכר עולם יהיה 
1404 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
 לא שהלכה כן אלא הוראת שעה הצריכה לכך...
The permission for such breaches for the sake of protecting the Torah is interpreted from the verse 
in Psalms 119: 126, עת לעשות לה' הפרו תורתיך - (It is a time to act for the Lord, Your Torah has been destroyed), 
which is reformulated to mean “It is a time to act for the Lord by breaching your Torah,” thus permitting 
problematic breaches in times of emergency, in order to protect religion. Not coincidentally, one of the classic 
examples of such a permissible temporary breach is also related to textual transmission. It is deployed in the 
Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Tmurah 14b, and it relates to the decision to put the oral Torah down in writing 
because it was at risk of being forgotten. 
1405 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a:כי נורא הוא ומי יכילנו  – alludes to Joel 2: 11, about the day of Judgment: 
“The day of the Lord is great and terrible; who can endure it.” כי גדול יום ה' ונורא מי יכילנו 
1406 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: ואחריו לא קם כמוהו לעשות כמעשהו... 
1407 Vidal de Toulouse, Magid Mishne on Mishne Torah, ed. Shabtai Frankel (Jerusalem: Keter 
press, 1975), 2: 3. 




Yaveẓ emphasizes Magid Mishne’s allusion to the frustration expressed by 
prominent scholars when they failed to find a certain law in what seemed like its 
appropriate place, cases where “it was sometimes difficult for some scholars to find their 
way in his marvelously ordered book.”1408 Yaveẓ regards these blunders and omissions as 
signs. Apparently, he considers that the unfolding of halakhic textual organization in 
history and the contingencies of its transmission communicate something essential about 
Jewish law. He describes these failures as a type of triumph: “It seems that the divine 
wisdom cunningly brought this about, that she was not to be fenced in, in keeping with the 
legal division and the gradation, like the works of the other – human – wisdoms, which 
progress from principle to offshoot, from cause to effect….”1409 
This rational system, Yaveẓ maintains, is in essence, mismatched with the halakhic 
sources, which express divine knowledge. His structure holds together two different levels 
of knowledge – one that contains the rational truth and another, deeper one that contains 
                                                     
His example is RaShbA (Rabbi Shlomo ben Adret), who criticizes Maimonides for mentioning only 
the case in which sailing on Shabbat is permitted, without specifying when it is prohibited. The Magid Mishne 
explains that this is untrue, Maimonides did mention the prohibition, but he did so in a separate location in 
order to keep the organizational scheme intact. This separation led to confusion for RaShbA, and, Magid 
Mishne adds, “there are many more such similar cases.” 
רת הסדר היה לשנות בקצת מקומות קצת דינין להיות לכל אחד מהן מבוא בענינים חלוקים כפי החלוקה מהפלגת רבינו בשמי
הישרה שנחלקו מאמריו ונסדרו,...וכבר ראיתי למי שהיה בקי בספריו שלא הרגיש בנמשך אחרי זה, רצוני לומר שבהיות לדין אחד 
לק השני במקומו האחר, ויעיין המעיין בדין ההוא וימצאהו במקום אחד מבוא בשני ענינים יבאר רבנו חלק אחד במקומו הראוי לו והח
 מבלתי שלמות חלקיו ויתמה על זה. 
וכבר נמשך זה אצל הרב הגדול ר' שלמה בן אדרת ז"ל שכתב בספר עבודת הקודש בדין הפלגה בספינה דבר ז"ל: 'ראיתיו 
כמבריח איסורו שכך כתב בפכ"ד (הל' ו') 'מפליגין לים הגדול לדבר מצוה...' כתב היתר דבר מצוה ולא כתב איסור שלא במקום מצוה 
אסור שלא במקום מצוה' עכ"ל. ורבינו כתב דין זה על השלמות, פ"ל (הל' י"ג). וכיוצא בו והניחו במשמע במכלל היתר במקום מצוה 
 יש הרבה. 
1408 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
ואעפ"כ הוקשה לכמה גדולים למצוא הדרך בספרו הנפלא בסידורו כמו שהעיד המ"מ בפתיחת הל' שבת כי עמוק עמוק מי 
 ימצאנו.
1409 Ibid.: 
להית שלא תגדר בשמירת החלוקה המשפטית והדרגה כחיבור שאר החכמות האנושיות -זה החכמה האכמדומה שהערימה ב
 ההולכות מן הקודם אל המאוחר מהסיבה אל המסובב.




the divine truth. The rational truth is accessible and human – it “lacks any inner meaning 
different from the exterior one”1410; it is homogenous and transparent. Rational knowledge, 
being fundamentally human, is permeable to the human intellect, which allows it to be 
organized in a rational manner, “from principle to offshoot, from cause to effect.” 
According to Yaveẓ, Maimonides’ organization of halakhic knowledge uprooted these 
sources from their original order, in which dual levels of meaning could be maintained 
simultaneously, and it repositioned them according to its shallow exoteric aspects alone. 
Divine knowledge, however, can never fully be penetrated. Unlike divine truth, 
Yaveẓ explains, rational truth “is made of one piece. It does not speak one thing from its 
mouth while meaning another in its heart.”1411 This expression, which refers to insincerity 
and  usually has a negative connotation, is mobilized here to praise the multiplicity of 
meanings that can be contained in divine texts. This divine knowledge, which he alludes 
to in the feminine, is equivocal and deceptive: “She” may seem quite clear and 
comprehensive on the surface, but she purposefully veils herself. Beneath the covering, 
countless levels of secrets lie hidden. The divine truth is, by its very essence, impossible to 
comprehend in rational terms. As Yaveẓ explains, she hides herself behind a mysterious 
logic in order to reveal herself only to the chosen ones: “…because her face is covered, and 
she is concealed from her head to her feet. Her hems are not revealed to those unworthy of 
her. It is hidden for the righteous…”1412 
                                                     
1410 Ibid.: 
  בהיותם משוללים מכוונה אחרת פנימים בלתי הנגלית, היא כסותם לבדה העצמית. כי מעשה ידי אדם הם... 
1411 Emden, Igeret bikoret, 16a: 
  כי מעשה ידי אדם הם. כחומר מקשה הם ולא ידברו אחת בפה ואחת בלב חמדה גנוזה. משא דבר ה׳ הוא אשר חזה.
1412 Ibid: 




 Maimonides came close to subverting this inner anti-logic by organizing the 
Torah’s laws in a manner that, against all odds, managed to emerge as surprisingly 
complete and comprehensive. Yaveẓ sees this organizational enterprise as defeating the 
essence of the Torah. Although he praises Maimonides for taking this necessary task upon 
himself because of an urgent situation and succeeding, he regards Mishne Torah as a deeply 
problematic project. These parenthetical remarks continue, seguing seamlessly from his 
critique of Maimonides to a more general discussion of natural versus divine knowledge. 
Although human knowledge has a purpose when it comes to the study of natural 
phenomena, those who study nature merely scratch the surface of the appearances of 
empirical evidence. 
 ... she [reason, embodied by the treacherous woman] has overstepped the bounds. 
Seething, she will step venomously and walk. An overly big step with a haughty air, she 
goes naked and barefoot, floating above the waters of inquiry, touching the accidental but 
not the essence and core of the thing. Therefore, the inquirer will eat the bread of his 
intellect with the sweat of his brow. Because he will not fulfill his needs. And if he speaks 
of secret and hidden issues all day, do not pay any attention to his words.1413 
 
What started out as subtle criticism of Maimonides’ choice of a logical order for 
Mishne Torah led Yaveẓ into a direct attack on rational thought as a sufficient tool for 
comprehending the world. He who relies on his own reason to process the gleanings of 
knowledge is doomed to “eat the bread of his intellect with the sweat of his brow,” just like 
man, who was expelled from paradise, where the tree of divine knowledge grew, into a 
mundane existence. Beyond attacking those who have excessive confidence in the human 
                                                     
כי כסתה פניה והסתירה מראשה עד רגליה לא נגלו שוליה. לבלתי ראוים אליה. יצפון לישרים תושיע לרוב הודיע למבקשיה 
  ואוצרותיהם ימלא עשרות מונים. לא עשה כן לכל גוי...ככסף וכמטמונים. להנחיל אוהביו יש 
1413 Ibid.:  אז תפשני מדי עברה גבולה בזעם תצעד ארש ותפסיעה. פסיעה גסה ברוח יתיר' (יהירה?) הלוך ערום ויחף
מילא קוצר מרחף על פני מי החקירה נוגע במקרים ואינו נוגע בעצם הדבר ומהותו. על כן יאכל החוקר לחם תבונתו בזעם אפו. שלא 
 כפו. ואם כל היום דבר כמו"ס וסו"ד ירבה. אל תשמע ואל תאבה.




intellect, his strongest criticism is reserved for those who maintain that halakha – divine 
knowledge itself – can be entirely penetrated by means of rational inquiry. 
Yaveẓ applies the same manner of thinking about the world and its phenomena to 
halakhic texts: The lack of apparent structure in the order of halakhic texts is, in fact, 
essential to its esoteric layers stemming from its divine nature, which, by virtue of its 
essence, cannot be structured fully by human logic. For this reason, halakhic texts must be 
studied in their own (irrational) order. Reordering these sources places one at risk of losing 
the truth contained within. Consequently, Maimonides’ project, which comes close to 
proving that halakha can be codified successfully, was so threatening to him. Divine 
wisdom, however, managed, cunningly, to resist codification. The Torah, Yaveẓ maintains, 
defies any rational systematization, preserving its secrets for those who truly love her. He 
emphasizes this using the phrase “The secret of God [belongs/goes] to those who fear 
Him.”1414 This verse from Psalms appears in a famous midrash which is about halakha, 
transmission, and concealment versus – what else? – textuality: 
 Rabbi Judah ben Pazi said... “Write for you these things,”1415 this is the 
Written Torah, “For according to (lit. “on the mouth”) of these things,”1416 this is the 
translation that was given orally. [...] Rabbi Judah bar Shalom said: Moses asked that the 
Mishna, too, should be in writing, and God foresaw that, in the future, the gentiles will 
translate the Bible and read it in Greek and they will say “we are [them of] Israel,” so God 
said to him “I will write him [only] the majority of my Torah and if so, they will be seen 
as strangers.”1417 And to this extent, why? Because the Mishna is the mystery of God, and 
God only transmits his mysteries to the righteous men, as it says “The secret of God to 
those who fear Him”1418 
                                                     
1414 Psalms 25:14, סוד ה׳ ליריאו 
1415 Exodus 34: 27. 
1416 Exodus 34: 27. 
1417 Hosea 8: 12. 
1418 Midrash tanḥuma, Vayera §5: 
 שנתן תרגום הרי האלה הדברים פ"ע כי בכתב שנתנה התורה הרי האלה הדברים את לך כתב שנאמר... פזי בן יהודה ר"א 
 ולהיות התורה את לתרגם עתידין שאומות ה"הקב וצפה, בכתב היא אף המשנה שתהא משה בקש שלום בר יהודה ר"א... פה על





In this sense, Yaveẓ can be considered to represent the remnants of an older, 
ashkenazic, approach to Jewish law, an approach that maintained that “all the holy books 
need one another” and that viewed codification as inherently opposed to the very divine 
aspects of halakha: “For the paths of Torah are meandering ones,” and these meanderings, 
these traces of disorder, outwitting even the treatment of the best of codifiers, was the proof 
of its transcendent origins. 
 
                                                     
 מפני למה כ"וכ נחשבו זר כמו כ"וא תורתי רובי לו אכתב למשה ה"הקב ל"א, ישראל של הן אנו אומרין והן יונית אותה קוראין
  ליראיו’ ה סוד שנאמר לצדיקים אלא שלו מסטורין מוסר ה"הקב ואין ה"הקב של מסטורין היא המשנהש
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